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Abstract 
The premise of this dissertation is that Article 79 of the UN 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods-which 
concerns exemptions for contractual non-performance due to an 
"impediment" beyond a party's control-should be interpreted 
autonomously, that is, as an international norm, without reference to 
domestic legal concepts and principles. To this end, this dissertation 
considers the application of Article 79 by courts and arbitral tribunals across 
a number of signatory states. By studying the treatment of Article 79 by the 
courts and arbitral tribunals of various states, differences in doctrine and 
case law have been discerned. The extent of conceptual differences towards 
the doctrine of excuses for nonperformance also helps to determine whether 
the CISG's goal of uniformity is achievable. This research concludes that 
there has been a convergence in the treatment of Article 79, and this 
supports the premise that a legal doctrine-in this case, the excuse for non-
performance-germinating in various legal systems, ultimately evolved into 
an autonomous principle, towards a conceptual goal of uniformity in a body 
of international commercial law, regardless of its unique development in 
separate and distinct legal jurisdictions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE QUEST FOR A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 
A. The Quest for Uniformity 
The objective of this dissertation is to determine the extent to which a problematic 
legal doctrine-the excuse for nonperformance, as embodied in Article 79 of the 1980 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG" or 
"Convention") 1-is an autonomous2 international norm, and capable of relative 
uniformity within the context of the CISG's goal for a sales law that is transnational in 
design. A premise that will be explored is that while excuses for non-performance in 
Article 79 may have developed out of an amalgamation of similar national conceptions, it 
ultimately stands alone as an autonomous international doctrine under the CISG. This 
development plays a crucial role for uniformity in international sales law. It supports the 
idea that individual domestic or national legal doctrines may ultimately coalesce into 
autonomous international principles, regardless of their distinctive development in 
independent legal jurisdictions. 
The CISG was created with the intention to unify through harmonization the 
commercial sale of goods law throughout the world. In the development of the CISG by 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), and its 
1 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, April 11, 1980, 1489 
U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671, hereinafter cited as the "CISG" or "Convention." 
2 
"Autonomous" comes from the Greek words auto meaning "independent" and nomos meaning "law". In 
this paper "autonomous" refers to a concept or action that is self-contained and undertaken or conducted 
without outside control-it exists and develops independently of the whole, and lives outside the 
environment of state-based law. 
2 
subsequent adoption at a Diplomatic Conference in Vienna-which was attended by legal 
experts from across the world-the CISG managed to survive the typical regional and 
political divisions that frequently divide UN bodies. In effect since 1988, the CISG 
prescribes a uniform law for the international sale of goods for all signatory states. It 
seeks to replace the numerous domestic laws that govern this area in each country with a 
single law that transcends3 a variety of legal systems and national borders. It is the most 
ambitious attempt thus far to create an international sale of goods law that is relatively 
uniform across the signatory states. 
As of May 1, 2012, the CISG has been adopted by 78 countries, 4 making it the 
world's preeminent sales law. It is estimated that the signatory states to the CISG now 
represent over 70 percent5 of all world trade, and it is, arguably, one of the most 
successful international conventions to date.6 Given the unprecedented growth of global 
3 In strict terms, no international law is able to "transcend" a national border. The term "transcend" as used 
here means to cross multiple state boundaries and to have a law apply within a variety of legal jurisdictions. 
4 According to the Pace Law School CISG website at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html. The signatory states, in alphabetical order are: 
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Burundi, Canada, Chile, China (PRC), Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint 
Vincent & the Grenadines, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, and 
Zambia. Significant exceptions include Brazil, Indonesia, India, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom. 
5 Franco Ferrari, "Forward" in Franco Ferrari, ed., The 1980 Uniform Sales Law: Old Issues Revisited in 
the Light of Recent Experiences (Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 2003) at v. 
6 See Monica Kilian, "CISG and the Problems with Common Law Jurisdictions," (2001) 10 J. Transnat'l L. 
& Pol'y 217 at 217 who states: "[g]enerally applauded as the most successful international treaty so far". 
See also Camilla Baasch Andersen, who notes that the CISG "is constantly gaining more success as more 
countries choose to ratify it" in "Furthering the Uniform Application of the CISG: Sources of Law on the 
Internet," (1998) 10 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 403 at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/andersenl.html 
[hereinafter Andersen, "Uniform Application"] and Clayton P. Gillette and Robert E. Scott, who state "the 
CISG has become the most successful of efforts to create uniform commercial law" in "The Political 
3 
trade in the last few decades, and the importance of the CISG in international 
transactions, an examination of the extent to which the CISG has succeeded in its stated 
objective to "promote uniformity"7 in international sales law requires further study. Such 
an analysis is driven, in part, by critics of the CISG who maintain that the benefits of 
uniform international sales law is minimal, and that domestic courts are invariably guilty 
of the homeward trend8 or domestic gloss9 analysis. Such a nationalistic approach tends 
to view and interpret the CISG through the lens of domestic legal concepts, contrary to 
the ideals of uniformity. As J.S. Hobhouse noted, international conventions "lack 
coherence and consistency. They create problems about their scope. They introduce 
uncertainty where no uncertainty existed before. They probably deprive the law of those 
very features [that make it] an effective tool for the use of international commerce". 10 
But such a perspective is misguided. Having domestic courts interpret an 
international instrument will always raise concerns about the degree and extent of 
ethnocentricity in their decisions. Added to this concern is the fact that international 
conventions, such as the CISG, are not comprehensive legal codes. Gaps will exist, but 
this does not mean that the law will be made "in a piecemeal fashion". 11 Being an 
Economy oflnternational Sales Law," (2005) NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-02 at 1 at 
SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=709242>. 
7 Article 7 (1). 
8 The terms "homeward trend" and "domestic gloss" are discussed in Larry A. DiMatteo et al., 
International Sales Law: A Critical Analysis of CISG Jurisprudence (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). See also Harry M. Flechtner, "The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: 
Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 
7(1)" (1998) 17 J. L. & Com. 187. 
9 See DiMatteo ibid. 
10 J.S. Hobhouse, "International Conventions and Commercial Law: The Pursuit of Uniformity" (1990) 106 
Law Q. Rev. 530 at 533, 
11 Ibid. at 532. 
4 
incomplete law can also be a positive feature of a convention. 12 As Louis Marquis noted: 
"contrary to appearances, expanded and fragmented uniform law appears to be eminently 
practical. It is capable of identifying the true issues, the actual problematic and most · 
likely components of a solution" .13 Gaps in uniform laws provide for minor variation 
(i.e. relative uniformity) in the application of the Convention in domestic courts, but there 
is no substantial alteration of the law from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. If there were, 
choice oflaw rules would significantly alter the legal outcomes of disputes, and would 
render attempts at harmonization and unification as superfluous. Thus, uniformity is not 
just a "Utopian ideal", and international conventions, which are the results of "multi-
cultural compromises between different schemes of law", are able to produce uniform 
results. 14 
A. i. Dissertation Structure 
Chapter One provides an introduction to the problem of the quest for uniformity 
in international sales law, and considers the role of Article 79 within this broader 
framework. It also situates this dissertation within the scholarly debates regarding 
uniform sales law efforts generally. 
Uniformity in international sales law facilitates global trade by reducing legal 
barriers and, hence, making the trading process more efficient for market participants. 
This will be highlighted in the next section of this Chapter. In the chapter sections that 
12 Bruno Zeller makes this important point in his CISG and the Unification of International Trade Law 
(New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) at 9-11. In his words: "Being incomplete-a quality!" 
13 Louis Marquis, International Uniform Commercial Law: Towards a Progressive Consciousness 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2005) at 236. 
14 Ibid. at 533. 
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follow, it will also be demonstrated how the CISG came to be the most ambitious legal 
convention to date that has attempted to create an international legal environment for 
commercial sales that is relatively uniform in character (section A.iii.)~ -The focus will be 
on the CISG as a whole. Next (sections A.iv. and A.v.), the role of Article 79 as a 
specific example of the quest for relative uniformity in international sales law will be 
examined in more detail. As an exception to the principle of pacta sunt servanda, Article 
79 is of considerable importance. It is also a provision within the CISG that bears prima 
facie semblance to similar domestic legal concepts. This makes it uniquely suitable for a 
scholarly examination to consider the extent to which it diverges or converges with 
similar domestic conceptions in the quest for uniformity in international sales law. 
That uniformity in international sales law is even possible has been the subject of 
much scholarly debate. This discussion, which has been passionate at times, is reviewed 
in some detail in section B. The Research Problem is detailed in section C and the 
Methodology follows in section D. 
Chapter Two provides a background to the CISG, and it includes a discussion of 
the ancient and modem lex mercatoria. The chapter concludes with a section on the 
history of the. CISG, demonstrating the effort of the drafters to create a transnational sales 
law with neutral legal terminology, hence, the development of an autonomous provision 
in Article 79. 
Chapter Three details the development of force majeure-type legal principles 
from their ancient origins to the rise of pacta sunt servanda and its counterpart rebus sic 
stantibus. It also surveys the development of frustration and impossibility in the common 
law, andforce majeure in civil law jurisdictions. It concludes by demonstrating how 
Article 79 developed as an autonomous legal principle as it bridged the gap between 
tliese common law and civil law conceptions of excuse for non-performance. 
6 
Chapter Four analyses a large body of Article 79 case law. These court and 
arbitral decisions, while not always perfect, have made a significant contribution to a 
growing convergence on Article 79. The conclusion is that these decisions have been 
rendered, for the most part, without reference to domestic legal concepts. In other words, 
they are relatively uniform, autonomous interpretations of Article 79. By contrast, 
Chapter Five considers a much smaller body of Article 79 case law that has been 
influenced by the homeward trend. These decisions have led to divergent interpretations 
of that provision. In spite of a number of disappointing decisions, this dissertation 
concludes by noting that courts are becoming more serious in applying the CISG's 
interpretive methodology. Such a development will only led to more relatively uniform 
decisions on Article 79 in the future. 
A. ii. The Importance of Uniformity 
Uniform sales law facilitates international trade. It does so by creating the legal 
conditions that are favourable to this commercial activity. 15 Domestic law is still 
relevant, and must work in conjunction with the CISG. The two types of law are not 
mutually exclusive, but have a symbiotic relationship. International commerce is best 
served and supported by domestic legal regimes that are sensitive to the needs of 
merchants who frequently cross national borders. This requires a sales law that is 
15 This point is argued in Marquis, ibid. at 13.ff. 
7 
universally applicable and unrestricted by national boundaries. Globalization and 
international commerce eschew national borders. 
Within this context, the. terms "unify" and "harmonization" have· been subject to 
some academic scrutiny. 16 While the terms are related, there is an important distinction 
to be made. "Harmonization" is the first step towards "unification". To harmonize 
international sales law is to make this body of law similar; to unify this body of law is to 
make it identical across borders. In this study, the term "unify" (and its variants) is not to 
be interpreted narrowly. Rather, it is used to denote a form of "relative uniformity," 
which must be differentiated from "absolute" or "strict uniformity." It is closer to the 
concept of "functional uniformity" and "harmonization" in that the goal is to lessen the 
legal impediments to international trade through a sales law that is common to all trading 
parties. 17 
In spite of the desire to create uniform law, my previous research18 on the CISG 
revealed that problems still exist with efforts to implement uniform international sales 
law-at least in certain jurisdictions. This research examined Canadian jurisprudence 
and the CISG across a variety of substantive law issues. In exploring six key Canadian 
16 See e.g. Larry A. DiMatteo et al., (2004) "The Interpretive Tum in International Sales Law: An Analysis 
ofFifteen Years ofCISG Jurisprudence," 34 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. J. 299, at 309-10. See also Charles 
Sukurs, "Harmonizing the Battle of the Forms: A Comparison of the United States, Canada, and the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods," (2001) 34 Vand. J. ofTransnat'l L. 
1481, at 1500-503 (Sukurs utilizes the term "vertical uniformity," which is similar to the concepts of 
"relative uniformity," "functional uniformity," and "harmonization"). 
17 Sukurs, ibid. 
18 Peter J. Mazzacano, "Canadian Jurisprudence and the Uniform Application of the U.N. Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods" Pace Int'l L. Rev. (ed.), Pace Review of the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (2005-2006) (Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 
2006) at 85-151 [Canadian Jurisprudence] and Peter J. Mazzacano, "Brown & Root Services v. Aerotech 
Herman Nelson: The Continuing Plight of the U.N. Sales Convention in Canada" in Pace Int'l L. Rev. 
(ed.), Pace Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (2004-2005) 
(Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 2006) at 169-178 [Brown & Root]. 
8 
CISG cases within the context of the quest for uniformity in international sales law, it 
found that Canadian courts had failed to utilize the interpretative methodology embedded 
. within the CISG. Instead ofrecognizing the Convention's "international character" and-· 
"the need to promote uniformity in its application," Canadian courts typically invoked 
parochial common law language and concepts, and domestic case law. 19 At the 
international level, this contributes to conflicting and diverging interpretations of the 
Convention's rules. These interpretations are also antithetical to the purposes and general 
principles of the CISG, and the effort to create, in the words of some scholars, a new lex 
mercatoria.20 Should such a trend continue on a broader scale among the Convention's 
signatory states, the goal of the CISG-to create a uniform international sales law-
might ultimately fail. 
A.iii. The CISG's Quest to Promote Uniformity 
A primary objective of the CISG is to standardize international sales law across 
national boundaries. To this end, the preamble of the CISG introduces the concept of 
uniformity. It states, inter alia, the desire to remove "legal barriers in international trade" 
and to promote "the development of international trade". 21 The objective of uniformity 
further permeates the CISG by way of Article 7(1 ), which states, "in the interpretation of 
this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to 
promote uniformity[ ... ] in international trade".22 Although the goal of uniformity may 
19 Article 7(1). 
20 See e.g. Bernardo M. Cremades and Colin Kaufman, "The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization 
of the Laws oflntemational Commercial Transactions" (1984) 2 B.U. Int'l L.J. 317. 
21 Preamble. 
22 Article 7(1). 
9 
be commendable, in practice, has this objective been elusive? Considering that the CISG 
is practiced in about 50 different languages, with signatory nations having diverse social, 
economic; and cultural"environments, the goal of uniformity would appear to be 
ambitious.23 To create further difficulties in the quest of a uniform international law, 
there are great differences in the legal systems of each signatory state as, for example, 
between common law and civil law regimes. Even within a major legal system, there is a 
variable state of law as, for example, nuances in the treatment of the common law in 
Canada, compared to its handling in England and the United States. Additional 
complications arise in states with federal systems of law or with hybrid legal systems. 24 
In the quest for uniform international law there are also linguistic or translation 
complexities. The CISG is officially published in six different languages, with each 
version being "equally authentic".25 Against this variegated background is Article 79. 
Unless national courts and arbitral tribunals have an advanced or sophisticated 
understanding of the CISG, recourse to local law and domestic legal concepts would 
seem to be inevitable. 
To reduce the effects of the homeward trend, Article 7(1) suggests that the goal of 
uniformity should impart an obligation upon legal practitioners, tribunals, and courts to 
look to standards of international practice in an interpretation or a determination of 
provisions of the Convention. As Michael J. Bonell noted, courts are to be sensitive to 
23 Andersen, "Uniform Application", supra note 6 at 406. 
24 Canada, the United States, and Mexico are examples of countries with federal systems of law. Canada 
and the United States can also be described as nations with hybrid legal systems. The province of Quebec 
in Canada is a civil law jurisdiction, as is the state of Louisiana in the United States. Both of these 
jurisdictions exist within the broader framework of federal common law legal systems. 
25 Following Article I 01. The six official languages are Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish. 
10 
the international character of the Convention. This "implies the necessity of interpreting 
its terms and concepts autonomously, i.e., in the context of the Convention itself and not 
by referring to the·meaning which might traditionally be attached to· them within a 
particular domestic law". 26 To extrapolate from Bonell' s comment, the courts of all 
signatory nations are obliged to consider the practice and judgments of other countries, a 
form of ipso facto stare decisis.27 Tribunals and courts should not reflexively resort to 
domestic law, unless they are specifically directed to do so under the CISG. As Antonio 
Boggiano notes, "[u]niform law requires[ ... ] a new common law" in which "[f]oreign 
precedents would not be precedents of a foreign law, but of uniform law". 28 This 
statement appears to be in harmony with Lord Scarman's assertion that, "[c]ourts [ ... ] 
have to develop their jurisprudence in company with the courts of other countries".29 
Thus, when a court or tribunal examines an excuse for non-performance in an 
international sales contract under CISG Article 79, international case law should also be 
considered. The corollary is that in the spirit of international uniformity, courts need not 
follow international precedent if it is incorrect or inapplicable. However, there is a 
minimal duty to consider similar cases from international practice if courts are to honour 
the mandate of CISG Article 7(1) and reduce the risk of diverging interpretations of the 
26 M.J. Bonell in C.M. Bianca and M.J. Bonell (eds.), Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 
1980 
Vienna Sales Convention (Milan: Giuffre, 1987) at 74. 
27 This term has been coined by Rene Henschel in "Conformity of Goods in International Sales Governed 
by CISG Article 35: Caveat Venditor, Caveat Emptor and Contract Law as Background Law and as a 
Competing Set of Rules" (2004) 1 Nordic J. Com. L. article 2 at 9. The term "supranational stare decisis" 
has also been used. See Larry A. Dimatteo, "The CISG and the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended 
Contractual Liability in International Business Dealings" (1997) 22 Yale J. Int'l L. 111 at 133. 
28 Antonio Boggiano, "The Experience of Latin American States," International Uniform Law in Practice, 
(New York: Oceana, 1988) 4 7. Italics are in the original. 
29 Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd. (1980), 2 All E.R. 696 at 715 (H.L.). The quote is also available 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/introduction.html#notel>. 
11 
CISG. As Viscount Simonds stated on behalf of the House of Lords, "it would be 
deplorable if the nations should, after protracted negotiations, reach agreement [ ... ] and 
that their several courts should-then disagree as to the meaning of what they appeared to -
agree upon".30 If this were to be the case, it would result in diverging interpretations and 
a homeward trend. The problem with this is that it "deprives the collective signatories of 
the predictability and reliability of law which the CISG was meant to create. In order for 
the CISG to truly live up to the purpose for which it was created, interpreting courts must 
stay within the strict boundaries of Article 7". 31 
A. iv. Uniformity and CISG Article 79 
In any domestic legal regime, it often proves difficult to provide coherent answers 
to problems that arise when, for example, unforeseen supervening events prevent the 
performance of a contract. Instances of war, embargo, acts of terrorism, strikes, or the 
bankruptcy of a supplier all represent various degrees of difficulty and unpredictability. 
Domestic legal regimes may label these events differently-impossibility, hardship, an 
act of God, frustration, force majeure, failure of presupposed conditions, Wegfall der 
Geschiiftsgrundlage, Unmoglichkeit, etc. More importantly, not only are these 
supervening events labeled differently in domestic legal regimes, the conceptual scope of 
each is different. As A.H. Puelinckx noted, "[ f]rustration is not the equivalent of force 
30 Scruttons Ltd. v. Midland Silicones Ltd. (1961), (1962] A.C. 446 at 471 (U.K.). 
31 Marcus G. Larson, "Applying Uniform Sales Law to International Software Transactions: The Use of the 
CISG, its Shortcomings, and a ComparativeLook at How the Proposed U.C.C. Article 2B Would Remedy 
Them", (1996) 5 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 445 at 459. 
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majeure or Unmoglichkeit, nor isforce majeure Unmoglichkeit; evenforce majeure under 
Belgian law is not force majeure under French law". 32 
The legal issuethat this terminological difficultyraises is narrow in.scope: what 
type of unforeseen supervening event excuses a party from contractual performance? 
The answer is fraught with complexities in any domestic legal realm. At the international 
level, the challenge is even greater, particularly for the CISG, which aims to provide for 
the uniform treatment of sales law across national boundaries. Such uniform treatment of 
sales law is crucial to the facilitation of international trade. Non-uniform sales laws and 
differing judicial interpretations lead to forum shopping by litigants. This forces parties 
to first dispute jurisdictional questions of law rather than the merits of the dispute. The 
result is not only an economic inefficiency, but also legal uncertainty. Uniform law 
solves this problem by creating a legal environment that has greater predictability and 
certainty. 
A. v. Article 79 and the Problem of Pacta Sunt Servanda 
The homeward trend presents a particular problem for CISG Article 79. The 
article is of considerable theoretical and practical importance, as it is an exception to the 
basic common law principle of pacta sunt servanda. However, variations of the concept 
of pacta sunt servanda also exist in other legal systems, primarily in the form of the 
general principle that contractual obligations must be honoured.33 For example, in the 
arbitral award in LIAMCO v. Libya the court stated that "[t]he principle of the sanctity of 
32 A.H. Puelinckx, "Frustration, Hardship, Force Majeure, Imprevision, Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, 
Unmoglichkeit, Changed Circumstances" (1986) 3:2 J. Int'l Arb. 47 at 47. 
33 Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v. Libya (1981), 20 I.L.M. 1. 
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contracts[ ... ] has always constituted an integral part of most legal systems. These 
include those systems that are based [on] Roman law, the Napoleonic Code (e.g. article 
1134) and other European civil·codes, as well as Anglo-Saxon Common Law and Islamic 
Jurisprudence 'Shari'a"'.34 As an exception to this principle, Article 79(1) states: "A 
party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the 
failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be 
expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences". 35 
A cursory reading of Article 79(1) reveals that it bears a general resemblance to 
similar contractual performance exemption provisions in various legal regimes.36 For 
example, the words in the article mimic French civil law, which accepts justification or 
excuse for non-performance in the case of a force majeure event, to the extent that the 
event is unforeseen and insurmountable. 37 There is also a related French principle of 
imprevision that allows for contract modification in situations of changed 
circumstances.38 Similarly, under English law the doctrines of frustration and 
impossibility of performance discharge a contract, as well as both parties from 
contractual obligations, by means of the common law and the Law Reform (Frustrated 
34 Ibid. 
35 CISG Article 79(1). 
36 See generally Barry Nicholas, "Force Majeure and Frustration" (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 231. 
37 Dionysios P. Flambouras, "The Doctrines of Impossibility of Performance and clausula rebus sic 
stantibus in the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the 
Principles of European Contract Law: A Comparative Analysis" (2001) 13 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 261 at 265. 
The rule of force majeure is established in Article 1148 of the French Civil Code. 
38 Ingeborg Schwenzer, "Force Majeure and Hardship in International Sales Contracts" (2008) 39 
V.U.W.L.R. 709 at 710. 
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Contracts) Act. 39 In Canada the equivalent corresponds to provincial common law and 
statutory rules, as for example, ss. 7-8 of Ontario's Sale of Goods Act, and the various 
provincial frustrated contracts acts.40 However, in Barry Nicholas' pre-Convention· .· 
comparative study of force majeure and frustration of contract, he warns of a "superficial 
harmony which merely mutes a deeper discord".41 Similarly, Liu Chengwei makes the 
important point that "the concept that a party's contractual obligations can be excused 
because of changes in surrounding circumstances takes a different form in each national 
legal system". 42 On this note, John Honnold reminds us that when reading this article we 
"purge our minds of presuppositions derived from domestic traditions and, with innocent 
eyes, read the language of Article 79 in the light of the practices and needs of 
international trade. "43 The Secretariat of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) made an analogous point, and emphasized that 
the drafters of the CISG "took special care in avoiding the use of legal concepts typical of 
a given legal tradition [ ... ] that would not be easy to transplant in different legal 
39 Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. VI, c. 40, § 1 (U.K.). 
40 The Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 461. According to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 
standardized versions of its Frustrated Contracts Act have been enacted by six provinces (Alberta, British 
Columbia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nunavut, and Ontario), plus the Yukon. See Uniform Law 
Conference of Canada, online at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=3. See e.g. Ontario's Frustrated 
Contracts Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-34. 
41 Nicholas, supra note 36 at 231. 
42 Liu Chengwei, "Remedies for Non-performance - Perspectives from CISG, UNIDROIT Principles and 
PECL" (September, 2003) at s. 19.3.2, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ cisg/biblio/chengwei.html>. 
43 John 0. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention, 4th 
ed., Harry Flechtner, ed., (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2009) at 425 [Honnold & Flechtner, 
ed.]. 
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cultures". 44 The Secretariat elaborated further, and cited Article 79 as a prime example of 
the drafting style embodied in the CISG. It notes that Article 79 "does not refer to terms 
- · · ·typical of the various domestic-systems ·such as 'hardship', 'force majeure' ·or 'Act of -
God'".45 Rather, Article 79 "provides instead a factual description of the circumstances 
that may excuse failure to perform".46 For this reason, it is imperative that Article 79 be 
treated autonomously. 
The focus on Article 79's excuse for non-performance is of paramount importance 
to our understanding of contract law. The article strikes at the core of contract theory and 
practice as it is an exception to the performance of contractual obligations, the pacta 
principle. At the theoretical level, to compel the performance of a promise is a basic and 
universally accepted principle in all legal systems. That a promise should be binding also 
satisfies our ethical and moral expectations. In many respects, pacta sunt servanda is so 
self-evident and such a basic legal norm that it requires little justification or explanation. 
As Christoph Brunner stated, "the value of the contract as a social institution for 
encouraging economic activity would become meaningless if a party's obligation could 
be avoided any time a contract does not tum out as favourably as the party hoped".47 But 
with a change of events, Article 79 assists in distinguishing between those cases where a 
party has simply made a poor bargain from those where there has been such a 
fundamental change in supervening circumstances that the aggrieved party should be 
44 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL: Digest of Case Law 
on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (New York: UN, 2008) at ix para. 4 
[UNCITRAL Digest]. 
45 Ibid. at para. 5. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Christoph Brunner, Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles (The Netherlands: 
Wolters Kluwer, 2009) at 9. 
16 
exempt from liability for contractual non-performance. Such a determination is a 
fundament question of contract law. To address this question, a greater understanding of 
Article 79 can assist parties in defining the border between pacta sunt servanda ·and· rebus 
sic stantibus. In other words, it helps to delineate a true force majeure event. By 
recognizing this boundary, informed contractors will be able to adjust their affairs, and 
will know in advance which party is better equipped to bear the risk of a supervening 
event. This enhances the predictability of otherwise potentially uncertain legal outcomes 
in international business transactions. 
Article 79 is an ambitious attempt to enhance legal predictability in cases of 
supervening events. Indeed, this dissertation will argue that the excuse for contractual 
non-performance embodied in Article 79 goes beyond a generic, factual description of the 
circumstances that excuse performance: it represents an autonomous, international 
standard that is different to related domestic legal doctrines. It is more comprehensive in 
scope than similar concepts in national laws. For example, in some legal systems laws on 
"impossibility" or "impracticability" coexist with those on "frustration".48 Article 79 
goes beyond the scope of associated domestic legal concepts to embrace a wide range of 
excuses for non-performance.49 In Article 79 there is no enumerated restriction in the 
type of excuse that may be utilized. It is a unitary concept of exemption that bridges the 
48 For example, in certain common law jurisdictions, "impossibility", "frustration of purpose", and 
"commercial impracticability" exist side-by-side as contemporaneous legal principles. These principles 
also fall under the broader heading of"frustration". See generally John D. McCamus, The Law of 
Contracts (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 566-611. See also Sonja A. Kruisinga, (Non-)conformity in the 
1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Uniform Concept? (Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2004) at 148 where she notes that in the Dutch legal system, the theory of "impossibility", or 
force majeure, co-exists with the theory of "changed circumstances". 
49 See e.g. Brunner, supra note 47 at 233: "The terms of Article 79 CISG do not include any restriction with 
regard to the scope of application of the force majeure excuse". 
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gap between various civil law and common law conceptions of supervening events. 
Thus, the problem is that when considering an issue under Article 79, important legal 
doctrines, which are more restrictive in scope, such as the common-law's concept of 
frustration of contract, changed circumstances, or impossibility, and the civil law's rough 
equivalent,/orce majeure, imprevision, or cause etrangere, might be subject to divergent 
treatment that is full of domestic gloss. In addition, some domestic laws, such as the 
German civil code, allow the courts to make contract revisions in cases of a supervening 
event, rather than suspending or discharging the contract. 50 Islamic law adds to this 
complexity by introducing various doctrines of excuse for non-performance that are 
based on religious teachings.51 In the interpretation of Article 79, any reference to these 
divergent foundations of domestic law would likely undermine the purpose of the CISG 
to create a uniform body of international sales law. As Peter Schlechtriem stated, it is 
"imperative[ ... ] to treat radically changed circumstances as 'impediments' under Article 
79 in exceptional cases in order to avoid the danger that courts will find a gap in the 
Convention and invoke domestic laws with their widely divergent solutions".52 
B. Critical Scholarly Perspectives on the CISG 
The question of whether uniformity of international sales law is achievable has 
been at the heart of considerable scholarly debate. The question is also at the heart of this 
so Burgerliches Gesetzbuch s. 313 ["BGB']. See also Hannes Rosier, "Hardship in German Codified 
Private Law - In Comparative Perspective to English, French and International Contract Law" (2007) 15 
E.R.P.L. 483 at 485. 
st David R. Rivkin, "Lex Mercatoria and Force Majeure", in Emmanuel Gaillard (ed.), Transnational Rules 
in International Commercial Arbitration (Paris: ICC Puhl. No. 480, 4, 1993) 161 at 193. 
s2 Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law - The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (Vienna: Manz, 1986) at 102 footnote 422a. 
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dissertation because an analysis of Article 79 case law should show that there is a 
growing body of relatively uniform jurisprudence on that provision. This debate 
generally falls "into three ·broader areas of inquiry: i) excuses for the non-performance of 
contractual obligations within the context of the CISG and international commercial law; 
ii) the quest for uniformity in CISG jurisprudence generally; and, iii) Article 79 and its 
contribution towards to goal of uniformity in international sales law. 
Academic literature on the latter two categories will focus on the relative success 
or failure that the CISG has experienced in general, and more specifically with Article 79, 
in the development and implementation of a uniform international sales law. A review of 
scholarly commentary on the former area will demonstrate that the concept of excuses for 
non-performance embodied in Article 79 is influenced by similar conceptions in various 
legal systems. A premise of this dissertation, however, is that while excuses for non-
performance in Article 79 may have developed out of an amalgamation of similar 
national conceptions, it ultimately stands alone as an autonomous international doctrine 
under the CISG. This development plays a crucial role for uniformity in international 
sales law. It supports the premise that individual domestic legal doctrines may ultimately 
coalesce into autonomous international principles, regardless of their distinctive 
development in independent legal jurisdictions. 
i) The Quest for Uniformity in CISG Jurisprudence Generally 
The broadest question to be addressed in this dissertation is whether the CISG's 
goal of uniformity is achievable. While this question will be specifically addressed 
through a close examination of Article 79 case law, there has been a lively scholarly 
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debate on the relative success, or failure, of the CISG to promote uniformity in 
international sales law. Generally, this criticism appeared to be particularly strong in the 
early years of the Convention. fa words that appear to foretell the debate on the quest for 
uniformity, R.J .C. Munday in an early 1978 article, noted long before the CISG became 
effective that, "even when outward uniformity [is] achieved [ ... ] uniform application of 
the agreed rules [is] by no means guaranteed, as in practice different countries almost 
inevitably[ ... ] put different interpretations upon the same enacted words".53 The open-
textured nature of the CISG, combined with its attempt to strike a balance among 
different legal systems, and a variety of competing national interests, led some academics 
to charge that the Convention was too ambiguous to be of practical use. As Munday' s 
article foreshadows, much of this debate surrounds the wording within the Convention 
itself. 
While Munday is skeptical of the ability of the CISG to make a significant impact 
on uniform international sales law, Arthur Rosett, writing in 1984, initially views the 
CISG as a product, not only as a "monumental achievement" for uniform law, but also as 
a document that makes a positive political statement, benefiting humankind . 54 It does 
this by "giving concrete form to hopes for one peaceful family of nations living under a 
compatible legal order". 55 In his article56 Rosett begins by suggesting that the CISG may 
be a beacon of hope for the unification effort. He tells us that it is the product of more 
53 R.J.C. Munday, "The Uniform Interpretation oflnternational Conventions", (1978) 27 Int'l & Comp. 
L.Q. 450 at 450. 
54 Arthur Rosett, "Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods" (1984) 45 Ohio St. L.J. 265 at 265-266. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. at 267. 
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than 50 years of international negotiation, "which has produced a document unanimously 
approved by delegations representing sixty-two national legal systems". 57 Since its 
adoption, the CISG has also received "the approval of groups of lawyers all over the 
world. Little opposition has arisen to its ratification by the United States, and from all 
indications the reaction in other nations also has been very positive". 58 
The optimistic introduction quickly dissipates. Despite the lofty goals of the 
CISG, "the impressive talent of the drafters, the long period of gestation, and the 
universal acclaim with which the Convention has been met", Rosett maintains that the 
fundamental strategy of attempting to create an exclusive and comprehensive statement 
of international sales law is poorly conceived. He argues that international sales law 
harmonization and international sales law codification are not identical, hence, the goal of 
harmonizing the legal treatment of international sales transactions is not advanced by the 
adoption of the CISG. 59 
In the fifty-year period of negotiations leading to the CISG, Rosett believes that 
the nature of the problem changed. In the early years of negotiations, it seemed a worthy 
idea to promote trade through a unifying codification of national sales laws. During the 
intervening period economic integration proceeded rapidly and supported a number of 
important harmonization efforts. These reduced the substantive anomalies that concerned 
the early proponents of the CISG. The need for a unified doctrinal statement of contract 
principles, thus, became less important than it appeared at the outset. As Rosett notes, 
57 Ibid. at 265. 
58 Ibid. at 266. 
59 Ibid. at 267. 
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"[t]his diminished urgency is reflected in the slightly outdated character of some of the 
issues that most concerned the drafters".6° For example, the CISG does not deal with 
many contemporary issues of commercial law that are considered important in the U.S. · 
and abroad. For instance, it does not directly address the issues of product liability that 
are related to other doctrinal rules announced by the Convention.61 Rosett's list of 
imperfections with the CISG continues. In conclusion, he believes the Convention 
provides "no unifying guidance on the host of issues", and predicts that some of the 
ambiguous provisions within the CISG will continue to divide scholars, including those 
academics who participated in the drafting process. 62 The implication is that a body of 
case law will develop that will be permeated with domestic legal concepts. Should Rosett 
be correct, the homeward trend should be evident in Article 79 jurisprudence. 
Writing in 1988, the same year that the Convention became effective, John 
Honnold notes that uniform words in themselves will not guarantee uniform results. 63 
Honnold boldly states that the realists are "dead right" with their perspective regarding 
the quest for uniform laws that are designed to cross national borders. 64 As legal 
practitioners are required to use unreliable and imperfect tools-words-they will never 
be able to craft the perfect law, treaty, or convention. He notes that even a simple phrase, 
such as "Home Sweet Home", presents the French translator with a challenge.65 At the 
international level these difficulties with words are raised to a higher level. For example, 
60 Ibid. at 302. 
61 Ibid. at 303. 
62 Ibid. 
63 John Honnold, "The Sales Convention in Action-Uniform International Words: Uniform Application?" 
(1988) 8 J.L. & Com. 207. 
64 Ibid. at 207. 
65 Ibid. 
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common law legal concepts, such as "consideration", "trust", and "tort", are almost 
impossible to translate in civil law jurisdictions. Honnold is not a critic of the CISG, but 
he provides a valuable survey of the difficulties and criticisms that are encountered in ., 
quests for the international unification oflaw. To Honnold, like confirmed bachelors or 
spinsters who have built their lives in search of the perfect spouse, realists have been 
searching for the perfect uniform law. This quest is misguided. He states that he could 
simply conclude "[a]s our sad-faced realists predicted, international unification is 
impossible". 66 Instead, he ends the article on an optimistic note: "We cannot expect 
perfect uniformity in applying the [C]onvention--or for that matter, any other statute. 
But we can look forward to international commercial law that is more helpful and 
predictable than the present Babel of competing systems". 67 What uniform laws in 
general, and the CISG in particular, provide for is international acceptance of the same 
rules and a common medium for communication-a "linguafranca".68 
Words that are unique to specific jurisdictions are charged with legal meaning. 
To address this problem the CISG requires the displacement of domestic legal concepts. 
In its place is autonomous terminology. This explains why the CISG uses generic words 
and neutral terms that describe certain events, results, or practices that are typical in an 
international transaction, and not technically charged legal terms specific to a legal 
system. This is perhaps why Honnold dubbed the Convention the new lingua franca. 69 
66 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
67 Ibid. at212. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
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However, Amy Kastely, also writing in 1988, was critical of the attempt to create 
a new lingua franca, and felt that because of the open-textured wording within the CISG 
there· was a very real ·possibility that it would fail. Utilizing rhetorical analysis on the text 
of the CISG, Kastely uncovers many of the contextual problems and weaknesses within 
the Convention. She states: "To unify the law among nations means to subject people 
around the world to a single set of rules and principles and to have them understand and 
conform to these rules and principles as they would to the laws of their own 
communities". 70 The problem, as Kasteley understands it, is that while "human 
communities are natural, organic, or inevitable[ ... ] [t]he community created and 
promoted by the Convention[ ... ] is thoroughly consensual and artificial".71 This 
artificial community is precarious, and "vulnerable to the whim of human choice and 
self-interest".72 The bonds keeping it together are no stronger than the paper on which 
the Convention is printed. Kasteley, thus, predicts the failure of the CISG. By 
implication, the homeward trend should prevail. She concludes by stating the possibility 
that it will "only be ratified by a few states or in only a limited part of the world".73 Even 
if the CISG is widely accepted, "it is possible that the system of unified law will be short-
lived, with states denouncing the Convention after a trial period, or by domestic courts 
interpreting the Convention in mechanical or isolated ways". 74 While her prediction 
70 Amy H. Kastely, "Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United Nations Sales 
Convention" (1988) 8 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 574. 
71 Ibid. at 588. 
72 Ibid. at 589. 
73 Ibid. at 621. 
74 Ibid. 
., 
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generally appears to be wrong, she was correct to the extent that there would be problems 
with the CISG, at least initially. 
Interpretational problems will always arise with uniform laws·. Critics of the 
CISG have often focused on this problem, without fully acknowledging that national laws 
also face problems of interpretation. Fortunately, the interpretational challenge was 
recognized during the drafting of the Convention. In Gyula Eorsi's 1984 article75 she 
notes that, unlike many other conventions, the CISG contains two articles (Arts. 7(1) and 
8) specifically devoted to proper interpretation. Article 7 in particular specifically urges 
tribunals and courts not to make recourse to domestic law unless specifically directed by 
the Convention itself. 
Acknowledging that because language frequently tends to be vague or provides 
multiple meanings, Eorsi's article predicts the problems the CISG might encounter: "It 
could be argued that the [interpretive] provisions of Article 7(1) [of the CISG] are but 
pious wishes: the paragraph is necessarily vague and therefore open to surprising 
results".76 Eorsi was likely ahead of her time in predicting that the interpretive articles 
within the CISG would play an important role in its ultimate success, particularly with 
regard to the unification of international sales law. She states: "the elements of regard to 
the international character of the Convention and uniformity in its application were well 
75 Gyula Eorsi, "General Provisions", in Nima M. Galston & Hans Smit, eds., International Sales: The 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 2-1, (Huntington, NY: Juris 
Publishing, 1984) 2-1 online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/eorsi I .html>. 
76 Ibid. at 2-3. 
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chosen. The first, as we have seen, was devised to check the homeward trend, and the 
second is an admonition to follow precedents on the international plane". 77 
V. Susanne Cook's 1997 article78 logically follows ·Eorsi's and Kasteley's 
predictions that national courts might have a difficult time interpreting the CISG. In it, 
Cook discusses the interpretive difficulty encountered in the first U.S. Circuit Court 
decision interpreting the CISG.79 She begins by noting that only two cases interpreting 
the CISG have appeared in U.S. courts, and remarks how this is a "stunning result 
considering the broad scope of the Convention's application". 80 She suspects that the 
reason for this development is the apparent reluctance of the U.S. international business 
community and American legal practitioners to embrace the CISG. This "ethnocentrism" 
appears to be due to a certain lack of familiarity with the Convention, or because of a 
preference for known domestic sales legislation, i.e., the UCC.81 Cook notes that the 
establishment of a case law database, wherever the CISG is adjudicated, could increase 
the likelihood of its adoption by U.S .. legal practitioners. However, at this formative 
stage of U.S. jurisprudence on the Convention, courts must pay particular attention to 
developing a method of interpretation that takes into account the CISG' s international 
character. Yet in the case that Cook discusses, she notes how the court's "decision is 
encouragingly insightful, yet ultimately disappointing at the same time". 82 She remarks 
how the "court carefully set the stage by pointing out that the case 'is governed by the 
77 Ibid. at 2-5. 
78 V. Susanne Cook, "The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Mandate to 
Abandon Legal Ethnocentricity" (1997) 16 J.L. & Com. 257. 
79 De/chi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corporation, 71F.3d1024 (2nd Cir. 1995). 
8° Cook, supra note 78 at 257. 
81 UCC is the acronym for the Uniform Commercial Code (1995). 
82 Cook, supra note 78 at 258. 
26 
CISG', an international agreement that requires 'that its interpretation be informed by its 
international character and [ ... ] the need to promote uniformity in its application and the 
observance of good faith in international trade'". 83 ·While the court succeeded in · 
correctly identifying the international character of the CISG as the starting point of its 
analysis, it missed the mark when it referred exclusively to domestic jurisprudence and 
U.S. commentary. 
Cook's article is illustrative of a pattern that was to be repeated by a number of 
courts in various jurisdictions. CISG critics have used these errors to advance their 
position that the CISG is inherently flawed, and will ultimately fail. What is overlooked 
is that, as with many new laws, courts have initially overlooked or struggled with the 
CISG's interpretive methodology, but tend to improve their judicial decision-making as 
the jurisprudence develops. For this reason, it is important to note the historical context 
of Cook's article. At the time the article was written, there was no centralized database 
for CISG case law, and the Convention was less than ten years old in the U.S. 
Furthermore, of all the signatory states to the CISG, common law jurisdictions appear to 
have the greatest difficulty in looking beyond the confines of domestic law when 
interpreting the CISG. Since Cook published her article, CISG case law from virtually all 
signatory states is available on the Internet, and the Convention has developed to the 
extent that it has been deemed one of the most successful international commercial law 
. 84 
conventions. 
83 Ibid. 
84 See e.g. Michael P. Van Alstine, "Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation Through the Prism 
of Uniform International Sales Law" (1996) 37 Va. J. Int'l L. 1 at 6: "It can be said with little risk of 
overstatement that the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
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The issue of the uniform interpretation of the CISG is a recurring theme in the 
academic literature. Franco Ferrari is one of the more prominent figures in the debate on 
whether uniform interpretation is possible, and being realized;-in-international CISG 
jurisprudence. Writing in 1994,85 Ferrari reviews the challenges of interpretation 
specifically with the CISG, and he addresses these same problems in international 
conventions generally. Ferrari acknowledges that international conventions by their very 
nature are never definitive sources of the subject-matter, but deliberately govern only 
certain issues, while excluding others. This approach is not perfect, and can lead to 
problems concerning the precise meaning of certain provisions, and to problems 
concerning the necessity of filling the "gaps" with external law. Ferrari's conclusion is 
that "ultimately, it is the interpreter's task to decide whether the 1980 [CISG] is really a 
uniform law, i.e., whether universalism prevails over nationalism, whether any progress 
has been made since the enactment of the national codes". 86 
Ferrari returns to the important issue of interpretation in a 1999 article. 87 For 
Ferrari, and a host of other CISG commentators, a new problem arose with the growing 
body of international case law on the Convention: where was the proper place for this 
jurisprudence within the CISG's interpretive framework? To Ferrari, in order to achieve 
the CISG' s ultimate goal of uniform application, it is necessary that other signatory states 
consider the case law of other, i.e., foreign jurisdictions, when deciding cases on the 
represents one of history's most successful efforts at the unification of law governing international 
transactions". 
85 Franco Ferrari, "Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law" (1994) 24 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. 
L. 183. 
86 Ibid. at 228. 
87 Franco Ferrari, "CISG Case Law: A New Challenge for Interpreters?" (1999) 17 J. L. & Com. 245. 
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CISG. In other words, recourse to foreign judicial decisions "should always be 
considered" as it is a source for legal practitioners to draw either arguments or counter-
arguments. 88 As Ferrari's article notes, this result is, in essence; what CISG Article 7(1) 
dictates when it provides that "regard is to be had[ ... ] to the need to promote uniformity 
in its application". 
While Ferrari's article views the interpretive provisions of the CISG as 
contributing towards uniformity, some critics, have viewed these same provisions in a 
negative light. The arguments of the critics of uniform laws generally, and of the CISG 
specifically, cannot be ignored in this dissertation. In fact, their arguments will be 
challenged, demonstrating how critics have missed the point with their rigid perspective 
regarding the purpose of uniform laws. Typical of this realist critique is the work of 
James E. Bailey. In his 1999 article, 89 Bailey challenges the belief that the CISG 
accomplishes its goal of uniformity. Rather, he contends that the CISG is actually an 
obstacle to uniformity in the law of international sales. 
According to Bailey, the failure of the Convention to create uniformity is the 
result of the CISG's misguided goal, its character as a multinational treaty, its specific 
provisions, and its incorporation into many national jurisdictions (i.e., the U.S.) as a self-
executing treaty. The combination of these elements results in several specific problems 
that prevent uniformity in both the interpretation and application of the CISG. Bailey 
argues, first, that as a self-executing treaty under U.S. law, the CISG is virtually unknown 
88 Ibid. at 260. 
89 James E. Bailey, "Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law oflntemational Sales" (1999) 32 Cornell Int'l L.J. 273. 
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to American courts and practitioners. In his words, "it is frequently ignored by both U.S. 
attorneys and courts". 90 The implication is that if the CISG has not been embraced by 
legal-practitioners 'iri· America, it is likely receiving the same treatment elsewhere, and 
hence, failing as a uniform international convention. Second, the CISG's rules on 
interpretation are so "obscure" that the Convention's own rules for producing consistent 
interpretations fail to promote uniformity. 91 To Bailey, the interpretive provisions of the 
CISG are somehow defective. Third, the CISG's provisions regarding contractual 
freedom lead to bewildering and potentially contradictory results that prevent uniformity 
in the application of the Convention.92 It would appear to Bailey that the rights and 
obligations of buyers and sellers are not in balance, but instead overlap and somehow 
conflict. That almost all laws have provisions that, when isolated, contain conflicting 
terms is not addressed by the author. Fourth, the CISG's failure to define its subject 
matter prevents uniform application.93 That is, because legal or technical terms are not 
defined within the CISG (i.e., it does not contain a "definitions" section), this will 
somehow lead to inconsistent case law. Finally, the CISG's allowance for certain 
reservations by nations ratifying the Convention insidiously undermines its goal of 
uniformity.94 Nevertheless, few states have invoked these reservations, and for those that 
have, their significance in the context of uniformity is minimal. Furthermore, many 
international treaties and conventions contain reservations, yet the reservation provisions 
within the CISG are somehow problematic to Bailey. 
90 Ibid. at 276. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
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Fortunately, Bailey's article contains a kernel of hope for the CISG. He 
acknowledges that many of the problems he enumerates can be eliminated, or at least 
. .._ ·-·ameliorated by changes to domestic (i.e., U.S. federal) legislation, or through an 
UNCITRAL95 review of all court decisions involving the CISG, and by a broad 
interpretive approach by courts when applying the CISG.96 
Writing in a similar vain to Bailey is an article by Paul B. Stephan.97 The Bailey 
and Stephan articles are important in that they are prominent articulations of the critical 
approaches to the CISG and uniform law. This dissertation will emphasize that the true 
purpose of uniformity in international sales law is to achieve, not strict but relative 
uniformity. Like Bailey, in Stephan's piece, he too notes that the effort directed at 
unifying international sales law, particularly the CISG, "is unnecessary, and some 
produces rules that hinder rather than promote international business". 98 While not as 
critical as Bailey, Stephan draws from Law and Economics theory and argues that the 
CISG's deficiencies are due to inherent limitations in the process that generates 
international agreements for national implementation.99 The blame lies primarily with 
academics that have exacerbated the problem by mistakenly focusing on what uniform 
sales law should produce. To Stephan, less time should be spent on drafting rules to 
govern the substantive rights and duties of persons engaged in a transaction. Rather, 
more effort is needed on broader goals, such as devising ways to encourage states to 
95 UNCITRAL is the acronym for the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law. 
96 Bailey, supra note 89 at 276. 
97 Paul B. Stephan, "The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law" 
(1998-1999) 39 Va. J. Int'l L. 743. 
98 Ibid. at 744. 
99 Ibid. 
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facilitate contractual choices made by parties in the course of transactions, and in 
encouraging states to divulge how they plan to deal with private disputes that arise in 
· international transactions. Ioo 
Stephan attempts to uncover the true benefits that unification and harmonization 
achieve. He finds that there are three primary benefits: i) the reduction of legal risk 
associated with international commerce; ii) law improvement or law reform; and, iii) 
enhancement of the role oflegal intermediaries. IOI Considering these advantages, 
Stephan then examines the process that generates international conventions and model 
laws. He finds that the political economy of this process results too often either in rules 
written for the benefit of particular industries and other interest groups, or in the 
suppression of conflict that increases legal risk. With this approach, Stephan has shifted 
the focus from the substantive law of the CISG to the lawmaking process, in an attempt to 
"disrupt our complacency about the unification project". I02 Unlike the detractors of 
uniform law, Stephan believes in "the nobility of the [unification] project's aspirations", 
and does not think it is a futile exercise. I03 Rather, the uniform law effort deserves 
constructive criticism precisely because it is at the heart of a sustained and practical effort 
to improve international commercial law. 
Martin Gebauer's article104 covers issues that move beyond general rules of 
interpretation. This dissertation will argue that CISG Article 79 requires an autonomous 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. at 746 to 752. 
102 Ibid. at 797 
103 Ibid. 
104 Martin Gebauer, "Uniform Law, General Principles and Autonomous Interpretation" (2000) 4 Unif. L. 
Rev. 683. 
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interpretation. This requires that Article 79 be interpreted with reference to the CISG's 
own terms, objectives, and principles, that is, within the Convention's interpretative 
··system. The Gebauer article is important in that it notes·that international uniform law 
needs to be explained in a manner that differs from our usual understanding of other legal 
instruments, such as national law. 
Gebauer delves deeper into the CISG's interpretive framework, and considers the 
methodology of autonomous interpretation. He illustrates that autonomous interpretation, 
like any other form of legal interpretation, is a kind of argumentation. It may be inspired 
by "general principles", but autonomous interpretation of uniform law differs from other 
kinds of interpretation in that arguments are based on specific systematic and teleological 
elements. 105 It also differs somewhat from uniform interpretation in that it transcends the 
uniform application of a range of unified rules. In other words, autonomous 
interpretation "sorts out" arguments by utilizing a "rule of preference" in favour of 
specific arguments: it gives preference to certain interpretive results, but also discards 
other possible outcomes. 106 Most importantly for the purposes of this dissertation is 
Gebauer's argument that the CISG contains a built-in interpretive rule, i.e., Article 7(1). 
This compels national courts and arbitral tribunals to make decisions in harmony with the 
Convention's international character, and its specific aim to promote uniformity in sales 
law across national borders. 
!OS Ibid. 
106 Ibid. at 702-704. 
33 
Monica Kilian's 2001 article107 demonstrates the difficulty that certain common 
law jurisdictions have had in paying heed to the interpretive rule of CISG Article 7(1 ). 
- · She notes·that out of the more than 600 worldwide CIS6 court cases· Eas documented in 
the CISG database at Pace University Law School), only twenty-one are from common 
law jurisdictions. 108 Killian, thus, explores the question of why it is that common law 
jurisdictions have not fully accepted the CISG, especially when considering their 
prominent position in world trade. Kilian's answer is that courts oflaw in common law 
countries remain acutely attuned to their own legal history and traditions. These courts 
appear to be loath to apply law that has not been created from within and, moreover, that 
may conflict with more familiar domestic laws. She notes how American legal 
practitioners are suspicious about, or even fear the CISG, and therefore advise their 
clients to exclude it from their contracts. 109 
In reviewing U.S. case law, Kilian finds that as of 1998, there are only three 
significant court cases on the CISG. 110 This is an astonishing small number considering 
that the U.S. conducts most of its trade with contracting states, and that it was one of the 
first nations to adopt the Convention as law (in 1988). In reviewing American court 
cases, Kilian finds that these provide glaring examples of how the U.S. legal system 
manages to ignore or even circumvent the CISG. Unfortunately, the Article 79 cases 
from the U.S. support her conclusion. She notes that U.S. "courts are bending over 
107 Monica Kilian, "CISG and the Problems with Common Law Jurisdictions" (2001) 10 J. Transnat'l L. & 
Pol'y 217. 
108 Ibid. at 218. 
109 Ibid. at 227. 
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backwards to avoid having to take into account foreign precedents in a not so subtle bid 
to ensure that authority regarding CISG is not established". 111 
·, · - Because of the reluctant' acceptance of the-CISG in U.S. jurisdictions, Kilian does 
not believe that it best serves the interests of international merchants and the international 
legal community. Furthermore, the vast majority of CISG cases concern European 
jurisdictions that appear to indicate a propensity towards regionalization, rather than the 
internationalization envisaged by the CISG. Near the conclusion, Kilian's article 
suggests that an international commercial code like the CISG may be best housed in the 
realm of non-legally binding harmonizing agreements, such as the UNIDROIT 
Principles, rather than in the comparatively intractable arena of statute law. However, 
Killian ends on a positive note, stating "the more recent U.S. cases give room for cautious 
optimism" and that it "appears that CISG has broader acceptance than one might imply 
judging from case law alone".1 12 
Bruno Zeller argues that if common law courts tend to treat the CISG as an 
interloper that is because they have not used the proper methodology when interpreting 
the individual articles in the Convention. 113 Zeller's 2003 doctoral thesis114 highlights the 
importance of reading the CISG within its "Four Corners", that is, within the context of 
the entire CISG as an autonomous and comprehensive international sales code. In 
Zeller's view, the individual articles of the CISG cannot be read and interpreted in 
I I I /bid. at 242. 
112 Ibid. at 242-243. 
113 Bruno Zeller, Four-Corners - The Methodology for Interpretation and Application of the UN 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Ph.D. Thesis, Victoria University, 2003 
(unpublished] online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/4comers.html>. 
114 Ibid. 
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isolation; they are connected through the general principles on which the Convention is 
based. 115 To Zeller, the CISG must be interpreted uniformly to promote the 
•
1 
-"international character" of the Convention, as enunciated in Article 7. Recourse to 
domestic principles is not allowed. In addition, the autonomous method of interpretation 
is to be developed with the aid of case law and trade practices. Article 7 also points to 
the application of the concept of "good faith" in international trade. 116 Good faith as a 
principle is not only to be applied to the interpretation of the CISG as a whole, but it also 
regulates the behavior of the contracting parties. 
Zeller further argues that Article 7(2) recognizes that the CISG was never 
intended to be a complete statement of sales laws. 117 The members of the diplomatic 
conference in Vienna could not agree on the inclusion of several important principles of 
contract law into the Convention as, for example, the principle of validity. As a 
consequence, Article 7 also delineates between the application of the CISG and domestic 
law through the process of gap-filling. Zeller's thesis develops the principles and tools 
needed to implement Article 7(2), as gaps need to be filled in conformity with the general 
principles on which the CISG is based. It is also contended that restatements of contract 
law, such as the UNIDROIT Principles, if adopted by contractual parties will minimize 
references to domestic law. This is also a point noted by Kilian. 118 
In response to the mandate of Article 7, Zeller argues that tribunals and courts will 
look for a solution within the "Four Corners" of the CISG in a manner contemplated by 
115 Ibid. at Chap. 1. 
116 Ibid. at Chap. 4. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Kilian, supra note 107. 
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those who drafted the CISG, rather than by taking recourse to domestic law. He further 
argues that the failure to apply the rules contained within the "Four Comers" does not 
indicate an unwillingness· to depart from domestic laws. Rather it reveals that-courts and 
legal practitioners have not yet achieved a sophisticated grasp of the provisions of the 
CISG. 
In the early years of the CISG criticism of the Convention was relatively strong. 
It has now been more than 25 years since the CISG has come into force. As case law on 
the CISG developed with increasing momentum, and as legal practitioners and the 
international commercial community have become more familiar with the Convention, 
criticism of the Convention has subsided. However, it has not disappeared. One of the 
strongest articulations of the apparent flaws of the CISG is the 2005 article by Clayton P. 
Gillette and Robert E. Scott. 119 Gillette and Scott argue that the effort to create uniform 
international sales law fails to supply the contracting parties (i.e., the international 
commercial community) with the default terms that they prefer. This violates the 
normative criterion that justifies the law-making process for commercial actors in the first 
instance. Their argument rests on three propositions: i) that the process by which uniform 
international sales law is drafted dictates the form that many provisions take; ii) that the 
legal form dictated by the drafting process has significant, but flawed, substantive 
consequences, particularly for the policy objectives of uniform international sales law. 120 
This leads to their final claim: iii), that in order to achieve a uniform international sales 
119 Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, "The Political Economy oflntemational Sales Law" (April 22, 
2005) NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 05-02 online: SSRN 
<http://ssm.com/abstract=709242>. 
120 Ibid. at 2-3. 
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law that is widely adopted, those involved in the drafting process will systematically 
promulgate many vague, open-textured standards that contracting parties would not 
ordinarily select for themselves. For Gillette and Scott, these default standards cannot be · · · · , · · 
justified on the basis that this is the cost of achieving an optimal level of uniformity. If 
the products of a uniform international sales law are default terms that parties do not 
want, then the underlying justification for the law-making function, which are reduced 
contracting and transaction costs, disappears. 
Gillette and Scott begin their article by noting that the CISG "has become the 
most successful of efforts to create uniform commercial law". 121 The overall goal of their 
analysis is "to determine the extent to which [international sales law] as it is actually 
promulgated coincides with the provisions that would apply if drafters acted in a manner 
consistent with the normative goal of drafting legislation that optimally reduces 
contracting costs". 122 They find that a correlation exists between their propositions about 
the drafting of uniform international sales law and the CISG. More specifically, they 
claim that the CISG was drafted by parties whose objectives did not necessarily coincide 
with those of the international commercial actors whose conduct the treaty was intended 
to regulate. Gillette and Scott find this result somewhat surprising, as it might be 
expected that international sales law generally, and the CISG specifically, would reveal a 
positive relationship between goals and practice. 
As the literature in political economy explains, typically, any deviation from 
normative goals in the legislative process is likely due to the presence of interest groups 
121 Ibid. at 3. 
122 Ibid. 
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that are able to gain disproportionate influence. 123 But the authors do not find this to be 
quite the case with the CISG. Rather, the problem lies "in the unique processes by which 
·uniform international sales law is generated". 124 These processes must simultaneously ·. 
deal with incompatible political and commercial concerns. Political interests arise from 
the fact that uniform international sales law must combine different legal, governmental, 
and economic interests. The end result is an effort to accommodate a number of diverse 
political-as opposed to commercial-interests. Because of this vacuum, they argue that 
the product created is shaped entirely by the motivations and incentives of the drafters 
themselves. Unfortunately, this causes the law "to be drafted at a high level of 
abstraction, explicitly to authorize numerous exceptions to the law's uniform application, 
and implicitly to tolerate significant variation in the interpretation of the (formally) 
uniform law". 125 
For Gillette and Scott, the result is a variety of vague standards and compromises 
that appear to be inconsistent with the true needs of the international business 
community. They conclude by suggesting that, because of the inherent flaws within the 
text of the CISG, members of the international business community would prefer to 
choose their governing law from among the numerous domestic legal regimes that 
compete with the CISG, and supply parties with more attractive substantive terms. In 
conclusion, Gillette and Scott predict the CISG is "likely to become less and less useful 
as time goes on [and] will lose out in competition with alternative legal regimes" .126 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. at 4. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. at 63. 
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One of the most influential articles on the CISG appeared in 2004 by Larry 
DiMatteo et al. 127 The focus of the DiMatteo monograph is not on whether the CISG 
··mandates, or should mandate; absolute uniformity of application: · Rather~ the work· 
recognizes that many CISG provisions are the product of compromise and, thus, the 
authors ask whether these compromises have proven to be effective, or have resulted in a 
chaotic jurisprudence in the courts of the signatory states. In a broad survey of 
international CISG case law, the authors attempt to determine how each of the articles of 
the CISG have actually been interpreted and applied by various national courts. 
DiMatteo begins by examining the special characteristics of the CISG as an 
international code including its importance as an international convention and legal code 
meant for uniform application. The importance of defining a standard for measuring 
uniformity of application is discussed along a continuum between absolute and relative 
standards of uniformity. This dissertation will also take a similar approach when 
evaluating the degree of uniformity required in the interpretation of Article 79 of the 
Convention across national boundaries. They believe that "the success of the CISG 
should be measured using a standard of relative uniformity or a standard of the lessening 
of legal impediments to trade. Thus, a relative or useful level of uniformity should be the 
benchmark to measure the success of the CISG". 128 The discussion then focuses on the 
importance of autonomous interpretation, as intended by the drafters of the CISG, to the 
127 Larry A. DiMatteo et al., "The Interpretive Tum in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen 
Years of CISG Jurisprudence" (2004) 34 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 299. This article became such a popular 
article that the piece was subsequently published in monograph form in 2005 under a different title, Larry 
A. DiMatteo et al., International Sales Law: A Critical Analysis ofCISGJurisprudence (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). All references are to the latter work. 
128 Ibid. at 11. 
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goal of relative uniformity in the application of the Convention. It is their hope "that 
such autonomous interpretations, divorced from the idiosyncrasies of domestic 
-· jurisprudenc·e, will result in more truly supranationallaw''.-129 ·The introductory section of 
their monograph concludes with a discussion of the more expansive use of the CISG as 
"soft law". 130 This use of the CISG as evidence of customary international law offers a 
way for courts and arbitral tribunals to deal with differences between various legal 
regimes. 
The review of CISG jurisprudence throughout the monograph highlights the 
problems of the non-uniform application of the CISG. The survey covers almost each 
one of the Convention's 101 articles, and discusses poorly reasoned judicial opinions, as 
well as those court decisions that are products of better reasoning. DiMatteo finds that 
the poorly reasoned judicial opinions are generally characterized by decisions that merely 
apply the legal concepts of the court's domestic legal system. In contrast, the exemplary 
opinions are characterized by the application of the CISG's interpretive methodology, in 
pursuit of autonomous interpretations that recognizes the Convention's international 
character. 131 
DiMatteo also provides an overview of the CISG in actual practice. In essence, 
this is a descriptive review of the jurisprudence that has developed around the major 
articles of the CISG, and includes a discussion of the "raw material" necessary to judge 
the CISG' s functionality in lowering the legal impediments in the international sale of 
129 Ibid. at 12. 
130 Ibid. at 13-15. 
131 Ibid. at 12-13. 
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goods. 132 This review illustrates the types of issues and interpretational problems 
encountered by national courts and arbitration tribunals over a 15-year period since the 
CISG's adoption: The discussion demonstrates how courts have used (or misused) the~ 
CISG's interpretive methodology, and have developed specific default rules to make the 
CISG more functional. 
The DiMatteo monograph also reviews CISG jurisprudence according to the main 
substantive areas of the Convention, including, for example, contract formation, 133 the 
obligations of buyers and sellers, 134 and the common obligations of the parties. 135 In each 
of these sections, the provisions with the largest volume of case and arbitral law are given 
the most coverage. The consequences of breach of contract, 136 the calculation of 
damages, 137 doctrines limiting damages recovery, 138 and excuses for non-performance 
due to "impediments" found in Article 79, 139 which is the focus of this dissertation, are 
analyzed. Through this examination, divergent judicial interpretations, CISG interpretive 
methodology, and the development of specific default rules of the CISG are highlighted. 
DiMatteo concludes with the premise that the CISG is an evolving legal code. 
Consequently, its jurisprudence reflects courts' confusion and methodology to contend 
with the CISG's perceived shortcomings through gap-filling measures. Because case law 
commonly brings necessary depth and clarity to statutory acts, the authors offer a number 
132 Ibid. at 6. 
133 Ibid. at 32-75. 
134 Ibid. at 76-120. 
135 Ibid. at 121-131. 
136 Ibid. at 132-150. 
137 Ibid. at 150-162. 
138 Ibid. at 153-158. 
139 Ibid. at 158-160. 
of examples of such developing jurisprudence and the persistence of homeward trend 
reasoning in CISG judicial opinions. A brief passage highlights their primary finding: 
:At one extreme, some courts have largely ignored the CISG's 
mandate that interpretations are to be formulated with an eye 
toward the international character of the transaction and the need 
for uniformity of application. At the other extreme are courts, and 
more often arbitral panels, that have taken the above mandates 
seriously and have resisted the temptation of homeward trend 
interpretations. In the middle, are the majority of cases that have 
attempted to provide autonomous interpretations with various 
degrees of success. 140 
Finally, the monograph concludes by noting that the level of disharmony 
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associated with divergent national judicial interpretations of CISG is acceptable because 
national interpretations impact the effectiveness or functionality of the Convention itself. 
Some divergence in interpretation is to be expected, and is acceptable considering the 
difference in national legal systems and in the very nature of legal codes. This 
divergence is to be expected not only because codes have multi-jurisdictional 
applications, but also because the CISG is an evolving, living law. As such, it provides 
for the contextual input of the "reasonable person", including the recognition of evolving 
trade usage, in the re-formulation and application of its rules. The benefit of such a 
dynamic, contextual interpretive methodology is that the code consistently updates its 
provisions in response to novel cases and new trade usages. This process should 
ultimately overcome many of the initial divergent judicial interpretations of the CISG, 
and ultimately result in an effective and functional international sales law. But the 
success of the living, contextual nature of the CISG is dependent upon courts balancing 
140 Ibid. at 178. 
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the need for flexibility in application against the need to minimize divergent 
interpretations to ensure that the CISG remains attentive to its mandate of uniformity. 
ii) Excuses for Contractual Non-performance in Domestic and International 
Commercial Law 
Much has been written on the various doctrines concerning excuses for non-
performance of contractual obligations within the context of domestic legal systems. 141 
These writings often focus on specific countries and distinguish between the various 
incarnations of excuses for non-performance as encountered in different legal systems 
and jurisdictions. What is usually offered is a conceptual framework identifying the 
general characteristics of the excuse for non-performance, discussions that highlight case 
law, or details of problematic issues that are related to the doctrine in a specific 
jurisdiction. Typical of this approach, one post-World War II law journal ran a series of 
articles on excuses for non-performance that covered a range of countries and legal 
systems. 142 While some of this material is helpful in providing some context to the study 
141 A representative-but far from exhaustive-list of literature on the topic in various domestic 
jurisdictions can be found. See e.g. 'Abd El-Wahab Ahmed El-Hassan, "Freedom of Contract, The 
Doctrine of Frustration, and Sanctity of Contracts in Sudan Law and Islamic Law" (1985) 1 Arab L.Q. 51; 
Herve Leclercq, "Notes and Comments: Force Majeure in Chinese Commercial Law" (1989) 7 J. Energy, 
Nat'l Res. L. 238; Robert Lombardi, "Force Majeure in European Union Law" (1997) 3 Int'l Trade & Bus. 
L. Ann. 81; J. Denson Smith, "Some Practical Aspects of the Doctrine oflmpossibility" (1937) Ill. R. Rev. 
672: John D. Wladis, "Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the Doctrine of 
Impossibility of Performance in English Contract Law" (1986) 75 Geo. L.J. 1575; Pan. J. Zepos, 
"Frustration of Contract in Comparative Law and in the New Greek Civil Code of 1946" (1948) 11 Mod. L. 
Rev. 36. 
142 See J.P. Azevedo, "Frustration of Contract in Latin America and Particularly Brazil" (1946) 29 J. Comp. 
Legis. & Int'l L. 15; E.J. Cohn, "Frustration of Contract in German Law" (1946) 28 J. Comp. Legis. & Int'l 
L. 15; Rt. Hon. Lord Cooper, "Frustration of Contract in Scots Law" (1946) 28 J. Comp. Legis. & Int'l L. 
1; Arthur L. Corbin, "Frustration of Contract in the United States of America" (1947) 29 J. Comp. Legis. & 
Int'l L. l; Rene Davis, "Frustration of Contract in French Law" (1946) 28 J. Comp. Legis. & Int'l L. 11. 
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of the development and judicial treatment of CISG Article 79, the usefulness of some of 
this material is limited. 
One of the most prominent treatise on contractual excuses for non.;.performance is 
Frustration and Force Majeure by Guenter H. Treitel. 143 The Treitel monograph 
provides a broad, but thorough examination of the principles governing the conflict 
between pacta sunt servanda and the discharge of contractual obligations in response to 
supervening events. Treitel discusses a host of supervening events that may be 
encountered in any commercial transaction, setting out the statutory principles involved, 
together with judicial interpretations from a number of common law jurisdictions. While 
the book deals primarily with English law, it does adopt a comparative approach. 
Without attempting to provide a comprehensive account of excuses for contractual non-
performance in foreign legal systems, it does refer to the rules and principles in some 
foreign jurisdictions to aid in the understanding and evaluation of the doctrine in English 
law. 
More recently, Christoph Brunner has expanded the scope ofTreitel's study 
beyond the domestic realm, and considered the role of force majeure and hardship 
specifically in the context of international commercial transactions. 144 Brunner's work 
does cover many of the Article 79 cases discussed in this dissertation. However, his 
quest is entirely different. Brunner comprehensively analyzes contemporary approaches 
to the principles of exemption for non-performance, which are he notes are commonly 
referred to as force majeure and hardship. Brunner believes that the best way to address 
143 Guenter H. Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004). 
144 Brunner, supra note 47. 
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the problem of excuses for non-performance is to use a general principle of law approach. 
To him, this approach encompasses principles of international commercial contracts 
derived from a·variety of legal codes, making it a comparative law approach to a certain 
extent. The most important iterations of general contract principles is found in the CISG, 
as well as in two soft law codifications of international commercial contract law: the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts145 and the European 
Principles of Contract Law (PECL). 146 
In many jurisdictions, the excuse for contractual non-performance is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, having been developed only in the last two centuries. As Michael 
Aubrey explains in his 1963 article, 147 in England, for example, until the seventeenth 
century, pacta sunt servanda was such an entrenched principle of contract law that the 
excuse for contractual non-performance was unknown. Courts required the fulfillment of 
obligations even though physical performance might be impossible. 148 Excuses for non-
performance began to develop in England in the 1863 case of Taylor v. Caldwell, 149 and 
initially came to be known in common law jurisdictions as the doctrine of frustration or 
impossibility. 150 Aubrey explains that the doctrine was initially too narrowly interpreted 
by the courts, and as cases developed, courts became more liberal with their application 
of the doctrine. Eventually, English law and European law developed along similar lines 
145 UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004, (Rome: International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, 2004). 
146 Commission on European Contract Law, Principles of European Contract Law, Ole Lando & Hugo 
Beale eds., (The Hauge: Kluwer Law International, 2000). 
147 Michael D. Aubrey, "Frustration Reconsidered-Some Comparative Aspects" (1963) 12 Int'l & Comp. 
L.Q. 1165. 
148 Ibid. at 1165. 
149 (1863) 3 B. & S. 826. 
150 Aubrey, supra note 147 at 1165. 
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by denying efficacy to contracts that had become legally or physically impossible to 
perform. Although the theoretical foundation of the doctrine may be different in each 
European country, there came a·need to limit the effect of contract performance in certain-
circumstances. Aubrey, thus, concludes with the prediction that "with increasing 
international trade we shall soon be able to perceive a European concept of 
frustration". 151 
Aubrey hints at a comparative approach to the doctrine of frustration. A number 
of scholars have used this method. A comparative law approach is an important tool of 
interpretation, particularly those that involve questions of uniformity. By liberating the 
researcher from the narrow confines of a single legal system, it helps to discern 
universally accepted legal principles and transcendent values concerning the law. For 
example, Leo M. Drachsler, in his 1957 article, 152 reviews the remedial modalities of the 
doctrine of frustration across a number of representative legal systems. 
Drachsler attempts to find how, and under what circumstances, courts in common 
law and civil law systems, when handling cases of sales transactions that have been 
aborted by a supervening event, allocate the risks and split the losses among the parties. 
In other words, he tries to determine the nature and scope of "judicial revision" in 
applying remedies in cases where the transaction has been frustrated, particularly those 
involving an illegal government decree. 153 Drachsler finds "observance in all legal 
151 Ibid. at 1188. 
152 Leo M. Drachsler, "Frustration of Contract: Comparative Law Aspects of Remedies in Cases of 
Supervening Illegality" (1957) 3 N.Y.L.F. 50. 
153 Ibid. at 52. 
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systems of the underlying principle of impossibility of performance". 154 In the 
international cases he reviews, both common law and civil law systems reach virtually 
the -same result. 
However, a major divergence has developed in terms of the judicial policymaking 
in frustrated contracts cases. Due to wars and economic disasters that have plagued 
Europe, there has been a drastic enlargement of judicial power in the civil law nations of 
the Continent. "The judicial process in those countries, under the strain of post-war 
economic reconstruction, is empowered as an instrument of public policy in the quasi-
administrative readjustment of private contract obligations whose performance had 
become legally impossible or economically ruinous". 155 In contrast, in common law 
jurisdictions the principle of judicial policymaking, at least in this area, is "piously 
denied". 156 Interestingly, Drachsler notes that at the international level, there is the 
possibility for the synthesis of the common law and civil law conceptions of frustration of 
contract. This is found in the precursor convention to the CISG, the Uniform Law on the 
International Sale of Goods ("ULIS"), 157 which was in draft form at the time the 
Drachsler article was published. In commenting on the difficulty of reconciling the 
different perspectives on frustration of contract, Drachsler concludes by suggesting that 
these diverse doctrines may ultimately become integrated at the intemational level. 158 
154 Ibid. at 81. 
155 Ibid. at 82. 
156 Ibid. at 83. 
157 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S 107 (July 1, 
1964). 
158 Drachsler, supra note 152 at 83-84. 
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There is an abundance of scholarly commentary on the various doctrines 
concerning excuses for non-performance of contractual obligations within the context of 
international transactions generally. These articles tend to take a comparative approach. 
Their usefulness lies in illustrating how the substantive law of excuses for contractual 
non-performance in one country may be similar or different from that of another 
jurisdiction. By examining the law in foreign jurisdictions, the legal researcher is, thus, 
better able to see how various legal systems approach and resolve common problems. 
Typical of the comparative approach is a 1963 article by Harold J. Berman. 159 
Berman discusses how the problem of excuses for contractual non-performance has 
vexed legal scholars of many countries for generations. While components of the 
doctrine vary slightly from one country to another, Berman's major finding is that "the 
great upheavals of recent decades [ ... ] have created the tendency toward liberalization of 
excuse [for non-performance]". 160 Thus, in Berman's view the doctrine of excuse for 
non-performance appears to be converging across legal systems. 
Michael G. Rapsomanikis, writing in 1979, also provides a historical comparative 
survey of the doctrine of excuses for contractual non-performance, but he reaches an 
entirely different conclusion to Berman. Rapsomanikis' article161 is a thorough review of 
law and contract theory across a variety of nations and legal systems. However, 
Rapsomanikis states that ''one can unhesitatingly conclude that a uniform standard, apt to 
resolve the problem of [the doctrine of] frustration in international trade universally, can 
159 Harold J. Berman, "Excuse for Non-performance in the Light of Contract Practices in International 
Trade", (1963) 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1413. 
160 Ibid. at 1438. 
161 Michael G. Rapsomanikis, "Frustration of Contract in International Trade Law and Comparative Law" 
(1979) 18 Duq. L. Rev. 551. 
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hardly be found". 162 To Rapsomanikis, for parties in an international commercial 
transaction, there is no homogeneous or universal principle that governs this area oflaw. 
Differences in the doctrine· of excuse for non-perfonnance are too pronounced for the·· 
practical application of a worldwide standard. The implication of this conclusion for this 
dissertation is that it might be difficult to interpret Article 79 of the CISG autonomously, 
that is, as an international norm, without reference to domestic legal concepts and 
principles. However, it is important to note that Rapsomanikis was also writing before 
the CISG was formulated. 
Theo Rauh takes a similar position as Rapsomanikis in his 1996 article. 163 Rauh 
examines the effects of force majeure164 clauses across a number of states, and considers 
how they differ in each jurisdiction. He finds that the legal effects of a force majeure 
event can vary greatly, depending on the governing law. He notes that "[e]ven within a 
particular national legal system, the outcome of a Force Majeure event cannot be 
determined with certainty, and with the exception of English law the options for the 
courts are broad". 165 
iii) Article 79 and Uniform International Sales Law 
162 Ibid. at 600. 
163 Theo Rauh, "Legal Consequences of Force Majeure Under German, Swiss, English and United States' 
Law" (1996) 25 Denv. J.L. & Pol'y 151. 
164 Force majeure is a variation of the term "excuses for non-performance", "impossibility'', or 
"frustration". 
165 Rauh, supra note 113 at 171. 
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Academic commentary is limited on the subject of whether Article 79 is 
contributing to or detracting from the quest for uniformity of international sales law. 166 
· As noted above, 167 Larry DiMatteo et al. have recently reviewed a large body of CISG 
case law covering many of the Convention's 101 articles, but this survey is selective and 
is aimed at uncovering the broader interpretive trends in court and arbitral decisions. 168 
The authors state that the work is not comprehensive, but is designed as an introductory 
general reference of CISG jurisprudence. In this vane, the coverage in the DiMatteo et 
al. monograph on Article 79 contains a mere four paragraphs and references only thirteen 
cases.
169 The only firm conclusion provided by these cases is that "a high standard is set 
for a party to successfully claim excuse due to impediment". 170 
Harry Flechtner has also recently written an important article on Article 79. 171 In 
it, Flechtner discusses Article 79 within the context of the homeward trend. More 
specifically, he considers whether the homeward trend might be responsible for the view 
of certain academics who believe that Article 79 may provide an exemption to a seller for 
delivering non-conforming goods. This seems to be the view of scholars from the civil 
166 An array of academic literature exists that focuses specifically on CISG Article 79. However, in this 
abundance of academic commentary on Article 79, the quality, breadth, and depth of topics vary. Much of 
this literature is not directly relevant to this research. 
167 At 21-25. 
168 Supra note 4. Larry DiMatteo et al. state at 19, n. 1: "The selectivity is due to a number of 
considerations including the increasing number of reported cases, especially in countries like Germany, the 
unavailability of English translations, and the clustering of cases among a number of issues [ ... ] Some 
provisions of the CISG have yet to develop critical mass of cases." Although "CISG jurisprudence has 
become more comprehensive [since] 1998 a deeper jurisprudence still needs to be developed in numerous 
areas of CISG coverage." 
169 Ibid. at 158-160. 
170 Ibid. at 160. 
171 Harry M. Flechtner, "Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG) as Rorschach Test: The Homeward Trend and Exemption for Delivering Non-
Conforming Goods" (2007) 19 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 29. 
51 
law tradition, such as Hans Stoll and Georg Gruber. 172 Their view is derived from the 
German legal system, where a seller is liable in damages only if it fails to perform in 
matters that are within its· control. If the seller is not at fault; it will be exempt from · 
damages. In contrast, John Honnold takes the "no-fault" or strict liability perspective 
from the common law tradition. This appears to be the more plausible perspective, as per 
Article 79, a party is liable for all events within its control irrespective of its negligence. 
As an American, Honnold believes that Article 79 is entirely inapplicable where a seller 
delivers non-conforming goods, regardless of"fault". These two incompatible views of 
the application of Article 79 illustrate the Rorschach-test nature of Article 79 and the 
CISG. Flechtner's article thus highlights the tendency to interpret the CISG with the 
assumptions and conceptions that the interpreter brings to the task based on the training 
from a particular domestic legal system. 
With the exception of Flechtner' s article, to date there has been no comprehensive 
scholarly study exclusively on Article 79 (and the relevant case law) to determine the 
extent to which that provision has been interpreted autonomously. However, Dennis 
Tallon's 1987 analysis entitled "Article 79"173 does come close. He provides an 
overview on the origins and development of the provision, but this material is somewhat 
dated. For example, Tallon notes that "East European legal systems[ ... ] rarely permit 
the discharge of the promisor because it jeopardizes with official planning". 174 This is 
hardly a problem today. More importantly is the context that Tallon provides relating to 
172 Stoll and Gruber, "Article 79" in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, infra note 599 at 806 to 837. 
173 Dennis Tallon, "Article 79" in Bianca-Bonell, eds., Commentary on the International Sales Law (Milan: 
Giuffre, 1987). 
174 Ibid. at 573. 
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the development of Article 79. We learn that the doctrine of excuses for contractual non-
performance as embodied in Article 79 was developed "on a variegated background". 175 
While the concept is widely accepted throughout the world; it does not apply similarly 
everywhere. It is subject to various interpretations in the domestic laws of each country. 
Most importantly, the CISG avoided reference to these domestic theories and, instead, 
developed its own, novel approach. Thus, when interpreting Article 79, reference to 
similar legal concepts becomes "difficult because one cannot resort to these laws as a 
guide". 176 This opens the door to an autonomous interpretation of Article 79, which this 
dissertation explores in detail. 
Barry Nicholas provides a critical analysis of Article 79. 177 Nicholas begins his 
1984 article by noting that in some respects, Article 79 is one of the most "unsatisfactory 
provisions" in the CISG. 178 He states that critics would likely conclude that the wording 
in Article 79 "has yielded a formula which is so vague that there are bound to be 
differences of interpretation in different jurisdictions and the prime purpose of any 
uniform law will in consequence be defeated". 179 Acknowledging that there are defects 
with the CISG, Nicholas finds that Article 79 does provide a unique but adequate 
framework for the principle of excuses for contractual non-performance. What remains 
to be determined, however, is how national courts will read the Article in the context of, 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid. at 574. 
177 Barry Nicholas, "Impracticability and Impossibility in the U.N. Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods" in Galston & Smit, eds., International Sales: The United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, (Huntington, NY: Juris Publishing, 1984). 
178 Ibid. at 5-1. 
179 Ibid. at 5-2. 
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not only the individual contract itself, but also with reference to the distinctive practices 
of international trade. 
The key question that many authors attempt to address is under what 
circumstances will a party be exempted from its obligations under an international sale of 
goods contract in the case of supervening events. This dissertation will not attempt to 
answer that question directly. Rather, it will aim to compare the case law on Article 79 
across signatory states to determine the degree of relative uniformity in this area oflaw. 
Tom Sutherington's 2001 article 180 is a survey of the role of impossibility of 
performance in a number oflegal systems. Sutherington's aim is to compare the 
solutions that different national rules provide in the case of a supervening event. Such an 
approach is only oflimited value to this dissertation. However, he discusses how Article 
79 fails to follow any national law. In Sutherington's words, Article 79 "does not use 
terms like force majeure, frustration or the like, and it forms a system of its own 
autonomic from the national systems". 181 The autonomous conception of excuse for non-
performance in Article 79, thus, may "find [its] way back into national systems which in 
part harmonizes the law". 182 
A number of articles also compare CISG Article 79 to similar provisions in other 
international instruments, such as the UNIDROIT Principles 183 and the Principles of 
180 Tom Sutherington, "Impossibility of Performance and Other Excuses in International Trade" (2001) 
Faculty of Law of the University ofTurku, Private Law Publication Series B:55 online Pace Law School 
CISG Database: <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/southerington.html>. 
181 Ibid. at s. 1.1. 
182 Ibid. 
183 UNIDROIT, supra note 145. 
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European Contract Law ("PECL"). 184 This material is comprehensively covered in three 
articles by Dionysios P. Flambouras, 185 Chengwei Liu, 186 and Niklas Lindstrom. 187 All 
three articles focus on specific rules dealing with excuses for contractual -non-
performance under similar international instruments. This material is not crucial for this 
dissertation, but it helps to place CISG Article 79 within a broader, international context. 
Dionysios P. Flambouras approaches the topic of Article 79 with reference to the 
relevant rules of the CISG, and provides parallel references to the application of the 
appropriate provisions under the PECL and the UNIDROIT Principles. Throughout, 
there is a discussion of how these international instruments compare in their treatment of 
supervening events. Liu's article takes a similar approach, but adds to the discussion 
with a section on the evolution of the concept of force majeure as an autonomous 
principle internationally. Liu stresses at the outset of his article "that the term 'force 
majeure', 'has evolved progressively in international trade practice by assuming many 
original and autonomous features distinct from similar legal concepts"'. 188 This 
dissertation will make a similar, but much more thorough argument. Lindstrom discusses 
a breaching party's exemption from liability under the CISG due to changed 
circumstances. His article contemplates the relationship between the doctrine of hardship 
and an exemption from liability under the CISG, with frequent comparisons with the 
184 Commission on European Contract Law, supra note 146. 
185 Flambouras, supra note 37. 
186 Chengwei Liu, "Force Majeure: Perspectives from the CISG, UNIDROIT Principles, PECL and Case 
Law", 2d ed., (April, 2005) online Pace Law School CISG Database: 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/liu6.html>. 
187 Niklas Lindstrom, "Changed Circumstances and Hardship in the International Sale of Goods" (2006) I 
Nordic J. Com. L. I online: <http://www.njcl.utu.fi/1 2006/commentaryl.pdf>. 
188 Liu, supra note 133 at s. I. 
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UNIDROIT Principles and PECL. Lindstrom views Article 79 as a flexible provision, 
which might leave considerable room for judicial appraisal and divergent case law. The 
· ·"' author is· of the opinion that "hardship", which is a variation of an excuse for·non-
performance, is governed by the CISG, and that there is no room allowing for the 
application of national laws. 189 The approach appears to be correct. 
C. Research Problem 
The premise of this dissertation is that Article 79-which concerns exemptions 
for contractual non-performance due to an "impediment" beyond a party's control-
requires an autonomous interpretation, that is, as an international norm, without reference 
to domestic legal concepts and principles. Put in slightly different terms, the objective of 
this dissertation is to determine the extent to which a problematic legal doctrine-the 
excuse for non-performance, as embodied in Article 79-is an autonomous international 
norm, and capable of relative uniformity within the context of the CISG's goal for a sales 
law that is transnational in design. While Article 79 may have developed out of an 
amalgamation of similar national conceptions, it ultimately stands alone as an 
autonomous international doctrine under the CISG. To this end, this dissertation will 
consider the application of Article 79 by courts and arbitral tribunals across a number of 
signatory states. 
The focus on Article 79 and excuses for non-performance of a contractual 
obligation, involves one of the most important principles in contract law: pacta sunt 
189 Lindstrom, supra note 134 at 24. 
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servanda. 190 This is a basic animating principle of the law of contacts, which demands 
that promises must be performed. 191 Thus, while the principle of party autonomy allows 
parties to contract in any manner permissible under law, pacta sunt servanda dictates that 
parties are rigidly bound by their agreements. In a case of changed circumstances, the 
extent to which a party may be exempted from contractual obligations is, thus, of 
fundamental significance at both the domestic and international levels. In the latter case, 
contractual obligations take on an additional element of risk due to changing political and 
economic events in foreign countries. With globalization, and the involvement or more 
countries in the procurement, production, and sales process, there are greater 
imponderables for commercial parties. Cultural differences and the greater geographical 
distances frequently encountered in international trade only serve to augment the risk of a 
changed circumstance in a transaction of goods. 
The examination of Article 79 will provide focus and the depth of analysis 
necessary to draw firm conclusions regarding the development and treatment of an 
important, but problematic, legal doctrine. 192 This doctrine is common, in various guises, 
to all the major legal regimes of the world. By studying the treatment of Article 79 by the 
courts and arbitral tribunals of various states, differences in doctrine and case law will be 
discerned. Disparities in the national treatment of Article 79 will also be examined 
190 Although the doctrine of absolute obligation was revised in the common law by Taylor v. Caldwell, 
[1863] 3 Best & S. 826 (Q.B.), pacta sunt servanda nonetheless survives as a general principle in common 
and civil law systems. 
191 McCamus, supra note 48 at 14. 
192 Jacob S. Ziegel notes that Article 79 "is probably one of the most difficult in the whole convention". 
See Jacob S. Ziegel, "Analysis from a Provincial Common Law Perspective" in Ziegel and Claude Samson, 
Report to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada on Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, (Toronto: Uniform Law Conference, 1981) at Section IV - Exemptions. 
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within the context of globalization and the advent of international trade. The extent of 
conceptual differences towards the doctrine of excuses for non-performance will also 
help to detetmine whether the CISG's goal of uniformity is achievable;· Should there be a 
convergence in the treatment of Article 79, this would support the premise that a legal 
doctrine-in this case, the excuse for non-performance-germinating in various legal 
systems may ultimately evolve into an autonomous principle, and towards a conceptual 
goal of uniformity in a body of international commercial law, regardless of its unique 
development in separate and distinct legal jurisdictions. Such a development would play 
a crucial role for uniformity in international sales law. It would support the premise that 
individual domestic legal doctrines may ultimately coalesce into autonomous 
international principles, regardless of their distinctive development in independent legal 
jurisdictions. This is important for the development of uniform law in that it would 
demonstrate to international business and legal communities that conceptual barriers to 
various national legal backgrounds and doctrines can be overcome. Furthermore, with 
uniform laws, such as the CISG, common solutions are available to typical problems for 
businesses in international sales, negating any potential jurisdictional advantage by 
litigants through forum shopping. 
Evidence in support of the proposition that Article 79 stands alone as an 
autonomous international doctrine will indicate that since the CISG has come into force, 
there has developed a generally cohesive body of case law exemplifying a relatively 
uniform and autonomous doctrine of excuses for non-performance. This should be 
substantiated by a consistency in the application of excuses for non-performance, as well 
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as by judicial deference to international case law and scholarly opinion when courts 
decide cases under the CISG in general, and Article 79 in particular. A variation of this 
proposition may find that any dissension associated with divergent domestic· 
interpretations of Article 79 can be viewed as a minor discrepancy within the CISG's 
broader mandate of uniformity. 
Alternatively, diverging doctrine and case law on Article 79 may support the 
competing premise that the courts and tribunals of particular countries remain acutely 
attuned to their own legal traditions. This will be evident in Article 79 cases where CISG 
jurisprudence is typically permeated with domestic legal concepts. In such cases, 
domestic court decisions regarding excuses for non-performance in the CISG will be 
compared with those of other national jurisdictions. An examination will also be made to 
determine whether the treatment of Article 79 cases differs between legal systems. 
Furthermore, a comparison will be made between the decisions of arbitral tribunals and 
those of the traditional judiciary. As my previous research on Canadian CISG 
jurisprudence193 illustrated, certain national courts appear reluctant to apply law that has 
not been created internally and, moreover, that is not in harmony with established 
domestic law. But perhaps the Canadian experience has been an exception. A recent 
study of worldwide CISG jurisprudence by Larry DiMatteo et al. noted, "despite the 
problem of diverging interpretations, there are signs that courts are taking more seriously 
their role in applying CISG interpretive methodology." 194 However, my previous 
research of Canadian CISG jurisprudence failed to provide evidence of converging 
193 Mazzacano, supra note 18. 
194 Supra note 8 at xi-xii. 
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uniformity emanating from that nation. 195 Should a detailed analysis of Article 79 across 
various states reach a similar conclusion, it may suggest that the CISG, and the attempt to 
create a new lex mercatoria, may be more suitable as part of a non-legally binding 
harmonizing agreement, such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contract ("UNIDROIT Principles")196 or the Principles of European Contract Law, 197 
rather than in the intractable realm of treaty and statute law. 
D. Methodology 
The methodology utilized in this dissertation is diverse. It uses some quantitative 
data and empirical research, but it relies more heavily on qualitative information. As part 
of its qualitative analysis, it is comparative in its approach to law and legal systems. As 
part of the empirical research, relevant cases and the national law on excuses for 
contractual non-performance are analyzed. The countries included are Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, China, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, 
Russia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. In addition, Article 
79 cases are reported from a number of arbitral institutions. These include the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA), 198 Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce, China International 
Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission (CIET AC), Hamburg Chamber of 
Commerce, Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Budapest, 
195 Mazzacano, supra note 18. 
196 UNIDROIT (ed.), UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004, 2d ed. (Rome: 
UNIDROIT, 2004). 
197 Commission on European Contract Law, The Principles Of European Contract Law, Parts I & 11, 
(Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1999). 
198 The arbitral award was subsequently challenged in U.S. courts, thus, this case is listed in this dissertation 
as one belonging to the domestic courts of the U.S. See Macromex Sri. v. Globex International Inc., infra, 
footnote 205. 
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Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), High Arbitration 
Court of the Russian Federation, Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration at the 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Tribunal of 
International Commercial Arbitration at the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Trade. 
In examining each Article 79 case in the relevant jurisdiction, an attempt is made 
to determine the extent to which the court or arbitral panel correctly interpreted Article 79 
in light of the CISG's mandate to promote uniformity in the area of international sales 
law. This approach is based on the assumption that an analysis of the case law is able to 
spot variations and discrepancies in judgments that consider Article 79, particularly in 
those decisions that deviate markedly from the interpretive standard imposed under CISG 
Article 7. In this manner, differences in the details and nuances in a wide range of case 
law concerning excuses for non-performance can be discerned. In addition, any 
interpretive errors are uncovered by utilizing this approach. The result is research that 
more accurately reflects the understanding and treatment of excuses for non-performance 
in CISG jurisprudence, particularly within the context of the national legal systems of 
each jurisdiction covered in this study. 
Similarly, a comparative law approach is an important tool of interpretation, 
particularly those that involve questions of uniformity. By liberating the researcher from 
the narrow confines of a single legal system, it helps to discern universally accepted legal 
principles and transcendent values concerning the law. 
This study also involves questions of statutory interpretation and contract theory 
within the context of the internationalization of sales law. However, statutory 
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interpretation and contract theory are not discussed in detail. In addition, domestic legal 
practices are analyzed only to the extent that they assist in the understanding of the 
development-of Article 79 as an autonomous, international norm. The·competing 
interests of various groups, factions, and states in the drafting of the CISG are also 
addressed. In addition, attention is given to determining whether any of the case law 
tends to favour or protect certain jurisdictions or industrial sectors. 
In the thirty years since the adoption of the CISG, there has developed a critical 
mass of case law, which provides the basis for this dissertation. However, it would be 
impractical to study the entire body of CISG jurisprudence within the confines of a single 
study. With over 2,500 cases reported worldwide on the CISG (plus 10,000 case 
annotations), 199 a review of all CISG jurisprudence would only point to broad trends and 
general conclusions. Similarly, it would also be impractical to study in-depth each one of 
the Convention's 101 articles. Such a task would fail to uncover the nuances and detail 
important to a focused scholarly inquiry concerned with autonomy and uniformity in the 
application of an international sales convention. 
To arrive at a better understanding of the development of CISG case law, this 
dissertation will concentrate only on court and arbitral cases concerning a single CISG 
article involving excuses for non-performance, Article 79. Thus, the research method 
includes the utilization of primary sources covering a rich body of Article 79 case law. 
Many of these cases have become available in the last few years. Until recently, only a 
few cases on Article 79 could be located. For example, in his 1997 article on contractual 
199 As ofSeptember4, 2012, according to the Pace Law School CISG Database. See 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/caseschedule.html>. 
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excuses in the Convention, Todd Weitzmann discusses only one Article 79 case.200 Scott 
D. Slater, writing in the following year, notes, "[a]n exhaustive review of international 
casdaw unearthed only two-[Article 79] cases worth considering".~01 Similarly, Joern 
Rimke found that "[ v ]ery little case law on Article 79 exists," mentioning only three 
cases.
202 It appears, however, that cases on Article 79 have existed as far back as 1989.203 
Until more recently, most CISG cases remained unreported, and were thus, unknown to 
most legal researchers. Of the cases that were known, translations-particularly from the 
German, Russian, and Chinese languages-into English were lacking. Fortunately, in the 
last few years there has been a veritable flood of case law on Article 79. 
This accomplishment is largely due to the efforts of the joint Pace Law School 
and Queen Mary Case Translation Programme, 204 which has added a large body of 
previously unreported or inaccessible CISG cases to the Pace Law School CISG 
databank. Through the efforts of an international network of volunteers, most (but not 
all) of the foreign language cases have been translated into English. As of June 10, 2010, 
the Pace Law School CISG Database reported 128 separate Article 79 cases205 from a 
200 Todd Weitzmann, "Validity and Excuse in the U.N. Sales Convention" (1997) 16 J. L. & Com. 265 at 
286-289. 
201 Scott D. Slater, "Overcome by Hardship: The Inapplicability of the UNIDROIT Principles' Hardship 
Provisions to CISG" (1998) 12 Fla. J. Int'l L. 231 at 255. 
202 Joern Rimke, "Force Majeure and Hardship: Application in International Trade Practice with Specific 
Regard to the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contacts," in Pace Int'l L. 
Rev. (ed.), Pace Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1999-2000), 
(New York: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 197 at 225. 
203 According to the Pace Law School CISG Database at 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/gueenmarv.html> 
204 According to the Pace Law School CISG Database, ibid. 
205 For a list of these cases see the Table of Authorities, infra. The list of 128 cases has been consolidated. 
That is, the search on the Pace Law School CISG Database originally listed 136 Article 79 cases, however, 
some of these were duplicate cases or related proceedings and appeals (e.g., trial level cases listed 
separately from the appeal case). One case, Macromex Srl. v. Globex International, Inc., began as an 
arbitral proceeding at the American Arbitration Association, but the award was subsequently appealed to 
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variety of signatory states and international arbitral panels. 206 Of these, 28 cases are 
cross-referenced to the UNCITRAL Digest on Article 79.207 The UNCITRAL collection 
the Federal District Court, and then the Circuit Court of Appeals. This case has been listed, not as an 
arbitral case, but as one under the domestic courts of the U.S. See Macromex Sri. v. Globex International 
Inc. at the Pace Law School CISG Database at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071023a5.html>. 
206 According to the Pace CISG website at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/anno-art-79.html. 
207 Supra note 44 at 25 I-26 I. The UNCITRAL Digest on Article 79 actually lists 29 cases. However, one 
of those cases (the Vine wax case from Germany) contains a duplicate proceeding, i.e. separate listing of 
the lower level court decisions. 
The UNCITRAL Digest cases are: Vital Berry Marketing v. Dira-Frost, Rechtbank van 
Koophandel [District Court] Hasselt 2 May I995, A.R. I849/94, 4205/94 (Belgium), online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950502b I .html>; Bulgaria Chamber of 
Commerce Arbitration Award, I2 February I998, Case I l/I996 [Steel ropes case], online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/9802I2bu.html>; Bulgaria Chamber of 
Commerce Arbitration Award, 24 April 1996, Case 56/I995 [Coal case], online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960424bu.html>; Cour d'appel [CA] Colmar, I2 June 200I, 
Societe Romay AG v. SARL Behr (France), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/O I 06 I 2fl .html>; Tribunal de commercial [Trib. com.] Besan~on, I 9 
January I998, Flippe Christian v. Douet Sport Collections (France), online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980I I9fl.html>; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] 
Zweibriicken, 2 February 2004, 7 U 4/03 (Germany) [Milling equipment case], online: Pace Law School 
CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040202g I .html>; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal 
Supreme Court], 9 January 2002, VIII ZR 304/00 (Germany) [Powdered milk case], online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020 I 09g I .html>; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] 
[Federal Supreme Court], 24 March I999, VIII ZR I2l/98 (Germany) [Vine wax case], online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990324gl.html>; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] 
[Appellate Court] Hamburg, 4 July I997, I U I43/95 and 410 0 2I/95 (Germany) [Tomato concentrate 
case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970704gl.html>; 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Hamburg, 28 February I997, I U I67/95 (Germany) [Iron 
molybdenum case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970228g I .html>; Hamburg Arbitration Award, 2 I March 1996 
(Germany) [Chinese goods case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/96032IgI.html>; Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Ellwangen, 2I 
August 1995, 1Kfll032/95 (Germany) [Spanish paprika case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/95082Ig2.html>; Amtsgericht [AG] [Lower Court] Alsfeld, I2 May 
1995, 31 C 534/94 (Germany) [Flagstone tiles case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/9505I2gl.html>; Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Berlin, 15 
September 1994, 52 S 247/94 (Germany) [Shoes case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/9505I2gl.html>; Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Aachen, I4 May 
1993, 43 0 136/92 (Germany) [Electronic hearingaid case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930514gl.html>; Budapest Arbitration Award, 10 December 1996, Vb 
96074 (Hungary) [Caviar case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/961210hl.html>; ICC Court of Arbitration, I995, Case 8128 [Chemical 
fertilizer case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/958I28il.html>; ICC Court of Arbitration, 1992, Case 7197 [Failure to 
open letter of credit and penalty clause case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/927I97il.html>; ICC Court of Arbitration, 28 August 1989, Case 6281 
[Steel bars case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/896281il.html>; Tribunale [District Court] Vigevano, I2 July 2000 n. 
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of case law contains far fewer cases on Article 79 than does the Pace Law School CISG 
database, but its advantage is that the UNCITRAL Digest also omits cases that refer to 
Article 79 in "<ltrinsignificant way. While some of the cases from the Pace CISG 
databank touch on Article 79 in a peripheral manner, and a small number of these cases 
remain un-translated, such a large body of case law wields invaluable information about 
the treatment of Article 79 from a cross-section of signatory states and international 
tribunals. Indeed, there now exists a critical mass of interpretive jurisprudence on Article 
79. As an online service that is frequently updated, the Pace CISG databank remains very 
current. The number of reported Article 79 cases on the Pace CISG databank, with a 
jurisdictional break-down of public court cases and arbitrations, is as follows: 
Figure 1 
Article 79 Court and Arbitral CasesLuc:s 
405 (Rhein/and Versicherungen v. Atlarex) (Italy), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html>; Tribunale [District Court] Pavia, 29 December 1999 
(Tessile v. lxela) (Italy), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991229i3.html>; Tribunale [District Court] Monza, 14 January 1993 n. 
R.G. 4267/88 (Nuova Fucinati v. Fondmetall International) (Italy), online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930114i3.html>; Malaysia Dairy Industries v. Dairex Holland, 
Arrondissementsrechtbank [Rb] [District Court] 's-Hertogenbosch, 2 October 1998 (Netherlands), online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981002nl .html>; High Arbitration 
Court of the Russian Federation, 16 February 1998, [Information Letter No. 29] [Onions case], online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980216rl.html>; Tribunal of 
International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 22 January 
1997, Award 155/1996 [Butter case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970122rl .html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 17 October 1995, Award 123/1992 [Automatic 
diffractameter equipment case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951017rl .html>; Tribunal oflnternational Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 16 March 1995, Award 155/1994 [Metallic 
sodium case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950316rl.html>; 
Handelsgericht [HG] [Commercial Court] Zurich, 10 February 1999, HG 970238.1 (Switzerland) [Art 
books case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990210sl.html>. 
208 According to an entire search of the Pace CISG databank (as of June 10, 2010). 
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Court Cases Number 
Austria 5 
Belgium 3 
China 1 
Finland 2 
France 3 
Germany 18 
Greece 2 
Hungary 1 
Israel 1 
Italy 4 
Netherlands 4 
Russia 1 
Slovak Republic 2 
Spain 1 
Switzerland 9 
United States of America 4 
Court Cases Sub-Total 61 
Arbitral Cases Number 
Bulgaria - Arbitration 3 
China-Arbitration 26 
Germany - Arbitration 1 
Hungary - Arbitration 2 
ICC - International Court of Arbitration 9 
Russia - Arbitration 25 
Ukraine -Arbitration 1 
Arbitral Cases Sub-Total 67 
Total 128 
In certain jurisdictions, commercial disputes involving the CISG are arbitrated 
rather than litigated in public courts. While there are numerous reasons why parties 
might choose arbitration over litigation, in some countries, such as China, Bulgaria, and 
Russia, commercial disputants are prevented from adjudicating their claims in public 
courts. Thus, arbitration is the only option. In addition, as access to the court system is 
blocked in these jurisdictions, the treatment of Article 79 needs to be assessed against 
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competing domestic laws onforce majeure and similar legal concepts. In this way, 
whether through the courts or arbitrations, an assessment can be made of the extent to 
-which a particular legal systems' legal culture either supports or impedes international 
uniformity in the approach to the interpretation of Article 79. For these reasons, Figure 2 
(below) illustrates the combined Article 79 public court and arbitral cases from the same 
jurisdiction (to the extent possible209). 
Figure 2 
Article 79 Court and Arbitral CasesL w 
Court Arbitral Totals 
Cases Cases 
Austria 5 5 
Belgium 3 3 
Bulgaria 3 3 
China 26 1 27 
Finland 2 2 
France 3 3 
Germany 18 1 19 
Greece 2 2 
Hungary 1 2 3 
ICC - International Court of Arbitration 9 9 
Israel 1 1 
Italy 4 4 
Netherlands 4 4 
Russia 25 1 26 
Slovak Republic 2 2 
Spain 1 1 
Switzerland 9 9 
Ukraine 1 1 
United States of America 4 4 
Court and Arbitral Cases Totals 61 67 128 
209 For obvious reasons, cases from the International Chamber of Commerce's International Court of 
Arbitration are not assigned to specific jurisdictions. 
210 According to an entire search of the Pace CISG databank (as of June 10, 2010). 
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As Figure 2 illustrates, the number of arbitrations (at 67) slightly outnumber-the 
number of court cases (at 61) involving Article 79 issues. Furthermore, China, Russia, 
-and Germany are:the most prolific Article 79 adjudicating jurisdictions (with 27, 26, and 
19 cases respectively). Also of note is that these countries are civil law jurisdictions. By 
contrast, only one common law jurisdiction, the United States, reports any case law on 
Article 79. Considering its status as one of the world's largest trading nations, the 
number of Article 79 cases from that country, at four, appears to be relatively low. 
It is to be noted that there are no reported cases on Article 79 in Canada, even 
though the country is one of the world's most active traders in goods.211 Indeed, the lack 
of Canadian jurisprudence on the CISG generally has been the subject of much 
commentary among academics212 and legal practitioners.213 Anecdotal evidence also 
suggests that it is often excluded by contracting commercial parties located in common 
law states.214 As noted above,215 research has thus far indicated that Canadian courts 
have been insensitive to the interpretative methodology embedded within the CISG.216 
They have typically invoked domestic legal concepts and case law when interpreting the 
211 World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2009 (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 
2009) at 12. According to the World Trade Organization, ibid., for the year 2008, Canada holds eleventh 
place as the world's importer and exporter of merchandise, accounting for 5 .3 percent of global trade in 
goods. 
212 See e.g. Mazzacano, "Canadian Jurisprudence" and "Brown & Root", supra note 18. 
213 At a recent Ontario Bar Association-International Law Section conference "Convention on Contracts of 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG)" a number of lawyers expressed a reluctance to incorporate the 
CISG into their clients' contracts. See James Klotz, Peter J. Mazzacano, and Antonin I. Pribetic, 
"Convention on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods (CISG)" (Toronto: International Law Section, 
Ontario Bar Association Conference, 10 March, 2009). 
214 Ibid. 
215 See e.g. Mazzacano, "Canadian Jurisprudence" and "Brown & Root", supra note 18. 
216 Under CISG Article 7(1 ). 
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Convention. Unfortunately, a more recent case study confirmed this same approach.217 
This apathy towards the CISG is not limited to Canadian courts. In terms of the broader 
effect of the CISG on the Canadian legal profession, John McEnvoy recently concluded 
that "the record of court and administrative tribunal decisions during the fifteen year 
period (1992-2007) does not reflect a significant CISG impact in Canadian legal 
practice". 218 At the international level, this parochial approach contributes to conflicting 
and diverging interpretations of the Convention's rules and presents a challenge to the 
quest to develop relative uniformity in international sales law. 
The CISG received a similarly indifferent response in the United States. This 
may assist in explaining why there are only four reported American Article 79 cases on 
the Pace Law School CISG website. This lack of case law is all the more striking 
considering that the United States is the world's largest trader of goods, accounting for 
over 21 percent of merchandise imports and exports in 2008.219 By way of comparison, 
Germany is the world's second largest trader in goods, and there are 19 reported Article 
79 cases from that country on the Pace website.220 Similarly, the Pace website records 
that China heard 27 cases to date on Article 79, while the country placed third as a 
leading trader of world goods. 221 Thus, although there seems to be a correlation between 
the extent of trade in goods and litigation or arbitration in cross-border trade, Canada and 
217 James M. Klotz, Peter Mazzacano & Antonin I. Pribetic, "All Quiet on the CISG Front: Guiliani v. lnvar 
Manufacturing, the Battle of the Forms, and the Elusive Concept of Terminus Fixus", Case Comment, 
(2008) 46 Can. Bus. L.J. 430 ["Guiliani"]. 
218 John P. McEvoy, "Canada" in Franco Ferrari, ed., The CISG and its Impact on National Legal Systems 
(Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 2008) at 33-70. 
219 World Trade Organization, supra, note 211at12. The U.S. accounted for 8 percent of world 
merchandise exports and 13 .2 percent of imports. 
220 Ibid. Germany is responsible for 16.4 percent of the world's imports and exports. 
221 Ibid. China accounts for 15.8 percent of the world's imports and exports. 
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the United States appear to be exceptions to this trend-at least in cases involving CISG 
Article 79. However, as this study will indicate, the unfortunate state of affairs for the 
--CISG in Canada andthe U.S. does not appear to be shared in many other signatory states. 
As this dissertation reveals, most of the courts and arbitral panels that have had an 
opportunity to interpret Article 79 have generally been sensitive to the provision as an 
autonomous, neutral international standard and norm that is different to related domestic 
legal doctrines. Of course, there are some exceptions: some courts and arbitral panels 
have resorted to domestic legal concepts when they should have conducted their legal 
analysis under the exclusive purview of the CISG and Article 79. In other words, the 
homeward trend is discemable in some of the Article 79 cases. However, although the 
record is not perfect, most courts, especially those in civil law countries, have paid heed 
to the interpretive mandate of CISG Article 7, and have treated Article 79 as being more 
comprehensive in scope than similar concepts in national laws. 
Based on this analysis, which is admittedly not comprehensive, it appears that the 
courts of certain countries, particularly the common law jurisdiction of the United States, 
remains acutely attuned to its own legal tradition and eschews unification efforts. By 
contrast, civil law jurisdictions, particularly those of continental Europe, are seemingly 
more receptive to uniform laws, such as the CISG. What accounts for this difference? 
Why does it appear that the civilian legal tradition is more attuned to the nuances and 
intricacies of the CISG? This dissertation will suggest a number of answers. 
Based on the analysis of case law and arbitral decisions, the evidence suggests 
that CISG jurisprudence from civil law countries is in harmony with the interpretive 
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mandate of the Convention to promote uniformity in its application, and pay heed to its 
international character. By contrast, common law countries, particularly the United 
States and ·Canada,: appear to have demonstrated a reluctance to embrace the CISG' s · 
international character, and have tended to treat it as an interloper. 222 In its place, 
domestic sales law is preferred, even though it is ill-equipped for international 
transactions. As a result, the development of sophisticated CISG case law and scholarly 
writings in common law jurisdictions has paled in comparison to the growth of CISG 
jurisprudence in civilian states. 
222 This trend has been documented by Mazzacano, "Canadian Jurisprudence" and "Brown & Root" supra 
note 18. See also Klotz, Mazzacano & Pribetic, "Guiliani" supra note 217. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND TO THE CISG 
A. The Ancient Lex Mercatoria as Autonomous Law 
For the last millennium, the European merchant class has been interested in 
engaging in business transactions across jurisdictions with relative autonomy outside the 
confines of local state authority. 223 With this interest-at times a preoccupation-
European merchants essentially rejected the political and legal authority of individuals or 
institutions that were not members of this class. In essence, these merchants believed that 
only members from their own class had the authority to make and enforce the rules that 
governed their lives. The principle of legal autonomy eventually evolved into a body of 
rules, known as the lex mercatoria or the Law Merchant. At the core of the lex 
mercatoria is a set of autonomous commercial customs, which materialize in the form of 
trade usages and practices. 
The term lex mercatoria has been described as "a uniform system of law to 
regulate international commercial transactions, avoiding the vagaries of differing national 
systems".224 As Julian Lew notes, "[t]his system oflaw [the lex mercatoria] comprises 
the rules which have been developed to regulate and facilitate international trade relations 
223 See generally A. Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) at 104-107. 
224 Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, Law & Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd ed., 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1991) at 11 7. 
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and the customs and practices which have attained universal (or at least very extensive) 
recognition in international trade".225 
Thus, the quest for predictability and uniformity in the rules- of international trade 
is not a modem phenomenon. Indeed, the roots of the CISG can be traced back more 
than 900 years to the beginning of the eleventh century when medieval Europe 
experienced a commercial resurgence that required a need for a special law to govern its 
commercial activities.226 The earliest known version, entitled Lex Mercatoria, has been 
dated circa 1280.227 This legal code is inextricably tied to the marketplace. The law 
itself appears to be a creation of the market, as the first sentence in the treatise notes: 
"Mercantile law is thought to come from the market, and thus we first need to know 
where markets are held from which such laws derive". 228 From this statement is the 
notion that mercantile law evolved from the merchant community, and by extension it is 
independent of local law and authority. However, it is not made explicit in the English 
medieval record until the fifteenth century that the lex mercatoria is considered to be 
positive law in the international community. 
A 14 73 case involving the seizure of goods from a foreign merchant records the 
notion that the lex mercatoria is transnational in its application.229 The Chancellor of the 
225 Julian D.M. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana 
Publications, 1978) at 436. 
226 See Errol P. Mendes, "The U.N. Sales Convention & U.S.-Canada Transactions; Enticing the World's 
Largest Trading Bloc to Do Business Under a Global Sales Law" (1988) 8 J.L. & Com. 109 available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/mendes.html. 
227 Mary Elizabeth Basile et al., eds. & trans., Lex Mercatoria and Legal Pluralism: A Late Thirteenth 
Century Treatise and its Afterlife (Cambridge: The Ames Foundation, 1998) at 107. This treatise, written 
in Latin, formed part of a collection of material compiled by William de Colford, the recorder of Bristol in 
the 1340s. It is sometimes also referred to as The Little Red Book of Bristol. 
228 Ibid. at Ch. 1, p. 1. 
229 Ibid. at 128. 
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Star Chamber asserted that foreign merchants must not be judged according to English 
law, but rather according to "the law of nature which by some is called the law merchant, 
which is law universat:.throughout the world".230 Gerard Malynes; writing in 1622; traces 
the existence of uniform merchant customs back to ancient Greek and biblical times, 
"[ s ]o that it plainely appeareth, that the Law Merchant, may well be as ancient as any 
humane Law, and more ancient than any written Law".231 Its precursor may have also 
been the Sea Law ofRhodes232 from ancient Greece, and the Romanjus gentium, which 
was the body of law that governed trade between foreigners and Roman citizens.233 
Eventually, the }us gentium proved to be so universal in its application that Gaius and 
Justinian could speak of it as "the common law of mankind" and "the law in use among 
all nations".234 However, even in Malynes' time, the lex mercatoria had gained such a 
foothold in the commercial routes of Europe and the Mediterranean that he could declare, 
"[ f]or albeit that the government of the said kingdoms and common-weal es doth differ 
one from another: [ ... ] In the making of law es and ordinances for their owne government 
[ ... ]yet the Law-Merchant hath always beene found semper eadem, that is, constant and 
permanent without abrogation, according to her most auncient customes, concurring with 
230 Ibid. at 128-129. The case is Anon. v. Sheriff of London {The Carrier's Case), YB Eas. 13 Edw. 4, fol. 9, 
pl. 5, in Exchequer Chamber Cases, 2:32. 
231 Gerard Malynes, The Merchant's Almanac of 1622 or Lex Mercatoria, the Ancient Law-Merchant 
(Metheglin Press ed., 1996) (1622). Malynes provides numerous references to ancient commercial laws 
and customs as being uniform among all trading states, from the time of Solon in ancient Greece to the 
publication of his Lex Mercatoria. He also refers to the trade endeavors of Jacob, Joseph, and Moses, as 
well as Minos, Lycurgus, Phalcas, and others. 
232 Cutler, supra note 223 at 113. 
233 Ana Mercedes Lopez Rodriguez, Lex Mercatoria, RETTID (2002) 46 available at 
http://www.rettid.dk/artikler/20020046. 
234 Andrew Stephenson, A History of Roman Law (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1912) at 197. 
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the law of nations in all countries". 235 Indeed, one of Malynes' themes throughout his 
work is that ancient customs grew into an autonomous and unique body of transnational 
law;-and this law deals most effectively with merchants' disputes. 
With the Middle Ages came the rise of independent city-states, flourishing 
seaports, town markets, and boroughs that led to the flow of goods across new national 
borders. 236 The merchants not only brought goods across borders; they also transported 
their unique customs and practices into foreign markets. The impetus to create or 
crystallize rules for merchants came from a "desire to overcome the fragmentary and 
obsolete rules of feudal and Roman law", which were unsuited to the needs of 
international commerce. 237 Thus, trading centers began to "reduce local practices into 
regulatory codes" and the laws of particular towns eventually "grew into dominant codes 
of custom" with an international flavor. 238 Stimulated by the maritime trade of 
burgeoning seaport towns throughout Europe, the lex mercatoria soon acquired its 
"cosmopolitan character and reflected [a retreat] from local law to a universal system of 
law" that transcended sovereigns and national boundaries. 239 The end result was 
autonomy, or a new legal order, free from burdensome local laws and local 
legislators.240 In other words, the lex mercatoria became not only an autonomous body 
of commercial law, but also the embodiment of commercial practices as reflected in 
merchant customs. 
235 Malynes, supra note 58 at 5 (grammar, spelling, and italics in the original). 
236 Mendes, supra note 53. 
237 Rodriguez, supra note 60. 
238 Gesa Baron, Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts Form a New Lex 
Mercatoria? at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/baron.html. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid. 
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A unique feature of the lex mercatoria was that it incorporated the customs of 
commerce, trade fairs, markets, and maritime customs relating to trade into a single 
law.241 ·It also had additional features, some of which were not unlike the principles-
adopted by its modem incarnation, the CISG: it was a transnational law; cross-border 
disputes could be administered by the market tribunals of various trade centers, rather 
than by professional judges and state courts; justice was quick and informal; and the law 
stressed equity and fairness, hence, some decisions were made on the basis of ex aequo et 
bono.242 The principle of pacta sunt servanda also became the cornerstone of the lex 
mercatoria.243 These features speak in favour of the importance of norms and values 
regarding merchant conduct in trade, and override the importance of adherence to a rigid 
code of state-made law to govern international sales transactions. 
The lex mercatoria governed international commerce for an extremely long 
period, until the early seventeenth century. At this point the autonomous mercantile 
courts began to decline in relative importance and the lex mercatoria began to merge with 
common law. 244 The reason for this wane is attributed to the rising influence of 
nationalism and the quest for state sovereignty. 245 The pace accelerated under the 
influence of Sir Edward Coke, who initiated a comprehensive common law for England 
and the British Empire.246 ''During this period, the common law courts were given the 
241 Louise Hertwig Hayes, "A Modem Lex Mercatoria: Political Rhetoric or Substantive Progress?" (1976-
1977) 3 Brook. J. Int'l L. 210 at 212-214. 
242 Baron, supra note 64. 
243 
"I.C.C. Award No. 3383 (1979)", Yb. Comm. Arb., 1982, 119 at 129; "I.C.C. Award No. 5.485 (1987)", 
Yb. Comm. Arb., 1989, 156 at 168. 
244 Baron, supra note 64. 
245 See e.g. Rodriguez, supra note 60 at 46-47. 
246 Mendes, supra note 53. 
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power to override any decision[s] in the mercantile courts".247 Thus, in the case of a 
dispute, merchants would initiate an action with the common law courts and bypass the 
·mercantile courts altogether. Eventually, the mercantile courts became superfluous and 
fell into disuse. Those that remained were ultimately abolished by national laws. 248 
"The customs and usages of the merchants, while still relevant, were deemed not 
binding in the common law courts". 249 Instead, "they were treated as ordinary questions 
of fact, which had to be proved [in each] case to the satisfaction of twelve [civilian] 
jurors".250 With the blending of the lex mercatoria with the peculiarities of national law, 
the former began to lose much of its uniform and cosmopolitan character. It likely would 
have faded into oblivion had it not been recognized in the mid-eighteenth century by 
Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice of the King's Bench. In the famous case of Pillans v. 
Mierop, 251 Mansfield held that the rules of the lex mercatoria were questions of law to be 
decided by the courts, not issues of fact to be proved by the disputing parties.252 With 
this ruling, the lex mercatoria became "an integral part of the common law". 253 
The nationalization of mercantile law, including international sales law, occurred 
in the nineteenth century. During this period, states began to codify commercial common 
law rules into national legislation. They decided to take full control over international 
trade and developed new laws to regulate all aspects of economic relations between 
247 Ibid. 
248 See ibid. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Pillans v. Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663, 97 E.R. 1035 (1765). 
252 Baron, supra note 64. 
253 Ibid. 
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commercial parties. 254 Furthermore, disputes between domestic and foreign parties were 
to be resolved in state courts by referring to private international law.255 The emergence 
··,of these national laws, and the exclusive state court jurisdiction over-commercial 
disputes, marked the demise of the ancient lex mercatoria. By the end of this era, it had 
dissolved into an array of domestic legal regimes. With nationalization and codification, 
a universal, developing, cosmopolitan, commercial law ceased to exist.256 
But by the 1900s, there were already signs that the international trade community 
felt unduly restricted by the array of national legal systems governing their cross-border 
transactions. As W. Mitchell remarks, "whenever the private law is splintered into many 
jurisdictional fragments, the need for uniformity shows up most strongly in the field of 
commercial law".257 The complexity of the rules of private international law, and the 
obsolete character of domestic laws, failed to satisfy the business community's need for 
simplicity and predictability in cross-border trade. In particular, conflict of law rules 
often produced results that appeared arbitrary and impractical. It also became recognized 
that national laws were primarily enacted to govern domestic transactions and often failed 
to address the unique requirements of international transactions.258 The end result was 
the impairment of global trade. As Lord Justice Kennedy wrote in 1909: 
254 Imtyaz M. Sattar, "The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Vienna 
Sales Convention: Competing or Completing 'Lex Mercatoria'?", (1999) 4 Int'l Trade & Bus. L. Ann. 13 at 
14. 
255 Friedrich K. Juenger, "The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law", (2000) 60 La. L. Rev. 1133 
at 1136. 
256 Baron, supra note 64. 
257 Mendes, supra note 53, citing W. Mitchell, Essay on the Early History of the Law Merchant (1st ed. 
1969) at 90. 
258 See e.g. Rodriguez, supra note 60 at 51. 
The certainty of enormous gain to civilised [sic] mankind from the 
unification of law needs no exposition. Conceive the security and 
the peace of mind of the shipowner [sic], the banker, or the 
merchant who knows that in regard to his transactions in a foreign 
·-, · · · - -·country the law of contract, of moveable property, and-of civil 
wrongs is practically identical with that of his own country.259 
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States soon became aware of the negative impact on international commerce by a 
world divided into so many legal systems. Non-governmental institutions, such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") and its International Court of Arbitration 
were established to address some of the flaws inherent in the national regulation of global 
commerce. 
260 In 1926, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
("UNIDROIT"), an independent intergovernmental organization, was also founded as an 
auxiliary organ of the League of Nations. Its objective was to find methods for 
modernizing and harmonizing private international law between states or groups of 
states.261 Following the demise of the League of Nations, UNIDROIT was re-established 
in 1940 and continues to work towards preparation of modem, harmonized uniform rules 
of private law.262 
B. The Modern Lex Mercatoria 
The establishment of the ICC and UNIDROIT reflected the renewed interest in-
and rediscovery of-the historical, cosmopolitan character of commercial law and the 
desire on the part of international merchants to free themselves from the restrictions of 
259 Lord Justice Kennedy, "The Unification of Law", (1909) 10 J. Soc'y of Comp. Legis. 21, 214-15 
reprinted in Kastely, supra note 38. 
260 International Chamber of Commerce, Merchants of Peace, The ICC Story available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/id6167 /index.html. 
261 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), About UNIDROIT, 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/presentation/main.htm. 
262 See ibid. 
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national law.263 States began to address this dissatisfaction by introducing international 
conventions and model laws in the effort to harmonize private international law across 
borders.i64 ·Considering the various economic, social; ·political, and iegal systems of 
numerous participating states, the process was-and continues to be-difficult and time-
consuming. However, considerable progress has been made, especially in the fields of 
arbitration, factoring, leasing, letters of credit, sale of goods, and contracts. In the 1960s, 
academics also began to question the effectiveness of national law in international 
transactions, and they also noted the revitalization of the lex mercatoria.265 
As Ana Rodriguez notes, "[j]ust as the medieval merchants overcame feudal law, 
present time traders were adopting alternative solutions to avoid the application of 
national law to their transactions".266 With the use of standardized contract clauses, self-
governing contracts, trade term usages, and recourse to international commercial 
arbitration, merchants began to introduce their own regulatory regime, which operated 
autonomously, as an addendum of national law.267 Indeed, some academics have 
suggested that the new law merchant is simply de-nationalized law.268 This development 
263 Mendes, supra note 53. 
264 See ibid. 
265 Rodriguez, supra note 60 at 4 7. 
266 Ibid. 
267 See ibid. 
268 See e.g. Barton S. Selden, "Lex Mercatoria in European and U.S. Trade Practice: Time to Take a Closer 
Look" (1995) 2 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 111. Barton provides an interesting contemporary example of 
de-nationalized (or internationalized) law. He notes a remarkable clause in the agreement to construct the 
English Channel Tunnel between Eurotunnel (the owner and operator) and Transmanche Link (the group of 
English and French construction companies). The clause provides that the agreement shall "be governed by 
and interpreted in accordance with the principles common to both English law and French law, and in the 
absence of such common principles by such general principles of international trade law as have been 
applied by national and international tribunals". Selden, ibid. at 116. 
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has since become known as the new lex mercatoria.269 It is within the context of this 
dissatisfaction with national legal regimes, and the renaissance of the lex mercatoria, that 
the CISG came into being. 270 ·, 
C. The History of the CISG 
The CISG was established, in part, due to a dissatisfaction with national legal 
regimes and a resurgence of the lex mercatoria.271 However, the CISG was not the first 
modem attempt to codify a uniform international sales law. In the 1930s, a group of 
European scholars, led by the Austrian scholar Ernst Rabel, met to work towards the 
unification of international sales law under the auspices ofUNIDROIT.272 Rabel laid the 
foundation of this initiative through his treatise Das Recht des Warenkaufs (Vol. 1, 1936). 
Work on this initiative was suspended, with the outbreak of World War II, until 1951. 
With the support of 21 nations, UNIDROIT eventually produced two draft conventions, 
the final versions of which were adopted by a diplomatic conference at The Hague in 
1964.273 These were the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods ("ULIS")274 
and the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
269 On the new lex mercatoria see note 18, supra. 
270 John Felemegas, "The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: 
Article 7 and Uniform Inteipretation", (2001-2002) Pace Rev. of CISG 115, 130-140. See also Bernardo 
M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, "The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the Laws of 
International Commercial Transactions" (1983-1984) B.U. Int'l L.J. 317 at 319-323. 
271 John Felemegas, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: 
Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation, PACE REV. OF CISG 115, 130-140 (2000-2001). See also Bernardo 
M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the Laws of 
International Commercial Transactions, B.U. INT'L L.J. (1983-1984) 317, at 319-323. 
272 See Mendes, supra note 31. 
273 See Ibid. 
274 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S 107 (July 1, 
1964). 
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("ULF").275 ULIS and ULF became the first modem attempts to eliminate the problems 
stemming from variations in national laws, particularly those rules relating to the sale of 
goods and conflicts oflaws rules.276 Despite this admirable objective, neither of these 
two conventions received widespread acceptance. The common complaint with ULIS 
and ULF is that they reflected the parochial legal and social traditions of the W estem 
European countries that were primarily responsible for their creation.277 Without the 
input from nations worldwide, and participation from states with divergent social and 
legal systems, a universal contract and sale of goods convention would never receive 
extensive support from the international commercial community. 
Credit for the drive to create a truly international version ofULIS and ULF may 
be given to the state of Hungary at the United Nations. While work on ULIS and ULF 
was being completed by UNIDROIT, the Hungarian Delegation proposed to the 
Nineteenth Session of the UN General Assembly the following: "consideration of steps to 
be taken for progressive development in the field of private international law with a 
particular view toward promoting international trade."278 The Hungarians were 
concerned that the conflicts inherent in private international law, arising from divergent 
national legal systems-and the resulting uncertainties and complications-were creating 
barriers to the development of global trade. 279 They spoke convincingly, and at length, in 
275 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, 834 U.N.T.S 169 (July 1, 1964). 
276 Felemegas, supra note 70, at 140. 
277 See Mendes, supra note 31. 
278 UNCITRAL, Report on the First Session, reprinted in U.N. COMM. INT'L TRADE L., at 5-12, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/SER.A/1970 (1971); see also Mendes, supra note 31. 
279 In the words of the Hungarian Delegation: "[t]he diversity of the rules of private international law 
applied by different States is a disturbing element, which leads to 'limping marriages,' to mutually 
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support of their argument. At one point, they quoted a passage from a 1962 colloquium 
on the law of international trade, held in London, which summarized their position: 
· [T]he main defect which this examination of the sources·of the law of· · · 
international trade has revealed is the lack of purposeful co-operation 
between the formulating international agencies [ .... ] [T]he law of 
international trade, by its nature, is universal and for that reason, a 
progressive liaison and co-operation between the formulating agencies 
should be the next step in the development of an autonomous law of 
international trade. 280 
The UN decided to take up the matter and the Secretary-General approved the 
production of a preliminary study based on the Hungarian recommendation. 281 
Considering the concurrent work ofUNIDROIT and other bodies, the preliminary study 
acknowledged that there were inefficiencies with the duplication of unification efforts by 
competing organizations. The Hungarians similarly complained that "this diversified 
activity, for all its usefulness, is lacking in direction, uniform organization and 
synthesis".282 The remedy for this apparent state of affairs would lie in the establishment 
of a central organ based at the UN, which would co-ordinate and supervise activities for 
the harmonization of private international law.283 
Thus, the Secretary General proposed the creation of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") to lead the global effort on the 
unification front. This recommendation was adopted by the General Assembly in 
contradictory judgments in different countries and makes the establishment of international relations 
complicated and difficult in the field of economic and commercial activities." Ibid. at 9. 
280 UNCITRAL, supra note, at 12. 
281 See G.A. Res. 2085 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/Res/2085 (XX) (Dec. 20, 1965). 
282 UNCITRAL, supra note 77 at 12. 
283 Mendes, supra note 31. 
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1966.284 The mandate ofUNCITRAL is to provide for the "progressive unification and 
harmonization of the law of international trade". 285 In keeping with the international 
character-of the UN, the organ is to "have due regard to adequate representation of the 
principal economic and legal systems of the world, and of developed and developing 
countries". 286 A number of representatives further expressed the hope "that out of the co-
operative endeavours of the Commission and other bodies active in the field, a new lex 
mercatoria would in time evolve reflecting the interest of the entire international 
community". 287 
At the first meeting of UNCITRAL in 1966, it was decided that priority was to be 
given to the development of a unified international sales law. Members of the UN were 
circulated copies of ULIS and ULF to solicit opinions on their acceptability as the basis 
for a new unified international law. However, neither of these two conventions were 
found to be adequate. The basic problem stemmed from the lack of participation from 
representatives of countries with different legal regimes in the creation of these 
conventions. In simple terms, ULIS and ULF were too Western European in orientation. 
Even one of the world's largest traders, the United States, had little to do with the 
creation ofULIS and ULF and never adopted the conventions.288 Thus, UNCITRAL 
proposed the preparation of a new international sales convention that would more 
accurately reflect a cross-section of the organ's world-wide composition. By taking a 
pluralistic approach, UNCITRAL was confident that a universal international sales 
284 See G .A. Res. 2205 (XX!), U.N. Doc. A/Res/2205 (XXI) (Dec. 17, 1966). 
285 Ibid. 
286 Ibid. 
287 UNCITRAL, supra note 77 at 77 (emphasis in the original). 
288 Nor did Canada adopt these conventions. 
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convention would win "wider acceptance by countries of different social, legal, and 
economic backgrounds". 289 
· In 1978; theUNCITRAL draft of what was to become the CISG was 
completed.290 It clearly attempted to improve upon its less successful antecedents, not 
just by incorporating a collection of various rules from common, civil, and socialist law 
traditions, but by aiming for a true synthesis of the best features available from all 
modern sales law regimes. As Errol Mendes was to later state, "[i]t must be vigorously 
stressed that the Sales Convention is not simply a collection of rules supplanted from a 
multitude of common law, civilian and other sources. Rather, the drafters have aimed for 
a synthesis of the best features that modern sale systems have to offer".291 In the process 
of drafting the CISG, an array of cross-border legal traditions were reconciled to create 
new approaches to existing problems, and an innovative convention was produced that is 
truly global in scope.292 
In 1980, a U.N. Conference was held in Vienna to consider UNCITRAL's draft 
convention. True to its international roots, the delegates at the conference came from 62 
states: 22 were from European or other developed Western states, 11 came from socialist 
countries, and the remaining 29 were from third world nations.293 After only five weeks 
of deliberations, the CISG was unanimously approved and, as Mendes notes, "the 
289 Mendes, supra note 31, quoted in Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods: an Overview, 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 223, 225 (1979). 
29° Felemegas, supra note 70, at 142. 
291 Errol P. Mendes, "The U.N. Sales Convention & U.S.-Canada Transactions; Enticing the World's 
Largest Trading Bloc to Do Business Under a Global Sales Law" (1988) 8 J.L. & Com. 109 at s. IV, para. 
1. 
292 Ibid. at 143-144. 
293 See Andersen, Uniform International Sales Law, supra note 8 at 161. 
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historical cycle of international sales law which began in the 11th & 12th centuries" was 
completed. 294 In this respect, perhaps the most significant aspect of the Vienna 
- --Conference was· that it represented a truly global effort by balancing- representation from 
all regions of the world. It also took into account diverse social, economic, and legal 
systems. In keeping with its international character, the CISG was adopted in six 
different languages. The result is a sales convention that attempts to both de-politicize 
international trade law and to escape the ethnocentric perspectives and biases of a single 
legal system. With the implementation of the CISG, as T.C. Drucker remarked, "[i]t is 
hoped that at least in the area of international sales Voltaire's complaint, when crossing 
Europe in the 18th century, will soon no longer hold true, namely, that he had to change 
laws as often as he changed horses".295 
Berthold Goldman in the 1960s, and Lord Mustill in the 1980s, spearheaded the 
modern revitalization of the lex mercatoria.296 This movement ultimately led to the 
creation of the CISG and related uniform conventions, such as the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration,297 and the UNIDROIT Principles,298 to 
294 Mendes, supra note 31. 
295 Ibid., citing T.C. Drucker, "A Common Law Perspective on International Sales Contracts" in Meredith 
Memorial Lectures 58, 66 (1982). 
296 Andrew Tweeddale & Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) at 194. The sources referred to in Tweeddale & Tweeddale include: Bertold 
Goldman, "La Compagnie de Suez, societe international" (4 October 1956) Le Monde at 3; Frontieres du 
droit et lex mercatoria ( 1964) Archives de philosophie du Droit at 177; La lex mercatoria dans /es contrats 
et/ 'arbitrage internationaux: realite et perspectives (Clunet, 1979) at 475. Lord Mustill, "The New Lex 
Mercatoria: The First Twenty-five years" (1987) inLiber Amicorumfor Lord Wilberforce. 
297 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, United National Commission on 
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), (United Nations document A/40117, Annex I, 21 June 1985). 
298 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 196. Note that the Preamble states: 
These Principles set forth general rules for international commercial contracts. 
They shall be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed 
by them. 
They may be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed 
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name a few. Lord Mustill analyzed the principles of the lex mercatoria and defined this 
body of law and custom as follows: 
In the first place, the lex mercatoria is 'anational." ·This concept· 
has two facets. First, the rules governing an international 
commercial contract are not, at least in the absence of an express 
choice oflaw, directly derived from any one national body of 
substantive law. Second, the rules of the lex mercatoria have a 
normative value which is independent of any one legal system. 
The lex mercatoria constitutes an autonomous legal order.299 
The lex mercatoria is, thus, a set of principles and norms from which merchants, 
courts, and arbitral panels can seek guidance to settle disputes. A difficult issue, 
however, is to determine which principles constitute the lex mercatoria. This 
imperfection allows critics to charge that the lex mercatoria-and by implication, its 
modem incarnation, the CISG-is a vague set of rules, or perhaps a "non-subject". 300 
Even Lord Mustill had to consider the usefulness of the lex mercatoria and ask "whether 
it can and does exist as a viable system". 301 
A main point that critics charge is that the lex mercatoria is not a "law", or it is, at 
most, "soft law", that is, it is a guide that sets a standard of conduct, but it is not legally 
binding.302 This criticism has similarly been made of the CISG.303 However, courts and 
arbitral panels have used soft law rules as evidence of international customary law in 
by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or the like. 
299 Lord Mustill, quoted in Tweeddale & Tweeddale, supra note 96 at 194. 
300 Ibid. at 194-195. 
301 Ibid. at 195. 
302 See e.g. Ralf Michaels, "The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State" (2007) 14 Ind. J. Global 
Legal Stud. 447. 
303 For an example of the use of CISG as "soft law", see Larry A. DiMatteo, "Resolving International 
Contract Disputes" (1998) 53 Disp. Resol. J. 75, at 79. DiMatteo states: "The CISG, along with the 
UNIDROIT Principles, provide arbitrators a suitable framework for deciding international contract disputes 
by the application of the general principles that underlie [these] documents". See also e.g. Rosett, supra 
note 21 and Kastley, supra note 38. 
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order to oust national laws. 304 Critics may argue that the lex mercatoria lacks both a 
methodological base, and a legal system supporting it, and is dependent on national legal 
·· ~ systems to·-Work efficiently. Moreover, it does not have any state authority from which it 
can derive its binding force. As such, it is typically argued, it cannot govern a contract, 
because a contract concluded between private parties must be based on the municipal law 
of some state. Law is made exclusively by nation-states. Hence, a contract intended to 
be subject to the lex mercatoria would be a stateless contract, one floating in a legal 
vacuum. A state-free contract, thus, presents a logical impossibility, and is an intellectual 
solecism. Furthermore, trade practices, usages, and customs of international trade acquire 
the character of law only to the extent that they are incorporated into national legal 
systems, either expressly or impliedly. 
Implicit in a critical perspective of the lex mercatoria is the notion that, as an 
autonomous body oflaw, it is incomplete, vague, and somewhat incoherent. In other 
words, it is indeterminate. It can be challenging to uncover what constitutes this alleged 
body of law, or try to locate where its corpus can be found. The general principles, rules 
which are reflected in the law of all trading nations and which are said to constitute the 
core of the lex mercatoria, are to be distilled by means of a comparative analysis of 
representative national laws. However, uncovering rules and principles that are common 
to most nations is a daunting task. Considering the diversity of national legal systems and 
the vast number of states, there are very few principles that are truly common to a 
representative number of legal systems. In addition, it is important to note that "common 
304 Larry A. DiMatteo, "Contract Talk: Reviewing the Historical and Practical Significance of the 
Principles of European Contract Law" (2002) 43 Harv. Int'l L.J. 569 at 571. 
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principles" are often too general and too broad to solve any but the simplest problem, let 
alone a complex commercial dispute. The often-cited principles of, for example, good 
faith,-·or pacta sunt servanda, -are, as such, abstract-principles: They· gain meaning only 
through the supplementary rules, court decisions, and the enforcement mechanisms in the 
various national legal systems. However, these interpretive devices can be viewed as 
leading to doctrinal inconsistency. As Clare Dalton notes, "doctrinal inconsistency 
necessarily undermines the force of any conventional legal argument, and [ ... ] opposing 
arguments can be made with equal force[ ... ] [L]egal argumentation disguises its own 
inherent indeterminacy [ ... ] [L ]egal doctrine is unable to provide determinate answers to 
particular disputes".305 Dalton's focus on doctrinal inconsistency, and by extension, the 
indeterminacy of law, is misplaced. While she was addressing issues in contracts, and 
not the lex mercatoria or the CISG, Dalton fails to appreciate that an international 
commercial code can provide for the acceptance of similar norms, and a common 
medium for communication-a lingua franca. 
The lex mercatoria evolved independently of local political authorities or 
institutions. It comprised a de-territorialized legal order, "that did not derive its 
normative claims from treaties amongst sovereign states". 306 As a private commercial 
order, it existed outside the local political economy. This gave rise to a dualistic system 
of governance in commerce: laws and regulations for local commerce and the lex 
mercatoria for transnational commerce. It was essentially a self-regulatory merchant 
305 Clare Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine" (1985) 94 Yale L. J. 997 at 1007. 
306 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, quoted in Cutler, supra note 223 at 109. 
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community in the creation of laws, and in dispute resolution. 307 This community also 
created property rights and entitlements that were entirely inconsistent with traditional 
·. medieval·concepts,of property.308 The conception of equity in merchant courts also 
differed considerably form the canonical view of equity. 309 Although there existed 
normative and institutional pluralism in medieval society, including canon law, feudal 
law, manorial law, urban law, and local merchant law, local authorities were unable to 
enforce the lex mercatoria, and deferred to merchant courts. 310 
The lex mercatoria, as an autonomous body oflaw, evolved contrary to the 
jurisprudence of positivism. Positivism is based on the theory that all law is derived from 
the will of sovereign states, and that international law is derived from the combined wills 
of many sovereign states. Hence, legislation is seen as the heart of law, and, contrarily, 
critics would tend to downplay the _importance of the role of commercial customs, norms 
and values as guiding behaviour. As Ole Lando states, "the binding force of the lex 
mercatoria does not depend on the fact that it is made and promulgated by State 
authorities but that it is recognized as an autonomous norm system by the business 
community and by State authorities".311 As such, the lex mercatoria, as a code oflegal-
commercial norms is different to the traditional concept of "law" as the law to be found 
in legal texts, codes, and case law. It is, moreover, an evolving, "living law" which is the 
307 Cutler, supra note 223 at 110. 
308 Ibid. at 111. 
309 Ibid. at 116-117. 
310 Ibid. at 109. 
311 Ole Lando, "The Lex Mercatoria and International Commercial Arbitration" (1985) 34 I.C.L.Q. 747 at 
754. 
product of the adaptability and inventiveness of commercial merchants and which, 
therefore, concentrates on those legal norms that can be enforced in practice. 
,·.:· .... : :•. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EXCUSES FOR NON-PERFORMANCE: 
DEVELOPMENT OF AN AUTONOMOUS CONCEPT 
A. The Creation of an Autonomous International Commercial Concept 
It is a premise of this dissertation that a problematic legal doctrine-commonly 
known as force majeure, an Act of God, impossibility, frustration, the German wegfall 
der geschaftsgrundlage, the French imprevision, and the like, but embodied in Article 79 
of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
("CISG" or "Convention")312 under the neutral wording of "excuse for 
nonperformance"-is an autonomous international commercial norm, and capable of 
relative uniformity within the context of the CISG's goal for a sales law that is 
transnational in design. A related consideration is that while excuses for non-
performance in CISG Article 79 may have developed out of an amalgamation of similar 
national conceptions which, in tum, grew from the conflicting Roman maxims pacta sunt 
servanda and rebus sic stantibus, Article 79's "excuse for non-performance" ultimately 
stands alone as an autonomous international doctrine under the CISG in private 
international law. It belongs to a private legal order and is part of the non-state 
commercial lexicon of the new lex mercatoria. 
This development plays a crucial role for uniformity in private international law 
generally, and specifically for international sales law. It supports the idea that in certain 
cases, particularly in international commercial transactions, individual domestic legal 
312 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, April 11, 1980, 1489 
U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671, hereinafter cited as the "CISG" or "Convention." 
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doctrines and norms-some of which evolved out of Roman maxims- can transcend 
state-based law making, and may ultimately coalesce into autonomous international 
principles, regardless of their distinctive legal development in state-based jurisdictions. 
B. Roman Origins 
The concept of a legal excuse for the non-performance of an obligation due to an 
unforeseen event did not fully develop until trade began to flourish in the medieval 
Mediterranean world. In many respects, it arose to meet the needs of a vibrant-and 
increasingly international-mercantile community. The principle was not explicitly 
recognized in the laws of ancient Rome.313 The Roman Republic did not know the word 
impossibilis; the idea could be expressed, but only in Greek.314 This is not surprising as 
early Roman law did not have a comprehensive body of contract law.315 Rather, Roman 
law embodied various classifications ofliability, but no comprehensive system of 
contractual responsibility.316 In many respects the laws of Rome also failed to adequately 
address the needs of commerce. There was no separate court for the trial of mercantile 
disputes, and its commercial and maritime law was part of the general law.317 In the early 
313 J. Toshio Sawada, Subsequent Conduct and Supe~ening Events {Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 
1968) at 114. 
314 W.W. Buckland, "Casus and Frustration in Roman and Common Law" (1932) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 at 
1281. See also D. 28.7.1.20. pr. 
315 Anthony Jeremy, "Pacta Sunt Servanda: The Influence of Canon Law Upon the Development of 
Contractual Obligations" (2000) 144 Law & Just. Christian L. Rev. 4 at 4. 
316 Malcolm P. Sharp, "Pacta Sunt Servanda" (1941) 41 Colum. L. Rev. 783 at 785. 
317 Frederick Rockwell Sanborn, Origins of the Early English Maritime and Commercial Law (New York: 
The Century Co., 1930) at 8. Here, Sanborn describes Roman law, by way of contrast to other legal 
systems, as being unitary and much more "abstract" and "sharply defined" in nature. He concurs with 
Francois Morel and Levin Goldschmidt that such a separate mercantile law would have been "contrary to 
the centralizing genius of the Roman law, and [ ... ] contrary to their tradition of its unity". Op. cit. See also 
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days of the Latin language there were no words to express sea terms, even though the 
commercial Sea Code of Rhodes, a Greek creation, came into existence in the second or 
third century B.C.E.318 Even the term contractus retained a very restricted meaning, 
denoting lawful conduct that could give rise to liability.319 Gaius does not even define 
the term in his commentaries. 320 It was far removed from the modem concept of 
"contract". Only certain types of transactions were recognized, leaving many types of 
agreements to exist without legal validity. In the classical period, 321 parol contracts did 
not create a binding legal obligation, and the term nuda pacta ("bare pacts") initially 
represented this array of unsanctioned agreements that were common, but not enforceable 
in law.322 They were unenforceable for want of an action at law to make them binding, 
and were simply thought to be "natural obligations".323 
Like much of Roman law, Gaius' discussion of the law of obligations is very 
narrow and focused. There was the verbal contract, 324 the stipulatio, which consisted of a 
formalistic series of questions and answers. 325 But this was valid only between Roman 
Francois Morel, Les juridictions commerciales au moyen-iige: etude de droit compare (Paris: Arthur 
Rousseau, 1897), and Levin Goldschmidt, Handbuch des Handelsrechts, vol. i (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1891). 
318 Ibid. at 5 and 8. 
319 Coenraad Visser, "The Principle Pacta Servanda Sunt in Roman and Roman-Dutch Law, with Specific 
Reference to Contracts in Restraint of Trade" (1984) 101 S.A.L.J. 641 at 642. 
320 W.F. Harvey, A Brief Digest of the Roman Law of Contracts (Oxford: James Thornton, 1878) at 2. 
321 Circa 350 B.C.E. 
322 Jeremy, supra note 315 at 4-5. 
323 Ibid. at 6. 
324 While a written agreement was not necessary to make a stipulatio valid, often one was drawn up to 
record the transaction. See Thomas Collett Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian (Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 
1876) at 427. 
325 Charles Sumner Lobingier, The Evolution of Roman Law, 2d ed. (n.p.: published by the author, 1923). 
In the Institutes, Gaius describes the stipulatio as follows: 
A verbal contract is formed by question and answer, thus: "Dost thou solemnly 
promise that a thing shall be conveyed to me"? "I do solemnly promise". "Wilt 
thou convey"? "I will convey". "Dost thou pledge thy credit"? "I pledge thy 
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citizens, thereby excluding foreigners. Within the stipulatio, however, are the formative 
ideas that later evolved into more developed legal principles, such as force majeure, 
·frustration, impossibility, hardship, and the CISG variant in Article 79. For example, in 
his title on invalid stipulations, Gaius tells us that "if any one stipulates for a thing which 
does not, or cannot exist, as for Stichus, who is dead, but whom he thought to be living, 
or for a Hippocentaur, which cannot exist, the stipulation is void". 326 While the notions 
of impossibility and non-performance are evident here, absent are other fundamental 
ideas, such as a supervening event and unforeseeability. These are necessary in the 
doctrine of excuses for non-performance. Furthermore, there is also an absence of the 
concept of good faith, even though the idea of ex fide bona was a part of later Roman 
contract law involving sales, hires, and partnerships. 
Like the Roman action of bona fidei judicium, 327 good faith is implicit in the 
doctrine of excuse for non-performance, as it requires the parties to do, not what has been 
exactly promised, but rather that which is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. 
Roman law rules of ex fide bona were initially concerned with jurisdictional matters, not 
those of an ethical nature or moral responsibility. 328 Later, with the rise of commerce, 
and under the Christian influence of Justinian, the Canonists would imbue ex fide bona 
with the ideals of conscience and equity, and urge litigants to do what good faith and 
credit". "Dost thou bid me trust thee as guarantor"? "I bid thee trust me as 
guarantor". "Will thou perform"? "I will perform". 
G. 3.92 (trans. Thomas C. Sandars). 
326 G. 3.97 (Title XIX. "De Inutilibus Stipulationibus"). 
327 The action of Bona Fidei Judicium directed the judge of a dispute to found his judgment on the basis of 
good faith. In these cases the judge would order the defendant to render performance on the basis of good 
faith. In the action of Bona Fidei Judicium, the judge was thus given authority to introduce a good faith 
formula, and take into account informal agreements that would normally be unenforceable in law. See 
Jeremy, supra note 315 at 5. 
328 Ibid. at 4. 
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conscience required.329 As Baldus de Ubaldis (1327-1400) noted, bare pacts among 
merchants became actionable at a very early stage, "since good faith is required in these 
cohtracts which are most frequently concluded, and in these -respects a bare pact does not 
differ from a stipulation". 330 These became known as good faith agreements, and covered 
sales, hire, and partnerships. They allowed a judge to take into account implied terms, 
customs, and the unexpressed intent of the parties. In addition to the development of 
good faith, the concepts of a supervening event and unforeseeability would later evolve, 
as commerce expanded and legal rules adapted to more complex business transactions. 
While some scholars have attempted to discern the predecessor of the doctrine of 
excuses for non-performance in Roman private law, there is little evidence to support this 
finding. 331 As noted above, its beginnings are fractured in a variety of undeveloped legal 
maxims and ancient legal rules. The underpinning idea can be traced back to the Code of 
Hammurabi (2250 B.C.E.). For example, it stated that "the hirer of an ox is bound to 
return it safe and undamaged but he is excused from his liability for its death in two 
cases: the first is ins. 244 where the ox is devoured by a lion 'in the open country'; the 
second is in s. 249 when a god has struck it". 332 There are also references to legal 
excuses for non-performance in ancient Greek law, but these are only tenuous 
connections. 333 All that existed were certain formative ideas, and these would require 
considerable historical and legal development and articulation before crystallizing into 
329 Ibid. 
330 Gloss ad D. 13.5.1. 
331 Sawada, supra note 313 at 114 fn. 30. 
332 G.R. Driver and John C. Miles, eds. & trans., The Babylonian Laws (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1952) at 438-440. 
333 Ibid. at 114. 
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modem concepts such as force majeure, impossibility, frustration, and Article 79's 
excuses for non-performance. 
·The closest ancient iteration containing certain aspects of the doctrine is evident 
in Gaius' discussion of cases in which a stipulatio would be deemed invalid. He stated: 
"[i]f any one stipulates for a thing sacred or religious, which he thought to be profane, or 
for a public thing appropriated to the perpetual use of the people, as a forum or theatre, or 
for a free man, whom he thought to be a slave [ ... ] the stipulation is at once void". 334 
These also included agreements, for example, imposing an impossible condition, such as 
a non-existent or unattainable object, 335 or a deceased336 or insane337 person. Also void 
were illegal pacts, or those between persons who had no legal capacity to form 
agreements. 338 Otherwise, obligations were to be strictly enforced, in a similar fashion to 
the much later doctrine of pacta sunt servanda. Over time even the nuda pacta became 
actionable, and was transformed into the pacta vestita ("clothed pacts"). 
Not surprisingly, contract law began its slow development with the expansion of 
the Roman merchant empire. While Rome expanded rapidly by conquest following the 
First Punic War, 339 and foreigners, lured by commercial opportunities, flocked to the 
urban centres, the jus civile, the primary body of law that applied only to Roman citizens, 
failed to address these new conditions. 340 Initially the jus gentium, which was considered 
334 G. 3.97. 
335 
"A condition is considered impossible of which nature forbids the accomplishment; as, if a person says, 
'Do you promise ifl touch the heavens with my finger"'? G. 3.98. 
336 G. 3.100. 
337 G. 3.106. 
338 G. 3.104, 109. 
339 From 264 to 241 B.C.E. 
340 Andrew Stephenson, A History of Roman Law (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1912) at 197. 
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to be a component of the jus civile, was limited to transactions between foreigners and 
Roman citizens.341 Eventually, thejus gentium adapted and became the body oflaw that 
governed all commercial matters, covering both citizens and foreigners. 
C. The Rise of Pacta Sunt Servanda 
Even though the word pactum is one of the oldest words in the Latin language, the 
exact wording of the maxim pacta sunt servanda ("agreements must be honoured") was 
not common in the days of the Roman Empire. 342 However, the concept of the sanctity of 
contracts is universal: it is found in all legal systems, in all periods of history, in all 
cultures, and in all religions.343 For example, in 1292 B.C.E., a peace treaty was created 
between Ramses II and Hatushill III in which their respective gods were held to 
guarantee the sanctity of their agreement. Although the pacta maxim, which has since 
been elevated to a recognized legal principle, has its roots in Roman law, identical 
doctrines exist in Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Confucian, and in communist systems. 344 
It would appear that pacta sunt servanda has provided a standard of conduct for 
humanity from time immemorial. It is one of the world's most important legal norms, 
and it enjoys a very long tradition in all national legal systems. As an arbitral panel the 
held in Liamco v. Libya, "[t]he principle of the sanctity of contracts[ ... ] has always 
constituted an integral part of most legal systems. These include those systems that are 
based [on] Roman law, the Napoleonic Code (e.g. article 1134) and other European civil 
341 Lobingier, supra note 325 at 213. 
342 Richard Hyland, "Pacta Sunt Servanda: A Meditation" (1994) 34 Va. J. Int'l Law 405 at 412. 
343 W. Paul Gormley, "The Codification of Pacta Sunt Servanda by the International Law Commission: The 
Preservation of Classical Norms of Moral Force and Good Faith" (1969) 14 St. Louis U. L.J. 367 at 373. 
344 Ibid. at 373-374. 
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codes, as well as Anglo-Saxon Common Law and Islamic Jurisprudence 'Shari'a"'.345 
The pacta principle reflects not only natural justice, but also an economic necessity: 
·commerce would not be possible without reliable promises. -As a basic and universal · 
principle, it is today recognized in Article 1.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles,346 and 
codified in international law in Article 26 (entitled "Pacta sunt servanda") of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law ofTreaties.347 Unquestionably, it is a paramount feature of 
contract law. 
The pacta maxim was first used in a slightly altered form in 348 A.D. in a 
consilium by the Church involving a dispute between two bishops.348 It read: [p]acta 
quantumcunque nuda servanda sunt ("pacts, however naked, must be kept"). 349 The full 
phrase is not found in Justinian's Digest, even though an entire chapter is devoted to 
agreements, entitled De pactis.350 In the Decretals of Gregory IX, issued in 1234, it is 
found again in a modified form as a sub-heading to a chapter on agreements.351 The 
maxim as it is known today was likely first coined in the seventeenth century by the 
German jurist Samuel von Pufendorf ( 163 2-1694). 352 
D. Legal Abstraction and the Introduction of Rebus Sic Stantibus 
345 April 12, 1977, Y.B. Comm. Arb., (1981) 89 at 101. 
346 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 196. 
347 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980). The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties has been ratified by 111 states as of 16 June 2010. 
348 Gormley supra note 343 at 415-416. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Ibid. at 411-412. 
351 Ibid. at415. 
352 Ibid. at 421-422. 
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Over the course of many centuries, excuses for non-performance did eventually 
develop into a recognized legal principle. This development was likely assisted by new 
scientific discoveries that-forced academics to think in more abstractterms.35~ Without 
this level of abstraction, general legal principles would not evolve. Instead, what would 
follow would be a series oflegal rules (i.e. maxims) and their exceptions, as typically 
found in Roman law.354 In this way, excuses for non-performance evolved out of two 
conflicting Latin maxims: pacta sunt servanda355 and rebus sic stantibus ("assuming 
things remain the same"). 356 
Individually, neither maxim adequately addressed the situation where unforeseen 
supervening events made contractual performance impossible. Pacta sunt servanda 
would insist on performance in spite of the impossibility. Alternatively, reliance on rebus 
sic stantibus provided too much uncertainty in contractual relations. As a result of this 
inherent conflict, each maxim presented a different vision of contractual relations. As 
David Bederman stated: "[ o ]ne is harmonious, predictable, and stable; the other is 
dynamic, dangerous and uncertain". 357 This begs the question: how can a promise to 
perform a contractual obligation be reconciled with a fundamental change in 
circumstances? The development of the principle of an excuse for contractual non-
353 Ibid at 419. Hyland uses the example of Galileo's discovery of the trajectory of a cannon shot. In 
finding that the cannon ball follows the outline of a parabola, he needed to separate the movement into its 
discrete parts. These distinctions are not empirically observable. Rather, they force men to think in 
abstract terms, and visualize each part of the movement of the cannon ball along the plane and its free fall. 
The same approach is used to develop legal maxims into more sophisticated general legal principles. 
354 Ibid. 
355 See Hyland, ibid. and Coenraad Visser, "The Principle Pacta Servanda Sunt in Roman and Roman-
Dutch Law, with Specific Reference to Contracts in Restraint of Trade" (1984) 101 S.A.L.J. 641. 
356 Guenter Treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at 1. 
357 David J. Bederman, "The 1871 London Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View of the 
Law of Nations" (1988) 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 at 2. 
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performance, as in CISG Article 79, seeks to address this apparent contradiction. 
However, prior to the adoption of the CISG, it took a number of centuries to resolve the 
conflict between these two competing principles.- ·y 
E. Medieval Origins of the Principle of Excuse for Non-Performance 
The rigid position of pacta sunt servanda was based on ancient religious notions 
that developed long before the Roman Empire. The Chaldeans of Babylon, the ancient 
Greeks, Egyptians, and Chinese, all believed that the gods participated in the creation of a 
contract-and the divine became guarantors of the commitment. 358 In Islam, pacta sunt 
servanda also has a religious foundation, and Muslims are entreated to "abide by their 
stipulations". 359 The Koran, for example, states "[b ]e true to the obligations which you 
have undertaken[ ... ] Your obligations which you have taken in the sight of Allah[ ... ] For 
Allah is your witness". 360 As guarantors of the contract, and under divine threat, the gods 
ensured that the parties would honour their agreements, regardless of subsequent 
unforeseen hardship or impossibility of performance. The violation of a promise, 
partic~larly an oath made under the gods, was a punishable spiritual offence.361 In this 
way, contractual promises and performance became entwined with ancient religious 
. d 362 practices an customs. 
Early Christianity had a great impact on ideals concerning the sanctity of 
contracts. In the late fourth century, St. Augustine (354-430) preached that individuals 
358 Hans Wehberg, "Pacta Sunt Servanda" (1959) 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 775 at 775. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Passage is quoted in Wehberg, ibid. 
361 Jeremy, supra note 315 at 8. 
362 Ibid. 
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must always keep their word, even with enemies. 363 Thomas Aquinas echoed this view 
regarding the performance of contracts with foes. However, in words that foreshadow the 
modem principle of.excuses for non-performance, Aquinas also said that if the 
circumstances that existed at the time of contract formation had radically changed, non-
performance of the contract would be excusable.364 This notion likely evolved from the 
philosophical writings of Cicero (106-43 B.C.E.) and Seneca (4 B.C.E.-65 C.E.) who 
acknowledged that promises and agreements could be adapted to unforeseen and 
extraordinary changes in circumstances. 365 Cicero used the example of a person who 
promised to store another's sword, but argued that he was not obliged to return the sword 
if the depositor had subsequently become insane.366 Seneca devoted a chapter on the 
subject of exceptions to promises. His opening statement sets the framework: "When I 
promise to bestow a benefit, I promise it, unless something occurs which makes it my 
duty not to do so". 367 The Roman praetor also accepted this principle. 368 These views 
were helpful to those who admitted that there were exceptions to the sanctity of contracts. 
This idea was one of the formative components that later led to the development of the 
maxim of clausa rebus sic stantibus. This maxim found its way into Canon law in the 
363 Wehberg, supra note 358 at 775-776. 
364 Ibid. at 777. Reference is to Aquinas' Summa Theologica at 2, 2, q. 140. 
365 Ingeborg Schwenzer, "Force Majeure and Hardship in International Sales Contracts" (2008) 39 
V.U.W.L.R. 709 at 710 fn. 3. 
366 De Officiis, 1.10.31 and 3.25.94-95. 
367 De Beneficiis, 4.35.1. 
368 Schwenzer, supra note 365 at 710 fn. 3. 
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fourteenth century as rebus sic se habentibus, and was first used as a principle in contract 
law in 1507. 369 
For the Canonist lawyers of the early medieval period, a violation of.a promise 
became a sin, regardless of whether the promise had been made under the strict legal 
formalities of secular law. The Canonist Angelus Carletus put it in the following words: 
"The question is whether a man is bound by a naked pact. The answer is that he is so 
bound by Canon Law and in Conscience, under pain of mortal sin". 370 To break a 
promise was, in the eyes of the Canonists, perjury. In the eyes of God, even informal 
promises were to be as obligatory as those made under oath. The authority for this 
principle came from Jesus himself.371 These religious notions eventually transformed the 
nuda pacta into the pacta vestita. From the belief that all agreements were binding, the 
Canonists imbued the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda with the Roman law notion of ex 
fide bona. In this way, the Canonists infused the pacta sunt servanda principle with 
duties of conscience and equity, and directed the individual to do what good faith and 
conscience required. 372 Through this development, parol contracts of merchants and 
nuda pacta, which would previously have created no enforceable legal relationships, 
came to be recognized as bona fide negotia or "good faith agreements".373 This type of 
agreement bound merchants to perform not exactly what had been promised, but rather 
what might reasonably be expected under the circumstances. Conceptually, this laid the 
369 Ibid. at fn. 2 and fn. 3. Schwenzer notes that the phrase rebus sic stantibus was used by Jason de Mayno 
(1435-1519). 
370 Angelus Carletus, Summa Angelica quoted in Jeremy, supra note 315 at 8. 
371 
"Again you have heard that it was said to men of old, 'You shall not swear falsely, but shall perform to 
the Lord what you have sworn'". Matthew 5:33 (Revised Standard). 
372 Jeremy, supra note 315 at 4. 
373 Ibid. at 5. 
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foundation to exceptions or legal excuses for the non-performance of contractual 
obligations. 
The Canenists, in particular, Christopher St. Germain (1460-1540), had little ·· 
difficulty in synthesizing these various-and sometimes conflicting-legal concepts. No 
doubt, scientific abstraction also played some role in the development of legal maxims 
into more elaborate legal principles. Echoing the words of Angelus Carletus (1411-1495) 
in his Summa Angelica, St. Germain tells us that binding promises must meet a number of 
criteria. These include, inter alia, that the promise is intentional, and that it may be 
disavowed ifthere is a material change in circumstances.374 St. Germain's criterion sets 
the stage for rebus sic stantibus. The influence of the Canonists in the development of 
the law is clearly evident. The Canonists' proved decisive in developing the concept of 
pacta sunt servanda, even in the case of nuda pacta. This effect upon the nascent legal 
systems of Europe was to be significant. 375 In the West from the fifteenth century 
forward-roughly the era of Galileo (1564-1642)----contracts were to be honoured, unless 
there was no intent to attach legal significance to them, or unless a supervening material 
event discharged the parties' contractual obligations. 
An additional influence on the conceptualization of contractual obligations in 
Europe was the adoption of pacta sunt servanda by the natural law lawyers and 
philosophers. One of the most prominent was Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). Writing an 
374 Paul Vinogradoff, "Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth-Century Jurisprudence" (1908) 24 L.Q. Rev. 
373 at 382. The passage from St. Germain is from his work The Doctor and Student circa 1530. 
375 According to Harold D. Hazeltine, "during the centuries when this long process (the growth of secular 
legal systems) of development was taking its course, the Canon Law, profoundly influenced by the 
renaissance of Roman law, had slowly taken its place as a world wide system of jurisprudence". See 
Hazeltine, "Roman and Canon Law in the Middle Ages" in J.R. Tanner, C.W. Previte-Orton, & Z.N. 
Brooke, eds., The Cambridge Medieval History, vol. 5 (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1926) at 749. 
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entire chapter on the subject of promises, 376 he viewed bona fides as being inextricably 
linked with pacta sunt servanda: "good faith [is] the foundation of justice [ ... ] God 
· Himself would act contrary to His nature if He did not make good on His promises ... 
From this it follows that the obligation to perform promises arises from the nature of 
immutable justice". 377 Pufendorf followed Grotius' perspective in this regard and held 
that the sanctity of a promise was one of the inviolable rules of natural law. 378 A short 
time later, pacta sunt servanda was brought out in strong relief by Erner de Vattel ( 1 714-
1767). Although his primary concern was to apply the principle to the laws of nations, 
Vattel recognized its value in all contractual relationships. Phrasing it in very human 
terms, he noted that "[i]t is a settled point in natural law, that he who has made a promise 
to any one, has conferred upon him a real right to require the thing promised-and 
consequently, that the breach of a perfect promise is a violation of another person's right 
[ .. .like] it would be to rob a man ofhis property".379 In Vattel's view, rebus sic stantibus 
should only be used with the greatest of caution, and it was to play a subservient role to 
pacta sunt servanda. 380 It would be unjust to have to have a contracting party take 
advantage of rebus sic stantibus to release it from its contractual obligations: "we ought 
to be very cautious and moderate in the application of the present rule [rebus sic 
376 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), trans. by Francis W. Kelsey (Buffalo: William S. Hein & 
Co. Inc., 1995) at 328 (corresponding to Book II, chap. XI, "On Promises"). 
377 Ibid. at 330-331 (corresponding to Book II, chap. XI). 
378 Wehberg, supra note 358 at 779. Wehberg is referring to Pufendorfs Dejure naturae et gentium 
(1672), Book II, chap. III, s. 23 and Book III, chaps. III, IV, ss. 1, 2 respectively. 
379 Erner de Vattel, The Law of Nations (1758), trans. by [anonymous] (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc. 
2008) at 342 (corresponding to Book II, chap. XII, s. 163). 
380 Ibid. at 430 (corresponding to Book II, chap. XVII, s. 296). 
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stantibus]: it would be a shameful perversion of it, to take advantage of every change that 
happens in the state of affairs, in order to disengage ourselves from our promises".381 
· · -- · · · All contracts are based on the idea that at the commencement of a contract, risks 
are allocated to each party. As such, these risks must not be later disturbed unilaterally 
by one of the parties, or revised by the courts. This is the foundation of the tenacious 
pacta sunt servanda principle. In contrast, rebus sic stantibus acts as a counter-principle 
to pacta sunt servanda. Without pacta sunt servanda there would have been little need 
for the development of an exception to it, hence, reliance on rebus sic stantibus became 
dependent on the existence of pacta sunt servanda. Indeed, the notion that rebus sic 
stantibus is a recognized legal doctrine has even been contested. 382 Some have viewed it 
as nothing more than a creation of political theory, born from the statecraft of Cicero and 
Machiavelli (1469-1527).383 Regardless of its origins, as dubious as they may be, rebus 
sic stantibus has become a principle that is recognized today (albeit, in various guises) in 
every legal system. 
As an exception to pacta sunt servanda, rebus sic stantibus developed in the late 
medieval period to incorporate the premise that contractual terms are not absolute, but 
relative. In this respect rebus sic stantibus set the basis for the establishment of the 
modem doctrine of excuse for non-performance. From this perspective was the notion 
that parties enter contracts with certain shared and implicit assumptions. However, a 
fundamental change in subsequent circumstances may destroy the basic assumptions 
381 Ibid. 
382 Bederman, supra note 357 at 8. This criticism of rebus sic stantibus has come primarily from publicists 
in the field of international public law. They view it as an illegitimate child of international law, as it 
provides states with an excuse to renege on their treaty obligations. 
383 Ibid. 
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upon which the contract was formed. The effect of this legal abstraction was to discharge 
a contract due to a supervening event that made performance excessively onerous or 
--impossible. However, as an exception to contractual performance, the use of rebus sic 
stantibus was to be severely curtailed. From the outset, it was applied in a restrictive 
manner, not only in national courts, but also in arbitral practice. This approach continued 
into the modem era. Thus, by 1971 the sole arbitrator in ICC Case No. 1512 could state: 
The principle 'Rebus sic stantibus' is universally considered as being of 
strict and narrow interpretation, as a dangerous exception to the principle 
of sanctity of contracts. Whatever opinion or interpretation lawyers of 
different countries may have about the 'concept' of changed circumstances 
as an excuse for non-performance, they will doubtless agree on the 
necessity to limit the application of the so-called 'doctrine rebus sic 
stantibus' (sometimes referred to as 'frustration', 'force majeure', 
'imprevision', and the like) to cases where compelling reasons justify it, 
having regard not only to the fundamental character of the changes, but 
also to the particular type of the contract involved, to the requirements of 
fairness and equity and to all circumstances of the case.384 
Consequently, while the principle of rebus sic stantibus and concept of changed 
circumstances were widely recognized by arbitral tribunals and the courts of most 
jurisdictions, in practice the requirements were rarely met.385 
F. Origins of the Principle of Excuse for Non-Performance in Common Law 
The dichotomy posed by the conflict between the sanctity of the contract or its 
discharge by supervening events has, over time, received divergent treatment by the civil 
and common law systems. While both legal systems acknowledged in varying degrees 
384 The arbitrator was Prof. Pierre Lalive. The case involved an Indian concrete company and a Pakistani 
bank. See Pieter Sanders, ed., "Award of 1971 in Case No. 1512" (1976) 1 Y.B. Com. Arb. 128 at 128-129 
(italics are in the original). 
385 According to Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 417. 
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the doctrines of pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus, they emphasized certain 
aspects of each doctrine, and they did so at various historical periods. To say that one 
· -· -legal system embraced one doctrine over the other is to-simplify the rather· complex 
interaction each system had with these doctrines over the centuries. 386 Rather than focus 
on the broader principles of pacta sunt servanda or rebus sic stantibus, each legal system 
placed greater emphasis on the extent of the available remedies, as well as the culpability 
or degree of "fault" embedded in each doctrine. 
The civil law tradition rejected the notion that a party could contract to do the 
impossible. This is stated in Justinian's Digest: impossibilium nu/la obligatio.387 Civil 
law remedies are concerned primarily with performance, not damages. From this it 
follows that a party cannot be forced to do the impossible, even if this was promised in 
contract. Conceptually in civilian legal systems, there can be no enforceability of an 
impossible obligation. In contrast, this concept was originally rejected in the common 
law tradition. It had little difficulty in holding such a party liable, at least in damages. 
While the obligation may be physically impossible to perform, it could be compensated 
for by way of a monetary judgment. Holt J.C. put it in the following terms in 1706: 
"when a man will for valuable consideration undertake to do an impossible thing, 
although it cannot be performed, yet he shall answer in damages". 388 Performance of an 
obligation may become physically impossible, but the payment of damages is always 
possible. In later common law jurisprudence, the common law came closer to 
386 For example, Friedrich Kessler has noted that "[ c ]ivilians justify their system by reference to the maxim 
fi.acta sunt servanda". 
87 Dig. 50.17.185. 
388 Thornborow v. Whitacre (1706), 92 E.R. 270, 2 Ld. Raym. 1164 at 1165. 
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acknowledging rebus sic stantibus as in the civil law approach. In one case it made the 
analogy with the civil law nullity of an impossible obligation, and ruled "the court does 
not compel a person to do what is impossible". 389 In such ·cases; the courts would not 
order specific performance, but such a refusal did not preclude the awarding of damages. 
Unlike the initial common law approach, civil law could simultaneously 
acknowledge the existence of pacta sunt servanda, while stressing the importance and the 
flexibility provided in the principle of rebus sic stantibus. Of course, this would be 
tempered with the principle that no contract could be formed to do the impossible 
(impossibilium nulla obligatio ). 390 In addition, the emphasis on pacta sunt servanda was 
treated in civil law as a self-evident legal norm, with ethical and moral characteristics, 
incorporating the notion of "fault". Not surprisingly, the Canonists believed all promises 
to be binding, including those that had not yet been accepted.391 The moral imperatives 
of the Church were to be carried over into promissory obligations. 
The prominence of rebus sic stantibus over pacta sunt servanda provided the 
civilian legal tradition with a differing view towards contractual obligations. Assuming 
events remained unchanged, this view incorporated the notion that a party would be liable 
for contractual non-performance, but only if it could be demonstrated that the party was 
somehow at fault. 
By contrast, the common law tradition, at least initially, rejected the civil law 
position, and held parties liable to their contracts even where performance had become 
389 Forrerv. Nash (1865), 35 Beav. 167 at 171. 
390 Ibid. at 1-2. 
391 Hyland, supra note 353 at 418. 
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impossible. 392 As Hannes Rosier has noted, "English law has never known the medieval 
clausa [rebus sic stantibus] doctrine".393 Pacta sunt servanda was to dominate; rebus sic 
-- stantibus was to play a subservient role. The earliest-recorded· evidence of this· principle· 
is from an unnamed case in the Year Books.394 Reported in 1366, the case involved a 
defendant who had agreed to maintain the buildings on a property that he had leased from 
the plaintiff. 395 The defendant was to return the buildings in the same condition as they 
had been in when they were initially leased. When the lease ended and one building was 
returned to the plaintiff in damaged condition, he sued for breach of contract. In defense, 
the defendant pleaded that the damage, a fallen wall, had been caused by a severe wind-
storm. The plaintiff argued that this was still a breach of contract. The defendant 
responded that he was not obliged to repair damage caused by acts of God, which were 
beyond his control and unavoidable. The court ruled in favour of the plaintiff, upholding 
the pacta sunt servanda principle. Strictly speaking, while the storm was a supervening 
event, returning the property in its original condition was not something that was 
impossible. Rather, the promise was simply more onerous, but still capable of being 
performed, as the defendant could repair the damaged wall. Thus, the defendant was 
liable ifhe did not perform. The court stated that "a man is liable to do a thing which is 
capable of being done by a man, thus when he bound himself to the lessor to repair them, 
even though it was knocked down by the wind, or by other sudden events, yet you are 
392 Ibid. at 2. 
393 Rosier, supra note 50 at 497. 
394 [Anonymous] (1366), Y.B. Hil. 40 Edw. III, pl. 11, fol. 6. 
395 Ibid. 
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capable ofrepairing them, and can do this".396 If the defendant sought to avoid liability 
for damage caused by acts of God, he should have protected himself by expressly 
·· ·providing forsuch an exclusion at the time of contracting. 
Later English cases also upheld the primacy of pacta sunt servanda. Many of 
these cases involved the carriage of goods by sea. In one case, the defendant promised to 
carry apples by a boat from Greenwich to London, but the vessel sank in a "great and 
violent tempest". 397 The defendant pleaded an act of God, but the court ruled, "it was 
holden to be no plea in discharge of the assumpsit, by which the [defendant] had subject 
himself to all adventures".398 In a similar case a few years later, it was held that the 
defendant was still liable in damages under a contract of carriage, even though the boat 
was overturned "by the violence of wind and water". 399 
Although the law on impossibility of performance in England was still developing 
at this time, the initial emphasis was on a strict reading of pacta sunt servanda. This 
principle became enshrined in the English doctrine of absolute contacts in the 164 7 case 
of Paradine v. Jane. 40° Frequently cited in later court decisions, and still regarded by 
some jurists as good law,401 Paradine has come to stand for the common law principle 
that an impossible supervening event will not necessarily discharge a party from its 
396 Ibid. Translation by John D. Wladis, "Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the 
Doctrine oflmpossibility of Performance in English Contract Law" (1987) 75 Geo. L.J. 1575 at 1582 note 
36. 
397 Taylor's Case (1583), 4 Leon 31, 74 E.R. 708. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Tompson v. Miles (1591), I Rolle's Abridgement, Condition G.9. 
400 Aleyn 26, 82 E.R. 897 (K.B.) [Paradine]. 
401 Treitel, supra note 356 at 19. 
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contractual obligations. In doing so the case is an implicit rejection in English common 
law of the principle rebus sics stantibus. 
·· The· action in Paradine grew out of the English Civil War. According to the 
judgment, "Prince Rupert, an alien born, enemy to the King and his kingdom, had 
invaded the realm with a hostile army of men" and took possession of land owned by the 
plaintiff, Paradine. 402 At the time, the land was under lease to the defendant, Jane. The 
enemy army held the land for three years, and finally relinquished it in 1646. Paradine 
sued Jane for three years back rent, but Jane argued that he was not in possession during 
the period as the land was in enemy hands. As such the defendant was prevented from 
taking profits from the use of the land. In other words, Jane claimed to be without fault 
for his failure to pay the rent. 
The court held that Jane was still liable for the rent. It ruled that "as the lessee is 
to have the advantage of casual profits, so he must run the hazard of casual losses".403 
Jane assumed the risk that he would make a profit (or loss) from the use of the land. The 
court made a crucial distinction between cases where "the party by his own contract 
creates a duty" and "where the law creates a duty".404 It reasoned that the parties had 
committed themselves to the terms of the lease, and if they had wanted to provide for the 
avoidance of liability in certain situations, they could have done so by redefining the 
terms of the contract. When a party creates "a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound 
to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because 
402 Paradine, supra note 400. 
403 Ibid. at para. 3. 
404 Ibid. 
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he might have provided against it by his contract".405 As the contract did not provide for 
any reallocation of the loss due to the foreign invasion, the loss remained where it fell. 
Thus, without a contractual excuse for non-performance, Jane had to follow his duty as a 
tenant and pay the rent. This was the case even though he was deprived of the property 
by an event for which neither he nor the property owner was responsible. 
Paradine was followed in many later cases where it was similarly held that a 
tenant was not discharged for the payment of rent due to supervening events such as fire, 
flood, or enemy action.406 Indeed, pacta sunt servanda, as enshrined in the English 
doctrine of absolute contracts triumphed for the next two centuries. Not only did the 
principle prevail, it came to stand for the proposition that physical impossibility would 
never excuse performance. Thus, in Brown v. Royal Insurance Company Lord Campbell, 
after paraphrasing the Paradine principle, declared, "the fact that performance has 
become impossible is no legal excuse for [non-performance]".407 
The turning point for a strict reading of the pacta sunt servanda principle came in 
1863 in the case of Taylor v. Caldwell.408 While the case did not overturn the pacta sunt 
servanda principle in common law, it did introduce the notion that there can be mitigating 
factors to discharge an otherwise absolute contract. In the case, the defendant, Caldwell, 
contracted to permit Taylor the use of a music hall for four days in exchange for £ 100 per 
day. The contract stated that the hall must be fit for a concert but there was no express 
stipulation regarding disasters. The hall was destroyed by fire just before the first 
405 Ibid. 
406 Treitel, supra note 356 at 23-26. 
407 (1859), I El. & El. 853, 120 E.R. 1131 (Q.B.). 
408 3 B. & S. 826, 122 E.R. 309 (Q.B.) [Taylor]. 
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concert. As the concerts could not be performed at any other location, Taylor sued the 
music hall owner, Caldwell, for breach of contract for failing to rent the hall, and for his 
expenses that were incurred for advertising the concerts.'- There was no·clause within the 
contract itself which allocated the risk to the underlying facilities, except for the phrase 
"God's will permitting" at the end of the contract. 
In Taylor v. Caldwell Blackbum J. skilfully avoided a direct conflict with 
Paradine. He acknowledged the well-established precedent and stated, "[t]here seems no 
doubt that where there is a positive contract to do a thing, not in itself unlawful, the 
contractor must perform it or pay damages for not doing it, although in consequence of 
unforeseen accidents, the performance of his contract has become unexpectedly 
burthensome or even impossible".409 However, he dismissed Taylor's claim on the basis 
that "in contracts in which the performance depends on the continued existence of a given 
person or thing, a condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising from 
the perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the performance".410 Furthermore, the 
destruction of the hall excused not only the defendant from performance, but also the 
plaintiff: "both parties are excused, the plaintiffs from taking the [music hall] and paying 
the money, the defendants from performing their promise to give the use of the [music 
hall]".411 It is significant that Blackbum J. noted that the destruction of the music hall 
was the fault of neither party, and that this fact rendered the performance of the contract 
by either party impossible. Such a ruling went beyond what was necessary to decide the 
409 Ibid. 
410 Ibid. 
411 Ibid. 
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case. Blackbum J. should have focused only on the liability of the defendant and the 
obligation to supply the music hall. However, he also excused the plaintiff from the 
· obligation having to pay;·even though the agreed· payments wete·not impossible to make. 
The destruction of the subject matter in Taylor, and the associated discharge of the 
obligation to pay for the destroyed hall, thus, provided for an exception to the doctrine of 
pacta sunt servanda as enshrined in Paradine. 
Over time, the exception, as initially formulated in Taylor, would be developed 
further and extended to recognition of rebus sic stantibus and the doctrine of discharge 
through frustration, impossibility, or hardship. Through this progression, by the early 
1900s, the law came to recognize and address the problem of loss allocation that arises in 
situations where contractual performance becomes impossible because of a supervening 
event for which neither party is responsible.412 The law did evolve to address this 
problem, particularly with a group of cases that arose when the coronation of King 
Edward VII was postponed due to illness.413 It was in these coronation cases that the 
doctrine of frustration was recognized for the first time. Variants of the frustration, such 
as impossibility, hardship, and impracticability, also developed to address the realities of 
the modem world. 
However, pacta sunt servanda never disappeared entirely from the legal 
landscape in the common law. The principle continues to exist primarily in cases that 
concern landlord and tenant law, as well as in other case law that follows the reasoning of 
412 Wladis, supra note 396 at 1599. 
413 The cases are commonly known as the "Coronation Cases", and include Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 
K.B. 493, Clark v. Lindsay (1903), 19 T.L.R. 202, Griffith v. Brymer (1903), 19 T.L.R. 434, and Krell v. 
Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740. 
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Paradine, including those that concern antecedent impossibility.414 While the common 
law has developed to recognize the doctrine of discharge (through frustration, 
·impossibility; hardship, or impracticability) due to supervening events;· in the interests of 
commercial certainty, the common law has come to attach greater importance to pacta 
sunt servanda. For this reason, in England the doctrine of discharge was severely 
restricted in scope after its initial development. The First World War did give rise to a 
number of cases that successfully relied upon the doctrine of discharge due to 
impossibility.415 However, by the Second World War there were few reported cases of 
supervening impossibility.416 Indeed, in the post-War era there was a distinct judicial 
reluctance to apply rebus sic stantibus to discharge a contract except in only the rarest of 
circumstances. As Guenter Treitel remarked, "this reluctance is primarily based on the 
importance now attached to the principle of sanctity of contract".417 In this manner, 
excuses for non-performance of contractual obligations experienced a distinct evolution 
in the common law. This was to be different from the progression of excuses for non-
performance as it evolved in civil law jurisdictions, and beyond, as incorporated in CISG 
Article 79 as an autonomous principle. But as in civil law, the common law developed an 
array of related doctrines and principles to deal with a fundamental change in 
circumstances. 
G. Frustration 
414 Treitel, supra note 356 at 50-55. Treitel describes these as "historical survivals" and "survivals based on 
the reasoning of Paradine v. Jane". 
415 Ibid. at 57-58. 
416 Ibid. at 58. 
417 Ibid. at 59. 
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The common law has developed the doctrine of frustration to deal with three types 
of cases that concern excuses for non-performance because of a fundamental change in 
circumstances: these are i) impossibility; ii) frustration ofpurpose;·-~md, iii) temporary·· 
impossibility.418 The first type of case is that where the frustrating event has rendered 
performance impossible.419 In this respect, impossibility in the common law is a sub-set 
of the broader doctrine of frustration. In addition, the term "impossibility" must be 
differentiated from "frustration" even though these words are sometimes used 
interchangeably.420 Indeed, as John McCamus has observed, "the doctrines of 
impossibility and frustration were received as and continue to be regarded as two separate 
doctrines". 421 
i) Impossibility 
Frustration in the common law provides a party with an excuse for non-
performance of a contract because that party's ability to perform has become severely 
compromised because of a supervening event. In many respects, it resembles the civilian 
doctrine of force majeure, but there are notable differences. While civil law never 
accepted that a party could contract to do the impossible, in the early stage of the 
development of the doctrine of frustration, the common law accepted that an 
impossibility was no excuse for failure to perform a contract.422 As Treitel noted, 
418 McCamus, supra note 48 at 573. 
419 Ibid. 
420 See e.g. G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2006) 
at 576-577. 
421 McCamus, supra note 48 at 576-577. 
422 See e.g. Paradine v. Jane, supra note 400. 
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generally, in most common law jurisdictions, there was no theory of impossibility.423 
Thus, as noted above, initially the common law adopted the strict doctrine of "absolute" 
contractual obligations. From this it followed that an impossibility to perform was · -, -
generally not a legally recognized excuse. 
Unlike the civil law, the common law was much more reluctant to allow for the 
termination of a contractual obligation because of a new, unanticipated event. However, 
there were some exceptions to the general rule of absolute contracts. The death of a 
promisor in a contract of personal service was one recognized exception; the other was 
the enactment of subsequent legislation that would make the performance illegal. 424 
Apart from these narrow grounds, in the common law pacta sunt servanda was to prevail 
over a contractual impossibility. As Lord Buckmaster of the Privy Council stated in 
1920, "no phrase [is] more frequent! y misused than the statement that impossibility of 
performance excuses breach of contract. Without further qualification such a statement is 
not accurate; and indeed if it were necessary to express the law in a sentence, it would be 
more exact to say that precisely the opposite was the real rule".425 
Thus, in the common law where a party made an unqualified contractual promise, 
it had a prima facie duty to perform. If circumstances materially changed after contract 
formation, making performance impossible, the parties still remained bound to their 
obligations unless a term of discharge could be implied in the contract. More recently, 
Martin C.J. of Saskatchewan made this point when he stated, "[ w ]here a person by his 
423 Treitel, supra note 356 at 1-4, under the sub-heading "No Theory oflmpossibility". 
424 McCamus, supra note 48 at 568. 
425 Grant, Smith & Co. v. Seattle Const. & Dry Dock Co., (1920] A.C. 162 at 169 (U.K.). 
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own agreement creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to carry it out 
notwithstanding that he is prevented from so doing by some accident or contingency 
which he· ought to have provided against in his agreement'\ 4~9 The words of Martin 'C.J. 
echo those found in the seventeenth century judgment of Paradine: contractual 
performance was to be "absolute" to the extent that impossibility was not excusable, 
unless such a provision was provided for in the contract. 
Over time, the common law became less strict in the application of the doctrine of 
absolute contractual obligations. The process of change began with Blackburn J.' s 
decision in Taylor v. Cadwell.427 Blackburn J. did not directly contradict the precedent in 
Paradine in that impossibility could not apply to cases involving land, as the land could 
not be destroyed, and the remaining interests could survive.428 However, the accidental 
destruction of a building by fire on property that was to be leased could discharge a 
contract. Blackbum J. made a similar ruling in Appleby v. Myers. 429 That case concerned 
a contract for the manufacture and installation of machinery for a factory, and 
maintenance of the machinery for two years. The contract was held to be discharged 
when the factory was destroyed by fire prior to the installation of the machinery. 
Blackburn J. also acknowledged the principle he laid down in Taylor v. Cadwell-that 
both parties were excused from their performance-but the plaintiffs could not recover 
for any work that had already been completed. The common law approach to frustration 
and discharge was that losses should lie where they fall at the time of the frustrating 
426 McCuaig v. Kilbach, [1954] 3 D.L.R. 117 at 119 (Sask. C.A.). 
427 Supra, note 408. 
428 Fridman, supra note 420 at 633. 
429 Appleby v. Myers, [1867] L.R. 2 C.P. 651. 
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event. This approach has also been adopted in Canada where two early Supreme Court 
decisions applied Taylor v. Cadwell and Appleby v. Myers.430 
· · · ~ As G .H.L.- Fridman noted, it was the decisions of Blackbum· J. in the cases of· 
Taylor v. Cadwell and Appleby v. Myers that were instrumental in facilitating the 
development of the modem doctrine of frustration in the common law. 431 According to 
Fridman, "[t]he courts were attempting to extricate themselves from the straightjacket of 
the absolute theory of contracts".432 Treitel would appear to concur with this view by 
acknowledging that the judgment of Blackbum J. in Taylor v. Cadwell "formulated the 
doctrine of discharge in a way which facilitated its development and expansion".433 
However, in discussing the development of frustration, Treitel did so within the context 
of cases beginning with Paradine that remain historical "[ s ]urvivals of the doctrine of 
absolute contracts".434 The common law, in developing the modem doctrine of 
frustration, never abandoned the pacta principle. As Lord Shaw stated, "frustration can 
only be pleaded when the events and facts on which it is founded have destroyed the 
subject-matter of the contract, or have, by an interruption of performance thereunder so 
critical or protracted as to bring to an end in a full and fair sense the contract as a 
whole". 435 
430 The cases were Kerrigan v. Harrison (1921), 62 S.C.R. 374 and Canadian Government Merchant 
Marine Ltd. v. Canadian Trading Co. (1922), 64 S.C.R. 106. See also Fridman, supra, note 420 at 636-
637. 
431 Fridman, supra, note 420 at 633. 
432 Ibid. 
433 Treitel, supra note 356 at 55. 
434 Ibid. at 50 (sub-heading). 
435 Lord Strathcona Steamship Co. v. Dominion Coal Co., [1926] A.C. 108 at 114 (U.K.). 
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What Lord Shaw was alluding to is the implied-term theory, which plays a part in 
the development of the doctrine of frustration in the common law. Indeed, it was 
Blackbum J. who, in his··ruling in Taylor, articulated a concept that had been slowly · 
evolving in English jurisprudence. This was the concept of an implied condition to a 
contract. Even though a contract might not expressly provide for discharge in the event 
of the destruction of a building by fire, according to Blackbum J ., "a condition is implied 
that the impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the person or thing 
shall excuse the performance [ ... ] [T]hat excuse is by law implied, because from the 
nature of the contract it is apparent that the parties contracted on the basis of the 
particular person or chattel".436 This was a logical step from the decision in Paradine 
which acknowledged the defense of an implied promise or a "legal incident", for 
example, "if a house be destroyed by a tempest".437 By way of contrast, an express 
covenant to repair the same house would make a tenant liable even "though it be burnt by 
lightning". 438 In this way, Blackbum J. viewed the contract in Taylor as being subject to 
an implied condition that the owner be excused if the subject matter of the contract was 
destroyed: "looking at the whole contract, we find that the parties contracted on the basis 
of the continued existence of the Music Hall [ ... ] that being essential to their 
performance". 439 With the subject matter of the contract destroyed, it seemed reasonable 
to excuse the parties from performance. This solution, to Blackbum J ., must have been 
the presumed intent of the parties. 
436 Taylor, supra, note 408 at 839. 
437 Paradine, supra note 400. 
438 lbid. 
439 Taylor, supra, note 408 at 839. 
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Thus developed the theory that performance might be dependent upon certain 
promises, but these same promises, in tum, might be dependent upon the performance of 
some other condition~4~0 As a result, it could be implied into a contract; even where it 
was not made explicit that a promise depended on the occurrence of a certain event, that 
this was intended, based on the reasonable person standard. Hence, contracts could be 
subject to either a condition precedent or a condition subsequent. If the implied term 
where a condition precedent, it would not be a case of impossibility or frustration, but 
rather one from the older law that was based on dependency of performance (i.e. 
fulfillment of conditions precedent). Alternatively, it was now recognized as an implied 
contractual term that performance could be dependent upon a condition subsequent, i.e, a 
supervening event. As such, the contract could be deemed "frustrated" and excused 
based on impossibility of performance. 
The concept of implied conditions became the basis for the English doctrine of 
frustration until the House of Lords rejected it in a decision in 1981.441 The Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts Act) 1943442 enshrined many of the legal consequences of 
frustration, but its primary aim was to prevent unjust enrichment. 443 The Act otherwise 
did little to change the common law in this regard, and it did not enshrine the concept of 
implied intent in contract interpretation.444 In addition, many types of contracts fell 
44° Fridman, supra note 420 at 633-634. 
441 Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 89. The decision was in National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd., 
[1981] AC. 675 [National Carriers]. 
442 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40 (U.K.). 
443 Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 90-91. 
444 Ibid. 
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outside its scope.445 The problem with the implied intent theory was that the inquiry into 
intent did not concern the actual intent of the parties, but the presumed intent of them 
acting as reasonable persons. Where the subject matter of the contract was destroyed, 
who can say with certainty that the parties would not have wanted to adapt or continue 
with the contract? As Lord Radcliffe was to later note, "there is something of a logical 
difficulty in seeing how the parties could even impliedly have provided for something 
which ex hypothesi they neither expected nor foresaw".446 
The inadequacy of implying contractual terms had been noted in earlier 
jurisprudence. In particular, a 1916 case involved the requisition of a ship from a charter 
party for the purpose of carrying troops during World War I. 447 The owners claimed that 
the charter party had been discharged by the requisition. The charterers, who wished to 
continue with the contract, claimed that the government's intervention was not sufficient 
to frustrate the contract. There, in using an implied-term approach to reconstruct the 
intent of the parties, a majority of the court ruled that no term could be implied in the 
charter party to excuse performance. Thus, the contract had not been frustrated. In a 
dissenting opinion, and without referencing the intent of the parties or an implied 
contractual term, Viscount Haldane noted that the charter party could be dissolved on the 
basis that "[a]lthough the words of the stipulation may be such that the mere letter would 
describe what has occurred, the occurrence, itself, may yet be of a character and extent so 
445 Ibid. 
446 Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council, [1956] A.C. 696 at 728 [Davis 
Contractors]. 
447 Tamplin Steamship Co. v. Anglo Mexican S.S. Co., [1916] 2 A.C. 397 (H.L.) [Tamplin Steamship Co.]. 
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sweeping that the foundation of what the parties are deemed to have had in contemplation 
has disappeared, and the contract itself has vanished with that foundation". 448 
Theproblem,with the implied term theory was that'it left it to the courts to 
determine the true intent of the parties. The courts were forced to attempt to determine 
whether a supervening event had had such a negative effect on the contract that it would 
be unfair to hold parties to their bargain, in the absence of fault and of any assumption of 
the risk by either party. This left unanswered the question of what was the foundation of 
the contract, or what was fundamental to it, or what was the adventure or purpose of the 
contract. As Lord Hailsham L.C. remarked when the House of Lords rejected the implied 
term theory, "[t]he weakness[ ... ] of the implied term theory is that it raises once more 
the spectral figure of the officious bystander intruding on the parties at the moment of 
agreement".449 The theory preferred by Lord Hailsham L.C. and later courts was based 
on the construction of the contract. Such a theory sought to discern the true meaning of 
the contract. 
ii. Frustration of Purpose 
"Frustration of purpose" is the second type of case that falls under the doctrine of 
frustration. This type of case has broadened the notion of impossibility in English law. 
In many respects, cases of frustration of purpose seek to reconstruct the fundamental 
basis or foundation of the contract. The implied intent of the parties is not the focus; 
rather, the court attempts to uncover, or "reconstruct" the true meaning of the contract. 
448 Ibid. at 406-407. 
449 National Carriers, supra note 441 at para. 13. 
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The common law concept of frustration of purpose appears to have originated 
with the early case of Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd.450-at least that was 
the view of Diplock L.J.451 In Jackson, a-ship, which was to be chartered, ran aground 
without the fault of either contractual party. This caused several months' delay in the 
availability of the vessel. The court ruled that this event discharged the charter party. 
The ship could have been sent later, but by the time it would have been ready, the original 
purpose of the charter could not have been fulfilled. On this basis the case was decided, 
even though there was no physical impossibility or true frustration. Instead, there was 
"practical" frustration, or frustration of purpose. Giving credit to Bramwell B. in this 
case, Dip lock L.J. noted that "it was recognized that it was the happening of the event and 
not the fact that the event was the result of a breach by one party of his contractual 
obligations that relieved the other party from performance of his obligations".452 
Following Jackson, English courts treated cases of this type as "frustrating" the 
contract, even though the contract could be performed at some point in the future. The 
rationale for extending the scope of frustration was the notion that the commercial 
purpose of the original contract had been frustrated. To continue with performance 
would be to bind the parties to a new arrangement, under new circumstances. This would 
450 (1874), L.R. 10 C.P. 125 [Jackson]. According to Bramwell B. at 147: 
There are the cases which hold that, where the shipowner has not merely broken his 
contract, but has so broken it that the condition precedent is not performed, the 
charterer is discharged. Why? Not merely because the contract is broken. If it is not 
a condition precedent, what matters it whether it is unperformed with or without 
excuse? Not arriving with due diligence or at a day named is the subject of a cross-
action only. But not arriving in time for the voyage contemplated, but at such a time 
that it is frustrated is not only a breach of contract, but discharges the charterer. And 
so it should though he has such an excuse that no action lies. 
451 In Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., [1962] 2 Q.B. 26 at 68-69 [Hong Kong 
Fir]. 
452 Ibid. 
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be a radically different agreement than was originally agreed to. As Lord Radcliffe put it: 
"frustration occurs whenever the law recognises that without default of either party a 
···contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the· 
circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically 
different from that which was undertaken by the contract. Non haec in foedera veni. It 
was not this that I promised to do".453 
The historical impetus for the expansion of the principle of frustration in the 
common law came from a series of cases454 that occurred as a result of the postponement 
of the coronation procession of King Edward VII due to his illness. It appeared that the 
similar problems presented in these cases could not be easily resolved under the rigid 
common law rule of impossibility. As impossibility was never at issue, the courts felt 
compelled to expand the principle frustration to incorporate situations where the purpose 
of the contract failed or was defeated through a subsequent event that was not the fault of 
either party. In what became known as the coronation cases, 455 they represented an 
innovative approach to frustration, and marked a clear departure from earlier decisions. 
The facts in these cases had a common element. Numerous contracts ·had been 
made in anticipation of the coronation, such as the rental of rooms, the rental of seats in 
stands, etc. When the coronation had to be postponed, performance of these contracts did 
not become impossible. The leased rooms and seats could still be occupied on the 
contracted dates, but this would have been a superfluous exercise. 
453 Davis Contractors, supra note 446 at 729. 
454 Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K.B. 493; Clark v. Lindsay (1903), 19 T.L.R. 202; Griffith v. Brymer 
(1903), 19 T.L.R. 434; Herne Bay Steamboat Co. v. Hutton, [1903] 2 K.B. 68 [Herne Bay]; Krell v. Henry, 
[1903] 2 K.B. 740 [Krell]. 
455 Krell, ibid. 
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The leading case was Krell v. Henry. 456 The defendant, Henry, had agreed to hire 
from the plaintiff some rooms to watch the coronation procession on 26 and 27 June, 
1902. He paid ·£25 as a deposit and was to pay the balance of £50 on 24.June. When the· 
King became ill and the coronation procession was postponed, Henry refused to pay the 
balance, and the plaintiff brought a claim for the outstanding amount due. Henry also 
counterclaimed to recover the £25 deposit he had paid. At trial, the court held that there 
was an implied term in the contract that the procession should take place. Accordingly, 
Darling J. gave judgment for the defendant on both the claim and the counterclaim. Krell 
appealed, but the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the purpose of the 
contract had been frustrated. The court noted that the agreement made no reference to the 
coronation. However, the plaintiff was aware of the purpose for renting the rooms. In 
. the court's view, the postponement of the coronation destroyed the value of the contract 
for the defendant. Referencing the Taylor case, Vaughan Williams L.J. stated that the 
Taylor rule had been expanded to include those "cases where the event which renders the 
contract incapable of performance is the cessation or non-existence of an express 
condition or state of things, going to the root of the contract, and essential to its 
performance". 457 In his view, the novel point in this case was whether the court should 
consider circumstances that went beyond the terms in the contract in applying the rule 
that was established in Taylor. He answered in the affirmative: 
456 Ibid. 
you first have to ascertain, not necessarily from the terms of the 
contract, but, if required, from necessary inferences, drawn from 
surrounding circumstances recognised by both contracting parties, 
457 Ibid. at 748. 
what is the substance of the contract, and then to ask the question 
whether that substantial contract needs for its foundation the 
assumption of the existence of a particular state of things. If it does, 
this will limit the operation of the general words, and in such case, if 
- the contract becomes impossible of performance by reason of the· non-
existence of the state of things assumed by both contracting parties as 
the foundation of the contract, there will be no breach of the contract 
thus limited.458 
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Although it was not stated in the court's decision, such an approach would also 
honour the pacta principle. It was not that the contract became impossible to perform; 
the payment of money for the rent of a room is rarely an impossibility. Rather, where the 
occurrence of an event becomes the basis of a contract-even though it may not be 
explicitly mentioned in the agreement-the parties may be discharged from their 
obligation if the event does not occur. It is not an impossibility that has prevented 
performance, but instead it is the failure of the purpose of the contract that has rendered 
performance superfluous. In this way, Krell established a doctrine related to, but 
independent of, impossibility. As McCamus stated, "[b ]y eliminating references to 
impossibility of performance and by formulating the rule in terms of a cessation or non-
existence of a 'state of things' going to the root of the contract, the Krell decision cast the 
rule in broad enough form to embrace all of the impossibility cases" as well as cases like 
Krell "in which no question of impossibility arises".459 
The Krell decision has been subject to some criticism for its theoretical ability to 
allow a party to be excused from a bad bargain as a result of an unfortunate subsequent 
458 Ibid. at 7 49. 
459 McCamus, supra note 48 at 576. 
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event.460 As Thomas Roberts stated, "[t]o accept Krell as a general precedent allowing 
frustration of purpose to be a valid ground for cancellation would however introduce into 
the law a principle at odds with the principle sanctity of contract".461 ··,However; the ·· 
potential for the expansion of the doctrine of frustration of purpose has not been realized. 
As Lord Wright remarked of the Krell decision, it "is certainly not one to be extended".462 
Indeed, Krell has been narrowly distinguished from similar cases. In another of the 
coronation cases, Herne Bay,463 decided in the same year as Krell by the same panel of 
judges, the defendant's contract to hire a boat to watch the King at a naval review was not 
discharged from the agreement by the cancellation of the coronation. 
Herne Bay begs the question: why was a contract to rent a room for viewing the 
coronation wholly frustrated by the cancellation of the coronation, but a contract to hire a 
boat to watch the naval review was not frustrated? Even though the naval review was 
part of the coronation activities, Vaughan Williams L.J. felt that the object of the voyage 
was not limited to the naval review, but also extended to "taking them round the fleet". 464 
The fleet was still in place, and so the tour could still proceed in spite of the cancellation 
of the naval review. As Treitel has noted, the Herne Bay case demonstrates a common 
feature of the cases on frustration of purpose, in that it shows that the approach of the 
common law to partial frustration of purpose diverges from the method that has been 
460 See e.g. Treitel, supra note 356 at 320-321; McCamus, supra note 48 at 577; and Fridman, supra note 
420 at 635. 
461 Thomas Roberts, "Commercial Impossibility and Frustration of Purpose: A Critical Analysis" (2003) 16 
Can. J.L. & Juris. 129 at para. 30. 
462 Martime National Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Trawlers, [1935] A.C. 524 at 529. 
463 Herne Bay, supra note 454. 
464 Ibid. at 683. 
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adopted to cases of partial impossibility. 465 "In cases of partial impossibility", he stated, 
"a contract can be discharged if its main purpose can no longer be achieved; but in cases 
of frustration of purpose the courts ·have applied the more rigorous test of askingwhether 
any part of the contractual purpose [ ... ] could still be achieved: if so, [the courts] have 
refused to apply the doctrine of discharge".466 
The Court of Appeal in both cases also considered the "common purpose" of the 
parties, and made a noteworthy distinction. In Krell, the "common purpose" was for the 
rooms to be used for the viewing of the procession and this purpose was frustrated when 
the coronation was postponed. There was no such common purpose in Herne Bay. 
Romer L.J. considered that, the "statement of the objects of the hirer of the ship would 
not [ ... ] justify him in saying that the owner of the ship had those objects just as much in 
view as the hirer himself'.467 This meant that, although the postponement had frustrated 
the defendant's purpose in entering into the contract to hire the ship, it had not frustrated 
the plaintiffs purpose, which was presumably to provide a ship for a tour of the fleet. 
Wherever appropriate, the pacta principle would be upheld, and to defeat it would require 
a frustrating event for both parties. Treitel put it in the following terms: "This emphasis 
on the requirement that the purpose of both parties must be frustrated is found also in 
other English and American cases. It means that the supervening event must prevent one 
party from supplying, and the other from obtaining, what the former had contracted to 
provide and the latter to acquire under the contract".468 Thus, the court was unwilling to 
465 Treitel, supra note 356 at 324. 
466 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
467 Herne Bay, supra note 454 at 684. 
468 Treitel, supra note 356 at 324-325. Emphasis in the original. 
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allow the doctrine of frustration to be used by the defendant to escape from a bad 
commercial bargain. 
The doctrine-of frustration of purpose has also been recognized in Canadian 
law.469 However, even though the doctrine was considered to be innovative, it appears 
that the doctrine has had little practical effect on the courts in common law 
jurisdictions.470 Some scholars have seen its development as arising from a unique set of 
events.471 It has also played a relatively insignificant role in the subsequent development 
of the law of impossibility, at least in England. 472 This is likely due to the preference in 
the common law to place pacta sunt servanda ahead of the competing principle of rebus 
sic stantibus. 
iii. Temporary Impossibility 
As frustration can occur without the fault of either party, the courts have been able 
to fashion rules to excuse the parties from their contractual obligation as long as the 
impossibility continues. A problem arises, however, when the impossibility ceases and 
one party then insists on performance. In such cases, it must be determined whether the 
party should then perform, or whether the prolonged delay caused by the temporary 
impossibility should excuse performance entirely. In this respect, the term "temporary 
impossibility" must be distinguished from "partial impossibility". The latter term is often 
used to designate a situation in which some part, but not all of the promised performance 
469 McCamus, supra note 48 at 577. 
470 Ibid. 
471 See e.g. John D. Wladis, "Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the Doctrine of 
Impossibility of Performance in English Contract Law" (1987) 75 Geo. L.J. 1575 at 1608-1622. 
472 Ibid. at 1608-1622. 
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becomes legally impossible, while "temporary impossibility" refers to a delay in 
performance resulting from some operative facts of impossibility. 
The origin of-the·principle bf temporary impossibility can be traced to- Roman 
law. The perpetuatio obligationis excused the delay in performance in those situations 
where the obligation had become temporarily impossible to perform.473 Most 
importantly, it did not terminate the obligation to perform, but only suspended it.474 
When the temporary impossibility ceased to operate, performance was expected, or could 
be demanded. The same rule applies today in the common law: a temporary impossibility 
may have other legal effects, but it does not discharge a contract.475 In this respect, 
temporary impossibility is not firmly rooted in the principle of frustration. However, 
there is one exception. Contracts will be discharged in cases of temporary impossibility 
only where it is deemed that time is of the essence.476 In such cases, the practical effect is 
to treat the contract as though it were wholly frustrated. This approach is similar to that 
found in German and Swiss law, which is to treat a temporary impossibility as a 
. ·b·1· 477 permanent 1mposs1 1 1ty. 
Problems of temporary impossibility seemed to arise most frequently in maritime 
cases. These situations typically involved either a charterer or the shipowner who sought 
a discharge from its obligation under the charter party agreement due to an unforeseen 
delay. For this reason, the term "frustration of the adventure" has often been used by the 
473 W.A. Ramsden, "Temporary Supervening Impossibility of Performance" (1977) 94 S. African L.J. 162 
at 162. 
474 Dig. 46.3.98.8. 
475 Treitel, supra note 356 at 233. 
476 Ibid. at 233-235. 
477 Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 251. 
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courts to refer to cases where delayed performance had rendered the charter of no value 
to one of the parties. An example of such a case is Geipel v. Smith where the defendant 
shipowner had· contracted to ship coal from Newcastle to Hamburg, ''restraint ·of princes·" 
excepted.478 Before performance was effected, war broke out and Hamburg was 
blockaded. The court held that the blockade was likely to continue for some time, and 
the contract was not merely suspended, but dissolved. The court made the additional 
point that the contractual provision relating to the "restraint of princes" was a requirement 
to have performance made within a reasonable time. 
In a similar case, Jackson,479 a ship was chartered from Liverpool to Newport 
(U.K.) to load rails for shipping to San Francisco. It ran aground on its way to Newport. 
In this case, it was the ship-owner who wished to enforce the contract against the charter 
party. The court decided that the contract was frustrated. In the court's view, the delay 
in repairs meant that it would be unreasonable to require the charterers (the owners of the 
rails) to supply the cargo to the ship owner. The delay, although excusable, was held to 
so diminish the value of performance that the charterer was entitled to repudiate the 
agreement. 
The principle of temporary impossibility has extended to a series of cases 
involving prolonged delay. During World War I, for example, the principle became 
firmly established.480 In one wartime case, Tamplin Steamship Co.,481 the House of 
Lords went as far as to suggest that cases of prolonged delay were part of a line of 
478 (1872), L.R. 7 Q.B. 404. 
479 Supra, note 450. 
480 McCamus, supra note 48 at 578-579. 
481 Supra, note 447. 
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jurisprudence established in Taylor482 and Krell.483 However, although there may be 
some justification for speaking of a general doctrine of frustration that could incorporate 
impossibility; frustration of purpose, and temporary impossibility, this mergerof these· 
separate distinctions has not occurred-at least not in the common law. 484 As will be 
illustrated below, this contrasts with CISG Article 79, which embraces the vagaries of 
frustration as found in the common law. 
H Hardship and Impracticability 
The early common law of England rejected any notion of hardship that did not 
amount to an impossibility. The principle of frustration was not applied to cases of rebus 
sic stantibus where unforeseen circumstances had rendered performance extremely 
onerous. Treitel, for example, concluded that the "English cases do not provide a single 
clear illustration of discharge on such grounds [of hardship or "pure" impracticability] 
alone".485 The House of Lords has denied relief on the grounds of hardship or 
impracticability in a number of cases. As Lord Lorebum stated in one case: "the 
argument that a man can be excused from performance of his contract when it becomes 
'commercially' impossible[ ... ] seems to me a dangerous contention which ought not to 
be admitted unless the parties have plainly contracted to that effect".486 
Similar judicial hostility in England to hardship and impracticability appeared in a 
number of other cases involving contractual performance difficulties due to World War I. 
482 Supra, note 190. 
483 Supra, note 454. 
484 McCamus, supra note 48 at 579. 
485 Treitel, supra note 356 at 283. 
486 Tenants (Lancashire) Ltd. v. C.S. Wilson & Co. Ltd., [1917] A.C. 495 at 510. 
134 
In one case, for example, the contract was not discharged even though it was "practically 
impossible for the vendor to deliver".487 McCardie J. elaborated and expressed the view 
that-it could not be·"said that ~grave ·difficulty on the· part of the vendor in· procuring the 
contract articles will excuse him from the performance of his bargain".488 This is 
representative of the common law's preference towards pacta sunt servanda, and the 
subservient--or almost irrelevant-role played by rebus sic stantibus. This is in general 
contrast to the treatment of hardship in civil law jurisdictions, which have been much 
more receptive to cases of changed circumstances that result in situations of hardship and 
impracticability. 489 
Not surprisingly, therefore, other English cases have demonstrated the hostile 
judicial attitude towards hardship and impracticability, even during times of war. This 
relatively rigid position may represent the fact that common law countries did not 
experience the same degree of war-time devastation as did the civil law countries of 
continental Europe. Thus, English courts have held that an unanticipated 88 percent 
increase in the cost of goods to be supplied, 490 or a rise in the price of raw materials to 
manufacture paper,491 or in freight costs of the seller that made the transaction 
unprofitable, are not grounds to discharge a contract.492 Similarly, in Greenway Brothers 
Ltd. v. S.F. Jones & Co. the defendant, who had contracted to sell zinc ingots, was not 
487 Blackburn Bobbin Co. Ltd. v. T. W. Allen & Co., [1918] 2 K.B. 540 at 551, aff'd [1918] 2 K.B. 467. 
488 Ibid. at 545. 
489 See infra, section D. b. Imprevision, Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, Changed Circumstances and 
other Hardship Principles. 
490 S. Instone & Co. Ltd. v. Speeding Marshall & Co. Ltd. (1916), 33 T.L.R. 202. 
491 E. Hulton & Co. Ltd. v. Chadwick Taylor & Co. Ltd. (1916), 33 T.L.R. 202. 
492 Blythe & Co. v. Richards, Turpin & Co. Ltd. (1916), 85 L.J.K.B. 1425. 
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excused even though, due to the outbreak of war, the defendant could obtain the metal 
alloy only at an "abnormal price".493 
··· -· · The English common law hostility to the principle·ofhardshipand 
impracticability also extended to events that arose during World War II. The leading case 
concerned the contract for the supply of newsreels to cinemas during the war.494 After 
the end of the war, the cinema owners argued that the contract had been discharged by the 
end of the war. The Court of Appeal agreed that this "uncontemplated tum of events" 
had released the parties from the contract, 495 but the House of Lords reversed the 
decision.496 Lord Simon remarked that "parties to an executor contract are often faced, in 
the course of carrying it out, with a tum of events which they did not at all anticipate-a 
wholly abnormal rise or fall in prices, a sudden depreciation of currency, an unexpected 
obstacle to execution or the like. Yet this does not of itself affect the bargain they have 
made".497 
Later cases would follow this line of reasoning. For example, Lord Radcliffe 
would note that "it is not hardship or inconvenience or material loss itself which calls the 
principle of frustration into play",498 and Lord Simonds would assert without any 
qualification that "an increase of expense is not a ground for frustration". 499 These 
judicial statements support the English common law view that to discharge a contract on 
493 Greenway Brothers Ltd. v. S.F. Jones & Co. (1915) 32 T.L.R. 184. 
494 British Movietonenews Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas, [1952] A.C. 166 [H.L.] [British 
Movietonenews]. 
495 [1951] 1 K.B. 190 at 201. 
496 Supra, note 494. 
497 Ibid. at 185. 
498 Davis Contractors, supra note 446at 729. 
499 Tsakiroglou & Co. Ltd. v. Noble Thor! GmbH, [1962] A.C. 93 at 115. 
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the basis of hardship or impracticability would introduce too much uncertainty in 
contractual relationships. English law has, thus, placed greater emphasis on certainty and 
pacta sunt servanda, even though the result has occasionally been harsh· on one of the · 
parties. As Treitel has stated, after surveying English jurisprudence in this area of law: 
"[ o ]ne can conclude that no English decision supports a general rule of discharge by 
impracticability and the number of dicta of high authority appear to emphatically to reject 
such a rule". 500 
With the notable exception of the United States, most common law jurisdictions 
have followed the English approach toward hardship and impracticability, and do not 
explicitly recognize the doctrine. 501 Even in the United States, where impracticability is 
recognized under the Uniform Commercial Code,502 as well as under the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts at s. 261, 503 the courts have applied it in a very restrictive 
soo Treitel, supra note 356 at 290-291. 
501 See e.g. Brunner, supra note 47 at 418: "A comparative law analysis shows that hardship is not 
universally, but widely recognized as a ground for exemption. This is especially true for civil law 
systems". 
502 Under the heading "Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions", the Uniform Commercial Code 
[UCC] s. 2-615 states in part: 
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to 
the preceding section on substituted performance: 
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who 
complies with paragraphs (b) and ( c) is not a breach of his duty under a 
contract for sale if performance as agreed h.as been made impracticable by the 
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic 
assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith 
with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order 
whether or not it later proves to be invalid. 
Although this provision refers explicitly to sellers, it has also been deemed to be applicable to buyers. This 
is through UCC s. 1-103 which preserves common law principles unless they are displaced by specific 
provisions of the UCC. Because impracticability is a common law defense, UCC s. 1-103 permits a buyer 
to also assert the defense of impracticability even though this is not explicitly provided for under s. 2-615. 
503 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts at s. 261 establishes common law grounds for "Discharge by 
Supervening Impracticability" as follows: "Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made 
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic 
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manner. 
504 This strict approach has even led certain scholars to question whether a 
difference exists between American and English law of contractual discharge by 
· "impracticability".505 Indeed, it has been observed thaMhe US doctrine·of 
impracticability is nothing more than a corollary of the English doctrine of frustration of 
purpose. 506 Such a view supports the proposition that while US law may explicitly 
recognize impracticability, it still retains the relatively rigid common law approach to 
contractual discharge due to supervening events. 
Section 2-615 of the UCC, entitled "Excuse by Failure of Presupposed 
Conditions", explicitly adopts the doctrine of impracticability in circumstances where 
supervening events affect a seller's performance. 507 It can also be extended to buyers 
through s. 1-103.508 It provides that a seller's failure to perform a contract, either in 
whole or in part, is not a breach of contract "if performance as agreed has been made 
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a 
basic assumption on which the contract was made". 509 
assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the 
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary''. 
504 See e.g. Brunner, supra note 47 at 408. According to Brunner, "[i]n applying the impracticability test, 
American courts have adopted a restrictive attitude". See also Treitel, supra note 356 at 280: "in all these 
cases is therefore a strong indication of the restrictive attitude of the American courts towards 
impracticability as a ground of discharge". 
505 Treitel, supra note 356 at 289, where he states: "The preceding discussion shows that it is hard to 
formulate the exact difference between English and American law on discharge by 'impracticability"'. 
506 See e.g. Rivkin, supra note 51at167 who puts it in the reverse: "Frustration of purpose is the converse 
of impracticability". See also Treitel, supra note 356 at 419: "English law acknowledges frustration of 
purpose as a ground of discharge, which may be considered as the mirror-image of [the American doctrine 
ofJ impracticability". 
507 Supra note 502. 
508 Ibid. 
509 Ibid. 
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The American principle of impracticability incorporates of the notion that the 
object of a contract could not be accomplished without commercially unacceptable costs 
···· · and time input far beyond that contemplated in the contract. In this respect, it·can be 
narrowly distinguished from frustration of purpose. While both principles fall short of 
cases of pure physical impossibility, frustration of purpose typically involves a party in 
which the performance received (or expected) has substantially decreased in value. With 
impracticability, the cost of performance for one party has increased so dramatically, that 
the original obligation has become economically unviable. 
The American doctrine of impracticability appears to have originated in the case 
of Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 510 which relied in part on dictum in the English 
case of Moss v. Smith. 511 Mineral Park involved a contract where the defendants agreed 
to take all of the gravel required for a nearby construction project from the plaintiffs 
land. The plaintiff was to be paid 5¢ per cubic yard. Only about half of the gravel was 
taken, which was the only part that was above water level. No greater quantity could 
have been taken by ordinary means, except at "a prohibitive cost" of ten to twelve times 
the typical cost of such an extraction.512 On this basis, the plaintiffs claim was rejected. 
In his decision, Sloss J. noted that "[a] thing is impossible in legal contemplation when it 
is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can only be done at an excessive 
and unreasonable cost". 513 
510 172 Cal. 289 (1916) [Mineral Park]. Sloss's J. quote came from Beach on Contracts at 459. 
511 (1850), 137 E.R. 827, 9 C.B. 94. 
512 Ibid. 
513 Ibid. 
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It may appear paradoxical that English law, which first recognized the doctrine of 
frustration of purpose, as discussed in the coronation cases, above, has been reluctant to 
recognize its mirror-:image; the doctrine of impracticability.-- However, it must also be 
recalled that English jurisprudence has not expanded the doctrine of frustration of 
purpose since the coronation cases. Similarly, American jurisprudence has applied the 
doctrine of impracticability in a number of cases, but such an application has been very 
restrictive.514 From this conceptual perspective, the difference between the two doctrines 
is not particularly striking. 
In addition, American law has made a distinction between those cases where 
performance of a contract has become merely more onerous for one of the parties, and 
where performance becomes excessively more onerous. It is only in the latter case where 
the doctrine of impracticability may apply. The official commentary on UCC s. 2-615 
makes this point in terms of increased costs: "Increased cost alone does not excuse 
performance".515 Although the term "impracticable" suggests that far less is required 
than "impossibility" to release an aggrieved party from its contractual obligations, the 
requisite threshold remains quite high in the US. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
provides a number of examples of cases in which impracticability might apply, such as 
514 See supra note 504. 
515 American Law Institute & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Official 
Comment Number 4 to U.C.C. s. 2-615. The full passage reads: "Increased cost alone does not excuse 
performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature 
of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for that is exactly 
the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover". 
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the loss or destruction of property necessary to perform the contract. 516 However, the list 
is not intended to be exclusive. 
·-·-The·required threshold whereby performance must become excessively more 
onerous to constitute impracticability is set considerably high. In one case, a US District 
Court summarized American jurisprudence on this point: "[the court] is not aware of any 
cases where something less than a 100% cost increase has been held to make a seller's 
performance 'impracticable"'.517 As this statement suggests, in practice, US courts have 
interpreted rules regarding impracticability very strictly. New York courts, for example, 
have excused contractual obligations for impracticability "only in extreme 
circumstances".518 Financial difficulty or economic hardship "even to the extent of 
insolvency or bankruptcy" is generally not enough to render a contract impracticable.519 
In other American jurisdictions, courts have similarly held that even long-term contracts 
will not be excused as impracticable if they become more economically burdensome than 
anticipated. 520 Thus, it appears evident that US courts will rarely excuse performance 
because of mere financial hardship. 
James White and Robert Summers have also undertaken a comprehensive review 
of the UCC, and have similarly concluded that "American courts have generally rejected 
the sellers' arguments under section 2-615".521 They continue by adding that where 
sellers have sought to use the impracticability defense, "[t]he courts have[ ... ] favored 
516 Restatement (Second) of Contracts ss. 262-265 (1981). 
517 Publicker Industries v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 989 at 992 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
518 Ke! Kim Corp. v. Central Markets Inc., 519 N.Y.S.2d 384 at 385 (N.Y. 1987). 
519 406 East 6lst Garage Inc. v. Savoy Fifth Avenue Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 275 at 281(N.Y.1968). 
520 Valero Transmission C. v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 743 S.W.2d 658 at 663 (Tex. App. 1988). 
521 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code (4th ed.) (St. Paul, MN: West 
Publishing Co., 1995) at 129. 
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buyers". 522 Thus, even though the doctrine of impracticability has been elevated in 
American law to black letter status, its importance appears to be significantly reduced, 
and it would seem that a change in this perspective should not be expected anytime· soon. 
As White and Summers have opined, "[b]y and large, American courts have been 
unreceptive to such claims [of impracticability] and we expect them to continue that 
hostility". 523 
Nicholas Weiskopf has reached a similar conclusion on this topic. Based on his 
survey of American jurisprudence on impracticability, "the inescapable conclusion is that 
the courts typically do not permit purchasers of goods and services to escape contractual 
liability because of supervening frustration of [the] bargaining objective [i.e., 
impracticability]."524 He further notes that American courts, while formally recognizing 
the doctrine, do little more than "pay lip service to its viability, and then virtually refuse 
to apply it". 525 Based on this treatment, one must question whether American jurists take 
the doctrine of impracticability seriously, or view it as an interloper. Courts there 
typically voice doctrinal acceptance to the doctrine, but then deny the defense on the 
grounds of foreseeability, contributory fault, or based on partial impracticability. 526 
Notwithstanding the codification of impracticability in the UCC, the apparent 
American aversion to hardship and the doctrine of impracticability is consistent with the 
general common law attitude towards pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus. While 
522 Ibid. at 130. 
523 Ibid. 
524 Nicholas R. Weiskopf, "Frustration of Contractual Purpose-Doctrine or Myth?" (1996) 70 St. John's 
L. Rev. 239 at 242. 
525 Ibid. 
526 Ibid. at 261-262. 
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civil law jurisdictions have maintained an affinity for rebus sic stantibus, the common 
law has emphasized the primacy of pacta sunt servanda. The reason for this difference in 
· the-approach in the civil law and common law towards hardship;· impracticability, and 
force majeure (and its variants) can be traced to fundament differences in each legal 
system. The concept of force majeure was imported from the Code of Napoleon when 
the common law courts began dealing with commercial disputes that arose under 
merchant law. While the force majeure concept had its origins in Roman law, the 
common law was less-influenced by this ancient legal tradition. The civilians followed 
the Roman rule impossibilium nu/la obligation est-that no person can be obliged to 
perform the impossible. To the common law jurists, however, this did not mean that a 
contract, which became impossible to perform, was necessarily void. 
In this respect, the concept of force majeure was not embedded in the common 
law; rather,force majeure was viewed as an interloper, imported into the common law 
through its appearance in clauses in the contracts of commercial parties. Rather than 
being a universally applicable concept as in civilian jurisprudence, a force majeure clause 
in the common law tradition became a purely contractual right. The foreign nature of 
these clauses, in part, may explain the difficulty that common law jurisdictions have had 
when dealing with concepts such as hardship, impracticability, frustration, and force 
majeure. Fundamentally, the common law tradition is an adversarial system in which the 
courts' function is to assign liability between the two adversarial parties on the basis of 
either tort or contract principles. In this tradition, pacta sunt servanda is paramount, and 
liability is imposed where a party to a contract fails to perform its contractual obligations. 
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Although it is often equated to the common law doctrine of contractual 
frustration,force majeure is different, and it has been applied much more broadly and 
flexibly than has its approximate common law counterparts of frustration or ·. 
impracticability. A late nineteenth-century English case illustrates this point. In Jacobs 
v. Credit Lyonnaise the defendant shipper claimed force majeure after it failed to deliver 
a number of remaining shipments of esparto due to a war that had broken out in 
Algeria.527 Under French law, which prevailed in Algeria at that time, the defendant 
argued that it would not have been liable due to"the insurrection in Algeria and the 
military operations connected with it [which] had rendered the performance of the 
contract impossible; and that by the French Civil Code, which prevails throughout 
Algeria,force majeure is an excuse for non-performance".528 The court found that while 
French law may have given relief under force majeure, English law applied in this case, 
and there was no equivalent common law principle, including frustration, that could 
relieve the defendant of liability. While the intervening war had disrupted performance, 
it did not destroy the "subject-matter" of the contract or the underlying rational for the 
bargain as was required for relief under the doctrine of frustration. 529 As the court 
explained, "one of the incidents which the English law attaches to a contract is that [ ... ] a 
person who expressly contracts absolutely to do a thing not naturally impossible is not 
excused for non-performance because of being prevented by vis major."530 
527 (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 589 (C.A.). 
528 Ibid. at 599. 
529 Ibid. at 600. 
530 Ibid. at 603. The term vis major is from Latin, meaning "superior force". 
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The differences between the civil law and common law become clearer when 
force majeure is contrasted with the common law doctrine of frustration. Force majeure 
· · · · -·and the doctrine of frustration are similar in that they deal with unforeseen supervening 
events that are beyond the control of parties to an agreement. Frustration requires that the 
entire subject matter or underlying rationale for the contract be entirely destroyed. It 
normally operates to relieve parties permanently from all of their contractual obligations, 
including those to perform and to pay, and essentially leaves the pieces of a contract to 
fall where they may. Courts are not able to revise the terms of the contract to achieve a 
fair or equitable remedy. By contrastforce majeure permits greater flexibility. The 
unforeseen events giving rise to relief can be broader, and the entire rationale or subject 
matter of the contract need not be destroyed in order for force majeure to operate. 
Civilian courts typically have greater latitude to revise, or "re-write" contractual terms to 
account for the unforeseen event. Force majeure may also be temporary, allowing the 
parties to suspend their contract temporarily, and then to reinstate it once the event passes 
or is remedied. This is in contrast to the doctrine of frustration, which is a blunt 
instrument that permanently ends all contractual obligations. 
The most significant difference between civil law's force majeure and the 
concepts of hardship, impracticability, frustration, is that these latter principles are 
antithetical to common law principles and ideals. With the use of these defences for non-
performance, parties avoid contractual obligations and fault or liability is ascribed to 
neither party to the contract, but rather to a cause deemed to be beyond the control of 
both parties. Given the great divergence between common law values and the concepts 
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of hardship, impracticability, frustration, and civil law's force majeure, it is not surprising 
that common law courts have repeatedly shown great reticence in giving effect to these 
· principles: 
I. Origins of the Principle of Excuse for Non-Performance in Civil Law 
The principle of an excuse for contractual non-performance developed along 
different lines in civil law jurisdictions. Even though civilian jurists utilized many of the 
same philosophers who had enunciated the notion of pacta sunt servanda, they 
emphasized not the rule per se, but rather the exceptions to the rule. Thomas Aquinas, 
for example, had noted that individuals must always keep their word, even with enemies. 
However, he also stated that an individual's promise may be excused "if circumstances 
have changed with regard to persons and the business at hand". 531 Niccolo Machiavelli 
went much further, eschewing the pacta sunt servanda principle: "experience shows that 
princes who have achieved great things are those who have given their word lightly". 532 
Ever-changing circumstances were to be used to the advantage of the prince: "a prudent 
ruler cannot, and must not, honour his word if it places him at a disadvantage and when 
reasons for which he had given his promise no longer exist".533 Jean Bodin (1530-1596), 
who opposed Machiavelli's views on power politics, was also able to formulate the 
exception to the rule that a prince must honour his word, for instance "in cases where 
what you have promised is by nature unfair or cannot be performed". 534 
531 Quoted in Bederman, supra note 357 at 8 fn. 22. 
532 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. by George Bull (London: The Folio Society, 2006) at 93. 
533 Ibid. at 94. 
534 Quoted in Wehberg, supra note 358 at 778 
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In the seventeenth century, the principle of pacta sunt servanda was also attacked 
by two prominent political philosophers, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Benedict de 
-Spinoza (1632-1677). This attack was within the context ·of political arguments for the 
supremacy of state sovereignty, yet there was little difficulty in transforming the principle 
of rebus sic stantibus to contractual relations between individuals rather than applying it 
to relations between states. While Hobbes acknowledged the importance of the sanctity 
of contracts ("[ f]or performance is the natural end of obligation"), he also stressed the 
idea that the sovereign had almost unlimited power, and was "bound to himself only".535 
However, agreements need not be kept if they might cause a person harm or threaten the 
security of the state.536 Spinoza similarly claimed that "no holder of State power can 
adhere to the sanctity of contracts to the detriment of his own country, without 
committing a crime".537 It was also during Spinoza's time that rebus sic stantibus came 
to be regarded in certain European jurisdictions as an implicit condition in contracts, 
allowing parties freedom to adjust their agreements due to a change in circumstances. 538 
During the seventeenth century, the attack on the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
assisted in the growth and development of rebus sic stantibus. 539 Perhaps this was 
influenced by the philosophers of the era and the rise of the Age of Reason. Seventeenth 
century Europe witnessed the culmination of the slow process of detachment of 
philosophy from theology, and reason was seen as the primary source for legitimacy and 
535 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Markham: Penguin Books, 1982) at 198, 313. 
536 Ibid. at 215. 
537 Quoted in Wehberg, supra note 358at 778. The passage is from Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus. 
538 Bederman, supra note 357 at 8 fn. 24. 
539 Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (New 
York, Oxford University Press Inc., 1996) at 581. 
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authority. In Europe there began critical questioning of traditional institutions, customs, 
and morals, and a strong belief in rationality. This new perspective assisted in the growth 
of rebus sic stantibus as a rational counter-balance to the pacta principle.· 
It appears that part of the attractiveness of rebus sic stantibus was due to efforts to 
address the devastation caused by numerous wars in Europe. The rebus principle was 
also popular with the natural law theorists, particularly as it applied to public 
international law.540 It flourished on the continent for about 200 years. However, in the 
area of private law, rebus sic stantibus began to lose its credibility as a legitimate legal 
principle. 541 By the nineteenth century most jurists were hostile to it, and the principle 
seemed to have disappeared. However, it is more accurate to term the disappearance as a 
transformation. While the term rebus sic stantibus may have fallen out of favour, the 
concept that it represented (i.e. changed circumstances) continued to develop. In this 
respect, the rebus principle only temporarily lost its attraction. As one legal commentator 
noted, the rebus principle, having been thrown out the door, found its way back in 
through the window. 542 
As already noted, the civil law system rejected the notion that a party could 
contract to do the impossible (impossibilium nulla obligation), even if this was promised 
in a contract. In addition, the focus of civil law remedies is on performance, not 
damages. As such, in civil law jurisdictions the obligor is released from its contractual 
performance obligations if the impossibility was not foreseen at the time of contracting, 
540 Ibid. 
541 Ibid. 
542 The remark is attributed to Bernhard Windscheid (1817-1892), a Germanjurist. See ibid. 
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and if the impossibility arose after the contract was formed. Alternatively, some civil law 
jurisdictions allow the courts to modify contracts in cases of unforeseen supervening 
events.543 To revise contracts is to interfere with party autonomy, and such an approach 
would be an anathema in common law systems. Furthermore, with some exceptions, 
civil law jurisdictions are traditionally based on the fault principle. 544 Breach of contract 
presupposes fault on the part of the non-performing party. In common law, a contract is 
similar to a guarantee: if a party breaches any of its obligations under the contract, the 
aggrieved party is entitled to damages, regardless of the fault of the non-performing 
party. From a conceptual perspective, the civil law and common law systems, thus, have 
opposing approaches to the principle of strict liability for breach of contract. 
In civil law, pacta sunt servanda is still, of course, an important principle. 
However, in comparative terms, continental legal systems have placed greater emphasis 
on the role of rebus sic stantibus, even though it is dependent on the pacta principle. For 
this reason, national laws in civilian law jurisdictions have developed an array of 
doctrines and principles to deal with a fundamental change in circumstances. All of these 
doctrines and principles differ to some extent from CISG Article 79. In these national 
laws, the phrase rebus sic stantibus is rarely used, but other terminology has developed in 
its place. Although the wording has been altered, the concept of changed circumstances 
has remained intact. This is evident in a comparative overview of excuses for non-
performance in a number of continental legal systems. 
543 See e.g. Rosier, supra note 50 at 485. Rosier notes that German courts now prefer "judicial adaptation" 
of the contract over discharging the contract. Note also that the French principle of imprevision allows a 
contract to be modified in case of a change of circumstances. See Schwenzer, supra note 365 at 710. 
544 Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 69. 
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a. Force Majeure 
There are numerous words and terms in national legal systems to describe 
supervening events-that make contractual performance impossible or excessively more 
onerous. Some of these terms are used interchangeably, but this is incorrect: such 
imprecision masks the subtle legal complexity behind these words. Thus, even though 
the term "frustration" more accurately describes the common law recognition of an 
excuse for non-performance, courts in Canada have occasionally imported the termforce 
majeure into the nation's legal vocabulary. Dickson J. of the Supreme Court of Canada, 
for example, noted in a leading case on the subject that "[a]n Act of God clause or force 
majeure clause[ ... ] generally operates to discharge a contracting party when a 
supervening, sometimes supernatural, event, beyond control of either party, makes 
performance impossible. The common thread is that of the unexpected, something 
beyond reasonable human foresight and skill". 545 
The termforce majeure originated in one of the oldest codifications that still 
exists today: the French Civil Code of 1804. 546 It is defined in Articles 114 7 and 1148 of 
the Civil Code.547 It generally describes circumstances outside one's control.548 
545 Atlantic Paper Stock Ltd. v. St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp and Paper Company Limited, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 580 
at 583. 
546 C.c.F. (1804-1807); Reinhard Zimmermann, "The Civil Law in European Codes" in Hector MacQueen, 
Antoni Vaquer, & Santiago Espiau Espiau, eds., Regional Private Laws and Codification in Europe (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 19. Zimmermann notes that the French Civil Code was based 
on the Prussian Code of 1794. The other oldest, current codification is the Austrian General Civil Code of 
1811, which was also based on the Prussian Code. 
547 C. civ. Article 1147: "The obligor will be found liable for the payment of damages, either by reason of 
the inexecution of the obligation, or by reason of delay in the execution, at all times when he does not prove 
that the inexecution does not result from an outside cause which cannot be imputed to him, and further that 
there was no bad faith on his part". 
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Literally,force majeure (or its Latin equivalent, vis major) means "superior force", but 
the French term is often used in a generic manner in many jurisdictions, including those 
of the common law, to characterize a wide range supervening events. For example; even 
the International Chamber of Commerce promotes its own model "Force Majeure" clause 
which parties to international contracts may incorporate into their contracts. 549 The 
UNIDROIT Principles similarly devotes an entire article to "Force Majeure".550 The 
article also closely mirrors the language found in CISG Article 79.551 In this respect, the 
terrnforce majeure has been assimilated into the English language and is often used to 
express an extraordinary event or circumstance beyond the control of contracting parties. 
This may include such events a war, strike, riot, fire, storm or any "act of God". 
However, strictly speaking, by way of contrast, legislation in common law jurisdictions 
rarely use the terrnforce majeure. Instead, terms such as "frustration", 
"impracticability", "impossibility", or "hardship" are used in its place. 
Article 1148: "No damages arise when, as a result of force majeure or of a fortuitous event, the obligor was 
prevented from giving or doing that for which he had obligated himself, or did what was forbidden to him". 
Translation by Rivkin, supra note 51 at 174. 
548 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th ed., defines ''force majeure" as an "[i]rresistible force, 
overwhelming power". 
549 International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Force Majeure Clause 2003; ICC Hardship Clause 2003 
(Paris: International Chamber of Commerce, 2003). 
550 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 196. Article 7.1.7 (Force majeure). 
551 Ibid. Article 7.1.7 states: 
(1) Non-performance by a party is excused if that party proves that the non-performance 
was due to an impediment beyond its control and that it could not 
reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences. 
(2) When the impediment is only temporary, the excuse shall have effect for such 
period as is reasonable having regard to the effect of the impediment on the performance 
of the contract. 
(3) The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the 
impediment and its effect on its ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the 
other party within a reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew or ought 
to have known of the impediment, it is liable for damages resulting from such nonreceipt. 
(4) Nothing in this article prevents a party from exercising a right to terminate the 
contract or to withhold performance or request interest on money due. 
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In the private, commercial law of France, however, the principle of force majeure 
exhibits the approach developed out of the remnants of Roman law, which focuses on the 
relative fault of the party in breach. 552 It applies to two- types of cases·: i) legal · 
impossibility, and ii) physical impossibility. 553 Legal impossibility can arise from a 
supervening change in the law or a governmental decree that make it illegal for a party to 
perform a contractual obligation. A physical impossibility is deemed to be an "Act of 
God" or some other event (e.g. destruction of the goods) that makes performance of the 
contract materially impossible. 
As noted above, as a general principle,force majeure deals with cases involving 
legal or physical impossibility of performance, even though the term "impossibility" is 
not used in the Code.554 As it is commonly understood, and as embodied in Articles 1147 
and 1148 of the Civil Code, force majeure is an event that is beyond a party's control, 
making performance of a contract impossible. A party in default is not liable in damages 
only if the non-performance is a "result from an outside cause which cannot be imputed 
to him". 555 Belgian, Dutch, and Luxembourgian law mirror the French approach. 556 
While Articles 114 7 and 1148 appear to be indistinguishable to the concept of strict 
liability as found in the common law, the Civil Code from its origins never adhered to the 
rigidity that was found in the English case of Paradine. Instead, French law, and other 
continental legal systems, utilized interpretive techniques to bring liability based on fault 
552 Rivkin, supra note 51 at 173. 
553 Rene David, "Frustration of Contract in French Law" (1946) 28 J. Comp. Legis. & Int'l L. 3d ser. 11 at 
12. 
554 James Gordley and Arthur Taylor von Mehren, An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Private 
Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 499. 
555 C. civ. Article 1147. 
556 Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 67. 
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closer to the common law concept of strict liability. For example, French law focuses on 
the substance of a party's performance obligation. In doing so, it makes a distinction 
:between "result-based" ·obligations (obligations de resultat) and obligations of "best .. 1 
efforts" or conduct-oriented obligations (obligations de moyens).557 In the case of an 
obligations de moyens the plaintiff must prove that the defendant did not act as a prudent, 
average person when undertaking his/her obligations. 558 With an obligations de resultat 
the plaintiff need only demonstrate that the result that the defendant undertook to provide 
had not been accomplished. 559 
Swiss law takes a similar approach, and makes a distinction between non-
performance and fault. 560 As with the French Civil Code, this technique brings liability 
based on fault closer to the concept of strict liability. In Switzerland, a party is at fault 
for non-performance if it can be proven that the obligor failed to use its diligence to fulfil 
its contractual obligations, regardless of whether this was intentional or done through 
negligence.561 However, in the case of a "best efforts" obligation, the distinction between 
non-performance and fault becomes irrelevant. Recently, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has 
focused on the requirement of non-performance, rather than on the requirement of 
fault. 562 Regarding the obligation to achieve a "specific result", in theory, Swiss law 
maintains the distinction between non-performance and fault. But in practical terms, if 
the plaintiff succeeds in proving the non-performance of a specific obligation, the 
557 Ibid. 
558 Ibid. 
559 Ibid. 
560 Ibid. at 68. 
561 Ibid. 
562 Ibid. 
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defendant may only succeed if it can prove that it was not at fault due to a force majeure 
event. In this respect, it has been said that "fault is to a large degree merely the other side 
· ofthe·coin ofnon-performance~'.563 In either case, as in French law;the non-performing 
party is excused if force majeure is found. So although the concept of force majeure 
appears different, and narrower than the common law concept of frustration, in actual 
cases, on similar facts, the same result may be reached. 
In traditional Islamic law there is no legal doctrine that might be considered 
analogous to force majeure. 564 In certain contracts, however, certain rules have been 
identified by Muslim jurists that bear some resemblance to force majeure. These include 
the concepts of Amer min Allah ("Act of God") and Afah Samawiyyah ("calamity"), both 
of which render performance impossible. 565 
Until the revision of the German Civil Code, the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch 
("BGB"), in 2002, that country followed the Roman law rule by making a distinction 
between initial and subsequent liability. Under the substantially amended BGB, it now 
makes no difference when the impossibility occurred. Retained from the past, however, 
is the principle that liability for an impossible performance depended on whether a party 
was responsible for the fact that performance had become impossible. 566 In such cases, 
that party was liable. According to s. 276, a party is "responsible" for "wilful default and 
negligence".567 While the BGB incorporates the concept of force majeure and changed 
563 Ibid. 
564 Adnan Amkhan, "Force Majeure and Impossibility of Performance in Arab Contract Law" (1991) 6 
Arab L.Q. 297 at 298. 
565 Ibid. at 298-299. 
566 BGB s. 276. 
567 Ibid. 
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circumstances (i.e. rebus sic stantibus), these both fall under the German principle of 
wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage.568 It states: "[i]f circumstances upon which a contract 
was based have materially changed after conclusion of the' contract 'and if the ·parties ·· 
would not have concluded the contract or would have done so upon different terms if they 
had foreseen that change". 569 As noted, in cases of non-performance under wegfall der 
geschaftsgrundlage, the role of fault plays a key role in determining whether a claim for 
damages can be excluded due to a party's non-performance. 570 However, the amended 
BGB now also allows for instances where fault is not to be used as a "guiding 
principle".571 Thus, in addition to an at-fault principle, the BGB incorporates the 
principle of liability without fault in certain circumstances. This stricter type of liability 
may apply where the obligor has assumed a guarantee, or assumed the acquisition risk to 
procure a certain item. These amendments to the BGB allow for greater flexibility for 
considering the scope of fault and liability in cases of impossibility and changed 
circumstances. However, with this flexibility comes, at least in theory, the possibility of 
greater uncertainty in the law. 
In France and many other continental legal systems,force majeure includes such 
events as a natural catastrophe, a strike, war, or a sovereign decree. More specifically, 
there are three characteristics of force majeure as recognized in the Civil Code. The first 
is the existence of an "outside cause" that cannot be imputed to the obligor. This must be 
an external event that occurred beyond the obligor's sphere of control. Secondly,force 
568 BGB s. 313(1). 
569 Ibid. Translation by Brunner, supra note 47 at fn. 1969. 
570 BGB s. 280(1). 
571 Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 39. 
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majeure event must have been "unforeseeable" at the time of the execution of the 
contract. In making this determination, all circumstances surrounding the event must be 
·considered. In addition, while the test is a subjective one, it does include what a 
"prudent" (en hon pere de Jami/le, literally, a good father of a family) or "average man" 
should have foreseen. 572 Finally, the requirement of "irresistibility" constitutes the third 
characteristic of the force majeure principle. In other words, the event must have raised 
an insurmountable obstacle to the performance of the obligation. This is an event against 
which there is no defense, even if the party had foreseen the event. It leaves the obligor 
powerless. As already noted, civil law accepts that no one can be obliged to perform 
what is impossible. In this respect, the "irresistibility" characteristic offorce majeure also 
incorporates the notion of rebus sic stantibus. This recognizes that the parties would not 
have contracted the same way if they had reasonably considered how events might 
otherwise develop. 
As under CISG Article 79, in French law, where force majeure is found, the 
obligor is not liable for damages. In most cases of force majeure, French courts will 
discharge both parties from the obligation.573 But in contrast to the CISG, where an event 
of force majeure prevents performance of an obligation only partially, cancellation of the 
. contract may be denied, but a corresponding diminution in the counter-performance of 
the obligee may instead be permitted. 574 
572 Rivkin, supra note 51 at 175. 
573 Michael D. Aubrey, "Frustration Reconsidered-Some Comparative Aspects" (1963) 12 Int'l & Comp. 
L.Q. 1165at1176. 
574 Rivkin, supra note 51 1 77. 
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b. lmprevision, Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, Changed Circumstances 
and other Hardship Principles 
Jmprevision, wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage, and· rebus sic stantibus, inter·lilia; 
are all recognized hardship principles found in various civil law countries. Each one of 
these principles recognizes an impediment to performance that consists of a fundamental 
change of circumstances that does not amount to a physical impossibility. In these 
situations, impossibility principles, such as force majeure, cannot apply since there is no 
contractual obligation that cannot be performed, but rather one where the promisor' s 
performance, though not impossible, has become excessively onerous. The basis for this 
approach is that in many business and legal circles a strict interpretation of the pacta sunt 
servanda rule was thought to be too severe, especially in contracts of a lengthy duration. 
In this respect, a hardship principle may be considered as a subset of the force majeure 
excuse. Considering this specific group of hardship cases under force majeure, there 
exist more flexible legal rules and consequences than those found under force majeure 
and frustration. 
A variation of force majeure exists separately in the laws of France, and it 
fundamentally relies on the principle of rebus sic stantibus.575 In contracts with the 
French government, it is an implied term of such transactions that the continuation of the 
obligation is subject to the continued existence of fundamental facts or circumstances. 
This is the basis of the French principle of imprevision, which is a principle of changed 
circumstances (i.e. rebus sic stantibus). While French administrative courts will accept 
575 Ibid. at 174. 
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the defence of imprevision in contract cases involving private parties and the government, 
the civil courts have thus far refused to recognize this defence when applied to private 
contracts. 576 As Rene David stated many years ago,·"[ t ]he doctrine of imprevision has 
never been admitted by the hierarchy of civil and commercial courts", as they favour 
exclusively the concept of force majeure. 577 However, this situation may be changing, as 
civil courts there have become increasingly more receptive to the concept in private law 
matters.578 Until imprevision is fully accepted in all of France's courts, the stricter 
defence of force majeure must be used in its place. 
Conceptually, imprevision is closer to the common and civil law principle of 
hardship. It appears to have developed out of the Civil Code's requirement of good faith, 
as well as the obligation it places on parties to reasonably comply with contractual 
obligations, while recognizing the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.579 In addition, until 
1914 the doctrine of force majeure was the only defence available to a party to discharge 
a contract in the event of new circumstances. The advent of World War I, and the 
outbreak of war again in 1939, forced the courts in France, and elsewhere on the 
continent, to expand the force majeure concept to discharge certain contracts. 580 The new 
doctrine became known as the theorie de l' imprevision. It encompassed cases where 
there was no impossibility of performance, but rather where performance had become 
much more onerous since the time of contracting. As part of this new doctrine, rebus sic 
stantibus was considered to be an implied or tacit condition stipulated by the parties to all 
576 Gordley and von Mehren, supra note 554 at 524. 
577 David, supra note 553 at 13. 
578 Brunner, supra note 47 at 404-405. 
579 C. civ. Articles 1134 and 1135. See also Aubrey, supra note 573 at 1175-1177. 
580 David, supra note 553 at 12. 
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contracts. In this respect, rebus sic stantibus was viewed as an intention of all contractual 
parties, regardless of whether or not this was expressed in the contract itself. In this way, 
imprevision could exist in harmony with the will theories of contracts, which became 
popular with jurists in the nineteenth century.581 As Windscheid noted, the continuation 
of certain circumstances could simply evidence an "undeveloped condition" of the 
contract, the "undeveloped condition" being something that was not willed by the 
parties. 582 
In addition, the unforeseen economic hardship must be severe, such as the 
devaluation of the French currency after World War I, which resulted in a fundamentally 
different obligation for the plaintiff. 583 The Conseil d'Etat has explained the term in the 
following manner: 
[a ]n "unforeseen contingency" may be defined as a situation in which the 
balance of a contract is upset as a result of an event of a general 
character, which is either political or most often economic, which is, in 
any case, independent of the intention of the parties, and which was 
unforeseeable at the signing of the contract, and which, without making 
performance by the administration's opposite contracting party 
impossible, makes the carrying out of his obligation intolerably 
onerous. 584 
lmprevision is limited to contracts for future and/or continuous performance, and 
results in the discharge of the promisor' s contractual obligations. However, it can be 
distinguished from the English principle of frustration. With frustration a contract comes 
to an end because it becomes something beyond what the parties had contemplated; it is 
581 Gordley and von Mehren, supra note 554 at 504. 
582 Ibid. 
583 Compagnie Generale d'Eclairage de Bordeaux c. Ville de Bordeaux, Conseil d'Etat, March 30, 1916, 
( 1916) III D. 25; ( 1916) III S. 17. 
584 Quote is from, and translated by, Rivkin, supra note 51 at 178. 
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beyond the will of the parties. 585 With imprevision, the contract may also be discharged, 
but this interpretation is based on the will of the parties to the contract. 586 
For centuries~ under the concept ·of rebus sic·stantibus, many civil law .· 
jurisdictions accepted the principle of changed circumstances. It is not surprising, 
therefore, to find that many continental legal systems have statutes that recognize the 
concept of hardship. Among them are Germany, The Netherlands, Italy, Greece, 
Portugal, and the Scandinavian countries. 587 In Italy, for example, the German principle 
of wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage was adopted in Article 1467 of the Italian Civil Code, 
which concerns cases of eccessiva onerosita sopravenuta. 588 
In other civil law jurisdictions, hardship is recognized in case law only. These 
countries include Switzerland, Austria, and Spain. 589 In addition, the modem civil codes 
in many Arab countries have imported the concept of rebus sic stantibus from continental 
Europe, and recognize cases of hardship through that principle.590 
The hardship principle attempts to determine which party should bear the risk of 
changed circumstances, and to what extent. In civilian jurisdictions this issue is typically 
determined by weighing the importance of pacta sunt servanda against the principle of 
good faith in contractual performance. While the pacta principle demands performance 
(assuming that physical performance of the obligations is possible), this must be balanced 
585 David, supra note 553 at 12-13. 
586 Ibid. 
587 Schwenzer, supra note 365 at 711. Schwenzer provides the following examples at fn. 10: Germany: 
BGB s. 313 (Storung der Geschiiftsgrundlage); Netherlands: Dutch Civil Code (BW) Art. 6:258; Italy: CC, 
Art. 1467 (eccessiva onerosita sopravvenuta); Greece: Greek Civil Code, Art. 388; Portugal: Portuguese 
Civil Code, Art. 437; Austria: Austrian BGB ss. 936, 1052, and 1170a. 
588 C.Cit. Art. 1467. 
589 Brunner, supra note 47 at 403. However, Schwenzer, supra note 365, notes that the Austrian BGB 
recognizes hardship through analogy in ss. 936, 1052, and 1170a. 
590 Ibid. note 47 at 404. 
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against the counter-principle of good faith. A violation of good faith would likely occur 
if a party demanded performance of a contract according to its original terms even though 
··'"-this performance· had become-excessively burdensome· for the obligor. Such a demand 
might even be deemed an abuse of right. 591 This assumes, of course, that the risk of 
changed circumstances was not assumed by the aggrieved party. It is also worth noting 
that, with the exception of the American UCC, 592 the common law has been hostile to 
recognizing good faith. This may help to explain why civilian legal systems have 
generally been more receptive than the common law to the concept of rebus sic stantibus. 
By way of contrast, English law rejects not only good faith in law, but also any 
notion of relief for changed circumstances that do not amount to an impossibility. 
Furthermore, the term "hardship" is more of a factual description than it is a recognized 
legal concept. 593 As noted above, most common law jurisdictions follow the English 
approach. A notable exception is the United States, but even in that case, American 
courts have taken a rigid stance towards hardship and impracticability. While the UCC 
recognizes impracticability, US courts have tended to follow the rigid pacta sunt 
servanda rule in the common law, and have generally rejected the defence of changed 
circumstances. Such an approach appears to be at odds with the promulgation of the 
UCC in 1953, and its adoption of the doctrine of impracticability ins. 2-615.594 The 
591 Ibid. note 47 at 394. 
592 The key good faith provision of the UCC is s. 1-203, which states: "Every contract or duty within the 
Uniform Commercial Code imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." The 
good faith obligation applies to all duties imposed by the UCC, as well as all contracts subject to the UCC. 
However, the good faith obligation does not appear to extend to the process of contract negotiation and 
formation. 
593 Schwenzer, supra note 38 at 711 
594 See UCC s. 2-615, supra note 502. 
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Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts reiterates this position, 595 but courts there 
still appear to follow the traditional common law approach, favouring pacta sunt 
· servanda· and eschewing rebus sic stantibus. 
J CISG Article 79 and Hardship 
CISG Article 79 provides a bridge between the extremes found in certain civil and 
common law jurisdictions. The term "hardship" and force majeure are not mentioned in 
the CISG. Indeed, the concept of an "impediment" belongs exclusively in the CISG.596 
However, while Article 79 does not explicitly recognize hardship, a compelling case can 
be made for the proposition that Article 79 does, indeed, cover cases of hardship. The 
basis for a hardship defence exists even though Article 79 relieves a party from paying 
damages only if the breach of contract was due to an impediment beyond its control. 
During the CISG negotiations in Vienna, the idea that Article 79 would cover cases of 
changed circumstances, i.e. hardship, thus recognizing the principle of rebus sic 
stantibus, was a highly contentious issue. A proposal made by the Norwegian delegation 
sought to release a party from its obligation if, after the temporary impediment had 
595 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Contracts, Vol. 2 (St. Paul, MN: American 
Law Institute Publishers, 1981) at s. 261. Under the heading "Discharge by Supervening Impracticability" 
s. 261 states: "Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his 
fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or circumstances 
indicate the contrary". 
596 See Nimrat Kaur, "Impediment: A Concept Under CISG, UNIDROIT and Indian Contract Law-A 
Comparative Analysis" (2011) 15 Vindobona J. Int'l Comm. L. & Arb. 91. Kaur notes at 91: "The concept 
of 'impediment' is exclusive to the Convention", and goes on to state that the "counter provisions of force 
majeure and hardship" can be found in other international instruments, such as those promulgated under 
UNIDROIT. 
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passed, there had been a radical change of circumstances. 597 The issue was debated, and 
it was noted by both the Swedish and French delegates that the Norwegian proposal "was 
something very different from force majeure and much closer to the theorie de 
l 'imprevision in French law or the doctrine of frustration in Anglo-Saxon law". 598 There 
was only limited support for the idea that hardship be explicitly recognized in Article 79, 
thus, the Norwegian proposal was rejected. 
However, the concept of hardship has been acknowledged as falling under Article 
79 by many courts, tribunals, and scholars. 599 There can be no gap in the CISG regarding 
a party's invocation of economic impossibility and the adaptation of the contract to 
changed circumstances and hardship. This outcome is due to the quest for uniformity of 
international sales law, i.e. the CISG, across national borders. To hold that hardship is 
not covered under Article 79 would be to allow courts and tribunals to invoke national 
concepts, such as imprevision, wegfall der geschaftsgrundlage, frustration, rebus sic 
stantibus, etc., resulting diverging interpretations of the CISG. Such a result would 
undermine the purposes of the CISG to create a uniform sales law that is able to 
transcend national borders. 
597 United Nations, United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods, Vienna, 
JO March-11April1980, Official Records, UN Doc. A/CONF.97119 (New York: UN, 1991) at 381-382. 
The Norwegian delegation proposed that the draft of the Convention should be revised to allow a party that 
fails to perform a permanent exemption to the extent that, after the impediment is removed, the 
circumstances are so radically changed that it would be manifestly unreasonable to hold that party liable. 
598 Ibid. at 381. Quote is from the French delegate, Mr. Plantard. 
599 See CISG-AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG, 
Rapporteur: Alejandro M. Garro, Columbia University School of Law, New York, N.Y. at para. 3. 
Adopted by the CISG-Advisory Council, 12 October 2007 [CISG-AC Opinion No. 7]; Georg Gruber and 
Hans Stoll, "Article 79" in Peter Schlechtriem and Ingeborg Schwenzer, eds., Commentary on the UN 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
at 810-811 [Schlechtriem &Schwenzer]; Lindstrom, supra note 187 at 23-24; Brunner, supra note 47 at 
218. 
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A recent statutory acknowledgement of hardship can be found in Germany. The 
Statute on the Modernisation of the Law of Obligations in 2001 finally codified the right 
to have a contract adapted to a fundamental change in circumstances (i.e. rebus sic -· 
stantibus) in section 313 of the BGB.600 This section of the BGB is all-encompassing, 
and it covers not only cases of hardship, where an unforeseen change in circumstances 
has made contractual performance excessively more onerous for a party, as well as 
traditional force majeure-type cases of impossibility. In this respect BGB section 313 is 
extremely comprehensive in scope, and is, arguably, analogous to CISG Article 79 in that 
it embraces a wide range of events that amount to a fundamental alteration of the 
equilibrium of a contract. 
Althoughforce majeure is dealt with under Articles 1147 and 1148 of the French 
Civil Code, and imprevision is accepted only in administrative contracts with the state-
which is effectively a rejection of imprevision in the private law of France-there is no 
other legal principle in that country that could be deemed a "hardship" provision. 
Conceivably, under Article 113 7, non-performance might be excused if there was a cause 
estrange, or an utter accident (casfortuity) under Article 1721. However, compared to 
other civil law jurisdictions, French law has not been favourable to the concept of 
hardship. 601 Where it might be recognized in France, a party would most likely use the 
defence of imprevision, which shares many of the same attributes as hardship. 
It is also important to note that while civil law emphasized rebus sic stantibus, the 
common law initially focused on the primacy of pacta sunt servanda. In conjunction 
600 Schwenzer, supra note 38 at 711. 
601 Ibid. note 38 at 710. 
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with the rebus principle, civilian legal systems focused on the degree of fault of the non-
performing party. Breach of contract, thus, presupposed fault on the non-performing 
party. Of course there were some exceptions, but civilian legal systems would then 
attempt to determine the degree of fault of the non-performing party. Conceptually, this 
is at odds with the approach taken by the common law. With its closer affiliation with 
the pacta principle, the common law utilized a stricter and more rigid approach. It treated 
every contract as a guarantee, as in strict contractual liability. A party that breached its 
obligation under a contract entitled the aggrieved party to claim damages, regardless of 
fault on the non-performing party. Typical of this perspective is the comment of Lord 
Edmund-Davies: it is "axiomatic that, in relation to claims for damages for breach of 
contract, it is, in general, immaterial why the defendant failed to fulfil his obligations, and 
certainly no defence to plead that he had done his best".602 From these two divergent 
approaches, each legal system developed unique methods to excuse contractual non-
performance in cases of supervening events. Although there were some exceptions and 
concessions in each legal system, each began from a different vantage point. Of utmost 
significance is how CISG Article 79, as an autonomous principle of an excuse for non-
performance, has been able to bridge this common law-civil law divide. 
K. CISG Article 79 as an Autonomous Legal Principle 
One of the unique aspects of CISG Article 79 is its aspiration to bridge the 
differences between the civilian principles of hardship andforce majeure with the 
common law's limited recognition of impracticability, frustration, and impossibility. 
602 Raineri v. Miles, [1981] 1 A.C. 1050 at 1086 (U.K.). 
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Like many provisions within the CISG, Article 79 represented a compromise between 
civil law and common law conceptions of excuses for non-performance due to an 
unforeseen··supervening-event. However, it is more than just a compromise provision; it 
is a self-contained, independent, concept that must be read and interpreted without 
reference to domestic legal principles. It exists within its own sphere. In this fashion, 
Article 79 is deemed to be "autonomous". 
As noted above, civilian legal systems generally recognized the Roman rule 
impossibilium nulla obligato. Thus, parties were readily excused from the performance 
of their contractual obligations if such performance had subsequently become impossible. 
This principle was codified in the laws of most civilian jurisdictions in the form of force 
majeure-type provisions. Indeed, the principle was later extended to include not only 
cases of physical impossibility, but also those of hardship-cases which fell far short of 
impossibility. In determining whether a party might be released from its contractual 
obligations, the extent of that party's "fault" was also, taken into consideration. Strict 
contractual liability was eschewed by the civilians. In this manner, the civilian 
jurisdictions emphasized rebus sic stantibus, and were more empathetic where 
circumstances had changed and performance had become more onerous for one of the 
parties. 
By contrast, the common law never adopted the impossibilium nulla obligato rule 
from Roman law. A party could, therefore, be found contractually liable even though a 
supervening event had occurred without his or her fault, and had made performance 
physically impossible. In the common law, liability for breach of contract was often 
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strict: a party would be held liable in damages even if, without fault, he or she contracted 
to do something that had subsequently become impossible to perform. An absence of 
·fault was not enough to discharge a contractual obligation.· ContraC3tual ·promises were · 
seen as guarantees. Such an approach towards commitments accounted for the primacy 
of pacta sunt servanda in the common law. This helps to explain the absence of force 
majeure-type legislation in the early common law. Recall that issues of force majeure 
entered common law courts because the parties had borrowed the concept from civil law, 
and incorporated/orce majeure clauses into their contracts. Otherwise,force majeure 
was viewed as an interloper in English law. 
The CISG can be regarded as one of the most successful international attempts in 
commercial law to harmonize divergent legal concepts and principles from various 
national laws and legal systems. The provisions within the CISG seek to eliminate the 
technical differences and peculiarities that are frequently encountered when comparing 
national laws and different legal systems. As Ulrich Magnus stated, "[t]he CISG 
provides a basic set of rules which has resulted from an intensive comparison of legal 
systems and politically supported compromises between these legal systems".603 The 
CISG achieves this by avoiding references to abstract legal concepts or principles that are 
peculiar to domestic laws. Instead, it uses an autonomous approach by using neutral 
language in describing specific circumstances, and then elaborating on the content of the 
rule without reference to national legal concepts. Article 79 is included in Section IV of 
Part III of the Convention under the heading "Exemptions". The drafters of the CISG 
603 Ulrich Magnus, "General Principles of UN-Sales Law" (1997) 3 Int'l Trade & Bus. L. Ann. 33 at s. 6(b). 
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chose the broad term "Exemptions", rather than something more specific, in order to 
avoid any association with a national legal system. Thus, Article 79 does not refer to 
force majeure, impossibility, frustration, hardship, impracticability or other related terms 
that have their origin in specific legal systems. Rather, in plain, generic language it 
expresses a situation, as in, for example, Article 79(1 ): "A party is not liable for a failure 
to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the failure was due to an impediment 
beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the 
impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided 
or overcome it or its consequences". 604 
As Andersen has noted, Article 79 is an excellent example of "terminological 
neutrality". 605 The concept of "an impediment" beyond a party's control that would 
excuse liability for failure to perform "would usually be deemed force majeure, wegfall, 
hardship, impossibility, or frustration in traditional legal terminology in numerous legal 
systems; but the drafters of the CISG sought to avoid such familiar terms, in the hope that 
Article 79 would establish its own autonomous definition of impediments beyond a 
party's control".606 
One salient feature of CISG Article 79 is that the concept of an excuse for non-
performance is unitary in scope. 607 It is unitary in that Article 79 encompasses a breach 
of any obligation under the contract. More importantly, it unifies the range of concepts 
604 CISG Article 79(1). 
605 Camilla Baasch Andersen, Uniform Application of the International Sales Law. Understanding 
Uniformity, the Global Jurisconsultorium and Examination and Notification Provisions {The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International, 2007) at 94. 
606 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
607 Brunner, supra note 47 at 57-61, 75-77. 
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that would be considered as legal excuses to non-performance. Specifically, the phrase 
"failure to perform any of his obligations[ ... ] due to an impediment beyond his control" 
· is extremely-broad- in scope, and it covers a litany of related principles that are found in a 
variety of national laws and legal systems. The non-performance referred to under 
Article 79 covers any failure to perform, for any cause whatsoever, including, for 
example, delay, the obligation to pay money, or the delivery of non-conforming or 
defective goods.608 The scope of Article 79 thus includes not only typical/orce majeure-
type events, or impossibility, but also related, narrower legal principles that are 
recognized in specific jurisdictions, such as frustration, hardship, imprevision, wegfall der 
geschaftsgrundlage, and impracticability, to name a few. In other words, conceptually, 
the impediments leading to a legal excuse for non-performance embrace a wide range of 
possibilities. The excuses available under Article 79 may be applicable to all types of 
non-performance. The range can be thought of as a spectrum of unforeseen supervening 
events, covering the most extreme cases at one end, such as physical impossibility 
because of the destruction of the subject-matter, to less-severe events, such as an 
unforeseen rise in prices, leading to hardship or something onerous to a party, at the 
opposite end. Article 79 can, thus, be successfully invoked in any case where the non-
performance is due to a partial, permanent, or temporary impediment that occurred after 
contract formation. 
608 Kruisinga, supra note 48 at 130. See also Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 111. Cf Harry M. Flechtner, 
"Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) as 
Rorschach Test: The Homeward Trend and Exemption for Delivering Non-Conforming Goods" (2007) 19 
Pace Int'l L. Rev. 29. 
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CISG Article 79 is also unitary in scope in that it reconciles the differing civil law 
and common law positions regarding fault. In many civil law jurisdictions, the principle 
of a bFeach of-contract presupposes-fault on the part of the non-performing· party. 609 . This · 
approach is due to the Roman law influence, where an obligor was absolved of liability if 
the obstacle to performance occurred without his/her fault. 610 The existence of various 
grades of culpa also accounts for the attempts in civil law to discern the subjective 
requirements for breach of contract, and to analyze, refine, and categorize the various 
degrees offault.611 For example, Friedrich Mommsen, writing in the nineteenth century, 
considered the concept of impossibility of performance within the context of breach of 
contract. 612 He applied and categorized impossibility into a wide-range of situations, 
such as initial and supervening, natural and legal, absolute and relative, objective and 
subjective, permanent and temporary, complete and partial, and apparent and "real" 
impossibility. The emphasis on rebus sic stantibus in civil law, with its allowance for 
changed circumstances, also reinforced this approach. 613 
This is conceptually at odds with the traditional common law principle of strict 
liability for breach of contract. In the English common law, a party's obligation and 
liability to perform did not depend on fault. In accordance with pacta sunt servanda, all 
contractual promises were thought of as guarantees. Exemptions for liability had to be 
incorporated into the contract, otherwise a party could be held liable even when a 
609 Brunner, supra note 47 at 65-68. 
610 Zimmermann, supra note 539 at 808. 
611 Ibid. 
612 Friedrich Mommsen's publication was entitled Die Unmoglichkeit der Leistung in ihrem Einfluss auf 
obligatorische Verhaltnisse (1853). See Zimmermann, ibid. at 809-810. 
613 Ibid. 
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supervening event had made performance impossible. Over time, the common law 
softened its rigid approach towards the pacta principle, and recognized the doctrine of 
frustration in the·case·of Taylor in 1863.614 Further developments in the common law 
occurred to mitigate the harsh consequences of the law's recognition of absolute contracts 
and insistence on literal performance. Nevertheless, these advancements failed to bridge 
fully the gap between the civil and common laws' divergent approaches to excuses for 
non-performance. 
As noted above, in Article 79's attempt to bridge the civil-common law divide it 
provides a principle of non-performance that fuses together the civil and common laws' 
distinctive approaches to this legal rule. It relies neither on the civil law's concept of 
presumed fault, nor on the common law's concept of strict liability.615 However, it does 
not abandon the concept of fault altogether. Indeed, "fault" is still relevant, but it is not a 
question of law; it has been relegated to an interpretation of the facts. Utilizing generic 
language, Article 79 thus uses the objective test of an "impediment beyond the control" 
of a party. By doing so, it is implicit that such non-performance does not require fault on 
the part of the party in breach, nor does there need to be an absence of fault. In other 
words, an absence of fault is not a relevant consideration for an invocation of Article 79, 
but the existence of fault leading to the impediment would exclude an application of 
Article 79. With fault, the impediment would not be beyond the control of the non-
performing party, or the impediment would have been reasonably foreseeable or 
avoidable. 
614 Supra note 408. 
615 Brunner, supra note 47 at 69. 
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The legislative history of the CISG further supports the view that Article 79 was 
not designed to rely on presumed fault as found in the civil law, nor on the common law's 
principle of strict liability. Instead, Article 79 was designed· as a compromise to bridge 
these two legal conceptions-and in doing so it has become an autonomous provision. In 
an early draft of this article from 1976, it provided that a party that failed to perform its 
obligations would not be liable in damages if the failure was due to an impediment that 
occurred without fault. 616 In this early draft, therefore, fault was presumed, as in the civil 
law. The following year, in revising the grounds for exemption, this provision was 
changed.617 The requirement, that the party be without fault to be held not liable in 
damages, was dropped. The "fault" or "no-fault" requirement was replaced by a new, 
more objective test, as incorporated in Article 79: an "impediment beyond the control" of 
the party. 618 
In this manner, CISG Article 79 has connected the two conceptual approaches to 
fault as found in the civil and common law. The focus is not on "fault" or "no-fault", but 
is shifted to something more neutral and objective: the conception of "impediment" and 
the equally official French empechement. While the difference between "fault" or "no-
fault" and an exemption from non-performance for an "impediment beyond the control" 
of a party may appear to be slight, this unitary formulation of an important legal concept 
is of utmost significance. As Andersen has commented, the attempt "to separate the 
language of the CISG from all other existing terminology demonstrates a good guideline 
616 The counterpart to CISG Article 79 was Article 50 in the 1976 Geneva Draft. See Brunner, ibid. at 69. 
617 The revised article was Article 51 from the Vienna Draft, 1977. See Brunner, ibid. at 69-70. 
618 CISG Article 79(1). See also Brunner, ibid. 
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for the uniformity of the CISG, as intended by the drafters: namely the quest for the 
development of autonomous terms-the drafters aimed for a uniform language [ ... ] to be 
understood universally the same, with no taint from domestic law'~.61 ~ ··· ·• · 
Even if the lofty goal of uniform and autonomous terminology is realized, it is 
necessary to look at whether there is uniformity in the application of the CISG among 
national courts and arbitral tribunals. This requires, for example, that Article 79 be 
applied in similar ways across various jurisdictions. As Hans Stoll and Georg Gruber 
have stated, 
Article 79 is the result of a difficult compromise between the 
advocates of an absolute guarantee that the contract will be performed 
[i.e. pacta sunt servanda], in accordance with the Anglo-American 
model, and the proponents of the principle of fault, characteristic for 
most of the continental European legal systems. The compromise 
must not be weakened by recourse to principles of liability under 
national law when interpretin~ Article 79; the provision's independent 
character must be observed. 62 
John 0. Honnold has similarly admonished courts, tribunals, and legal practitioners to 
"purge [their] minds of presuppositions derived from domestic traditions and, with 
innocent eyes, read the language of Article 79 in the light of the practices and needs of 
international trade."621 In other words, in the developing body of international cases, 
there should be no evidence of interpretive flexibility or divergence in its adaptation to 
the various national legal systems that have considered Article 79. 
619 Andersen, supra note 605 at 38-39. 
620 Stoll and Gruber, "Article 79" in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 599 at 807. 
621 Honnold & Flechtner, supra note 43 at 615. 
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But that might be wishful thinking. One American decision on Article 79 has 
been discussed in an article labeled, in part, "The Worst CISG Decision in 25 Years?". 622 
Quoting-the words of Michael Bridge, Harry Flechtner has· similarly-suggested that the 
"centrifugal forces of nationalist tendency" has come from even enlightened circles. 623 In 
John 0. Honnold's guarded view, "we face the likelihood that Article 79 may be the 
Convention's least successful part of the half-century of work towards international 
uniformity".624 As they exist, such pronouncements are an ill-omen to the continuing 
development of autonomous commercial norms in cross-border transactions. But 
whether these statements are accurate can be discerned from the cross-jurisdictional case 
law on Article 79 that is discussed in the following two chapters. 
622 Joseph Lookofsky and Harry Flechtner, "Nominating Manfred Forberich: The Worst CISG Decision in 
25 Years?" (2005) 9 Vindobona J. Int'l Com. L. & Arb. 199. The dubious distinction for the "worst" case 
is Raw Materials Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH, 2004 WL 1535839 (District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, July 7, 2004). 
623 Harry M. Flechtner, "Recovering Attorneys' Fees as Damages under the U.N. Sales Convention: A Case 
Study on the New International Commercial Practice and the Role of Case Law in CISG Jurisprudence, 
with Comments on Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co." (2002) 22 Nw J. Int'l L. & 
Bus. 121 at 121. 
624 Honnold & Flechtner, supra note 43 at 627. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
GETTING IT RIGHT: RELATIVE UNIFORMITY IN THE TREATMENT OF 
ARTICLE 79 IN DOMESTIC COURTS AND ARBITRATIONS 
- .. ' 
A. Article 79 Jurisprudence in Domestic Courts and Arbitrations: Civil Law 
Dominance 
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It has been stated that there are two influential legal traditions in the contemporary 
world, the civil law and the common law.625 Of these two prominent legal traditions, it 
has been argued that the older of these two traditions, the civil law, is not only more 
widely known and used throughout the world, but it is also the more influential, and 
dominate626 than its common law counterpart. 627 In an analysis of CISG jurisprudence it 
becomes immediately apparent that, with regards to the output of CISG case law and 
arbitral decisions, countries with civil law systems lead the field. 628 This may be due to 
the fact that there is greater awareness of the CISG in civil law jurisdictions.629 For 
example, in some civil law jurisdictions study of the CISG is part of the regular law 
625 John Henry Merryman & Rogelio Perez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition, 3d ed. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007) at 1. In the recent past, it could have been argued that there was also the socialist 
law tradition. However, most of these socialist law countries were previously part of the civil law tradition, 
to which they have reverted with the demise of communism in most parts of the world. 
626 H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, 4th ed. (New York, Oxford University Press, 2010) at 
175. 
627 Merryman & Rogelio Perez-Perdomo, supra note 625 at 1. The civil law tradition has been dated as far 
back to 450 B.C.E., with the publication of the Twelve Tables in Rome. By contrast, the date at which the 
common law is thought to have been founded is 1066, with the Norman invasion of England. See 
Merryman & Rogelio Perez-Perdomo, supra note 625 at 2-3. 
628 For example, excluding the nine ICC cases, of the 119 Article 79 cases noted in this dissertation, only 
four emanate from a common law jurisdiction, the United States. A review of the "Country Case 
Schedule" on the Pace CISG website reveals similar patterns. See online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html>. 
629 Ferrari, "General Report", supra, note 218 at 421-423. 
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school curriculum. 630 Bar associations in civil law countries appear to offer regular 
continuing legal education (CLE) courses on the CISG. 631 In other jurisdictions, 
particularly those of the common law; there is relatively little awareness of the CISG:-63·2 
For instance it has been noted that in Canada "it appears that only two CLE events [on the 
CISG] have been presented by major CLE providers in the last five to seven years".633 
The situation in the U.S. is similarly disappointing. Awareness of international case law 
on the CISG appears to have been ignored. As one commentator has lamented, "[ m Jost 
of the federal courts' decisions have actually hidden behind the 'false' excuse that there is 
little caselaw outside the U.S. caselaw on the CISG".634 
Where there is little awareness of the CISG, the Convention cannot have a 
significant impact on law students, practicing lawyers, judges, legislators, and 
businesspersons. This may help to explain why countries in the civilian tradition have 
been much more prolific than common law jurisdictions in their adjudication of CISG 
cases. For example, excluding ICC arbitrations, of the 61 Article 79 cases from signatory 
state courts considered in this study, only four emanate from a country from the common 
law tradition, the U.S.635 When 58 civilian arbitral cases are added, the total civil law 
630 Ibid. at 422. This is the case in China, Croatia, and Denmark. 
631 Ibid. at 422-423 fn. 62 where Argentina, Denmark, Germany, and Greece are cited as examples. 
632 See generally the chapters on "Canada", "New Zealand", and the "United States of America" in Ferrari, 
ed., The CISG and its Impact on National Legal Systems, supra, note 218. 
633 McEvoy, supra note 218 at 66. 
634 Alain A. Levasseur, "United States of America" in Ferrari, ed., The CISG and its Impact on National 
Legal Systems, supra, note 218 at 313. 
635 The four American cases are Macromex Sri. v. Globex International, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31442 
(S.D.N.Y. 16 April 2008), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080416ul.html>; Hilaturas Miel, S.L. v. Republic of Iraq, 573 F. Supp. 
2d 781 (S.D.N.Y. 20 August 2008), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080820ul.html>; Valero Marketing v. Greeni Oy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 475 
(D.N.J. 4 April 2006), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
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cases expands to 119. 636 If Israel is included as a hybrid or mixed legal jurisdiction-it is 
steeped in the common law tradition, but also embraces civilian legal traditions--one 
more· case can be added to the common law tally.637 Clearly, civil law jurisdictions 
dominate in Article 79 jurisprudence. However, some of those civilian jurisdictions have 
added little to Article 79 jurisprudence. 638 
This is not to suggest that civil law countries have homogeneous laws and 
uniform legal systems. Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and France are "civil law" 
countries, for example, but each has their own legal structures, with quite different laws, 
rules, processes, and institutions. The civilian tradition is, indeed, a composite of many 
different elements and distinct sub-traditions with unique origins and histories. 
Recognizing the great diversity that exists within the civil law tradition, it must also be 
appreciated that there is a history and tradition that is uniquely shared by civil law 
members that distinguishes them from legal systems that belong to the common law. 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060404ul .html>; and Raw Materials Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH 
& Co., KG, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12510 (N.D. Ill. 6 July 2004), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040706ul .html>. 
636 See Figure 1, supra. The total of 119 cases excludes the arbitral cases from the International Chamber 
of Commerce. 
637 The Israeli case is Supreme Court (CA) 3912/90 Examin v. Textile and Footware, 22 August 1993, 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930822i5.html>. However, 
even this case provides no information of substance on Article 79. That article is cited, but it is not an 
Article 79 case, and as such is not discussed herein. 
638 In addition to the Israeli case, ibid., the following cases, from China, Russia, Spain, and Ukraine 
respectively, add nothing to Article 79 jurisprudence. While Article 79 is briefly referred to in these cases, 
there is no significant discussion or analysis of that provision. Therefore, these cases are not discussed 
herein. See Shen Zhen fengshen Industry Development Co. v. Inter Service Internation France, Wuhan 
Economic and Technology Development Zone People's Court [District Court], 30 June 2000, online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000630c I .html>; Constitutional Court of 
the Russian Federation, 27 April 2001 (Resolution No. 7-P), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010427rl.html>; Juzgado de Primera Instancia [District Court] La 
Laguna, 23 October 2007, No. 1554/2006 [Cattle case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071023s4.html>; and Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce & Trade, 15 April 2004 [Counter-purchase case], online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040415u5.html>. 
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One common element is that the civil law tradition is traceable to the Roman law as 
codified under Justinian. More recently, and for reasons that are still debated,639 another 
trait from countries belonging to the civilian legal tradition appears to be that they share· a 
relative affinity (vis-a-vis the common law) for the CISG.640 
B. Austria: The Supreme Court Gets It Right-Almost. 
The five cases on Article 79 from Austria are relatively limited in the extent of 
their treatment of that provision. 641 This is somewhat in contrast to the general treatment 
of the CISG in that country. Considering Austria's comparatively small population,642 
the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof or OGH) has been very active in adjudicating a 
639 See e.g. Bruno Zeller, "The CISG and the Common Law; the Australian Experience" in Ulrich Magnus, 
ed., C/SG vs. Regional Sales Law Unification (Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 2012) at 57-78. 
640 See generally Franco Ferrari, ed., The CISG and its Impact on National Legal Systems, supra note 218. 
The CISG has directly impacted the domestic sales legislation of the Scandinavian countries (Norway, 
Finland, and Sweden), with the exception of Demark. The CISG has also had an important legislative 
impact in Russia, Estonia, and a number of other post-socialist Eastern and Central European countries. It 
has also been influential in the development of China's modem contract law. In Germany, it is reported 
that the CISG "had [ ... ] a strong real impact on the final outcome" of its revision to its civil code on 
obligations. Indeed, within the European Union (EU), the CISG's impact on legislation has been 
impressive. It is in force in 23 of the 27 EU member countries, and in this way it has given "shape to a set 
of common rules and principles in the field of cross-border sales transactions [within the EU]". Perhaps 
more importantly, "this process prepared the ground for the intervention by[ ... ] EU institutions aimed at 
harmonizing the national laws on sales within the EU in light of the CISG's model and to extend the CISG 
to a broader scope of application than simply sales law". Ibid., Ferrari, ed., at 82-84, 159-160, 347, 474-
475 respectively. 
641 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme 
Court] 21April2004, 7 Ob 32/04p [Omnibus case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040421a3.html>; Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] 14 
January 2002, 7 Ob 301/0lt [Cooling system case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020114a3.html>; Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] 29 June 
1999, 1 Ob 74/99k [Dividing wall panels case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990629a3.html>; Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] 15 
December 1998, 1 Ob 289/98a [Construction materials case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981215a3.html>; and Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] 6 
February 1996, 10 Ob 518/95 [Propane case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960206a3.html>. 
642 Currently estimated to be 8.4 million people, online, Wikipedia "Austria" 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Austria>. 
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variety of CISG cases. 643 Unfortunately for the purposes of this dissertation, only a few 
concern Article 79. One of these cases mentions that provision in a negligible way in the 
context of its discussion of foreseeability and damages.644 However, all five Article 79 
cases emanate from the Supreme Court. 
The earliest Austrian Article 79 case, the Propane case, was an important decision 
relating to the interpretation of statements made by parties to an international sales 
contract, but it stated nothing of significance on Article 79. 645 Instead, it made reference 
to that article's sister provision on exemptions, Article 80, which states that "[a] party 
may not rely on a failure of the other party to perform, to the extent that such failure was 
caused by the first party's act or omission".646 In such situations, the impediment is 
caused, not by a supervening event, but rather by the action or inaction of one of the 
parties. This explains why the provision is situated together with Article 79 under CISG 
Section IV "Exemptions". 
The rule is self-evident: a party must bear the consequences of its own misconduct 
and should not be able to benefit from its own wrongdoing. Thus, in the Propane case 
where the buyer was under a contractual obligation with the seller to obtain a letter of 
credit, the Supreme Court held that the buyer was exempt from liability because the seller 
had failed to provide it with the necessary details to open the credit. Article 80, thus, acts 
643 Willibald Posch & Thoma Petz, "Austrian Cases on the UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods" (2002) 6 Vindobona J. Int'l Com. L. & Arb. 1 at 2-4. Posch and Petz report 
that the Austrian Supreme Court has adjudicated 30 CISG cases since the end of 200 I. Many more have 
been reported since. 
644 Cooling system case, supra note 641. As this case is insignificant in Article 79 jurisprudence, it will not 
be discussed. 
645 Propane case, supra note 641. 
646 CISG Article 80. 
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to prevent the claims of a party where that party has caused the non-performance of the 
other party. As the Supreme Court noted, "[t]he non-issuance of the letter of credit[ ... ] 
was·eaused by an·omission of the [seller], and-following Art. 80CISG-·-the·fatter 
cannot rely on the [buyer's] failure to open the letter of credit".647 In this respect, the 
Court correctly concluded that an omission was the equivalent to an act, as it was a 
necessary condition to making performance possible. 
The Dividing wall panels case also considered Article 79 in a peripheral 
manner. 
648 The case was primarily concerned with the return of non-conforming goods, 
and which party was at risk for the safe delivery of returned defective products. The 
Supreme Court held that by delivering non-conforming goods in the first place meant that 
the seller had to bear the risk of the return transportation of the goods. In making this 
point, the Court referred to CISG commentary on the issue and made a distinction 
between the CISG and the Austrian Commercial Code ("HGB"). Such distinctions are 
important to the development of relative uniformity in CISG case law across signatory 
states. In this instance, the Supreme Court held that under the CISG, "wrong delivery" 
had to be assessed by Articles 35 et seq. instead of being treated as a case of non-delivery 
as provided for under domestic law. In that respect, as DiMatteo et al. noted, the Court 
"indicates a commitment to interpret the CISG in a manner that tends to promote 
uniformity of interpretation".649 Unfortunately, the Court utilized the term force majeure 
rather than referencing Article 79 when it stated that "the seller alone bears the risk of 
647 Propane case, supra note 641. 
648 Dividing wall panels case, supra note 641. 
649 DiMatteo et al., supra note 8 at 112. 
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chance accidents and force majeure".650 Then in a paragraph below, the Court noted that 
the possibility of exoneration according to Article 79 did not need to be examined. 
Regrettably, the ·comingling of terminology-force majeure··and Article 79~works · 
against the effort to promote uniformity of interpretation. While the Court refrained from 
the homeward trend in deciding the primary issue in this case, nevertheless, it made a 
minor-but common-error in its use of terminology when referencing Article 79. 
Not all cases from Austria are perfect in their interpretation of Article 79. 
Sometimes the homeward trend creeps into the courts' analysis of that provision. For 
example, in another early case, the Supreme Court made references to domestic law in a 
manner that is not consistent with the quest for uniformity in international sales law.651 
The facts of the Construction materials case are complex. In essence, it involved the 
development of a gravel pit and the related construction of a mobile concrete facility for a 
grit delivery contract. The Austrian plaintiffs were to lease a gravel pit to the German 
defendants. The defendants were to extract raw materials from the pit, erect a processing 
plant, and then resell the goods to the plaintiffs. Following the conclusion of the contract, 
the market for gravel and concrete deteriorated significantly. Even though the plaintiffs 
agreed to a price adjustment, the defendants failed to erect the plant, citing economic 
duress. 
The issue concerning the Supreme Court was whether the defendants could rely 
on frustration of contract as a consequence of changed market conditions to exempt them 
from liability for non-performance. The Court found that even though this contract 
650 Dividing wall panels case, supra note 641. 
651 Construction materials case, supra note 641. 
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applied to lease of land, the CISG was applicable to the grit delivery contract. It referred 
to Article 79, and conceded that that provision "does also contain elements to be qualified 
as··frustration-of contract", and accurately noted that "a party could only-refer to this 
provision, but not to national provisions".652 Notwithstanding its desire to limit its 
discussion to Article 79, rather than to similar domestic legal concepts, the Court noted 
that "the defending parties could [ ... ] not successfully rely on a frustration of contract as 
a consequence of a changed market situation". 653 The reference to ''frustration" was 
unfortunate, as was the Court's statement that "the same results from the grounds of the 
doctrine of the frustration of contract according to purely national law". Also 
disappointing were the references to numerous domestic examples of changed market 
conditions were frustration of contract was denied. 654 References to international case 
law would have been more desirable. The Court did, however, acknowledge that Article 
79 was the controlling provision, so, "in the sense of Art. 79 CISG, [the defendants] had 
been unable at the time of the conclusion of the lease and grit delivery contract to take 
into account a change in the market situation".655 As such, the defendants were denied 
reliance on changed market conditions to exempt them from liability for their non-
performance. 
The issue of an exemption from liability for an impediment due to the conduct of 
a third person is central in the Omnibus case. 656 An Austrian seller/distributor of 
652 Ibid. 
653 Ibid. 
654 These included "[fJrustrated expectation concerning the development of a shopping centre ... a change of 
commodity prices, [and] a decrease of purchasing power and down-sizing of companies". Ibid. 
655 Ibid. 
656 Omnibus case, supra note 641. 
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omnibuses was sued by a Swiss buyer for a bus that had been destroyed by fire. An 
investigation revealed that the cause of the fire was due to the improper installation of the 
air-conditioning-system. It could not be determined ifthe improper installation·was 
caused by the manufacturer of the bus, or its supplier. The seller argued that it should not 
be held liable for damages as it acquired the new vehicle from a reputable manufacturer, 
and had not subjected it to any modifications. Consequently, there was to be no "direct 
liability" from the seller to the buyer. The trial court ruled in favour of the buyer, finding 
the seller liable for delivering defective goods, but the seller appealed. It was not clear, 
however, if the court made this ruling on the basis of the CISG or under Austria's civil 
code. The same problem arises with the ruling by the Appellate Court. It found that the 
seller, as a dealer/distributor, could not be burdened with the obligation to examine all 
apparently harmless parts of factory-new goods prior to their resale. It further noted that 
the installation of the air-conditioning system was a very complex procedure, and even if 
it had been inspected, it would not have attracted the attention of the seller. That would 
appear to be an acceptable defense under Austria's domestic law, but it is likely to be 
unsuccessful under the CISG. 657 
The Appellate Court thus ruled that the Seller was neither liable for the defect of a 
supplier far down the procurement chain, nor liable for damages arising from the fire. 
While this may have been the correct ruling under Austria's domestic law, the Supreme 
657 As the Supreme Court made the point that unlike Austria's civil code, the CISG features a system of 
strict liability. As such, "liability of the parties under the CISG exceeds that under the ABGB [Austrian 
Civil Code]". Ibid. 
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Court noted that the CISG was the governing law in this matter, and it features a system 
of strict liability. 658 
· Article· 79( 1) remains the controlling provision even where a ·contracting party has 
engaged a third person to perform the contract in whole or in part. The seller's 
responsibility for its suppliers is part of its general procurement risk. In general, the 
seller is not exempted under Article 79(1) when those within its sphere of risk fail to 
perform. This is the basis of Article 79(2). A seller, including a bus dealer, cannot 
contract away its procurement risk by using a third party, even if that party is far-
removed from the seller in the supply chain. In other words, the seller cannot draw any 
advantages by using third party suppliers. As the Supreme Court noted, Article 79(2) is 
meant to increase the seller's liability, by making the seller responsible for defective 
performance incurred by third persons as if it were the seller's own conduct. 
The key issue in the Omnibus case was whether a supplier, subcontractor, or third 
person to whom the seller looked for performance fit the phrase of Article 79(2) "a third 
person whom [the party claiming exemption] has engaged to perform the whole or part of 
the contract." How far down the supply chain should this extend? The Supreme Court 
correctly confirmed that it extended to a far-removed, system component supplier of the 
manufacturer's. Even though the defect was possibly from a third party that was only 
remotely connected to the sales contract, i.e., the bus manufacture' s air-conditioning 
supplier, the "[Seller] could not exempt itself through any failure on the side of its 
658 Ibid. 
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suppliers; instead, it was liable for their failure". 659 By a close reading of the CISG, and 
by remaining sensitive to the international character of the Convention, the Supreme 
Court divorced itself from the idiosyncrasies of domestic jurisprudenee·. The result was a 
set of decisions-although not perfect-that appear to be the product of a court with an 
international perspective. 
C. Bulgaria: Avoiding the Domestic Law Bias 
As is usually the case with China and Russia, Bulgarian cases involving the CISG 
have been settled exclusively by arbitration. In Bulgaria, commercial disputes are 
arbitrated under the auspices of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
("BCCI"). There are three Article 79 cases that emanated from the BCCI, but only two 
of these rule on Article 79 in significant fashion. 660 In doing so, these cases appear to 
interpret that provision in a manner that seems to avoid a bias with domestic law. The 
arbitral decisions interpret Article 79 in a manner that supports international uniformity 
on the CISG. 
659 Ibid. 
660 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these two cases are: Bulgaria Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration Award, 12 February 1998, Case 11/1996 [Steel ropes case], online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980212bu.html>; and Bulgaria Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration Award, 24 April 1996, Case 56/1995 [Coal case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960424bu.html>. The third, insignificant case is Bulgaria Chamber of 
Commerce Arbitration Award, 19 March 2001, Case 26/99 [Unknown goods case], online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010319bu.html>. There, in a terse ruling, the 
tribunal made one obscure reference to Article 79. This was regarding the fact that the buyer was unaware 
that when it returned goods to the seller, the transportation company failed to inform the buyer of the date 
of the return. Being late, the seller sought to invoke a penalty clause, but the tribunal referred to Article 79 
to excuse the buyer. While this may be a questionable use of Article 79, there is little detail in the ruling to 
make a proper assessment of the treatment of that provision in this case. 
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The earliest case is from 1996, and it involved a Ukrainian seller and a Bulgarian 
buyer for the sale of coal. 661 Following a series of shipments, the buyer became 
concerned about the quality of the coal, and it refused payment. ·Following this ·· 
development, the seller alleged that there was a prohibition on coal exports by the 
Ukrainian government. It also argued that a strike of Ukrainian miners made it 
impossible to deliver the outstanding shipments of coal. The seller commenced an action 
for payment of the outstanding price, and the buyer counterclaimed and argued that the 
seller should pay the contractual penalty for non-performance of its obligation to deliver. 
As the tribunal correctly stated in its award, the governmental prohibition on coal 
exports did not correspond with the requirements for an exemption from damages under 
CISG Article 79. Furthermore, the seller was not exempted because of the miners' strike, 
since at that time the seller was already in default, and this excluded any later reliance on 
force majeure. While the tribunal used the termforce majeure, rather than Article 79's 
more neutral term "impediment", it correctly decided that the government's prohibition 
on exports of coal did represent force majeure. However, the prohibition was already in 
force at the time of the conclusion of the contract, and was, therefore, foreseeable. It is 
not enough that an impediment hindering performance is an objective one or occurs 
outside a party's sphere of control. In addition to this, the impediment must not have 
been foreseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract. In this respect, Article 79 
661 Coal case, ibid. 
• -- - ( • 4 
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specifies the foreseeability requirement as an independent requirement of exemption, and 
such a risk, if assumed, should be reflected in the contract. 662 
··Another-Bulgarian case also seems consistent with Article 79's foreseeability· 
standard. In the Steel ropes case a BCCI tribunal refused to accept a seller's argument for 
a price increase because of changes in market conditions.663 A buyer sought to be 
excused from further performance of a contract to buy steel ropes for two reasons: the 
increase in the value of the American dollar had made the product more expensive, and a 
depressed construction market had lowered demand for the steel ropes. Because these 
were foreseeable, the tribunal ruled that these circumstances were not covered by Article 
79. Risks that fall within the ordinary range of commercial probability are thought to be 
foreseeable under Article 79. 
D. China: Early Concerns of the Homeward Trend Ill-Founded 
In the early years of the CISG, there was some concern that Chinese arbitrators 
and lawyers might apply the CISG in an idiosyncratic way, and out of sync with the plain 
meaning of the CISG's provisions.664 The fear was that the homeward trend in China 
might pose a threat to the uniform practice of the CISG across the signatory states. More 
specifically, there was concern that the influence of Chinese domestic law on the CISG 
would be pronounced, and that the CISG might be treated as an interloper in arbitration 
662 Brunner, supra note 47 at 320. 
663 Steel ropes case, supra note 660. 
664 See generally Frank N. Fisanich, "Application of the U.N. Sales Convention in Chinese International 
Commercial Arbitration: Implications for International Uniformity" (1999) 10 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 101. 
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practice. 665 However, while the early record of Chinese jurisprudence on the CISG was 
not perfect, these initial fears have not been realized. 
Today~ China has become an influential and prolific contributor of case law and 
scholarship on the CISG.666 The CISG is now an integral part of the Chinese legal 
system.667 For example, it ranks second (behind Germany) in the number of cases 
reported on the Pace Law School CISG Database.668 Of the 2,655 cases reported there, 
424 have come from China. 669 Of these, the majority of cases come from arbitral 
proceedings. This is not surprising. While arbitration in China is of a more recent 
development, with its roots in Confucian philosophy, mediation has been used for 
thousands of years to resolve disputes in China.670 Litigation has traditionally been 
viewed with derision, as a last resort.671 In its place exists a legal tradition that places a 
great emphasis on informality and persuasion. 672 Perhaps that is why one commentator 
on Chinese law (concerning force majeure) went as far to state, "the role of law was 
never given great weight in Chinese society".673 This view was complicated by the fact 
that in the first two decades of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, no 
665 See Xiao Yongping & Long Weidi, "Selected Topics on the Application of the CISG in China" (2008) 
20 Pace Int'l L. Rev 61. 
666 Albert H. Kritzer, "Celebrating and Researching the CISG-Progress in the Rule of Law in the PRC" 
(2008-2009) 10 Int'l L. Rev. Wuhan U. 81. 
667 Shiyuan Han, "China" in Franco Ferrari, ed., The CISG and its Impact on National Legal Systems, supra 
note 218 at 71. 
668 As of June 6, 2011, according to the Pace Law School CISG Database, online: 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html. (German cases lead the total with 465 cases reported.) 
669 Ibid. 
670 Kritzer, supra note 666 at 83. On this point, Kritzer refers to Fiona D'Souza, "The Recognition and 
Enforcement of Commercial Arbitral Awards in the People's Republic of China" (2007) 30 Fordham Int'l 
L.J. 1319. 
671 Glenn, supra note 626 at 351. Confucius stated that "[w]hat we need is for there to be no lawsuits" (The 
Analects, Book XII.13). 
672 Glenn, supra note 626 at 320. 
673 Donald L. Grace, "Force Majeure, China & the CISG: Is China's New Contract Law a Step in the Right 
Direction?" (2001) 2 San Diego Int'l L.J. 173 at 177. 
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real effort was made to distinguish politics from law.674 Since the death of Mao Zedong 
in 197 6, however, the country has undergone a profound number of changes, including 
·the establishment,of a-less political and more institutionalized and codified system of 
law.675 Today, for example, for aspiring Chinese lawyers, knowledge of the CISG is 
required to pass the national law exams, and for this reason, the Convention is a required 
component of the law school curriculum. 676 
In 1985 China passed the Foreign Economic Contract Law ("FECL") that for the 
first time explicitly allowed private Chinese citizens to contract openly with foreign 
parties. 677 Prior to the passage of this law, any party wishing to conduct business in 
China had to do so under its 1981 Economic Contract Law ("ECL''), but it was 
inadequate in that was primarily designed to cover contracts between domestic parties. 678 
These laws were promulgated in an effort to place China on the global stage as a 
legitimate actor in international business. Following the ratification of the CISG on 
December 11, 1986, the CISG entered into force in China on January 1, 1988. Until this 
event, Chinese contract law was relatively complex, especially before 1999, when a new 
law came into force that unified the previously separate regulation of domestic contracts 
and contracts involving foreign parties. 679 Without the CISG, Chinese contract law was 
674 Mark R. Shulman & Lachmi Singh, "China's Implementation of the UN Sales Convention Through 
Arbitral Tribunals" (2010) 48 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 242 at 249. 
675 Ibid. 
676 Han, supra note 667 at 71-72. 
677 Foreign Economic Contract Law, adopted Mar. 21, 1985 at the 10th Sess. of the Standing Committee of 
the 6th National People's Congress, effective July 1, 1985. See also Grace, supra note 673 at 175. 
678 Economic Contract Law, adopted Dec. 13, 1981 by the 4th Sess. of the 5th National People's Congress, 
effective July 1, 1982. See also ibid. 
679 Andrea Vincze, "Conformity of the Goods under the UN Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG)- Overview of CIETAC's Practice" in Camilla B. Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeter, 
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not sufficiently adequate to cover all the aspects of an international sales transaction.680 
The CISG has, thus, corrected a number of deficiencies in international sales law in 
China, and it has generally-had a positive impact ·on trade and economic development-in· 
that nation. Still, there was concern that there was some interaction between domestic 
sales law and the CISG in China where judicial bodies had "customized" the CISG to 
Chinese law and ideas. 681 However, the new contract law of 1999 has restricted this 
practice as it makes it explicit that the CISG prevails in sales transactions with foreign 
parties. This has led one reviewer on CISG jurisprudence in that country to note that 
"[ u ]niformity of application of the CISG has been emphasized by Chinese scholars". 682 
However, other scholars have noted a disturbing lack of consistency in the application of 
the CISG in China. Xiao Y ongping and Long W eidi, for example, have concluded that 
Chinese courts and CIET AC arbitrators have demonstrated a homeward 
trend in applying the CISG, which is well manifested by the parallel 
application of the CISG and Chinese domestic law to the same matters, 
the reliance upon Chinese legal rationale in the interpretation of the 
CISG, the fallback role of the CISG to fill the gaps of Chinese domestic 
law, and the exclusive resort to Chinese domestic law despite the 
applicability of the CISG. 683 
In their view, it is difficult to determine that the CISG has received uniform interpretation 
in China. According to Y ongping and W eidi, "Chinese courts and CIET AC arbitrators 
are familiar with Chinese domestic law and, hence, feel more confident when dealing 
with this body oflaw, while they are not well equipped with a comprehensive 
eds., Sharing International Commercial Law across National Boundaries: Festschriftfor Albert H Kritzer 
on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday (London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing, 2008) at 552. 
680 Ibid. 
681 Ibid. at 553. 
682 Han, supra note 667 at 77. 
683 Y ongping & W eidi, supra note 665 at 101. 
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understanding of the CISG".684 Such a view suggests that the CISG, particularly Article 
79, will be interpreted in a less than uniform manner in that country. This review of 
Article-79 case· law, however, strongly suggests that this concern with·homeward trend is 
exaggerated. In the majority of cases analyzed below, arbitral tribunals were careful to 
avoid references to domestic law. 
Arbitration in China is governed by the Arbitration Law that came into effect in 
1995.685 Pursuant to this legislation, the China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission ("CIET AC"), which was established in 1956, is best known 
internationally because of its license to handle disputes with foreign parties. Access to 
public courts for commercial dispute resolution is usually not available. CIET AC is now 
the most prominent arbitral institution in China, and it is also influential on a global 
level. 686 This is due not only to the prolific number of CISG cases emanating from 
CIET AC-which, at its current rate will allow China to surpass all other signatory states 
in the production of CISG case law-but also because CIET AC provides extensive 
redacted reports on its arbitral proceedings. 687 However, as with the homeward trend 
with CISG case law in China, criticism of the CIETAC arbitral process is also evident. 
Jerome Cohen, a leading authority on Chinese law, has remarked that CIETAC's 
practices need substantial reform if it is to compete with other international arbitral 
684 Ibid. at 102. 
685 Zhonghua Renrnin Gongheguo zhongcai fa ["Arbitration Law"] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective September 1, 1995), translated in 34 I.L.M. 1650 (1995) 
(P.R.C.). See also Catherine Mun & Shen Peng, "China" in Baker & McKenzie, ed., The Baker & 
McKenzie International Arbitration Yearbook, 2010-2011 (New York: JurisNet, LLC, 2011) at 25. 
686 Vincze, supra note 679 at 554, 581. 
687 Fan Yang, "CISG, CIETAC Arbitration and the Rule of Law in the P.R. of China: A Global 
Jurisconsultorium Perspective" in Camilla B. Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeter, eds., Sharing International 
Commercial Law across National Boundaries: Festschrift for Albert H. Kritzer on the Occasion of his 
Eightieth Birthday (London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing, 2008) at 602. 
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institutions.688 In describing his experiences with CIET AC, he stated: "I saw some of the 
most blatant contract violations I'd ever seen, but it was like the [other arbitrators] had 
been watching a different case". 689 Some critics view CIET AC as an institution that is · 
not entirely independent or impartial.690 A review of decisions on CISG Article 79 from 
CIET AC will help to determine whether these criticisms are justified. 
D.i. Force Majeure in China 
The laws of most, if not all, countries allow for an exception to the important rule 
of pacta sunt servanda. In this respect, China is no exception, but this is a relatively 
recent development. Under the communist regime, the comparative growth of private 
commercial practices was stunted until relatively recently. Doctrines such as force 
majeure, therefore, did not develop, as China remained relatively isolated from 
international trade until the last few decades.691 The concept of force majeure, when it 
did develop, followed the French terminology that connoted a superior or irresistible 
force. That is where the comparison ends. It is defined in Article 153 of the General 
Principles as an unforeseeable, unavoidable, and insurmountable condition or event. 692 
The General Principles does not enumerate or elaborate or define the various conditions 
that would qualify an event as unforeseeable, unavoidable, or insurmountable. However, 
in practice it seems that these three prongs of force majeure refer only to natural disasters 
(i.e., earthquakes, floods, fire, storms) that could not have arisen from any human 
688 Shulman & Singh, supra note 674 at 257. 
689 Ibid. 
690 Ibid. 
691 Grace, supra note 673 at 177. 
692 General Principles of the Civil Law, adopted by the 4th Sess. of the 6th National People's Congress on 
Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987. 
192 
intervention. Even such calamities as war, revolution, strikes, and government 
intervention are excluded, as these stem from human causes. In this respect, the Chinese 
concept of force majeure·resembles the stricter principle of pacta sunt servanda, -as found · 
in the common law. Indeed, the concept of force majeure in China has been compared to 
the common law principle of frustration. 693 
A force majeure provision is found in Article 27 of its 1981 ECL,694 as well as in 
Article 24 of the FECL 695 which applies to foreign parties. While many layers of Chinese 
law may be applicable to foreign transactions, the FECL is the most relevant, having been 
based on the CISG, with a few notable exceptions.696 In terms of excuses for non-
performance, the FECL and the CISG differ considerably. CISG Article 79 allows for 
excuse when a party proves that his failure to perform was due to "an impediment beyond 
his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment 
into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome 
it or its consequences".697 The main FECL provision onforce majeure is in Article 24 
that reads: 
A party should be exempted from his obligations in whole or in 
part in case he fails to perform all or part of his obligations as a result of a 
force majeure event. 
693 Herve Leclercq, "Force Majeure in Chinese Commercial Law" (1989) 7 J. Energy Nat. Resources L. 
238. 
694 Supra note 678. 
695 Supra note 677. 
696 The most important difference between the CISG and the FECL is in the area of contract formation. 
The FECL has no provisions for offer and acceptance as in CISG Articles 14-24. See Frank N. Fisanich, 
"Application of the U.N. Sales Convention in Chinese International Commercial Arbitration: Implications 
for International Uniformity" (1999) 10 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 101 at 104, 112. 
697 CISG Article 79. 
In case a party cannot perform his obligations within the time limit 
set in the contract due to a force majeure event, he should be relieved from 
the liability for delayed performance during the period of continued 
influence of the effects of the event. An event of force majeure means the 
event that the parties could not foresee at the time of conclusion of the 
contract and its occurrence and consequences cannot be avoided and 
cannot be overcome. 698 
As with many domestic laws concerning excuses for contractual non-
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performance, there is a superficial similarity in this provision of the FECL and the CISG. 
In theory and practice, CISG Article 79 is much broader and more liberal in scope. For 
example, Article 79 refers to a party's "failure to perform any of his obligations", so 
government acts may result in an "impediment" under the CISG. In contrast, China has 
generally not allowed acts of government to be regarded as force majeure events for the 
purpose of excusing performance. 699 As already noted, China has allowed excuse due to 
a force majeure event only in cases of natural disasters. Considering this definition of 
force majeure, the time limits noted in the second paragraph of the FECL reflect the 
Chinese view that natural disasters are only temporary impediments, and that a party's 
excuse only lasts as long as the disaster impedes performance.700 Unlike CISG Article 
79, there is almost no recognition in Article 24 of a permanent impediment to 
performance. Such differences between the CISG and the FECL belie the similarities 
between the two laws and weaken any claim that having the FECL apply to an 
international sale of goods contract will make little difference in the outcome of a 
contract dispute. In addition, the FECL contains an additional provision onforce majeure 
698 Supra note 677. 
699 Fisanich, supra note 696 at 114. 
700 Ibid. at 115. 
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that requires that the party relying on force majeure to secure proof of the event from a 
relevant agency in the form of a certificate. 701 Such a requirement would be incompatible 
with the CISG, and fortunately, none·ofthe CIETAC cases show evidence of this,.:- ·, · · · · 
domestic law requirement. However, five cases involved contracts withforce majeure 
clauses that required that if a party relied on the force majeure provision, it would need to 
furnish proof from a third party agency or authority.702 This requirement must be 
differentiated from the necessity to procure a certificate under domestic law. 
From the perspective of the general principle of uniformity in international trade 
as embodied in CISG Article 7, an application of the CISG should not rely on the 
eccentricities of local practice, but on demonstrable evidence of a uniform, international 
practice. Thus, an analysis of Article 79 decisions from CIET AC should indicate that the 
CISG has been applied without reference to China's domestic contract laws, particularly 
those referencing national conceptions of force majeure. 
701 Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 106. 
702 These cases are: CIETAC Arbitration Award, 17 June 1994 [CISG/1994/08] [Warm rolled steel plates 
case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940617cl.html>; 
CIETAC Arbitration Award, 14 March 1996 [CISG/1996/14] [Dried sweet potatoes case], online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960314cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration 
Award, 31December1996 [CISG/1996/58] [High carbon tool steel case], online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/96123 lc2.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 4 February 
2002 [CISG 2002/17] [Steel bar case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020204c2.html>; and CIETAC Arbitration Award, 9 August 2002 
[CISG 2002/21] [Yellow phosphorus case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<htto://cisgw3 .law.pace.edu/cases/020809c I .html>. 
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D. ii. Article 79 Jurisprudence under CIET AC 
There are 26 CIET AC cases that directly or indirectly invoke Article 79 as an 
excu.se for non-performance.703 As noted above, this deinoiistrates thafparties inay often 
703 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: CIET AC Arbitration Award, May 2007 
[CISG 2007/06] [Hammer mill case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<htto://cisgw3 .law.pace.edu/cases/070500c I .html>; CIET AC Arbitration Award, 7 December 2005 
[CISG/2005/05] [Heaters case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/05I207cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 25 May 2005 [CISG 
2005/09] [Iron ore case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050525cl .html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, I 7 September 2003 
[CISG 2003/14] [Australia cotton case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030917cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 26 June 2003 [CISG 
2003/10] [Alumina case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030626cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 2I October 2002 [CISG 
2002/16] [Engraving machine case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021021cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 9 August 2002 [CISG 
2002/21] [Yellow phosphorus case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020809cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 4 February 2002 [CISG 
2002/17] [Steel bar case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020204c2.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 25 December 200I 
[CISG 2001104] [DVD HiFi case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011225cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 3I May 1999 
[CISG/I999/27] [Indium ingot case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/99053IcI.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, I5 December I998 
[CISG/1998/09] [Shirt case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/98I2I5cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 3I December I997 
[CISG/1997/37] [Lindane case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/97I23Icl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 30 November 1997 
[CISG/1997/33] [Canned oranges case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/97I 130cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 29 September I997 
[CISG/1997/28] [Aluminium oxide case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970929c I .html>; CIET AC Arbitration Award, 25 June I 997 
[CISG/1997116] [Art paper case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970625cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 7 May 1997 
[CISG/I997/1 I] [Sanguinarine case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970507c2.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 3 I December 1996 
[CISG/I996/58] [High carbon tool steel case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/96I231c2.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 30 July I996 
[CISG/1996/33] [Ferro-molybdenum alloy case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960730c2.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 2 May I996 
[CISG/1996/21] [ "FeMo" alloy case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960502cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, I4 March I996 
[CISG/1996/14] [Dried sweet potatoes case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/9603I4cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 30 January I996 
[CISG/1996/05] [Compound fertilizer case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960130cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 28 April 1995 
[CISG/I995/08] [Rolled wire rod coil case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
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resort to this provision as a defence, but they are rarely successful.704 Of all of the 
CIET AC cases, only once was an Article 79 defense used with success. That single case 
involved the sinking of a ship. 705 This suggest that the standards established under 
Article 79 are set relatively high, even where, comparatively speaking, Article 79 is 
broader and more liberal in scope than the equivalent domestic legislation, as in the case 
of Chinese law. For example, of the 26 CIETAC cases involving Article 79 considered 
here, there is only one single instance where a party invoked that provision to its 
advantage. 706 Another interesting point is that the claimants won 23 of the 26 cases. 707 
This suggests that claimants commence CISG arbitrations only where the likelihood of 
success weighs in their favour. 
Many of the CIETAC Article 79 cases refer to that provision in only minor way. 
Indeed, of the total of 29 cases cited by the 2008 UNCITRAL Digest of Article 79 case 
law, none refer to decisions emanating from CIETAC.708 As previously noted, however, 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950428cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 10 March 1995 
[CISG/1995/04] [Wool case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950310cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 17June1994 
[CISG/1994/08] [Warm rolled steel plates case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940617cl .html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 7 August 1993 
[CISG/1993/11] [Semi-automatic weapons case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930807cl.html>; and CIETAC Arbitration award, 6 June 1991 [date 
claim filed] Shenzhen [ Cysteine Monohydrate case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/910606cl.html> .. 
704 Supra note 77 5. 
705 Art paper case, supra note 703. 
706 Ibid. 
707 The claimants that lost their cases are: CIET AC Arbitration award, 6 June 1991 [date claim filed] 
Shenzhen [ Cysteine Monohydrate case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/910606cl.html>; CIETAC Arbitration Award, 31December1996 
[CISG/1996/58] [High carbon tool steel case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/961231c2.html>; and CIETAC Arbitration Award, 4 February 2002 
[CISG 2002117] [Steel bar case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020204c2.html>. 
708 See UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 44. 
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the fact that cases may not appear in the UNCITRAL Digest does not mean that they are 
irrelevant or unimportant. Rather, it may suggest that the case is not a key case for that 
·particular article of the Convention. It may also mean that the national UNCITRAL 
correspondents may not be aware of that particular case, or that the case is relatively 
recent. The Pace CISG database, from which these translated CIET AC cases were 
culled, is more current and comprehensive in scope. Its only disadvantage is that it may 
include cases that mention Article 79 in a minor way. Nevertheless, important material 
concerning the application of the CISG Article 79 can still be gleaned from these cases. 
The first CIETAC Article 79 case, from 1991, did not even mention the article, 
but instead referred to an "Act ofGod".709 Indeed, many of the parties in the CIETAC 
cases refer to the termforce majeure rather than to Article 79. This appears to be 
common with many courts and arbitral panels. The termforce majeure is used with great 
frequency in many Article 79 cases. While the tribunal made no correction by noting that 
an "Act of God" and Article 79 should be differentiated, it nevertheless rejected the 
respondent's defense in this regard. It stated that the bankruptcy of the consignee was no 
excuse for its failure to seek a return of the goods. However, the tribunal ruled in favour 
of the respondent on other grounds. That a party cannot rely on the bankruptcy or 
insolvency of a consignee to excuse its non-performance appears to be a correct 
interpretation of Article 79. The bankruptcy or insolvency of a commercial party is 
typically thought to be a normal business risk. 
709 CIETAC Arbitration award, 6 June 1991 [date claim filed] Shenzhen [Cysteine Monohydrate case], 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/910606cl.html> at s. A. 
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D. iii. Article 79(1) Impediments and Non-conforming Goods 
Disputes concerning the non-conformity of goods are the most common cases that 
appear before courts and tribunals. 71° For this reason, there is an· abundancei of case law 
at the juncture of non-conformity of goods and excuses for non-performance. As a 
prerequisite to an exemption, Article 79(1) requires that a party's failure to perform under 
the contract be due to an "impediment" that was beyond the party's control, and that the 
party could not have reasonably taken it into account at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract. The issue of whether a party is able to invoke Article 79 successfully when it 
has sold non-conforming goods has been a subject of much debate. 711 Some scholars 
prefer a liberal approach of excuse that attempts to seek fairness in the allocation of the 
costs of the unforeseen event between the parties. 712 As noted above, excuse for non-
performance in many civil law jurisdictions, particularly on the European continent, are 
closer to this liberal perspective.713 At the other end of the spectrum is a strict 
construction approach that provides for very few conditions that will serve to excuse a 
party from performing.714 This latter approach is closer to the traditional pacta sunt 
servanda doctrine, and is more consistent with the relatively rigid attitude found in 
common law jurisdictions. The CIET AC cases appear to adopt the stricter, common law 
710 Magnus, supra note 6 at 223. 
711 See generally Ronald A. Brand, "Article 79 and a Transactions Test Analysis of the CISG" in Franco 
Ferrari, Harry Flechtner, & Ronald A. Brand, eds., The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond: Cases, 
Analysis and Unresolved Issues in the U.N Sales Convention (Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 
2004) at 395-397. 
712 Ibid. Brand notes that John Henry Schlegel is representative of the "liberal" approach. 
713 Ibid. 
714 Ibid. Brand sees Harold J. Berman as representative of the "strict" approach. 
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approach. This should not be surprising, as Article 79 also incorporates a "no-fault" or 
"strict liability" rule that sets a more objective and higher standard to trigger relief. 
Many of the CIET AC cases involving Article 79 also concerned alleged non-
conforming goods and an attempt to invoke Article 79. These cases involved a shipment 
of damaged and defective shirts,715 non-conforming indium ingots,716 DVD players with 
quality problems,717 a problematic engraving machine,718 the return of malfunctioning 
heaters,719 and a faulty hammer mill. 720 In none of these cases was the non-performing 
party excused with an Article 79 exemption for delivering non-conforming goods. In this 
respect, these decisions are in harmony with an interpretation of Article 79(1) that deems 
a party's failure to perform must be due to an "impediment", that is, where performance 
has been prevented, and not where a party has rendered defective performance, such as 
non-conforming goods. This view also highlights the no-fault nature of the seller's 
liability for damages where it delivers non-conforming goods. Even where a reliable 
supplier has furnished the goods, and the seller has had no reasonable opportunity to 
discover defects before delivery, the seller will not be exempt from liability. Thus, the 
715 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 15 December 1998 [CISG/1998/09] [Shirt case], online: Pace Law School 
CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981215cl.html>. 
716 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 31May1999 [CISG/1999/27] [Indium ingot case], online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990531cl.html>. 
717 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 25 December 2001 [CISG 2001/04] [DVD HiFi case], online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011225cl .html>. 
718 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 21 October 2002 [CISG 2002/16] [Engraving machine case], online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/02102 lcl.html>. 
719 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 7 December 2005 [CISG/2005/05] [Heaters case], online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051207cl.html>. This case had only a minor 
Article 79 issue. The seller claimed that it could not receive a return of its substandard merchandise (as 
agreed to by the parties in the contract) because the buyer sent the return notice to the wrong party. It 
argued unsuccessfully that under Articles 79 and 80, it was unable to receive the returned goods. 
72
° CIETAC Arbitration Award, May 2007 [CISG 2007/06] [Hammer mill case], online: Pace Law School 
CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070500c I .html>. 
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issue of fault becomes irrelevant. In all cases, the seller is strictly liable, even though it 
may have taken extreme care in selecting a supplier. 
D. iv. The Impediment Requirement under Article 79(1) 
A prerequisite to an exemption under Article 79(1) is the specification that a party 
"is not liable" for failing to perform its obligations, as well as the remedial consequences 
if the exemption from liability applies. 721 This sub-section relieves a party of liability for 
"a failure to perform any of his obligations", but only if all of the following requirements 
are met: the party's non-performance was "due to an impediment"; the impediment was 
"beyond his control"; the impediment is one that the party "could not reasonably be 
expected to have taken into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract"; the 
party could not reasonably have "avoided" the impediment; and the party could not 
reasonably have "overcome" the impediment ''or its consequences".722 
In all the CIET AC cases, the impediment requirements for an exemption were not 
met. The language used sometimes by the tribunals reflected the domestic law onforce 
majeure, such that an "impediment" as used in Article 79 was deemed instead as an 
"unforeseeable", "unavoidable", and "insurmountable condition or event", as reflected in 
the domestic law of China.723 This was particularly evident in the earlier case law. For 
example, the tribunal in the 1996 Dried sweet potatoes case noted that according to 
domestic law "force majeure means unforeseeable, unavoidable and insurmountable 
721 CISG Article 79(1). 
722 Ibid. 
723 General Principles of the Civil Law, supra note 692. 
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objective conditions".724 Fortunately, the tribunal proceeded to invoke CISG Article 
79(1) as the basis to deny the respondent the force majeure defense. Similar references to 
domestic force majeure law and terminology were also evident in the "F eMo" alloy 
case, 
725 the Aluminium oxide case, 726 and the Canned oranges case. 727 In all these cases 
there was aforce majeure clause in the contracts, which may have provided the parties 
with some latitude in their use oflanguage. In the "FeMo" alloy case, the tribunal even 
referred to the doctrine of "frustration", but this may have been partly in response to the 
respondent's references to the same, and its assertion that "[n]either Civil Law, Common 
Law, Chinese Law nor International Convention" would recognize "such an 
unconscionable transaction with [an] unpredictable loss".728 
A common theme in CIETAC case law is that the disputants frequently invoked 
or resorted to domestic force majeure law and terminology in their pleadings. As just 
noted,force majeure clauses are frequently included in these contracts, and that may 
explain the use of that particular, domestic terminology. However, the use of domestic 
law and terminology was often done even when the parties acknowledged that the CISG 
was the applicable law. Considering that none of the parties objected to the applicability 
of the CISG in these cases, the references to domestic force majeure were likely made in 
ignorance of the fact that Article 79's rule of"impediment" would govern any claim for 
724 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 14 March 1996 [CISG/1996/14] [Dried sweet potatoes case], online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960314cl.html>. The tribunal was 
referring to Article 153 of the General Principles of the Civil Law, supra note 692. 
725 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 2 May 1996 [CISG/1996/21] ["FeMo" alloy case], online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3 .law.pace.edu/cases/960502c I .html>. 
726 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 29 September 1997 [CISG/1997/28] [Aluminium oxide case], online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970929cl.html>. 
727 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 30 November 1997 [CISG/1997/33] [Canned oranges case], online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/971130cl.html> 
728 
"FeMo" alloy case, supra note 725. 
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an excuse for non-performance due to a supervening event. While the disputants may 
have inaccurately referred to domestic force majeure law and terminology instead of 
Article- 79's "impediment", the relevant tribunals failed to correct the parties in this 
regard. 
Even though these can be deemed minor errors, some CIET AC tribunals were just 
as careless as the disputants in their references and use of language. This is much more 
apparent in the earlier cases, which suggests that arbitral tribunal members needed time to 
learn of the nuances of the CISG, and lose their domestic law focus. For example, in the 
1997 Aluminum oxide case, it was the buyer that referred to Article 79, and argued that 
its bank's refusal to issue a letter of credit was beyond its control.729 The tribunal made 
reference to both domestic law and the CISG with respect to other aspects of the case. It 
did not mention Article 79 or "impediment". It referred only to domestic law.730 The 
tribunal noted that the bank's refusal to provide the letter of credit to the buyer was based 
on a history of poor business practices by the buyer. As a result, the bank's denial was 
foreseeable and did not constitute force majeure. While the same result would have 
likely occurred had the tribunal examined the issue under Article 79, it is unfortunate that 
the tribunal did not focus on the Convention with its legal analysis. 
Later that year ( 1997) in the Canned oranges case, the seller attempted to use a 
force majeure defense based on a provision in the contract and domestic law 731 to excuse 
729 Aluminium oxide case, supra note 726. 
730 Ibid. 
731 Article 24 of the Foreign Economic Contract Law, supra note 677. Article 24 states: "A party who 
cannot perform part or the entire contract due to force majeure should be exempted from bearing part or the 
entire responsibility" (trans. by Meihua Xu, Queen Mary Case Translation Programme). 
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it from its failure to supply oranges to the buyer. 732 It argued that the non-performance of 
the contract was caused by unavoidable and uncontrollable reasons, namely heavy rains 
and flooding; which ·caused a shortage of oranges in the· area: This time the tribunal 
correctly referred to Article 79 sub-sections (1 ), (2), (3), and ( 4), as well as the 
contractualforce majeure clause, to deny the seller's defense. As a commercial party in 
the trade, the seller should have foreseen that weather might affect its ability to procure 
oranges from the region. Even though there was flooding in the area, which caused a 
shortage of oranges, this was not a sufficient impediment. Under the Chinese domestic 
force majeure law, excuses for non-performance are only allowed in cases of natural 
disasters, such as storms and flooding. The tribunal obviously did not apply the domestic 
rule in this instance. As a commodity product, it held that the seller could have procured 
the oranges from other provinces (albeit at a higher cost). Accordingly, the tribunal 
denied the seller the force majeure/ Article 79 defense. 
Some of the Chinese decisions have focused on what constitutes an "impediment" 
within the meaning of Article 79(1 ). Even where the language is framed in terms of force 
majeure, the tribunals in the remaining CIETAC cases have defined Article 79(1)'s 
"impediment" requirement as performance that is beyond a party's control, and that the 
party could not have anticipated or explicitly or implicitly assumed the risk of its 
occurrence. Furthermore, "fault" is not a relevant criterion in an excuse for non-
performance. In other words, the issue of "fault" should be removed from an evaluation 
of a party's non-performance. The essence of the test is that the impediment hindering 
732 Canned oranges case, supra note 727. 
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performance must be beyond the control of the non-performing party. There is also no 
need to make a distinction between the different types of failure to perform, such as 
partial, temporary, or absolute impossibility of performance. Article 79 can apply to- any 
type of performance that has been prevented; it cannot apply where a party has rendered 
defective performance. This is supported by the language of Article 79(4): "The party 
who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the impediment". 733 This 
requirement would be illogical if it were to apply to the delivery of defective or non-
conforming goods. 734 
The term "impediment" suggests that like the word "obstacle", there is a barrier to 
performance, such as a fire, military blockade, or government prohibition, rather than an 
obstacle that is personal to one of the parties' performance. As the CIETAC decisions 
demonstrate, while it may be difficult to determine the exact point on a continuum 
between "difficult" and "impossible", the requirement under Article 79(1) is strict. One 
of the decisions went so far and stated that a lightning strike that knocked out power to a 
transformer, causing a delay in production, as well as a typhoon and subsequent flooding 
that led to a suspension of the railroad, were not sufficient impediments to excuse the 
seller. 735 Even though these supervening natural events caused extensive delays (of many 
months), the seller could have procured substitute goods from other suppliers to fulfill its 
contractual obligation to the buyer. This decision suggests that difficulties, even extreme 
ones, in fulfilling a contractual obligation are not sufficient to warrant an excuse for non-
733 CISG Article 79( 4 ). Emphasis added. 
734 This point is noted in Honnold & Flechtner, ed., supra note 43 at 617-618. 
735 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 9 August 2002 [CISG 2002/21] [Yellow phosphorus case], online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020809cl.html>. 
.. , 
205 
performance. The impediment needs to be much closer to, or an actual impossibility, for 
a party to be successful with an Article 79(1) defense. 
--· ·· · Most CIETAC decisions have not focused on what constitutes an "impediment'·' 
within the meaning of Article 79(1). Rather, they have more often presumed that the 
impediment requirement was not met, without elaborating on a precise definition of 
"impediment". These decisions focus on elements that are peripheral to the impediment 
requirement. For example, many decisions have acknowledged that an impediment 
existed, but concluded that the impediment was foreseeable or should have been 
considered a normal business risk. Thus, the necessity of getting import approval from 
its government should have been foreseen by the buyer of semi-automatic weapons. 736 
Similarly, where a buyer could not open a letter of credit in time due to a provisional 
government measure that required an importation certificate, this was deemed not "due to 
an impediment that was beyond his control".737 The seller reiterated the more widespread 
view that "[b ]ased on the common practices of international trade, the reasons of force 
majeure could be war, strike or Act of God".738 Even though the buyer thought that the 
governmental measure was "unforeseeable, unavoidable and insurmountable", the 
tribunal agreed with the seller and held, without much elaboration, that the buyer was not 
exempt under Article 79. 739 
736 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 7 August 1993 [CISG/1993/11] [Semi-automatic weapons case], online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930807cl.html>. 
737 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 31December1996 [CISG/1996/58] [High carbon tool steel case], online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/96123 lc2.html>. 
738 Ibid. 
739 Ibid. 
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Similar situations applied in a number of CIET AC cases, where government 
import or export requirements were used as an excuse for non-performance. In the Steel 
- --bar case, -due to Chines·e· foreign exchange controls, the buyer was required-to obtain an 
original invoice from the seller. 740 This regulation, and a national holiday that required 
banks to close, caused a delay for the buyer. The seller was not obliged to ship the goods 
until receipt of the letter of credit. Because of this interruption, the seller could not 
charter a ship on time, and the buyer's importation certificate became void. The buyer 
claimed that the invalidation of its importation license should be considered an act of the 
government that would exempt it from liability under Article 79. According to the buyer, 
this was an impediment that was "unpredictable", and the "impediment or its 
consequences could not be overcome or avoided".741 The tribunal disagreed. Without 
referring to Article 79, but rather to the Convention generally, it ruled in favour of the 
seller. 
The Alumina case 742 and Australian cotton case 743 had similar issues regarding the 
requirement that the buyer obtain a governmental importation certificate. In the former 
case, the buyer used an amended government regulation in an attempt to excuse it from 
non-performance in the purchase of a large quantity of alumina. It argued that after the 
contract was signed, the imposition of the amended regulation was out of the parties' 
740 Steel bar case, supra note 707. 
741 Ibid. 
742 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 26 June 2003 [CISG 2003/10] [Alumina case], online: Pace Law School 
CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030626c I .html>. 
743 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 17 September 2003 [CISG 2003/14] [Australia cotton case], online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030917cl.html>. 
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control, and represented a "legal barrier" to performance. 744 Without referencing Article 
79, the tribunal found that the revised regulation did not completely prohibit the import of 
-- alumina; but rather stipulated some new requirements that the buyer could ·have · 
overcome. The buyer was, thus, found to have fundamentally breached the contract. 
Similarly, in the Australian cotton case, the buyer claimed that its ability to obtain a quota 
and import permission were preconditions to contractual performance. The tribunal 
disagreed. It noted that as a company that specializes in textiles, it knew, or ought to 
have known, that the importation of Australian cotton was restricted by the Chinese trade 
system. It held that neither the quota nor the import permission constituted preconditions 
to performance, or were sufficient excuses to exempt the buyer from liability for its non-
performance. 
An American buyer also attempted to rely on aforce majeure clause in its 
contract to release it from its obligations to purchase and import Sanguinarine into the 
United States. Sanguinarine is a product that is used in insecticide. The contract 
contained aforce majeure clause that specifically noted, "the [buyer's] failure to get an 
import license shall not be deemed as a force majeure event".745 This did not prevent the 
buyer from arguing that the government's restriction or ban on products containing 
Sanguinarine was different from the requirement to obtain an import license. Thus, it 
was the ban on the product, not the failure to get an import license that was beyond the 
buyer's control. Referring to Article 79(1), the tribunal disagreed. It noted that as a 
744 Alumina case, supra note 742. 
745 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 7 May 1997 [CISG/1997111] [Sanguinarine case], online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970507c2.html>. 
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prudent businessperson, and as a normal business risk, the buyer should have been aware 
of the government's banning order. 
Even where aforce majeure clause has been incorporated into the' contract 
between the parties that deems that government conduct falls within the scope of force 
majeure, the excuse for non-performance has been denied. The Iron ore case, for 
example, contained such a contractual provision. 746 From the time that the contract was 
signed, the price of iron ore had dropped dramatically. The seller shipped the goods, 
even though the buyer had failed to open a letter of credit in time as required by the 
contract. The buyer claimed that a new government document had been issued with 
revised guidelines that were designed to control credit risk. Due to this policy change, its 
bank could not open the letter of credit. Additionally, it argued that because the seller 
shipped the goods before the credit was issued, such an uncommon practice allowed it to 
refuse delivery. The tribunal held that the decline in the price of iron ore was a normal 
commercial risk, and was not a relevant force majeure defense. Further, the government 
conduct that caused restrictions on credit did not fall within the scope of force majeure. 
Although the tribunal did not explicitly state this, presumably, changes in government 
conduct in the form of new policies regarding credit were also deemed to be normal 
commercial risks. 
Other supervening events have also been deemed commercial risks that fall 
outside of an Article 79 excuse. A technical problem resulted in one manufacturer's 
746 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 25 May 2005 [CISG 2005/09] [Iron ore case], online: Pace Law School 
CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050525c 1.html>. 
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production capacity to be reduced by 35 percent.747 This caused a temporary delay, and 
the seller then claimed that it could not book a ship on time. The tribunal held the seller 
liable. Even though one manufacturer had a production problem; the seller's non-
performance could not be exempted, as it could have ordered the goods from other 
factories (although at a higher cost). 
Difficulties resulting in the failure to rent a ship have also been regarded as an 
insufficient "impediment" and excuse for non-performance. 748 However, the sinking of a 
ship was an "unforeseeable [ ... ] act of God" and "impediment beyond [the seller's] 
control".749 But as title to the goods had already passed to the buyer, it could not seek 
damages from the seller. Rather, it had to claim compensation from its insurance 
company. This is the only example in this body of CIET AC case law where the tribunal 
upheld the force majeure defense. This appears to be a correct interpretation of Article 
79(1 ), as the sinking of a vessel is clearly an unforeseen event that prevents performance. 
This case also suggests that like Article 79 jurisprudence in other jurisdictions, the 
requirements for a successful excuse for non-performance are set relatively high. 
A flood could be deemed a natural disaster and an Act of God under both Chinese 
domestic law and CISG Article 79. As noted earlier, 750 natural disasters are one of the 
few events that qualify for an exemption from non-performance under Chinese domestic 
law. In one case, the area around a mine was flooded and the seller (smelter) of ferro-
747 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 17 June 1994 [CISG/1994/08] [Warm rolled steel plates case], online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940617cl.html>. 
748 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 28 April 1995 [CISG/1995/08] [Rolled wire rod coil case], online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950428cl.html>. 
749 Art paper case, supra note 703. 
750 Supra at s. C. Force Majeure in China. 
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molybdenum claimed/orce majeure.751 It was still willing to perform its obligation, but 
at a later date. As the price of the alloy was increasing in domestic and international 
·market; it also requested more money from the buyeL Fortunately, the tribunal referred · 
only to the CISG as the applicable law. The tribunal held that, as the seller did not ask 
for a termination of the contract, and appeared willing and able (at a later date) to perform 
its obligation, that it could not rely on the force majeure defense. As the impediment was 
only of a temporary nature, the seller was liable for breach of contract. 
D. v. Particular Impediments: Breach by Third-Party Suppliers 
A few CIET AC cases concern the claim of an impediment to performance due to 
a failure by a third-party supplier. In these cases, the sellers have typically invoked their 
suppliers' default as grounds to exempt them from liability for their own failure to deliver 
the goods. However, these cases demonstrate the prevailing view that according to 
Article 79, a seller bears the risk that its supplier might not perform, and the seller will 
not receive an exemption when its own failure to perform was the result of its supplier's 
default. 
Recall that the CISG contains a special provision on exemption related to third 
parties that are retained by the obligor to perform its contractual duties. Article 79(2) 
states that "[i]f the party's failure is due to the failure by a third person whom he has 
engaged to perform the whole or a part of the contract, that party is exempt from liability 
only if: (a) he is exempt under the preceding paragraph; and (b) the person whom he has 
751 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 30 July 1996 [CISG/1996/33] [Ferro-molybdenum alloy case], online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960730c2.html>. 
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so engaged would be so exempt if the provisions of that paragraph were applied to 
him". 752 In essence, this provision, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, 
-· extends the obligor's sphere of control to their third-party suppliers, and as such, makes -
the obligor liable. Thus, it is the seller's risk if it engages third-party suppliers or others 
to perform its contractual duties. The obligor should not be able to rely on any advantage 
by engaging a third-party, even where it has diligently selected or supervised the third 
person. The objective of Article 79(2) is to make exoneration more difficult in cases 
where performance has been delegated to others. This also highlights the fact that in 
order to claim an exemption under Article 79, performance must be prevented. Excuses 
of a personal nature, such as the engagement of a non-performing third-party, will not 
excuse the obligor of liability. 
The CIETAC cases that have considered a non-performing third-party have ruled 
accordingly. In the Compound fertilizer case, the seller claimed force majeure under a 
contract clause because it could not obtain the materials from its supplier. 753 As its 
supplier was in another country, and the seller could not find any other sources for the 
materials, it informed the buyer "it is impossible to deliver the goods".754 In the 
tribunal's view this was an insufficient excuse, and it held the seller liable. A similar 
case involved an installment contract of an insecticide. 755 The seller informed the buyer 
that a production problem caused its supplier to cease production mid-contract, so it 
752 CISG Article 79(2). 
753 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 30 January 1996 [CISG/1996/05] [Compound fertilizer case], online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960130cl.html>. 
754 Ibid. 
755 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 31 December 1997 [CISG/1997/37] [Lindane case], online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/97123lcl.html>. 
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could not ship the outstanding product. It claimed that "[ s ]ince that was beyond the 
control of the [Seller], it was unable to supply the [remaining] goods".756 Even though 
the seller·performed the first installment of the contract, it was not released 'from its 
liability to perform the remainder. Although the tribunal was not explicit on this point, 
its decision reflected the accurate view that a seller cannot invoke its supplier's default to 
claim an exemption under Article 79. 
Force majeure has also been invoked by a seller to excuse it, not from default by 
a third-party supplier, but from the negligence of its shipping agent. In the Wool case, its 
shipping company gave the seller incorrect information. 757 As a result, the buyer was 
given the wrong ship name and date of arrival, and the buyer had to incur a substantial 
lateness penalty. According to INCOTERMS, because the hiring of the shipping 
company was the responsibility of the seller, it had a duty to provide correct shipment 
information to the buyer. That the shipping company failed to perform its duty properly 
did not excuse the seller under Article 79(1) or (2). On this point, it has been noted that 
the distinction between a third-party under Article 79(2) and a third-party under Article 
79(1) has no practical consequences.758 
In all cases, the seller bears the procurement risk, whether it involves its own 
personnel, a supplier's default or for its supply of non-conforming goods. The only 
situation that may lead to an exemption is where the contract specifies an exclusive 
source or supplier of the seller's, and that source is destroyed or somehow unable to 
756 Ibid. 
757 CIETAC Arbitration Award, 10 March 1995 [CISG/1995/04] [Wool case], online: Pace Law School 
CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/95031 Oc I .html>. 
758 This has been noted by Brunner, supra note 47 at 187. 
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perform. Otherwise, the seller bears all the procurement risks, including that one of its 
agents, such as a transportation company or bank, may not perform. This reasoning is 
also in harmony with the CISG's no-fault or strict liability approach for damages. There 
is no further need for the injured party to prove that the non-performance was also due to 
the fault of the non-performing party. The right to damages flows from the sole fact of 
non-performance. 
The CIET AC decisions on Article 79 generally demonstrate a nuanced 
understanding of that provision. While there has been a tendency to use the terminology 
from domestic sales law (e.g. force majeure, "unforeseeable", "unavoidable", and 
"insurmountable condition or event"), there is no other evidence that the CIET AC 
decisions have interpreted Article 79 in a manner that shows a predisposition towards 
domestic law and the homeward trend. The CIETAC cases interpreting Article 79, while 
sometimes imperfect, have, overall, avoided any interpretation to suggest that decisions 
were made with reference to the domestic law onforce majeure rather than on the basis 
of CISG Article 79. This is an important step in the development ofrelatively uniform 
CISG jurisprudence. 
E. Finland: A Small Contribution Towards Relative Uniformity 
Of the two Finnish cases that mention Article 79, only one of those cases 
considers that provision in a significant manner. 759 In the Canned food case, which was a 
759 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: Hovioikeus/hovratt [HO] [Appellate Court] 
Turku, 24 May 2005, S 04/1600 [Radiated spice case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050524f5.html>; and Tampereen karajaoikeus [Court of First Instance], 
17 January 1997, 95/11193 [Canned food case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970117f5.html>. 
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dispute regarding non-conforming food products, the trial and appeal courts cited Article 
79 in a marginal manner, in reference to their discussion on damages. 760 Noteworthy 
· .... were the courts'·recognition that the application of Article 79· could only·be-·effective -
when it is based on an "external impediment".761 In other words, the impediment must 
have been extraneous to the activity of the defaulting party, otherwise it would have 
produced no exempting effect. This observation can be considered part of the 
conventional view with respect to the nature of Article 79 impediments. As such, it 
contributes-albeit in a small way-to the development of a relatively uniform 
jurisprudence in international sales law. 
The Radiated spice case also concerned non-conforming goods, and the 
discussion by the appeal court was primarily concerned with the extent of damages.762 
The case involved the sale of powdered paprika from a Spanish seller (the defendant) to a 
Finnish buyer. The contract specified that the powder was to be steam-treated to reduce 
bacteria. However, laboratory tests established that the powder had been treated with 
radiation and not steam. Under a European Union directive, all consumer products 
treated with radiation were to be marked as such on the packaging of the goods. 
According to buyer, its customers did not wish to purchase products treated with 
radiation, so this rendered the powder unsalable. 
The seller testified that it did not radiate the paprika, but had treated it with steam. 
However, the seller also admitted that its own suppliers might have radiated the spice; if 
760 Ibid. 
761 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
762 Radiated spice case, supra note 7 59. 
215 
that had been the case, it was done without the seller's knowledge. It was on this basis 
that the seller attempted to claim an exemption from damages under Article 79. The trial 
and appeal courts Tejected this argument. In particular; the appeal court; without referring 
specifically to Article 79(2), noted that the seller bears the risk that its suppliers might 
provide non-conforming goods. This was the opposite ruling of an anomalous decision 
with similar facts in the District Court of Besancon in the French case of Flippe Christian 
v. Douet Sport Collections. 763 It should make no difference whether a defect was the 
fault of the seller's supplier. By using a third party supplier, a seller cannot contract 
away its liability. The seller is exempt under Article 79 only if the failure to perform is 
due to an impediment beyond the control of the seller and the seller's supplier. Without 
an in-depth discussion of the issue of impediments or third-party suppliers, the appeal 
court dismissed the seller's claim on the merits because it involved a breach of contract 
under Article 35.764 While this was the correct outcome, it is disappointing that the 
Finnish courts did not provide greater analysis of these issues under Article 79. 
763 Discussed infra note 1109. Tribunal de commercial [Trib. com.] Besam;on, 19 January 1998, Flippe 
Christian v. Douet Sport Collections, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980 I I 9fl .html>. 
764 CISG Article 35 states: 
(I) The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and 
description required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in the 
manner required by the contract. 
(2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform 
with the contract unless they: 
(a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would 
ordinarily be used; 
(b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the 
seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the 
circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for 
him to rely, on the seller's skill and judgement; 
( c) possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a 
sample or model; 
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F. Germany: Mastery of CISG Jurisprudence 
F.i. The Evolution of Excuses for Non-performance: from Wegfall der 
Geschii.ftsgrundlage to an International Standard in Article 79 
The theory of excuse for contractual non-performance has a long history in 
Germany. This development in law reflects the history and fate of that nation, as well as 
its civil law tradition. As noted above, under the influence of Roman law, many 
European states came to recognize the principle of initial impossibility, impossibilium 
non est obligato.765 In continental Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
legal scholars further developed this principle, and contracts were to be considered 
concluded under the implied condition that there would be no fundamental change in the 
circumstances under which the agreement had been completed. 766 This became known as 
the doctrine of an implied clausula rebus sic stantibus, and was codified in certain 
jurisdictions. 767 Over the course of the nineteenth century, the doctrine of implied 
conditions experienced a number of modifications, but the most substantial revision 
occurred in 1921, under the influence of the currency inflation crisis. 768 At that time, the 
former Reichsgericht applied the doctrine of changed circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) 
to cases of economic hardship in long-term contracts when inflation threatened to prove 
( d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where there 
is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods. 
(3) The seller is not liable under subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the preceding 
paragraph for any lack of conformity of the goods if at the time of the conclusion 
of the contract the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of such lack of 
conformity. 
765 E.J. Cohn, "Frustration of Contract in German Law" (1946) 28 J. Comp. Legis. & Int'l L. 3d 15 at 15. 
766 Ibid. at 19. 
767 Ibid. at 19-20. 
768 Leo M. Drachsler, "Frustration of Contract: Comparative Law Aspects of Remedies in Cases of 
Supervening Illegality" (1957) 3 N.Y.L.F. 50 at 71. 
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disastrous for parties in the aftermath of World War I. 769 In 1923, rebus sic stantibus and 
the concept of the lapse of the contractual basis were codified into the legal doctrine of 
·1 Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, which was then used by German courts to decide cases 
of hardship and impracticability.770 In the civilian tradition, courts had the option of 
either terminating or revising contracts when the balance of the contract had significantly 
changed due to unforeseeable events. In the revised German civil code of 2002, BGB 
section 313 has modified slightly the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage. Under 
the modified title of Storung der Geschaftsgrundlage, which means "interference with the 
basis of the contract", BCB s. 313 now incorporates the principles of rebus sic stantibus, 
which amounts to hardship, as well as the doctrine of absolute impossibility.771 This 
extended the existing doctrines beyond the sphere of frustration or impossibility, to 
situations where unexpected changes in circumstances had simply made performance 
more onerous for one party. In this respect, BCB s. 313 bares some semblance to CISG 
Article 79. 
The liberal approach towards excuses for non-performance under German law 
may also explain why Jacob Ziegel stated that Article 79 is "more civilian than common 
law in its conception". 772 Ziegel made this point because the existence of an impediment 
under Article 79 does not automatically terminate the contract, as is generally the case 
with "frustration" or "impossibility" in the common law. Article 79 also recognizes 
temporary impediments. The immediate effect of Article 79 is to excuse the non-
769 Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 79. 
770 Ibid. 
771 Ibid. 
772 Ziegel, supra note 192 at "Article 79", para. 2. 
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performing party from liability from a claim in damages. In the common law a contract 
is "frustrated" where the supervening event has so radically altered the basis of the 
contract that it is automatically terminated. 
But rather than conceptualize Article 79 as being more civilian in scope, that 
provision was designed to be a compromise between the different legal approaches taken 
towards excuses for non-performance in civil law and common law systems. While 
German law is thought to be generally in harmony with some of the most liberal articles 
of the CISG, other civilian jurisdictions, such as France, employ relatively strict rules to 
excuse non-performance. 773 
As suggested by the historical development in German law, the approach to the 
principle of excuses for contractual non-performance is relatively liberal, even by civilian 
standards. For example, a strict application of the rule of pact a sunt servanda is rarely 
invoked. 774 This flexible approach is partially the result of the German historical 
experience of the last century. During that time, the country has been subjected to severe 
social and political upheavals. Its economy has been ravaged by two major wars, it had 
witnessed rampant currency inflation and revaluation, and it has had to reabsorb and 
restructure the economic system of the former German Democratic Republic. Under such 
conditions, the certainty and dependability of commercial contractual performance was 
often in doubt. Impossibility of performance, hardship, or frustration, have been constant 
risks in the commercial life of the modern German nation. Not surprisingly, these events 
773 Flambouras, supra note 37 at 262. 
774 Joern Rimke, "Force Majeure and Hardship: Application in International Trade Practice with Specific 
Regard to the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles oflnternational Commercial Contracts" in Pace Int'l L. 
Rev., ed., Pace Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1999-2000), 
(Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 207. 
·, 
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have had a profound influence on the development and legal treatment of excuses for 
contractual non-performance in that nation. 
F. ii. Article 79 in Germany: General Observations 
Having a relatively large number of Article 79 cases from Germany provides a 
window from which to view general trends concerning that provision. With the 
exception of the Chinese arbitral cases from CIET AC, Germany has reported more 
Article 79 cases than any other CISG signatory state. This amounts to 19 cases from that 
country that are considered in this dissertation. 
There are some interesting facts concerning the evolution of Article 79 case law in 
Germany. An overview of Article 79 demonstrates that parties may frequently resort to 
this provision as a defence, but they are rarely successful.775 This may suggest that the 
standards established under Article 79 are set relatively high, particularly relative to 
equivalent domestic law. For example, of the 19 German cases involving Article 79 
considered here, 776 there is only one instance where the successful party invoked that 
775 According to CISG-AC Opinion No. 7, "Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the 
CISG" at 4: "Article 79 has been invoked in litigation and arbitration by sellers and buyers with limited 
success". Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro M. Garro, Columbia University School of Law, New York, 
N.Y., USA. See also UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 44 at 253: "Article 79 has been invoked with some 
frequency in litigation, but with limited success". 
776 This total includes one arbitral case and 18 court cases. In chronological order, from the most recent 
German case to the earliest, these are: Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Brandenburg, 18 
November 2008, 6 U 53/07 [Beer case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/081118gl.html>; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] 
Miinchen, 5 March 2008, 7 U 4969/06 [Stolen car case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080305gl.html>; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] 
Hamburg, 25 January 2008, 12 U 39/00 [Cafe inventory case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080125gl .html>; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court], 
27 November 2007, X ZR 111104 [Glass bottles case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071127gl.html>; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Dresden, 
21March2007, 9 U 1218/06 [Stolen automobile case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070321gl .html>; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] 
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provision to its advantage. 777 Even in that case, Article 79 was not the primary CISG 
article relied upon by the party; rather, it used Article 79 only to excuse it for a delay in 
·-payment.778 ·It ultimately won the case based upon receipt of the seller's non-conforming 
goods (in violation of CISG Article 35).779 Another interesting point is that the 
plaintiffs/claimants won 14 of the 19 cases. 780 This suggests that plaintiffs or claimants 
commence CISG litigation only where the likelihood of success weighs in their favour. 
Based on these cases, a defendant's or respondent's prospect for a successful Article 79 
defence would appear to be small. Indeed, of the 27 Article 79 cases recorded in the 
Zweibriicken, 2 February 2004, 7 U 4/03 [Milling equipment case], online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040202gl.html>; Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Freiburg, 
22 August 2002, 8 0 75/02 [Automobile case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020822gl .html>; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court], 9 
January 2002, VIII ZR 304/00 [Powdered milk case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020109gl.html>; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Hamm, 12 
November 2001, 13 U 102/01 [Memory module case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011112gl.html>; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court], 
24 March 1999, VIII ZR 121/98 [Vine wax case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990324gl .html>; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Hamburg, 
4 July 1997, 1U143/95 and 410 0 21/95 [Tomato concentrate case], online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970704gl.html>; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] 
Hamburg, 28 February 1997, 1U167/95 [Iron molybdenum case], online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970228gl.html>; Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] 
Koln, 21May1996, 22 U 4/96 [Used car case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/96052lgl.html>; Hamburg Arbitration Award, 21March1996 [Chinese 
goods case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960321gl.html>; 
Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Ellwangen, 21 August 1995, 1 KfH 0 32/95 [Spanish paprika case], 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950821g2.html>; Amtsgericht 
[AG] [Lower Court] Alsfeld, 12May1995, 31C534/94 [Flagstone tiles case], online: Pace Law School 
CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950512gl.html>; Landgericht [LG] [District Court] 
Berlin, 15 September 1994, 52 S 247/94 [Shoes case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/940915gl.html>; Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Miinchen, 2 
August 1994, 13 HKO 17330/93 [Copper and nickel cathodes case], online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940802gl .html>; and Landgericht [LG] [District Court] 
Aachen, 14 May 1993, 43 0 136/92 [Hearing aid case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930514g I .html>. 
777 The successful invocation of Article 79 in Germany was in the Shoes case, ibid. 
778 Ibid. 
779 Ibid. 
780 The 13 successful plaintiff actions are: Electronic hearing aid case, Cathodes case, Flagstone tiles case, 
Chinese goods case, Used automobile case, Iron Molybdenum case, Vine wax case, Powdered milk case, 
Used automobile II case, Milling equipment case, Stolen automobile case, Stolen car case, and the Beer 
case, ibid. 
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UNCITRAL Digest,781 only four parties successfully utilized Article 79 to limit their 
damages. 782 It also appears that disputes involving non-conforming goods and Article 79 
· ' are a· common theme in this jurisprudence. Perhaps this should not come as a surprise, as 
most sale of goods disputes arise over the issue of whether the product conforms to the 
contract description. 783 Six of the 19 German cases analyzed involve a primary dispute 
over non-conforming goods, in addition to the Article 79 defence. 784 Of course, issues of 
non-conforming goods exist in some of the remaining German cases, but product non-
conformity is not central to those disputes. 
F. iii. The Pre-Eminent Treatment of Article 79 in Germany 
German courts have been pre-eminent in their treatment of the CISG. Many of 
the decisions were the first in which a Supreme Court of a signatory state has ruled on 
specific CISG provisions.785 Not surprisingly, therefore, courts in other CISG states have 
often relied on German rulings. 786 As Magnus notes, "decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof 
781 Supra note 44. 
782 According to UNCITRAL, the four successful parties were two sellers and two buyers. They are, in 
respective order: Tribunal de commercial [Trib. com.] Besanc;on, 19 January 1998, Flippe Christian v. 
Douet Sport Collections, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980119fl .html>; Handelsgericht [HG] [Commercial Court] Ziirich, 10 
February 1999, HG 970238.1 [Art books case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/99021 Os I .html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 22 January 1997, Award 155/1996 [Butter case], 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970122rl.html>; and, 
Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Berlin, 15 September 1994, 52 S 247/94 [Shoes case], online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/940915gl.html>. 
783 See e.g. Honnold & Flechtner, ed., supra note 43 at 328. Honnold states: "Most sales controversies 
grow out of disputes over whether the goods conform to the contract". 
784 The six cases are: Shoes case, Spanish Paprika case, Used automobile I case, Vine wax case, Powdered 
milk case, and the Milling equipment case, supra note 1. 
785 Ulrich Magnus, "CISG in the German Federal Civil Court" in Franco Ferrari, ed., Quo Vadis CISG? 
(Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 2005) at 211. 
786 Ibid. at n. 3. Magnus provides three case examples, from the United States, Switzerland, and Italy. 
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[federal Supreme Court] have internationally paved the way in the interpretation and 
application of the CISG".787 Overall, the country is the most active adjudicator of CISG 
· · ·· -issues. According to UNILEX, 788 Germany has played a leading role in the interpretation 
of the CISG, ruling on 205 cases since the Convention's inception.789 This represents 
more than one-quarter Uust over 26 percent) of CISG case law world-wide.790 
Switzerland is the next largest adjudicator of the CISG, having ruled on 80 cases.791 
Magnus similarly notes that "[n]o wonder, that the first CISG cases published.by 
UNCITRAL in its databank CLOUT [Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts] were seven 
German decisions[ ... ] and in 2000 one third of the 600 CLOUT cases were of German 
origin". 792 
Germany has also played a leading role in cases that touch on Article 79 issues. 
The Pace Law School CISG website database records a total of 128 cases from a variety 
of signatory states and arbitral panels that mention Article 79. 793 Some of these cases 
only touch upon Article 79 in a marginal manner. However, of all the Article 79 cases 
listed on the Pace CISG database, Germany leads in Article 79 jurisprudence, having 
787 Ibid. at 211. 
788 UNILEX is database of international case law and bibliography on the CISG and the UNIDROIT 
Principles oflnternational Commercial Contracts. It is operated by the Centre for Comparative and Foreign 
Law Studies, which is a joint venture between the Italian National Research Council, the University of 
Rome I "La Sapienza", and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). See 
UNILEX online: <http://www.unilex.info>. 
789 UNILEX online: <http://www.unilex.info/dvnasite.cfm?dssid=2376&dsmid=13354&x=l> (as of 
December 3, 2010). Note that the UNILEX database lags significantly behind the Pace Law School CISG 
database on reported cases. 
790 As of December 3, 2010, the total number of CISG cases reported by UNILEX is 784. 
791 UNILEX, online: <http://www.unilex.info/dvnasite.cfm?dssid=2376&dsmid=13354&x=l> (as of 
December 3, 2010). 
792 Ulrich Magnus, "Germany" in Franco Ferrari, ed., The CISG and its Impact on National Legal Systems, 
surra note 218 at 143. 
79 As ofJune 10, 2010, according to the Pace Law School CISG Database, online: 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/case-annotations.html>. 
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decided 19 of these cases. UNCITRAL cites only 27 cases from all jurisdictions 
(signatory state courts and arbitral decisions) in its 2008 Digest of Article 79 case law. 794 
... ( · However, the Pace CISG database is more current and comprehensive in scope. Its· only 
disadvantage is that it also includes cases that mention Article 79 in a minor or peripheral 
manner. Based on the Pace CISG database, excluding arbitral decisions, German courts 
lead other signatory states in their interpretation of this article, having decided 19 
cases.795 As in CISG case law generally, Switzerland is the second-largest adjudicating 
state following Germany, with nine decisions involving Article 79.796 It is noteworthy 
that certain arbitral organizations have also been active in Article 79 adjudication. The 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIET AC) has 
considered 26 cases 797 on the article, and in Russia, 25 arbitral cases 798 have decided 
issues that have dealt with Article 79 to some degree. In those countries, arbitration of 
cases is the norm because parties are not able to access the public court system with 
commercial disputes. 
From the outset of CISG jurisprudence in Germany, the courts of that state have 
displayed a remarkable sensitivity to the interpretive requirements of the Convention. 
This is no easy task. As Enderlein and Maskow stated, "the existence of different 
national legal systems impedes the development of international economic relations with 
794 Supra note 44 at 252-261. These cases are listed at note 207, supra. 
795 Ibid. Not all of these cases have English translations, and some only refer to Article 79 in minor ways. 
For a list of the 18 German cases see supra, note 776. 
796 Ibid. 
797 For a list of the CIETAC cases, see infra. 
798 For a list of the Russian arbitration cases, see infra. 
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complicated problems arising from the conflict of laws". 799 However, in Germany, when 
the CISG was ratified in 1991, it did not represent an entirely new type oflaw. German 
·courts· already had·practical experience with the predecessor laws to the CISG,'the 1964 
Hague Conventions, which had governed international sale of goods transactions there 
since 197 4. 800 
Rather than reflexively invoking domestic legal concepts, such as the national 
equivalent to Article 79-the principle of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage801-courts in 
Germany have gone to great lengths to divorce themselves from the idiosyncrasies of 
domestic jurisprudence. As Magnus stated, in a recent decision the German "Federal 
Supreme Court felt the need to repeat the maxim of an international and autonomous 
interpretation of the CISG and underpinned that this kind of interpretation generally does 
not allow any redress to concepts developed under national law". 802 In doing so, the 
Supreme Court has assisted in the development of a separate, international legal doctrine 
into an autonomous principle. This is a small, but important step towards a conceptual 
goal of functional uniformity in a body of international commercial law, the CISG. In 
799 Fritz Enderlein & Dietrich Maskow, International Sales Law (Dobbs Ferry NY: Oceana Publications, 
1992) at 1, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/enderlein.html#pref.>. 
80° Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S 107 (July 1, 
1964) [hereinafter, UL/SJ and Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S 169 (July 1, 1964) [ULF]. 
801 According to Chengwei Liu, Wegfall der Geschii.fisgrundlage can be translated into English as 
"disappearance of the basis of the transaction". See Changed Contract Circumstances [2nd edition: Case 
annotated update (April 2005)], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/liu5.html>. Similarly, Theo Rauh translates Wegfall der 
Geschii.ftsgrundlage into "destruction of the basis of the contract". See "Legal Consequences of Force 
Majeure Under German, Swiss, English and United States' Law" (1996-1997) 25 Den. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 
15latl52. 
802 Ulrich Magnus, "Germany" in Franco Ferrari, ed., The CISG and its Impact on National Legal Systems, 
supra note 218 at 156. 
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this way, the unique development of Article 79 in separate and distinct legal jurisdictions 
may ultimately evolve into an autonomous international norm. German jurisprudence in 
- support of this proposition indicates that there has developed a generally cohesive body'· 
of case law exemplifying a functionally uniform and autonomous doctrine of excuses for 
non-performance. This is substantiated by general consistency in the application of 
excuses for non-performance, as well as by judicial deference to international case law 
and scholarly opinion when those courts decide cases under the CISG in general, and 
Article 79 in particular. 
This is not to suggest, however, that all German court decisions are to be held as 
exemplary jurisprudential models of the proper application of the CISG. Scrutiny of any 
jurisdictions' case law will invariably reveal certain imperfections, and certainly, German 
jurisprudence is no exception. Even Magnus, in his assessment of the treatment of the 
CISG in German courts, noted that "in the first years after the CISG entered into force in 
Germany a certain homeward trend of the lower courts could be observed which partly 
imported concepts of German domestic law into the interpretation of the CISG". 803 The 
context of the domestic legal environment can never be completely eradicated. As 
Murray noted, national courts find it difficult to "transcend its domestic perspective and 
become a different court that is no longer influenced by the law of its own nation 
state".804 What is to be commended is an approach that results in functional uniformity 
803 Ulrich Magnus, ibid. at 156. 
804 John E. Murray, Jr., "The Neglect of CISG: A Workable Solution" ( 1998) 17 J.L. & Com. 365 at 366. 
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of the Convention, rather than absolute or strict uniformity, which is a practical 
impossibility. 805 In this respect, German jurisprudence on the CISG generally succeeds. 
F. vi. Article 79(1) Impediments and Non-conforming Goods 
Of all the CISG cases that find their way to court or arbitration, disputes 
concerning the non-conformity of goods are the most common.806 It is not surprising, 
therefore, to find case law at the juncture of non-conformity of goods and excuses for 
non-performance. As a prerequisite to an exemption, Article 79(1) requires that a party's 
failure to perform under the contract be due to an "impediment" that was beyond the 
party's control, and that the party could not have reasonably taken it into account at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract. The issue of whether a party is successfully able 
to invoke Article 79 when it has sold non-conforming goods has been a matter of much 
scholarly debate. 807 At one end of the debate is a liberal doctrine of excuse that attempts 
to seek fairness in the allocation of the costs of the unforeseen event between the 
parties. 808 Excuse for non-performance in German national law is closer to this liberal 
805 
"Functional uniformity" must be differentiated from "absolute" or "strict uniformity." It is closer to the 
concept of "harmonization" in that the goal is to lessen the legal impediments to international trade. See 
Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of 
CISG Jurisprudence, 34 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. J. 299, 309-10 (2004). See also Charles Sukurs, 
Harmonizing the Battle of the Forms: A Comparison of the United States, Canada, and the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 34 Vand. J. ofTransnat'l L. 1481, 1500-503 
(2001) (Sukurs utilizes the term "vertical uniformity," which is similar to the concepts of "functional 
uniformity" or "harmonization."). 
806 Magnus, supra note 6 at 223, states: "Delivery of non-conforming goods is the most common and 
frequent violation of sales contracts". 
807 See generally Ronald A. Brand, "Article 79 and a Transactions Test Analysis of the CISG" in Franco 
Ferrari, Harry Flechtner, & Ronald A. Brand, eds., The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond: Cases, 
Analysis and Unresolved Issues in the U.N Sales Convention (Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 
2004) at 395-397. 
808 Ibid. Brand notes that John Henry Schlegel is representative of the "liberal" approach. 
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perspective.809 Fortunately, there is no evidence to suggest that domestic law concepts 
have crept into the case law on Article 79. At the other end of the spectrum is a strict 
· construction analysis·that provides for very few conditions that will serve to excuse a 
party from performing. 810 This latter approach is closer to the traditional pacta sunt 
servanda doctrine, and more consistent with the relatively rigid approach found in 
common law jurisdictions. There are also middle positions in this dichotomy, which 
attempt to apply various approaches, such as the "transaction test", the "litigation test", 811 
or the "better loss-bearer" approach. 812 These intermediate approaches attempt to balance 
contractual justice with predictability and security of transactions. 
The earliest German case involving Article 79 also concerned alleged non-
conforming goods and an attempt to invoke Article 79. The 1993 case813 involved the 
sale of hearing aids by a German seller (plaintiff) to an Italian buyer (defendant). The 
latter party had refused to take delivery of the products, even though the seller had 
allowed the buyer an additional period of time to perform.814 From the outset of the 
court's decision, it was unequivocal in its rejection of domestic law as governing the 
contract.815 This was an implicit rejection of the homeward trend. The court held that the 
CISG was comprehensive enough in scope to cover all of the substantive issues under 
809 Ibid. 
810 Ibid. Brand sees Harold J. Berman as representative of the "strict" approach. 
811 The "transaction test" and "litigation test" are discussed by Brand, ibid. 
812 For an overview of the "economic analysis of frustration" and the "better loss-bearer" approach, see 
generally Michael G. Rapsomanikas, "Frustration of Contract in International Trade Law and Comparative 
Law" (1980) 18 Duq. L. Rev. 551 at 568-570. 
813 Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Aachen, 14 May 1993, 43 0 136/92 [Hearing aid case], online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930514gl.html>. Note that German case 
citations do not name the parties to the proceedings. 
814 Ibid. at para. 4. 
815 Ibid. at para. 2(d), 
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consideration. More importantly, it noted that the Convention precluded recourse to 
domestic law, an approach that is mandated in Article 7(1). Accordingly, CISG Articles 
·3l(b)(c) and 60(b) dictated that-the buyer was under an obligation to take deliivery ofthe · 
goods.816 That the buyer failed to do so entitled the seller to claim damages under 
Articles 61 ( 1 )(b ), 63, and 7 4-77. This was the correct approach. 
In terms of excuses for non-performance, the buyer erroneously invoked the 
domestic rules of impossibility, frustration, and hardship, which are all incorporated 
under the German principle of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage, and attempted to apply 
these rules as a defense from the acceptance of non-conforming goods. 817 More 
specifically, the buyer attempted to avoid the contract by claiming that the hearing aids 
were not suitable for resale because a domestic regulation banned the sale of the products 
in question.818 In domestic law the modification or avoidance of a contract owing to 
Wegfall der Geschiiftsgrundlage is connected to the notion of good faith. 819 It would be 
considered bad faith to require a party to perform when the circumstances surrounding 
the basis of the contract have become highly unbalanced. However, the temptation of the 
court to apply a domestic rule over Article 79 was avoided. The court was resolute in its 
application of the CISG. 
In rendering its decision, the court determined that "hardship" was trumped by 
Article 79, and the issue was, in its opinion, settled in the Convention. Accordingly, the 
816 Ibid. at paras. 2, 3 and 4. 
817 Ibid. at para. 2(d). 
818 Vivian Grosswald Curran, "The Interpretive Challenge To Uniformity" (1995) 15 J.L. & Com. 175 at 
181. 
819 Denis Tallon, "Article 79" in Bianca-Bonell, eds., Commentary on the International Sales Law (Milan: 
Dott. A Giuffre Editore, S.p.A., 1987) at 593-594. 
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court had no reason to look beyond the text of CISG to either domestic law or elsewhere 
in order to fill possible gaps in the Convention. It rejected the more liberal domestic rule 
:·of Wegfall der Geschii.ftsgrundlage. Instead, the·court stated that"[r]ules of frustration or 
economic hardship ( Wegfall der Geschii.ftsgrundlage) under domestic law or domestic 
law challenges having to do with mistake as to the quality of the goods are irrelevant 
because the CISG fills the field in these areas".820 It is noteworthy that the court's 
reference to the impediment under Article 79 negated an analysis under the domestic 
concepts of "frustration" and "economic hardship". The implication is that Article 79 
stands alone, and is differentiated from similar domestic concepts, and is uniquely able to 
address the matter in question. 821 
A number of other German cases involved the alleged delivery of non-conforming 
goods and Article 79. In the Shoes case, the defendant buyer ordered shoes from an 
Italian seller.822 The buyer refused to pay the full amount of the invoice on the basis that 
a portion of the goods were defective and non-saleable. The seller commenced an action 
for the balance due plus interest. Ruling in favor of the buyer, the lower court823 noted 
that the defendant had given proper notice of the defective goods in accordance with 
CISG Article 39(1), and denied the seller's claim. The appeal court upheld the 
decision. 824 Both courts analyzed the facts of the case within the context of the CISG 
without any explicit references to domestic law. Both courts agreed that the buyer was 
820 Supra note 13 at para. 2( d). 
821 Contra Scott D. Slater, "Overcome by Hardship: The Inapplicability of the UNIDROIT Principles' 
Hardship Provisions to CISG" (1998) 12 Fla. J. Int'l L. 231 at 257 
822 Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Berlin, 15 September 1994, 52 S 247/94 [Shoes case], online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/940915gl.html>. 
823 Amtsgericht [AG] Alsfeld, see ibid. 
824 Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Berlin, supra note 822. 
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entitled to declare partial avoidance of the contract in accordance with CISG Articles 
49(1)(a) and 51(1), as the non-conformity of part of the goods sold constituted a 
fundamental breach of the-contract by the seller. The appeal court further held that-the·-· 
buyer's offer to make restitution of the goods was an unmistakable declaration of its 
intention to avoid the contract, per CISG Article 26. Its attempt to try to resell the 
defective goods after the declaration of partial avoidance was considered to be an attempt 
to mitigate the damages in accordance with Article 77, and not as an implicit waiver of its 
right to rely on the lack of conformity. 
Considering this relatively sophisticated analysis of the CISG, at the end of its 
judgment, the lower court invoked Article 79 in a peculiar manner. One must question 
whether the court made a typographical error, but if it did, the appeal court did not make 
a correction. The lower court stated that "[p ]ursuant to Art. 79(1) CISG, the buyer is not 
liable for the delayed payment as it could not reasonably be expected to pay immediately 
for defective goods the seller did not want to take back without either an agreement in 
this respect or without having tested the possibility of selling the goods despite their 
described defects".825 This reference to Article 79 appears to be out of context. Equally 
perplexing is the court's next statement that "[t]he buyer has also communicated to the 
seller the reason for its late payment (Art. 79(4) CISG)".826 This requires that a party 
who fails to perform give notice to the other party of the impediment, and its effect on its 
ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the other party within a reasonable 
825 Ibid. Both the English translation of the judgment and the German version make this reference to CISG 
Article 79. For the original language (German) decision see: cisg-online.ch <http://www.cisg-
online.ch/cisg/urteile/399.htm>; and, Unilex database 
<http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=l&do=case&id=218&step=Ful1Text>. 
826 Ibid. 
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time after the party who fails to perform knew, or ought to have known, of the 
impediment, the non-performing party is liable for damages resulting from the failure of 
· ·the notice to be ·received by the other party. Considering the context of this reference, the 
court's invocation of Article 79 does not appear to be an error. It is possible that the 
buyer relied on Article 79 to some extent in its submissions to the court. However, there 
is no reference in the decision to the buyer's argument that it had relied on Article 79 as 
an excuse for its delayed partial payment, and notice of such, to the seller. Rather, the 
buyer refused to pay the full purchase price because the goods were defective, and it 
could not re-sell them. It likely invoked Article 79 without realizing that it was not the 
appropriate provision for this argument. In any event, the seller refused to accept a return 
of the non-conforming portion of the shipment. These are the reasons addressed in the 
court's decision; there is no mention of a failure to pay due to an "impediment" beyond 
the buyer's control. 
The Spanish paprika case also involved an argument over non-conforming goods, 
partial non-payment, and the invocation of Article 79.827 The seller brought an action 
against the buyer for payment for a partial consignment of paprika pepper powder. The 
buyer counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract. It contended that some of the 
goods delivered were not fit to be sold in Germany. According to an expert's analysis, 
the pepper contained approximately 150 percent of the maximum concentration of ethyl 
oxide admissible under German food and drug law. However, courts will not usually 
make a seller liable for knowing and complying with the national laws and regulations in 
827 Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Ellwangen, 21 August 199 5, 1 KfH 0 3 2/9 5 [Spanish paprika case], 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950821g2.htrnl>. 
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the buyer's country. The court found that the seller had prior knowledge of the laws and, 
therefore, could not argue that it was ignorant of the requirement that the goods comply 
with the-Germanlaws.- The-court held that sincethe·paprika contained m©re ethylene- -· 
oxide than permitted under German law, the goods failed to conform to the contract and 
specifically failed to meet the buyer's purpose that was made known to the seller. This 
amounted to a fundamental breach as it deprived the buyer of what it was entitled to 
expect from the contract as per CISG Articles 35(1 )828 and 25, 829 thereby making the 
seller liable for damages under CISG Articles 74830 and 75.831 
Before the litigation commenced, the seller agreed to take back the goods and 
admitted that they were non-conforming under German food law. It stated it would 
deliver substitute goods, but failed to perform within the additional period of time for 
performance fixed by the buyer. It later argued that it should be exempt from having to 
pay damages under Article 79. The reason for invoking Article 79 is not made explicit in 
the court's judgment, but it appears that the seller tried to convince the court that the 
contamination of the pepper was beyond its control. The court correctly noted that the 
828 See CISG Article 35, infra, note 835. 
829 CISG Article 25 states: "A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results 
in such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the 
contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same 
circumstances would not have foreseen such a result". 
83° CISG Article 74 states: 
Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, 
including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. 
Such damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to 
have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and 
matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of 
the breach of contract. 
831 CISG Article 75 states: "If the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable 
time after avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in replacement or the seller has resold the goods, the party 
claiming damages may recover the difference between the contract price and the price in the substitute 
transaction as well as any further damages recoverable under article 74". 
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seller "is responsible for the performance of its contractual obligations (Art. 79 CISG) 
independently of whether the goods were contaminated with ethylene oxide through a 
treatment in the plant of-the-[ seller] or in any different way. In the lattercase, [the seller] 
was able to examine the goods before delivering them to the [buyer]". 832 Indeed, non-
conformity of goods is almost always deemed to be within the seller's sphere of control, 
even if the non-conformity was caused by the seller's supplier or producer. 
However, not all commentators agree with this approach -particularly those 
from civil law jurisdictions. One French court has, in fact, granted an Article 79 
exemption to a seller that delivered non-con-forming goods,833 but this case appears to be 
an anomaly. As Fletchtner has noted, scholars from the civil law tend to see Article 79 as 
providing some scope for exempting a seller from damages for delivering non-
conforming goods. 834 For example, Stoll and Gruber are of the view that an exemption 
under Article 79 "is also possible in principle if the seller fails in his obligation under 
Article 35835 to supply goods conforming to the contract".836 Their view reflects an 
832 Spanish paprika case, supra note 827 at para. III A. 
833 See Tribunal de commercial [Trib. com.] Besam;on, 19 January 1998, Flippe Christian v. Douet Sport 
Collections, online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980119fl.html>. 
This decision is problematic and its approach to Article 79 (and Article 39) can be criticized. See infra. 
834 See Harry Flechtner, "Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG) as Rorschach Test: The Homeward Trend and Exemption for Delivering Non-
conforming Goods" (2007) 19 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 29. 
835 Article 35, in its entirety, states: 
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and description 
required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in the manner required 
by the contract. 
(2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform with 
the contract unless they: 
(a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily 
be used; 
(b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the seller 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the circumstances show that 
the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's skill 
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exception to the common law strict liability rule that was incorporated in Article 79. The 
civilian perspective also reflects a rejection of the strict common law view of pacta sunt 
servanda by al-lowing for altered circumstances to exempt a seller's reasonable efforts to 
supply goods that are primafacie conforming. In their view, even though the cases may 
be rare, where a latent defect exists in goods at the time of the conclusion of the contract, 
a "seller must [ ... ] be permitted the defense that the defect was hidden and could not have 
been discovered by methods which a reasonable person in the seller's position could have 
reasonably have been expected to adopt". 837 From this perspective it also follows that in 
cases of an insuperable event that caused the defect, such as a natural catastrophe, or an 
act of sabotage, should allow the seller an exemption under Article 79. Stoll and Gruber 
concede, however, that a seller is always responsible for the sale of generic goods, or for 
defects that occur in the typical course of manufacturing, and where this occurs, "the 
question of fault is irrelevant". 838 
Product non-conformity and Article 79 has also been invoked in the Used car 
case839 and the Milling equipment case.840 The court's reference to Article 79 was 
and judgment; 
(c) possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a 
sample or model; 
(d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where there is no 
such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods. 
(3) The seller is not liable under subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the preceding paragraph 
for any lack of conformity of the goods if at the time of the conclusion of the contract 
the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of such lack of conformity. 
836 Gruber and Hans "Article 79" in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 599 at 828. 
837 Ibid. 
838 Ibid. at 829. 
839 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Koln, 21May1996, 22 U 4/96 [Used carcase], online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960521gl.html>. 
840 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Zweibriicken, 2 February 2004, 7 U 4/03 [Milling 
equipment case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040202gl .html>. 
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indirect in the Used car case, where it simply noted that damages would only be 
recoverable if they could have been "classified as unforeseeable". In that case, where the 
buyer claimed- damages from the fraudulent seller for a defective used automobile~ -- ·· · 
damages were clearly warranted.841 Similarly, in the Milling equipment case, the plaintiff 
buyer claimed the partial refund of the price it paid when it discovered that the milling 
components it received from the defendant seller were not the same as those specified in 
the contract. 842 The seller attempted an Article 79 defense on the basis that it could not 
obtain the specified milling components as offered by the original producer, and thus, 
was forced to use substitute parts of a foreign origin. It was aware .of this non-
conformity, but did not disclose this fact to the buyer. As this could not be deemed an 
unforeseeable impediment within the meaning of Article 79, the court rejected this 
argument. 
F.vii. Product Non-Conformity as an Impediment?: The Vine Wax Case 
The German federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshoj) has also provided 
guidance on the issue of non-conformity of goods and excuses for non-performance. In 
the Vine wax case, which has been considered a landmark in CISG jurisprudence, 843 the 
Supreme Court demonstrated an advanced and sophisticated understanding of the 
841 Used car case, supra note 839. 
842 Milling equipment case, supra note 840. 
843 According to Peter Schlechtriem, "Uniform Sales Law in the Decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof' 50 
Years of the Bundesgerichtshof: A Celebration Anthology from the Academic Community, online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <htto://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem3.html>. 
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Convention's interpretative methodology. 844 Schlechtriem viewed the decision with an 
optimistic perspective: 
[t]he decision-of the Bundesgerichtshof in the "vine-wax casen brought 
needed clarity [in this area of law] and is furthermore a "liberation" [ ... ]. 
In its treatment of the legal issue as well as in its reasoning, the decision is 
not only a welcome movement towards the point of view of other legal 
systems regarding seller's liability, which is extremely important for the 
preservation of a uniform interpretation of the Convention, but is also in 
two ways guiding for the future legal developments in internal German 
sales law and the Convention. 845 
The 1999 case involved the sale of vine wax used to protect vines from drying 
out, and to reduce the risk of infection. The buyer (plaintiff), from Austria, claimed that 
the vine wax was defective. The seller (defendant), from Germany, had obtained the vine 
wax from a third-party manufacturer. The buyer that took delivery in the original 
packaging directly from the manufacturer, gave notice of the non-conforming wax to the 
seller, and complained of major damage to its vines treated with the wax. It also 
demanded damages from the seller. The latter party refused to provide any 
compensation. It not only attributed the alleged damages to frost, but argued that it was 
exempt from any liability as an intermediary pursuant to Article 79. Because it only 
acted as an "agent" in the transaction, and purchased the product from a third party 
supplier, it argued that the reasons for the damages were beyond its control. 
The seller's invocation of Article 79 reflects a broader interpretation of excuses 
for non-performance that tends to be more widespread in the civil law jurisdictions of 
844 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court], 24 March 1999, VIII ZR 121/98 [Vine wax case], 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990324gl.html>. 
845 Schlechtriem, supra note 843. 
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Europe.846 In German law, this would entail a determination as to whether or not 
physical performance was still possible for the promisor. 847 If performance was possible, 
a case' for delay may be made. In such a situation, specific performance would still be 
available, and damages for the delay may be awarded. 848 This allowance provides a 
greater scope for an aggrieved party to perform. In harmony with the pacta principle, the 
common law takes a much more restrictive view of the doctrine.849 For the traditional 
doctrine of impossibility to apply, for example, performance must be physically 
impossible. 850 In addition, the events surrounding the failure to perform must be beyond 
the control of the non-performing party. Some academics also suggests that the delivery 
of non-conforming goods should not fall within the scope of Article 79, as the term 
"impediment" assumes the prevention of the delivery of goods.851 Indeed, Harry 
Flechtner has recently argued that "those who have drafted the [CISG] text did not intend 
Article 79 to apply to deliveries of non-conforming goods".852 Unfortunately, that 
intention was not clearly expressed in Article 79(1 ), as it states that it applies to "a failure 
to perform any [ ... ] obligation". 853 
The Bundesgerichtshof, therefore, considered impediments that might excuse a 
party from damages based on the non-performance attributable to third-party contractor. 
The Court stated: "Because the seller has the risk of acquisition [ ... ] he can only be 
846 J. Barrigan Marcantonio, "Unifying the Law Oflmpossibility" (1985) Hastings Int' 1 & Com. L. Rev. 41 
at 49-50. 
847 Ibid. at 49. 
848 Ibid. 
849 Ibid. at 50. See also Georg Gruber and Hans Stoll "Article 79" in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra 
note 599 at 810-811. 
850 Marcantonio, ibid. at 50. 
851 Gruber and Stoll, "Article 79" in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 599 at 810. 
852 Flechtner, supra note 834 at 36. 
853 CISG Article 79(1 ). 
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exempted under CISG Article 79(1) or (2) (even when the reasons for the defectiveness 
of the goods are[ ... ] within the control of his supplier or his sub-supplier) if the 
defectiveness is-due to circumstances out of his own control ·or·out of each of his··. 
suppliers' control". 854 
In analyzing the facts of the vine wax case, the Bundesgerichtshof identified a 
discord among scholars as to whether Article 79 "encompasses all conceivable cases and 
forms of non-performance of contractual obligations creating a liability and is not limited 
to certain types of contractual violations and, therefore, includes the delivery of goods not 
in conformity with the contract because of their defectiveness", or "whether a seller who 
has delivered defective goods cannot rely on Article 79 CISG at all".855 The Court did 
not deem it necessary to resolve this conflict stating that, "in any case, the defectiveness 
of the [goods] was not outside [the seller's] control. [The seller] is, therefore, responsible 
for the consequences of a delivery of goods not in conformity with the contract".856 
However, the court appeared to leave open the question that Article 79 might in 
some other exceptional circumstances exempt a seller for delivery of non-conforming 
goods. Although that was not the case in this instance, the court suggested that if 
defective goods had been caused by the seller's supplier, the seller would be exempt from 
that situation under Article 79 only if the defect was beyond its control as well as the 
control of the seller's suppliers. While the court did not provide a definitive answer on 
this question, this suggests, according to dicta from the German federal Supreme Court, 
854 Ibid. 
855 Vine wax case, supra note 844 at s. II. para. 2(a). 
856 Ibid. 
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that a seller could escape liability for damages under Article 79 for supplying non-
conforming goods. Such an approach would allow for fault-based liability, which is 
, , recognized in German law, to creep into Article 79. Recall that Article 79 does not 
follow the civil law, which bases solutions to impediments on the doctrine of fault. 
According to Honnold, who represents the scholarly view from a common law 
perspective, Article 79 is simply inapplicable when a seller supplies non-conforming 
goods. 857 Such a development, should it occur, would undermine the objective of the 
CISG to create an internationally uniform sales law. For this reason, while the Vine wax 
case is an admirable addition to CISG jurisprudence, theoretically, it does leave open the 
possibility of divergence in the case law on Article 79 in national courts. 
F.viii. Product Non-Conformity as an Impediment?: The Powdered Milk Case 
Three years later, product non-conformity and Article 79 was also again 
addressed by the Bundesgerichtshof in the Powdered milk case. 858 A German firm sold 
powdered milk to a company in the Netherlands. The buyer sampled the product at the 
time of delivery, and the test results failed to disclose any problems with the milk. The 
buyer then exported the goods to customers in Algeria and Aruba. These customers, 
however, claimed that some parts of the powdered milk were contaminated, so the buyer 
sought compensation from the seller. While the seller agreed that defects existed, and 
offered to take back the powdered milk, it declined to pay damages as requested by the 
857 Flechtner, supra note 834 at 41. 
858 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court], 9 January 2002, VIII ZR 304/00 [Powdered milk 
case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020109gl.html>. 
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buyer. The seller first claimed that its performance should be excused because the 
bacterial infestation occurred after the milk had been delivered, and therefore, the goods 
as delivered had conformed to the contract. Secondly, it argued that under the German · - · · 
Civil Code, no damages could be claimed. One of the conflicting terms was a force 
majeure clause in the seller's order confirmation. At the appeal court, 859 the seller argued 
that this contractual provision trumped the CISG as the Convention was derogated by a 
clause in its standard forms. 
The appeal court ruled that the force majeure clause was not part of the 
contractual relationship as it was not agreed to by the buyer. The Supreme Court also 
confirmed that neither the buyer's nor the seller's standard forms could be included in the 
contractual agreement. While the contract was deemed to be valid, the conflicting terms 
from the parties' standard forms were declared void, and were to be replaced by the 
provisions of the CISG that regulated the respective subject matter, including Article 79. 
As for the non-conformity, both the appeal court and Supreme Court were of the 
view that, in this case, the seller was not exempt from liability under Article 79(1 ). The 
appeal court noted that the seller failed to comply with its burden to demonstrate that it 
was exempt from liability for damages under Article 79(1).860 The seller had not 
demonstrated that the product non-conformity "originated from outside of its sphere of 
control" and remarked that "[ t ]his proof [ ... ] is critical in order to argue in favor of an 
exemption from liability".861 It was unequivocal on this point, noting that the seller was 
859 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Dresden, 23 October 2000, available ibid. 
860 Ibid. at s. 2.5.1.2.c. 
861 Ibid. at s. 2.5.1.2.c.aa. 
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"obliged [ ... ] to pay damages because [ ... the] powdered milk lacked conformity with the 
contract", therefore, there was "no exemption from liability in accordance with Art. 79 
CISG". 862• 
The Supreme Court agreed with this view to some extent, but also appeared to be 
less emphatic from ever denying a seller's non-conforming goods an exemption under 
Article 79. In this respect, it appeared to leave open the possibility that a seller might, in 
certain cases, be excused from liability for damages for supplying defective goods under 
Article 79. The decision lacks clarity on this important issue. In this respect, it referred 
back to the Vine wax case "as Art. 79 also applies to the delivery of goods that do not 
meet the requirements of the contract". 863 It elaborated on this point and ruled that if the 
existence of the infestation prior to the transfer could not be excluded, the seller's success 
under Article 79 would depend on the seller proving that the contamination would not 
have been detectable with the best possible testing method and, further, that any 
infestation had occurred outside of its sphere of control. 864 The Supreme Court then 
remanded the case for further fact finding on the timing of the contamination. 
The Supreme Court did not explain from where this test had originated, but it 
appears to have been based on its interpretation of the language of Article 79. It is also in 
harmony with the civil law tradition that is more accommodating to an unforeseen change 
in circumstances, i.e. rebus sic stantibus. The court's first condition for excusing the 
seller-that the non-conformity would be undetectable with the best possible methods of 
862 Ibid. at s. 2. 
863 Powdered milk case, supra note 858 at s. III. 
864 Ibid. 
242 
testing-arguably echoes the words of Article 79' s requirement that the failure to 
perform be out of the seller's control. However, this perspective also appears to reflect 
·the civilian fault-oriented position. The problem is that this perspective may be due to an 
ingrained familiarity with domestic law, but this view is not supported by the drafting 
history of the Article. 865 
In the Official Records of the Conference it was made clear that a "seller was not 
to be held free of responsibility for defects in the goods he supplied, even if he had not 
been at fault in regard to his own manufacturing process. It was also understood that [ ... ] 
there would be no 'impediment' if a seller instead of doing the manufacturing himself, 
bought goods from a supplier and those goods proved defective". 866 As Honnold and 
Flechtner have noted, this position reflects a "lack of sympathy with the no-fault867 
approach to liability for damages adopted in the CISG". 868 Yet according to the Supreme 
Court, if "the best possible testing" failed to detect the defect, the seller could not have 
discovered and cured it, nor could he have taken it into account or overcome its 
consequences. The result of this approach is a situation where a seller delivering non-
conforming goods would not be liable in damages. This reasoning bears a close 
resemblance to the more liberal approach towards "impediments" and force majeure in 
most civil law jurisdictions. Unfortunately, should this line of reasoning continue to 
develop in civilian courts, it could lead to significant differences in the outcomes of 
Article 79 cases across the CISG signatory states. 
865 See e.g. Honnold & Flechtner, ed., supra note 43 at 618. 
866 Official Records, supra note 597 at 410. 
867 
"No-fault" under the CISG is similar to the concept of "liability without fault" or "strict liability" where 
there is no determination that a party is blameworthy. 
868 Honnold & Flechtner, ed., supra note 43 at 620. 
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To complicate matters, the Supreme Court's second requirement that the seller 
prove that the infestation was caused by something "outside its sphere of control" appears 
to· restate Article 79' s "beyond the seller's control" test. Indeed;· there is nothing in the· 
language of Article 79 that might unambiguously limit its scope, and forbid its 
application to cases of non-conforming goods. This was only made explicit during the 
drafting of the Convention, but express terms were not incorporated into the CISG. 
Perhaps this was a drafting oversight. The provision does state in subpart (1) that it 
applies to "a failure to perform any [ ... ] obligation". 869 
However, when read within the context of other articles in the CISG, an argument 
can be made that a party delivering non-conforming goods was not to be entitled to an 
Article 79 defense. This is particularly evident when considering the CISG's approach to 
each parties' contractual obligations and its unitary approach to remedies for breach. For 
example, Article 35(1) states that a "seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, 
quality and description required by the contract", and Article 45(1) provides that "[i]fthe 
seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention" which 
includes the seller's obligations under Article 35(1), "the buyer may[ ... ] (b) claim 
damages".870 A similar provision for a breach by the buyer exists under Article 6l(l)(b). 
The CISG is, thus, based on a no-fault unitary contractual principle that all parties are 
obliged to perform their obligations, and will be held responsible for damages. This strict 
view differs to some extent from certain legal systems, particularly from civil law 
jurisdictions, that take a more liberal approach to the concept of fault when dealing with 
869 CISG Article 79(1). 
87
° CISG Articles 35(1) and 45(1)(b). 
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liability for damages for a contractual breach. The approach taken by the Supreme Court, 
thus, appears to reflect its ingrained familiarity with domestic law, and would seem to be 
a sensible and obvious interpretation of the CISG. However; such a result could lead to 
divergent interpretations of the Convention, and reflects the sometimes subtle, but 
insidious, nature of the homeward trend. 
F. ix. The Strict Impediment Requirement under Article 79(1) 
As a prerequisite to an exemption, Article 79 (1) requires that a party's failure to 
perform be due to an "impediment" that was beyond the control of the party, and that the 
party could not reasonably be expected to have taken it into account at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract, or to have avoided it or its consequences. 871 In the Chinese 
goods arbitration case the tribunal in Hamburg compared the "impediment" standard 
under Article 79 to those for excuse under the equivalent national legal doctrines of force 
majeure, economic impossibility, and excessive onerousness. 872 There the tribunal 
refused to find that the seller was exempt from liability because its supplier had run into 
severe financial difficulties. 873 An increase in the cost of performing the contract cannot 
excuse a seller from damages for failing to deliver the goods. The impediment must 
amount to "an unmanageable risk or totally exceptional event". 874 This underscores the 
reluctance to find changes to economic circumstances to amount to an impediment. 
871 The full text of Article 79( 1) states: "A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of its obligations if 
he proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be 
expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have 
avoided or overcome it or its consequences." 
872 Chinese goods case, supra note 776 at para. 12. 
873 Ibid. 
874 Ibid. 
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Under Article 79, a party is deemed to assume the risk of market fluctuations and other 
cost factors affecting performance under the contract. As the tribunal stated, these factors 
are not an "impediment beyond the control of the seller", but rather '~belongs· typically to · · 
the sphere of responsibility of the debtor". 875 
The English wording in Article 79(1 ), "beyond his control" is more precise than 
the general wording found in the German language (aufterhalb ihres Einfluftbereichs).876 
In order to determine whether the impediment was beyond the party's control, courts 
must undertake a risk analysis to establish whether the risk of the occurrence of the 
impediment was something within that party's sphere of control. In other words, a court 
is required to assess the risks that a party claiming exemption assumed when it concluded 
the contract. It must have regard to the allocation of risk that was incorporated in the 
contract, as well as any trade usages or practices that might be relevant (according to 
CISG Article 9). In the absence of any force majeure-type agreement, recourse must be 
made to the CISG. Indeed, even where a contract incorporates aforce majeure clause, 
such a provision does not necessarily exclude Article 79. Many contract clauses are 
incomplete, and need to be interpreted and supplemented by reference to international 
conventions, such as the CISG. 
Generally, a party's sphere of control is thought to be extensive. There will rarely 
be impediments that are deemed to be beyond its control. The most common examples 
for such cases are unforeseen events, such as natural catastrophes (storms, flooding, fire, 
earthquakes, disease epidemics, etc.), war or terrorist attacks, and governmental measures 
875 Ibid. at paras. 11-12. 
876 Gruber and Stoll "Article 79" in Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 599 at 814 para. 14. 
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affecting trade (export or import bans, embargoes, etc.). 877 The unforeseen event must 
also be exceptional. Thus, in the Tomato concentrate case, the seller was not exempted 
from liability under-Article 79, even though heavy rainfall had reducedthe·production of 
tomatoes.878 According to the Hamburg appellate court (OLG), even though the French 
seller claimed ''force majeure", the crop of tomatoes was not entirely destroyed, and the 
supply was not exhausted, thus, performance was still possible. The reduction of the 
tomato crop, and the resultant increase in the market price of tomatoes were burdensome, 
but not impediments that the seller could not overcome. The supply, although restricted, 
was deemed be within the seller's sphere of control. 879 
In the same year as the Tomato concentrate case, that same court had made a 
similar ruling in the Iron molybdenum case.880 An English buyer and a German seller 
had entered into a contract for the supply of iron molybdenum from China in 1994. The 
goods were never delivered to the buyer because the seller had not itself received delivery 
of the goods from its own Chinese supplier. The buyer then concluded a substitute 
transaction with a third party and sued the seller for the difference between the price paid 
and the price under the contract. The seller claimed that is was exempt from liability 
under a force majeure clause in the contract, as well as under Article 79, as the market 
price for the product had tripled since the time of the conclusion of the contract. The 
court held that the buyer was entitled to damages under Article 75 of the CISG. It stated 
877 Ibid. 
878 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Hamburg, 4 July 1997, 1U143/95 and 410 0 21/95 
[Tomato concentrate case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970704gl.html>. 
879 Ibid. 
880 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Hamburg, 28 February 1997, I U 167/95 [Iron molybdenum 
case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970228gl.html>. 
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that it was incumbent upon the seller to bear the risk of increasing market prices. 881 The 
court made the additional point that a seller has to make greater efforts where the 
transaction had a ·speculative character, as in this case, so the, fact that-the market price· 
had tripled was not sufficient to exempt the seller. 
Where the seller has sold generic or commodity goods, such as tomato paste or 
iron molybdenum, it will have to bear the acquisition or procurement risk, assuming there 
is no agreement to the contrary. Failure to do so is not considered an "impediment". 
Recall that the German federal Supreme Court also made this point in the Vine wax case. 
It noted that the seller normally bears the risk that its supplier might breach, and that the 
seller will not generally receive an exemption when its failure to perform was caused by 
its supplier's default. 882 Where other sources of supply exist, even if more expensive 
than the one from which the seller intended to purchase the goods, the seller must obtain 
the goods from any available source. Failure to do so will deprive that party from a 
defense under Article 79. Also, from the perspective of the buyer, it is often irrelevant 
how the seller obtains the goods, or whether the goods by-pass the seller, and come 
directly from the seller's supplier or producer. If a seller does not want to assume the 
acquisition risk, it should ensure that an exemption clause is included in the contract with 
the buyer exempting it from liability for failure to perform by its supplier or producer. 
There do appear to be limits to the extent to which the seller must bear all of the 
risk of acquisition. For example, if the contract provided that the seller was to supply the 
goods from a specific source, or if the seller promised to deliver the goods provided that 
881 Ibid. 
882 Vine wax case, supra note 844 at s. II. para. 2(a). 
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it received the product from its supplier, then a failure of the intended source, or a failure 
by the supplier to deliver, will normally exempt the seller from having to perform. 883 
Furthermore, even if no specific source of goods was--identified in the contract, the court .. 
in the Iron molybdenum case suggested that a post-contract market rise could become so 
extreme and unreasonable so as to entitle a seller to claim an exemption under Article 
79. 884 It stated, however, that "[ f]or parties doing business in a sector that has a very 
speculative aspect the limits of reasonability are very high". 885 Considering the 
speculative nature of the industry and the contract, it was not commercially unreasonable 
to justify an exemption under Article 79. In any event, these cases are small, but 
important contributions to the development of relative uniformity in the interpretation of 
CISG Article 79. 
F.x. Miscellaneous Article 79 Issues in German Case Law: Additions to the Quest for 
Relative Uniformity 
The remaining German cases concern a variety of issues, many of which touch 
upon Article 79 in only a marginal manner. One early case, the Copper and nickel 
cathodes case, for example, which dealt with contract formation, Article 79 was cited, but 
it otherwise had no other application in the case. 886 Similarly, in the Flagstone tiles case, 
the court referred to Article 79 by noting that the buyer had to accept certain foreseeable 
risks by paying an unauthorized sales agent, rather than directly remitting the payment to 
883 Huber & Mullis, The CISG at 261-262. 
884 Iron molybdenum case, supra note 880. 
885 Ibid. 
886 Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Miinchen, 2 August 1994, 13 HKO 17330/93at11.6 [Copper and 
nickel cathodes case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<htto://cisgw3 .law.pace.edu/cases/940802g I .html>. 
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the seller. 887 In this respect, the court noted that by the buyer's conscious act of paying 
an agent instead of the seller, the buyer had to bear the consequences of the possibility 
that the agent might casli the cheque without handing over-the purchaseprice to the · ··-
seller. If the buyer commissioned the agent to transmit the purchase price to the seller, it 
had to bear the risk of that transmission. In the court's view, this was a risk that fell 
under Article 79, even though this provision of the CISG is not explicit on this subject. 
The reference to Article 79 was, thus, inappropriate, but it is possible that the buyer 
attempted to use this provision as a defense, and the court was, thus, obliged to respond. 
Unfortunately for this buyer, non-payment has never been deemed to be an unforeseeable 
supervening event in CISG jurisprudence; it is never "impossible" for a party to make 
payment. The court correctly noted that the failure to pay the seller was, in this case an 
issue governed by CISG articles 53 888 and 57(1).889 
Non-payment was also the main issue in the Memory module case. 890 There, the 
Chinese seller sued the German buyer for payment of the purchase price for delivered 
memory modules, as well as for reimbursement of its legal fees. The district court ruled 
in the seller's favour, and the buyer appealed. It argued that it had rightfully avoided the 
contract under CISG Article 49, and that the legal fees were not recoverable by the seller. 
It also must have made an argument under Article 79 to support its position on contract 
887 Amtsgericht [AG] [Lower Court] Alsfeld, 12 May 1995, 31C534/94 [Flagstone tiles case], online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950512gl.html>. 
888 CISG Article 53 states: "The buyer must pay the price for the goods and take delivery of them as 
required by the contract and this Convention". 
889 CISG Article 57(1) states: "If the buyer is not bound to pay the price at any other particular place, he 
must pay it to the seller: (a) at the seller's place of business; or (b) if the payment is to be made against the 
handing over of the goods or of documents, at the place where the handing over takes place". 
890 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Hamm, 12 November 2001, 13 U 102/01 [Memory module 
case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011112gl.html>. 
250 
avoidance. The court noted, however, that contrary to the buyer's view, the contract was 
not properly avoided under Article 49 as there was no fundamental breach by the seller. 
· - -- - In its only reference td Article 79, the court stated that-~'[i]t is irrelevant according 
to Art. 79(5) CISG whether or not the seller is responsible for the failure to perform".891 
This cryptic reference to Article 79(5) appears to be peculiar. The article itself states: 
"[n]othing in this article prevents either party from exercising any right other than to 
claim damages under this Convention".892 By this reference, the court simply 
acknowledged that a party who fails to perform a contract owing to an impediment that 
meets all the requirements set forth in Article 79( 1) is not liable for damages, but the 
exemption of a party from damages does not prevent the other party from claiming other 
remedies. For example, since Article 79 does not prevent the other party from exercising 
any right other than to claim damages, a serious delay by one party will entitle the other 
party to avoid, i.e., put an end to the contract by reason of a fundamental breach. 
Because delayed delivery and payment were issues in this case, it can only be surmised 
that the buyer attempted to use, to a limited degree, an Article 79 defense, but was 
unsuccessful. 
In the German courts' interpretations of Article 79, it is important to consider the 
extent to which they have remained true to the interpretive mandate in CISG Article 7(1) 
and promoted uniformity in their court decisions. For the most part, German courts have 
been relatively sensitive to this requirement. As Ulrich Magnus has noted, it is his 
"impression that German courts today do neither directly nor indirectly on a subconscious 
891 Ibid. at s. III.1. 
892 CISG Article 79(5). 
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level follow the homeward trend. As far as the interpretation of the CISG is concerned 
the courts, and in particular the Federal Supreme Court, try to avoid any interpretation 
··which merely.imports the domestic solution into·the CISG"~893 The remaining German-
cases on Article 79 appear to underpin the need for an autonomous interpretation of the 
CISG that negates any recourse to law and legal concepts of a purely domestic nature. 
In the Automobile case, for example, the plaintiff buyer of vehicle with a 
defective title attempted to rely on s. 306 of the BGB to avoid the contract for reason of 
impossibility of performance. 894 It argued that under German domestic law regarding the 
legal consequences of an impossibility of a contractual performance, the seller was 
unable to properly transfer the ownership of the car to the buyer. The seller made a 
similar argument under Article 79(1 ), as it sold the automobile to the buyer without 
realizing that the vehicle was stolen property. It, thus, attempted to rely on an exception 
to its duty to perform under Article 79(1 ), arguing that the failure to properly transfer 
property (and title) was due to an impediment beyond its control. The Freiburg District 
Court (Landgericht) invoked numerous articles of the CISG, which it deemed to govern 
the dispute. It disregarded the inapplicable references that the parties made to domestic 
law, and determined that the buyer's claim was justified. It awarded the buyer 
reimbursement of the purchase price under Article 81 (2) CISG, and of all its expenses on 
under Article 74. In making this award, the court noted that the seller could not rely on 
exceptions under Article 79(1). It held that the seller's failure to properly transfer the 
893 Ulrich Magnus, "Germany" in Franco Ferrari, ed., The CJSG and its Impact on National Legal Systems, 
supra note 218 at 156. 
894 Landgericht [LG] [District Court] Freiburg, 22 August 2002, 8 0 75/02 [Automobile case], online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020822gl.html>. 
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property was not due to an impediment beyond its control. On the contrary, it was the 
responsibility of the seller to inquire into the background of the car. In addition, 
according to CISG Article 41, the seller was liable for any defects in title. If ifhad · 
undertaken a proper examination, the seller would have discovered that the car had been 
stolen and, thus, would have refrained from reselling it. This was within the seller's 
sphere of control. 
In addition to the Automobile case, 895 German courts have made similar rulings in 
two other cases that involve stolen vehicles and Article 79. What is also interesting is 
that it is apparent that these courts have had little difficulty in applying the CISG's 
articles in a sophisticated manner. Doing so retards the homeward trend. The Stolen 
automobile case involved a buyer of an automobile from Belarus, who purchased the car 
"without warranty" from a German seller.896 Shortly after taking delivery, the car was 
seized by Belarusian authorities based on an alleged theft. The buyer immediately 
informed the seller that the vehicle had been seized, and the seller agreed to reimburse the 
buyer for the purchase price on condition that the car be returned. As the car was 
impounded by the authorities, the buyer was unable to return it to the seller. Because the 
buyer had not been able to make restitution to the seller, the latter argued that it had been 
relieved of its obligation to perform. The court noted, however, that the buyer was 
895 Ibid. 
896 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Dresden, 21March2007, 9 U 1218/06 [Stolen automobile 
case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/070321gl.html>. 
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relieved from his obligation to return the car "because the impossibility to do so is not 
due to his act or omission". 897 
·, -· -- · ·In the alternative, the seller utilized an Article 79 defense by claiming !twas 
unaware that it had sold stolen property. In ruling against the seller, the court noted that 
it was not relieved from its obligation to reimburse the purchase price and to pay damages 
according to Article 79(1). In the words of the court, "[t]his Article provides that a party 
is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the failure was 
due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to 
have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract". 898 
As the seller should have been aware that a separate vehicle identification number had 
been spot-welded on top of the original plate, it was the seller who bore the burden of 
proof in this case, and he had not demonstrated he could not have noticed the attached 
plate. Damages were thus awarded to the buyer under CISG Article 74. 
Similar facts and arguments were also present in the Stolen car case in the 
following year. 899 A German car dealer sold a vehicle to an Italian buyer, who was also a 
professional in the trade. The seller had purchased the car from another automobile 
dealer and had submitted the vehicle registration document to local authorities for a 
preliminary check. Although nothing was revealed by this check, it later turned out that 
the car had been stolen prior to its sale. Consequently, the Italian police confiscated the 
car and returned it to its original owner. In the interim, the buyer, having resold the car to 
897 Ibid. at s. 2(f). 
898 Ibid. at s. 2( d). Emphasis in the original. 
899 Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Miinchen, 5 March 2008, 7 U 4969/06 [Stolen car case], 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080305gl.html>. Not to be 
confused with the Stolen automobile case, ibid. 
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a third party, had to return the funds received as payment for the car. The buyer then 
filed a suit against the seller claiming breach of contract plus damages and lost profits. 
The seller requested the dismissal of the claim, alleging that it had acted in good faith, as 
it had conducted due diligence on the title prior to the sale. 
The court of first instance had dismissed the claim, holding that, according to 
Article 79(1 ), the seller was not liable. This appears to be an unusual determination, as 
the court also seemed to be of the view "that Article 79 CISG had to be interpreted in a 
very restrictive way".900 In that court's view, the seller had demonstrated that its breach 
of contract-its failure to discern that the car was stolen property-was due to an 
impediment beyond its control, and it could not reasonably be expected to have taken the 
impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract, or to have avoided 
or overcome it or its consequences. Such a ruling, rather than restricting the scope of 
Article 79, appears to broaden it considerably. It must be questioned whether the court of 
first instance was subconsciously influenced by its own domestic laws, in particular, 
BGB section 313's more liberal doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage. Relying on 
its erroneous interpretation of Article 79, the buyer appealed the court's ruling, 
The Munich court of appeal partially reversed the decision of the court of first 
instance, and found that the seller had failed to perform its obligation, namely the transfer 
of ownership of the car to the buyer. In this respect, the court of appeal undertook a more 
sophisticated analysis of the CISG. After pointing out that while the CISG was the law 
applicable to the merits of the dispute, as per Article 4(b ), it did not govern the effects of 
900 Quote is from the judgment of the Munich court of appeal, ibid. 
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the contract on the property in the goods sold. As a consequence, this was a matter 
governed by domestic law. The court, thus, correctly applied German law, which 
prohibits the acquisition ·ofstolen property, even ·by those-who act in ·good faith. · · 
Furthermore, in contrast to what the court of first instance had affirmed, the court 
of appeal held that the seller could not be exempted from liability under Article 79, since 
such an exemption implies the occurrence of objective circumstances preventing the 
fulfillment of the contractual obligations, while in this case the alleged circumstances 
were of a subjective nature. In the words of the court, "[a]ccording to Article 79 CISG, 
an exemption of the seller from the consequences of a breach of obligation is only 
possible ifthe breach cannot reasonably be attributed to him".901 Moreover, the argument 
that the alleged impediment could not reasonably be expected to have been taken into 
account at the time of the conclusion of the contract was not convincing. Based on the 
facts of the case, including the low price of the car, the mileage, and the disparities in the 
owner's registration document, this should have led the seller to be suspicious regarding 
the ownership of the vehicle. As the court stated, "the obligation to inquire whether a 
seller is entitled to transfer property of a car dealer of used cars does not meet the 
requirements of Article 79".902 In consequence, the buyer was entitled to damages under 
CISG Articles 45(l)(b) and 74. 
The remaining three cases903 from Germany contain very little content on Article 
79. The Glass bottles case, which was an appeal case to the federal Supreme Court, 
901 Ibid. 
902 Ibid. 
903 These are: Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Brandenburg, 18 November 2008, 6 U 53/07 
[Beer case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/08 l l l 8g I .html>; 
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involved a German seller and a Greek buyer who had entered into a contract for the 
manufacture and supply of bottles that were to be resold to the buyer's customers in 
· Russia.904 Due to the difficulties of selling bottles in Russia caused by the ruble's · 
decline, the buyer informed the seller of its intention to accept only the goods already 
produced. It also asked the seller for the return of its moulds, which the buyer had 
financed with a loan from the seller. The seller refused, and the buyer brought an action 
against it claiming, inter alia, repayment of the loan. The seller counterclaimed with a 
claim for compensation of lost profits it had allegedly suffered as a result of early 
termination of the contract. The court of first instance and the Court of Appeal dismissed 
the buyer's claims, but the Supreme Court reversed these decisions in part, noting that the 
seller was entitled to set-off because the buyer had failed to perform its contractual 
obligations under the CISG. 
The buyer attempted an Article 79 defense, apparently first under German 
domestic law. It claimed that there had been a disruption of the "equivalence mandate" 
(Aquivalenzstorung), which is a domestic rule that stipulates that the duties of both 
contractual parties remain approximately the same. The Aquivalenzstorung rule bears a 
close resemblance to Wegfall der GeschO.ftsgrundlage, which is the German rule 
concerning the destruction of the basis of the contract. The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that although the ruble's value fell, resulting in a disruption of sales on the 
part of the buyer, "the buyer bears the risk whether the purchased object can be resold for 
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Hamburg, 25 January 2008, 12 U 39/00 [Cafe inventory case], 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080125gl.html>; and, 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court], 27 November 2007, X ZR 111/04 [Glass bottles case], 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071127gl.html>. 
904 Glass bottles case, ibid. 
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a profit".905 While the Court referred to previous Bundesgerichtshof jurisprudence and 
cited BCB s. 313, it correctly noted that CISG Article 79 was the governing provision. 
That the buyer was not able to sell the bottles because of a decline of the ruble exchange · · 
rate did not entitle the buyer to terminate the contract. At most, Article 79(1) simply 
"releases the debtor only from damages claims by the creditor".906 Otherwise, the 
buyer's obligations to perform the contract remained unaffected. 
The Cafe inventory case similarly raised only a minor point on Article 79.907 The 
Court held that the buyer's assignees were entitled to recover a contractual penalty for the 
seller's partial non-performance (in supplying defective equipment). In so doing, the 
Court left open the problem as to whether an exemption from the obligation to pay the 
contractual penalty should be decided on the basis of CISG, or on the basis of domestic 
law. With respect to CISG, the Court noted that an exemption for the seller's non-
performance would only be allowed if proper installation of the equipment at the buyer's 
premises had been impossible due to an unforeseeable impediment beyond the seller's 
control, as per Article 79(1 ), or through conduct by the buyer, in accordance with Article 
80. While the buyer did not leave its premises in an ideal condition to enable the seller to 
properly install the equipment, the seller's complete failure to install the equipment 
deprived it from a right to rely on Articles 79 and/or 80. This decision, while limited in 
scope, appears to be a correct application of the facts with regard to Article 79. 
905 Ibid. at para. 30(b). 
906 Ibid. at para. 31. 
907 Cafe inventory case, ibid. 
. ~ . . ' 
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The Beer case was primarily concerned with contact avoidance, fundamental 
breach, and damages.908 The dispute concerned two breweries with reciprocal claims 
involving contracts for the manufacturing of a plant and the bottling of beer for the buyer. 
When the buyer failed to purchase all the beer manufactured for the venture, the 
relationship between the parties deteriorated. The buyer attempted to argue that a 
distortion of the parties' implicit contractual purpose occurred, which is a principle 
recognized in German law (under Wegfall der Geschii.ftsgrundlage). This principle is 
often compared to force majeure, frustration, and CISG Article 79. However, the Court 
was quick to dismiss this argument, and stated that "[ t ]he CISG does not contain this 
legal principle".909 While Article 79 did not apply to these changed circumstances, the 
Court noted that CISG Article 7(1) provides that the principle of good faith is inherent to 
the Convention.910 As such, it could construe the principle of good faith in a way that 
when circumstances change, an aggrieved party could demand an adjustment of the 
obligations under a contract. So while Article 79 could not be used to broaden the scope 
of excuses for non-performance when new situations arise, the Court appeared to open 
the door for Article 7(1) to be used in claims for contract adaption, at least in some 
situations. However, in this case, the Court found that good faith was not a relevant 
factor, and dismissed this line of argumentation. 
908 Beer case, ibid. 
909 Ibid. at s. "Position of [Seller]". 
910 Ibid. at s. III. 3. 
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F.xi. Sophisticated Understanding of Article 79 in German Case Law 
Germany has a long history in efforts to unify international sales law, and it is 
' likely" that this· experien"ce has assisted jurists in that country.to treat the CISG iri a 
sensitive and sophisticated manner.911 This should not be surprising as German courts 
have had experience in applying ULIS and ULF from 1974 to 1990. The relatively large 
number of CISG cases coming from that country also speaks to the relative popularity 
and success of the Convention in Germany. Indeed, this analysis of Article 79 in German 
courts indicates that jurists there take the CISG very seriously. 
Most decisions demonstrate that courts there have a nuanced understanding of 
both the CISG's general principles as well as its' specific provisions, such as Article 79. 
While there has been a tendency to make a distinction between "normal" domestic sales 
law, and the CISG as a unique law for international sales, there is little evidence that 
German courts have interpreted Article 79 in a manner that shows a bias for the 
homeward trend. The German cases interpreting Article 79, although not always perfect, 
have gone to great lengths to avoid any interpretation that might import domestic law into 
the CISG. This is the case even though German courts have not quoted foreign case law 
on the Article 79. This practice is common in German courts, as they rarely invoke the 
decisions of foreign courts unless there is a specific international matter at stake.912 As a 
civil law country, this also reflects the lack of reliance on precedent, which is widespread 
911 See generally, Martin Karollus, "Judicial Interpretation and Application of the CISG in Germany 1988-
1994" in Cornell J. Int'l L., eds., Cornell Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods (CJSG) 1995 (New York: Kluwer Law International, 1996) 51. See also, Magnus, supra note 792 
at 143.ff. 
912 Magnus, supra note 792 at 155. 
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in common law jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the CISG calls for a uniform interpretation 
and application across signatory states, and German courts have managed to pay heed to 
this requirement. 
G. Greece: Autonomous Interpretation as the Rule 
In one scholarly analysis of Greek case law on the CISG, it was noted that "Greek 
courts have delivered interesting and mostly correct (although often incomplete) 
judgments in connection with various important [CISG] matters".913 Indeed, many court 
and tribunal decisions contain incomplete analysis of the CISG's various provisions. But 
fortunately, "autonomous interpretation [of the CISG] seems to be [ ... ] a general rule 
respected by Greek courts".914 This is the approach used by the Court of Appeals of 
Lamia in the first Greek cased that considered Article 79.915 
There are two Greek cases that mention Article 79,916 but only one of those cases 
provides a significant treatment of that provision.917 The Sunflower seed case involved a 
Greek buyer and a Bulgarian seller that had concluded a contract for the sale of 3,000 
tons of sunflower seeds. The seeds were to be produced in Bulgaria. Just prior to the 
delivery date, the seller informed the buyer that it was unable to perform the contract. 
913 Dionysios P. Flambouras, "Case Law of Greek Courts for the Vienna Convention (1980) for 
International Sale of Goods" (2009) 2 Nordic J. Com. L. 1 at 3 7 online: 
<http://www.njcl.fi/article.php?issue=2 2009&n=4>. 
914 Ibid. at 38. 
915 Court of Appeals of Lamia, Decision 63/2006 [Sunflower seed case], online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060001 gr.html>. 
916 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: Multi-Member Court of First Instance of 
Athens, Decision 4505/2009 [Bullet proof vest case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/094505gr.html>; and Sunflower seed case, ibid. The Bullet proof vest 
case mentions Article 79 as an example of the CISG's excuse provisions. As nothing more is considered in 
the judgment, the case is of little relevance to Article 79 case law. 
917 That case is the Sunflower seed case, supra note 915. 
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The buyer covered its purchase with another supplier, and sued the seller for damages. 
At trial, the seller invoked weather-related impediments to excuse its performance. 
Specifically, it claimed-that prolonged dryness resulted in the destruction of a large 
quantity of the sunflower seed harvest. In addition, the dryness caused a lowering of the 
level of the Danube river, so the seller would not have been able to load the goods on a 
ship near a port close to its premises. This situation meant that the seller would have 
been obliged to load the goods at a more distant sea port, entailing an increase in 
transportation costs. Such an increase, argued the seller, would have rendered the 
initially agreed price burdensome to the seller. Accordingly, the seller claimed that these 
were impediments beyond its control, and as such, it was exempt from liability to pay 
damages under Article 79. 
The court correctly rejected the arguments of the seller. It took the position that 
the CISG does not release a party from its liability in cases where there has been a mere 
change in the economic circumstances that surrounded the parties at the time of contract 
formation, even where there is a higher cost to the seller.918 The court was correct in not 
applying Article 79 in an event that constituted hardship. This was an implicit rejection 
of the rebus sic stantibus principle. The court specifically noted that at the time of 
contracting, the seller was already aware that the production of sunflower seeds would be 
limited due to the dry season, and that the lowering of the level of the Danube was an 
impediment within the control of the seller, since the same event had occurred a few 
years ago. As a general principle under CISG Article 79, even a considerable change in 
918 Flambouras, supra note 913 at 21. 
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the price or costs of goods sold, after contract formation, will not be allowed as grounds 
for an exemption from liability. In this way, the Greek Sunflower seed case has made a 
small contribution towards relative uniformity in CISG Article 79 jurisprudence.·· · 
H Hungary: A Small Contribution to Relative Uniformity 
There are both court and arbitral cases from Hungary. The sole court case on 
Article 79 from that jurisdiction concerned the sale of language interpreting machines 
from Germany.919 The defendant was a consignee of the plaintiff buyer, and it had 
entered into a sale of goods contract with a German seller that was appointed by the 
buyer. The defendant was obliged to take delivery any time within a twelve months 
period. The contract provided that in case of delay or frustration of the delivery due to 
force majeure, strike, or other circumstances beyond the control of the seller, the 
defendant consignee would not have the right to claim damages. The seller failed to 
deliver the goods, hence, the buyer avoided the contract and claimed damages. The seller 
stated that it was not liable for the non-delivery because its liability was excused by the 
relevant provision of the contract since non-delivery was due to a production failure at 
the manufacturer, which was beyond its control. At the trial level, the buyer claimed that 
the contractual force majeure provision trumped any guarantees provided for in the 
CISG. The defendant objected to this argument and argued that the contractual terms 
were in accordance with CISG Article 79. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to address 
the issues related to the CISG, even though it acknowledged that the Convention was 
919 Legfelsobb Bir6sag [Supreme Court], 1992 [Interpreting machine case], online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920000hl .html>. 
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applicable. Instead, it based its decision on the Hungarian Civil Code and ruled in favor 
of the defendant. As a matter of proper methodology, the trial court erred by referring to 
·domestic law in a dispute that was clearly governed by the CISG. 
The plaintiff buyer appealed to the Supreme Court, and now argued that pursuant 
to Article 79(2), the defendant was liable for third party suppliers of the seller. This is, 
indeed, a correct reading of that sub-Article. Under Article 79(2), the sphere of control of 
an obligor extends to cover the actions of third party suppliers. The Supreme Court held 
that even though the contract did not explicitly include Article 79, this did not mean that 
the liability of the seller for third parties would have been excluded. In this case, the 
seller was not obliged to purchase the goods from a specific source; rather, it was obliged 
to procure the goods from any source and sell them to the defendant. Thus, the Supreme 
Court held that the intermediary traders and the third party producers of the goods were 
within the seller's sphere of business control. As such, an impediment within the sphere 
of interest of the seller did not qualify as a ground for exemption under the contract or 
under Article 79. Such a ruling is consistent with most of the Article 79(2) case law on 
the topic of exemption from liability for the conduct of third parties. Although a small 
contribution, the Hungarian Supreme Court decision adds to the relative uniformity of 
Article 79 jurisprudence. 
The arbitral decision from Hungary has suggested that a correct application of 
Article 79 must focus on the risks that a party claiming exemption assumed at the 
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conclusion of the contract. 920 The Caviar case raised issues concerned with risk 
allocation and highlighted the relationship between Article 79 and risk ofloss rules.921 A 
Yugoslavian company had sold·and delivered caviar to· a Hungarian buyer;·butprior to-
payment a UN embargo against the former Yugoslavia took effect in Hungary. The case 
is of interest because one other tribunal (the BCCI in Bulgaria) noted that an embargo 
may constitute an "impediment" within the meaning of Article 79.922 
The sanction against Yugoslavia prevented the buyer from taking delivery of the 
caviar, and the product was eventually destroyed. Although the tribunal ruled that the 
CISG was applicable, it referred to the sanctions as force majeure under the former 
Yugoslavian Law on Obligatory Relations rather than referring to Article 79.923 This was 
an unfortunate, but minor, error as the tribunal could have conducted its risk assessment 
exclusively under the rules of the CISG. In any event, the outcome would likely have 
been the same. In this case, it determined that the damage caused by the embargo had to 
be borne by the party that was liable for the risk at the time the force majeure event 
occurred. Similar reasoning under Article 79 would likely have resulted in the tribunal 
ruling that the loss had to be incurred by the party who bore the risk at the moment of the 
impediment. To use the words of another arbitral tribunal, to be granted an exemption 
under Article 79, the impediment must be "an unmanageable risk or a totally exceptional 
920 Budapest Arbitration Award, IO December 1996, Vb 96074 [Caviar case], online: Pace Law School 
CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/961210hl.html>. The other Article 79 arbitral case from 
Hungary contains insufficient information and will not be discussed. See Article Budapest Arbitration 
Award, 8 May 1997, Vb 96036, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970508hl.html>. 
921 Caviar case, ibid. 
922 Coal case, supra note 660. 
923 1978, Article 262( 4 ). 
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event, such as force majeure".924 In the case of the Hungarian buyer, it had assumed the 
ownership risk before the sanctions became effective. Indeed, by being late with its 
payment to the seller, itwas technically in default before the sanctions were - · 
implemented. Loss of the goods after the risk has passed to the buyer does not discharge 
or exempt it from its obligation to pay the price. These two Hungarian cases appear to 
interpret Article 79 in a manner that is consistent with a growing body of relatively 
uniform jurisprudence. 
l International Chamber of Commerce: International Expertise on Article 79 
While much scholarly literature on the CISG has come from cases in national 
courts, relatively little has focused exclusively on the decisions of arbitral panels. This is 
unfortunate, as important trends and data could be culled from the arbitral decisions 
originating from specific institutions. Indeed, most arbitral institutions are associated 
with specific countries, regions, or industries. Because of this narrower scope, these 
institutions may have a national or regional bias, or may not have requisite expertise to 
adjudicate international disputes. In this respect, as a truly "international" institution, the 
decisions of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Court of 
Arbitration provide a unique perspective on the treatment of CISG Article 79. 
924 Hamburg Arbitration Award, 21March1996 [Chinese goods case], online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/96032lgl.html>. 
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Ii. Article 79 Jurisprudence in Arbitrations: Complementing Procedure and 
Substance 
Many parties to international sale of goods contracts choose arbitrafion as an 
alternative to litigation in national courts. This form of dispute resolution has a number 
of advantages to litigation, and this may explain, in part, the growing body of CISG case 
law emanating from arbitral institutions. One example of this growth is the fact that over 
half of the Article 79 cases considered in this study were from arbitral institutions rather 
than from national courts. Specifically, of these 128 cases, 67 (or 52 percent) emanated 
from arbitrations; 61 (or 48 percent) originated from national courts.925 
There are many reasons to explain the growth of arbitration as a form of dispute 
resolution in international sales transactions. One obvious explanation is that in certain 
jurisdictions like China and Russia, commercial parties do not have access to state courts 
to resolve their disputes. In these countries, arbitration is the only viable option. 
However, there are other attractions to this method of dispute resolution. One unique 
feature of arbitration is that it is a private means of settling disputes. The content of the 
proceedings remain confidential, which avoids public scrutiny. This is very attractive to 
commercial parties who wish to avoid negative publicity. Arbitration is also perceived as 
being a more neutral forum for the resolution of disputes than subjecting one of the 
parties to the national courts of the other party's country. Unlike national courts, 
members of an arbitral panel do not necessarily have ties to a particular country. In 
addition, members of an arbitral panel are often selected because they have the requisite 
925 See Figure 1, supra note 208. 
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industry knowledge or technical expertise to understand the nuances and complexities of 
the case. The same level of expertise may not be available from judges sitting in national 
courts. 
Arbitration is also favoured because awards are usually more easily enforced in 
other countries than are court awards. This is the result of the wide acceptance of the 
New York Convention.926 Finally, arbitration is perceived to be more expeditious than 
litigation. The time saved with the relatively quick resolution of disputes is an attractive 
feature of arbitration. While the costs of the arbitrators and institutions may be more 
expensive than paying for the services of a national court, the expedited and simplified 
nature of arbitration often results in an overall cost savings to the parties. 
I.ii. The ICC Cases: A Nuanced Understanding of Article 79 
The ICC International Court of Arbitration cases on Article 79 come from a 
variety of jurisdictions, all of them from the civil law tradition.927 None are identifiable 
as emanating from a common law jurisdiction.928 In any event, these cases are 
"international" in scope. Perhaps most importantly, the ICC cases on Article 79 generally 
926 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958, 330 
U.N.T.S. 38, 7 I.L.M. 1046 (entered into force 7 June 1959) [New York Convention]. 
927 The countries named in these Article 79 cases are Austria, Bulgaria, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Syria, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia. In some of these cases, the countries are not identified (Case 8786 
supra note 931) or just the regions are identified (Case 8501 identifies an "Oriental country" and a 
"European country", supra note 931; Case 8790 identifies the parties from "Central Europe" and Western 
Europe", supra note 931). 
928 In Case 8786, supra note 931, no countries are identified, however, there are clues that suggest that the 
parties were from Europe. One clue is that the tribunal refers to Swiss law (as well as the CISG). The 
second clue is that a German case is referenced. 
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reveal a nuanced understanding of that provision. In this respect, they add to the relative 
uniformity in the interpretation of Article 79. 
The ICC is one of the world's leading institutions for resolving international 
commercial disputes. The total number of cases handled by the ICC since it was founded 
in 1919 stands at more than 17,000.929 It is truly an institution with an international 
approach to commerce. For example, in 2010, 793 cases were filed, involving 2,145 
parties from 140 countries.930 However, the decisions relating to Article 79 are 
substantially less, and cover only nine awards.931 Two of these cases contribute 
insignificantly to Article 79 jurisprudence, and are not considered in this discussion.932 
Nevertheless, the remaining seven cases illustrate how ICC arbitrators have dealt with 
this important provision in this major instrument of international sales law, and the extent 
to which they have, for the most part, achieved a relatively uniform interpretation of 
929 ICC, online: International Court of Arbitration 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4584/index.html>. Note that the ICC's International Court of 
Arbitration was created in 1923. 
930 Ibid. 
931 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: ICC Court of Arbitration, 2000, Case 8790 
[Processed food product case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/008790il.html>; ICC Court of Arbitration, June 1999, Case 9187 [Coke 
case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/999187il.html>; ICC 
Court of Arbitration, January 1997, Case 8786 [Clothing case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/978786il.html>; ICC Court of Arbitration, 1996, Case 8501, online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/968501 i I .html>; ICC Court of 
Arbitration, 1995, Case 8128 [Chemical fertilizer case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/958128il.html>; ICC Court of Arbitration, 1994, Case 7585, online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/947585il.html>; ICC Court of 
Arbitration, 26 March 1993, Case 6653 [Steel bars case 2], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/936653il.html>; ICC Court of Arbitration, 1992, Case 7197 [Failure to 
open letter of credit and penalty clause case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/927197il.html>; and ICC Court of Arbitration, 26 August 1989, Case 
6281 [Steel bars case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/896281il.html>. 
932 These unimportant cases are: ICC, 26 March 1993, Case 6653 (Steel bars case 2) and ICC, 1994, Case 
7585, ibid. 
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Article 79. Only in one case is the outcome a questionable ruling that may detract from a 
relatively uniform interpretation of Article 79.933 
. One ·common element in these cases is the attempt on the part of sellers to invoke 
their supplier's default as an impediment to exempt the seller from liability for non-
conforming goods. As similar cases on this point have demonstrated, this defense has 
rarely been successful.934 Article 79 jurisprudence has been relatively uniform on this 
point: the seller bears the acquisition risk and cannot rely on its suppliers default as a 
basis for an exemption under the CISG. Thus, in ICC Case 9187, the seller was not 
exempted from its liability for delivering non-conforming coke, even though it had 
argued that it had acted only as an agent of the manufacturer in the transaction.935 As it 
had never disclosed this fact to the buyer, the seller was fully liable. The tribunal stated 
that "[i]f the seller uses auxiliary people for the performance of its contractual 
obligations, the consequences of their knowledge or grossly negligent lack of knowledge 
of the non-conformity have to be borne by the seller as if it had acted itself'. 936 The 
unanswered question in this case is whether the tribunal would have ruled differently if 
the seller had made known to the buyer that it was acting only in an agency capacity. 
Another ICC decision was also in harmony with this approach to third party 
suppliers, even though the buyer was complicit to a small degree in the non-performance 
of the contract. In ICC Case 8128 involving the supply of chemical fertilizer, an Austrian 
933 That case is ICC, 2000, Case 8790, supra note 931. It is discussed infra. 
934 The exception being a single case, that of Tribunal de commercial [Trib. com.] Besan9on, 19 January 
1998, Flippe Christian v. Douet Sport Collections, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980119fl .html>. This case is discussed infra. 
935 ICC, June 1999, Case 9187 (Coke case), supra note 931. 
936 Ibid. at s. 3, "Notice of Non-Conformity". 
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seller contracted with its Ukrainian supplier to obtain part of the contract.937 Under the 
instructions of the seller, the buyer sent the packaging (sacks) to the Ukrainian supplier to 
be used for the delivery of the product. However, the packaging did not conform·to the 
requirements of the Ukrainian chemical industry, so they could not be used by the 
supplier. Consequently, the goods were not delivered on time and the buyer was forced 
to make a substitute purchase at a higher price. The seller attempted to use Article 79 as 
a defense, but the tribunal held that the seller was ultimately responsible for the non-
delivery by its supplier, as it had breached its duty to give the proper packaging 
instructions to the buyer. As per Article 79(2), a third-party supplier's faulty or delayed 
performance is at the seller's risk. 
Other impediment issues in ICC cases concern the suspension of foreign debt 
payments,938 an increase in prices,939 delayed delivery of samples,940 and difficulties 
arising from government action and flooding. 941 Many of these issues have been 
considered reasonable business risks that are typically foreseeable. In Case 7197 the 
buyer alleged that it could not have opened a letter of credit because the Bulgarian 
government had ordered the suspension of payment of foreign debt. 942 The tribunal 
correctly refused to apply Article 79(1), as it noted that the suspension had already been 
declared at the time of the conclusion of the contract. Obviously, the buyer should have 
foreseen the difficulties in opening the credit in such an instance. 
937 ICC, 1995, Case 8128 (Chemical fertilizer case), supra note 931. 
938 ICC, 1992, Case 7197, supra note 931. 
939 ICC, 26 August 1989, Case 6281, supra note 931. 
940 ICC, January 1995, Case 8786 (Clothing case), supra note 931. 
941 ICC, 1996, Case 8501 (Chemical fertilizer case), supra note 931. 
942 ICC, 1992, Case 7197, supra note 931. 
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Case 6281 also involves a situation where the claimed exemption has been denied, 
as an increase in market prices is rarely thought to be a supervening event.943 The parties 
·-had·concluded·a contract for steel bars, which gave the buyer an option to purchase an 
additional quantity of the product at a future date at the same price. The buyer exercised 
its option, but the seller refused to deliver the steel because the market price had 
increased (by 13.16 percent). Interestingly, the tribunal found that the CISG was not 
applicable since the contract had been concluded before the Convention had entered into 
force in the countries of the buyer and seller (Egypt and Yugoslavia, respectively). 
Ruling that Yugoslavian law applied, the tribunal noted that that country was a signatory 
ofULIS.944 Nevertheless, the tribunal compared Article 74.1 ofULIS with Article 79(1), 
and noted that as would have been the case under Article 79(1), it was appropriate to 
apply "a strict approach in assessing lack of predictability".945 The tribunal also 
considered Yugoslavian domestic law on changed circumstances.946 In an interesting 
statement on this topic, it stated that the domestic provision 
corresponds to that of a "frustration" according to Anglo-American 
law or of a Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage according to German 
and Austrian law. Yugoslav commentaries speak of a clausula 
rebus sic stantibus, mainly because of the historical development of 
Yugoslav law. After all, a "genuine" clausula rebus sic stantibus 
would sustain (in a positive sense) legal relationships only for as 
long as there are no changes at all, giving no consideration to 
predictability and applicability. 
943 ICC, 26 August 1989, Case 6281, supra note 931. 
944 ULIS, supra note 157. 
945 ICC, 26 August 1989, Case 6281, supra note 931. The quote is from an excerpt of the decision edited 
by Albert Kritzer. 
946 Yugoslav Law of Obligations, 1978, Art. 133, paras. 1-2. 
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But considering that world market prices for products, such as steel, fluctuate, a 13.16 
percent increase in prices was a reasonable and predictable entrepreneurial risk. Indeed, 
-- noted the tribunal, "[a] teasonable seller had to expect that' steel prices might go' up 
further, perhaps even more dramatically than in actual fact". 947 
Considering that arbitrators do not have a permanent forum, unlike domestic 
courts, they have more flexibility in the choice of applicable law.948 For that reason, the 
question of the applicability of the CISG appears in a rather different light in arbitration 
than before a domestic court. That may explain why, in Case 6281 above,949 the tribunal 
utilized the CISG (by way of comparison to ULIS), even though it found the CISG to be 
inapplicable. In a similar fashion, the tribunal in Case 8501 found that no express or 
implied choice of law could be inferred from the parties, so it invoked the "generally 
accepted principles of international trade", in particular, the CISG.950 It did this, even 
though an argument could have been made that the respondent seller's domestic law 
applied to the case, which would have been Vietnamese law. Had this been the case, the 
CISG would likely have been inapplicable as Vietnam was not a contracting state of the 
Convention.951 But as the respondent did not state its position as to which law should 
apply, the tribunal was of the opinion that it was "not required ex officio to identify 
potential issues that might possibly arise under Vietnamese law".952 
947 ICC, 26 August 1989, Case 6281, supra note 931 at para. 14. 
948 See generally Alexis Mourre, "Application of the Vienna International Sales Convention in Arbitration" 
(2006) 17:1 ICC Int'l Ct. Arb. Bull. 43. 
949 ICC, 26 August 1989, Case 6281, supra note 931. 
950 ICC, 1996, Case 8501, supra note 931. 
951 As of August 24, 2011, Vietnam is still not a CISG contracting state. 
952 ICC, 1996, Case 8501, supra note 931. 
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As the tribunal was of the opinion that the CISG reflected widely accepted trade 
rules and commercial values, it referred to its provisions, as well as the UNIDROIT 
- Principles,9~3 in making its ruling. The seller sought to rely on an impediment that 
delayed its performance, which included government action and flooding. Without 
referring to CISG Article 79 or the force majeure954 or hardship955 provisions in the 
UNIDROIT Principles, the tribunal found that there was no case of force majeure 
preventing it from performing its contractual obligations. While much detail is lacking in 
this decision, 956 supervening government acts and seasonal droughts are most often 
deemed to be foreseeable business risks under Article 79. As such, they are rarely 
utilized with success as a defense for non-performance. 
An impediment under Article 79 has been described in this dissertation as a legal 
principle for allocating the loss caused by a supervening event that prevents performance 
by making it impossible. It is intended to apply only where the event is one over which 
the parties have no control and without the fault of the party seeking to rely on this 
defense. For these reasons, a self-induced impediment will not be grounds for relief.957 
This point is illustrated in Case 8786. 958 A seller of clothing had entered into a 
contract with the buyer, where the seller had to first produce satisfactory samples before 
the buyer would place the order. The buyer complained that the first samples were of 
poor quality, so the seller immediately delivered a second set of samples. By this point, a 
953 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 196. 
954 Article 7 .1. 7. 
955 Articles 6.2.1-6.2.3. 
956 The published decision in Case 8501 contains only extracts. Supra note 931. 
957 See Treitel, supra note 143 at 521-544. 
958 ICC, January 1997, Case 8786, supra note 931. 
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significant amount of time had lapsed and the buyer canceled the order, claiming that it 
was planned for a seasonal collection of clothing. Timeliness of the delivery of the 
·-'Clothing was of fundamental importance to the buyer. This being the case, the tribunal 
ruled that since the seller initially delivered defective samples, it caused the impossibility 
of the delivery of the goods by the deadline. As such, the seller, as claimant, could not 
rely on Article 79 to excuse it from its non-performance. In the words of the tribunal, 
"the impediment was well within the [seller]' s control considering that the entire chain of 
events which lead to the non-performance of the contract was commenced by the 
[seller]' s delayed delivery of the samples". 959 In other words, the impediment was self-
induced. 
This being the case, the tribunal should have also made reference to CISG Article 
80, which provides: "A party may not rely on a failure of the other party to perform, to 
the extent that such failure was caused by the first party's act or omission". 960 Article 80 
releases a party from its obligations where the other party has impaired its performance. 
Thus, if the seller frustrated performance by not providing clothing samples in a timely 
manner, it cannot demand specific performance or declare avoidance. In the words of 
Honnold regarding Article 80, "[t]he making of a contract necessarily implies an 
expectation of performance; action by one party to prevent performance by the other is 
clearly inconsistent with their mutual expectations".961 While the tribunal appears to 
959 Ibid. 
96° CISG Article 80. 
961 Honnold & Flechtner, ed., supra note 43 at 647-648. 
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have understood this principle, it ignored an important provision within the CISG that 
covered the issue. 
While it was found in Case 8501 (above)962 that flooding in the country of 
exportation (and government action) were not sufficient for aforce majeure defense, the 
opposite conclusion was reached four years later in Case 8790.963 Indeed, it is difficult to 
reconcile the reasoning in these two cases, and the lack of detail contributes to this 
problem, especially in Case 8501 (above).964 The facts of Case 8790 are relatively 
complex, and may help us understand why the sole arbitrator accepted the claimant's 
force majeure argument. The seller (claimant) concluded a contract where the buyer was 
to furnish the seller with a number of components for the production of a food product. 
The seller was then required to deliver to the buyer a large quantity of the processed 
product in periodic shipments. Following a number of deliveries, the seller informed the 
buyer that it was compelled to suspend its deliveries of the finished product for 
approximately one month. It initially stated to the buyer that the reason for the 
suspension was due to a reduction in its supply of raw materials and a modification in the 
assortments of the products of its plants. It also informed the buyer that the price had 
also increased by ten percent. The buyer responded by withholding payment, and it also 
complained that some of the goods had been received in bad condition. When settlement 
negotiations failed, the seller commenced arbitration proceedings. 
962 ICC, 1996, Case 8501, supra note 931. 
963 ICC, 2000, Case 8790, supra note 931. 
964 ICC, 1996, Case 8501, supra note 931. 
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The arbitrator found that the claimant was justified in its suspension of further 
deliveries due to force majeure. Thus, the impediment was of a temporary nature. The 
· seller produced a chamber of commerce certificate,. which stated that the 'climatic · , .. · ·· .-
conditions during the period in question led to a reduction of raw material, and that these 
circumstances were beyond human control and prevented the claimant from fulfilling its 
contractual obligations towards defendant. The buyer noted that the contract, which 
contained aforce majeure clause, did not specifically mention the term "drought". 
Instead, the contract clause referred to "natural catastrophes" and also to "other 
circumstances outside [the] control" of the parties. 
Considering this definition, the arbitrator felt entitled to include "drought" in this 
definition, even though this is arguably incorrect. While natural catastrophes can include 
such things as drought, these are more often thought to be significant only when they are 
unpredictable, and of considerable duration-known as "historical droughts".965 A 
drought causing a one-month delay in a shipment can hardly be considered a "natural 
catastrophe". Furthermore, the defendant introduced evidence that brought the existence 
of the drought into doubt. During the period in question, it showed that it had been able 
to sign a contract with another company in the same country of the seller. The arbitrator 
rejected this argument by noting that the other supplier was located in a city 300 
kilometers away from the claimant. In any event, this evidence suggests that the severity 
965 See generally Luis F. Ballesteros, "What Determines a Disaster?" September 11, 2008, online: 54 Pesos 
<http://54pesos.org/2008/09/l l/what-determines-a-disaster> and Neil Smith, "There's No Such Thing as a 
Natural Disaster" June 11, 2006, online: Social Science Research Council 
<http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Smith>. 
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and duration of the drought were not sufficient impediments to warrant the successful 
invocation of force majeure. 
-- Finally, it must be noted that the obligation to supply generic goods is usually·not 
excused by aforce majeure event or under Article 79.966 In this case it is unknown what 
the actual composition of the goods was, but the information given suggests that the 
goods required some degree of processing. However, it is not uncommon for generic 
goods to require some degree of processing. Unless otherwise stipulated in the contract, 
the seller bears the risk of procuring the goods it has sold to the buyer, even if this results 
in an increased cost (or loss) to the seller. And as the buyer demonstrated, another 
supplier was readily available. However, as the buyer was to supply some components 
for the production of the product, that may have limited the seller's procurement risk. In 
such delivery-against-supply contract clauses, the seller is not obliged to attempt to 
purchase goods from other suppliers. 967 But that was not likely applicable in this case. 
As the seller claimed that the "drought" caused a reduction of raw materials in its region, 
that statement suggests that the seller had otherwise sufficient components from the 
buyer. That being the case, the delivery-against-supply clause would not have released 
the seller from procuring the goods from another source. Unfortunately, the arbitrator did 
not consider these aspects of the case. Had he/she done so, it is much more likely that the 
claimant would not have been successful with its force majeure argument. Fortunately, 
the majority of ICC cases have demonstrated a nuanced understanding of Article 79, and 
Case 8790 may represent an anomaly in CISG jurisprudence. 
966 Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 171-17 5. 
967 Ibid. at 176. 
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J. Italy: "Enlightened" Article 79 Case Law 
In his assessment of the impact of the CISG in Italy, Marco Torsello has noted 
that the Convention has ·played an increasingly important role irfthe legal system ofthat 
country, but "it still has not gained wide-spread popularity".968 Torsello correctly noted 
that one of the challenges for the CISG in Italy (as elsewhere) was that as a uniform 
international sales law instrument it was at the "risk of being frustrated by divergent 
interpretations by domestic courts adjudicating similar cases".969 National courts, thus, 
play a pivotal role in assuring the uniform application of international conventions, such 
as the CISG. In the case of Italy generally, CISG case law suggests that some courts 
there constitute an "enlightened minority", but they unfortunately co-exist with many 
courts that have rendered "low-quality Italian decisions about the CISG".970 A larger 
sampling of Italian case law might support such a claim, but with only four Italian cases 
on Article 79 reported, few hard inferences can be made regarding the overall treatment 
of the CISG in that country.971 However, if any tentative conclusions can be drawn from 
these four cases, it is that these Italian courts appear to belong to the "enlightened 
minority". 
968 Marco Torsello, "Italy'' in Franco Ferrari, ed., The CISG and its Impact on National Legal Systems, 
supra note 218 at 189. 
969 Ibid. at 211. 
970 Ibid. at 219. 
971 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: Tribunale [District Court] Vigevano, 12 
July 2000 n. 405 (Rhein/and Versicherungen v. Atlarex), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000712i3.html>; Tribunale [District Court] Pavia, 29 December 1999 
(Tessile v. Ixela), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/991229i3.html>; Corte di Appello [Appellate Court] Milano, 11 
December 1998 (Bielloni Castello v. EGO) [Printer device case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/98121 li3.html>; and Tribunale [District Court] Monza, 14 January 1993 
n. R.G. 4267/88 (Nuova Fucinati v. Fondmetall International), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/930114i3.html>. 
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The first Italian case that considered Article 79 involved an Italian seller of 
ironchrome to a Swedish buyer, where the latter party attempted to avoid the contract on 
the basis of hardship (or eccessica on erositasopravvenuta) as.provided for in the Italian 
Civil Code. 972 The basis for the avoidance was that the price of the goods had increased 
after the conclusion of the contract, but before delivery, by 30 percent. The court found 
that the CISG was not applicable in this case since at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract the Convention was in force in Italy but not in Sweden. What is remarkable 
about this case is that the court, while recognizing the inapplicability of the CISG, 
nevertheless undertook an enlightened comparative analysis of Article 79. Although this 
is dicta, the court stated that even if the CISG was applicable, the seller could not have 
relied on hardship to excuse the seller's performance because the Convention did not 
contemplate this remedy in Article 79 (or elsewhere). A party cannot be excused as long 
as performance had not been made physically impossible. Consequently, a party cannot 
be excused in cases of severe price increases because performance is always physically 
possible. 
Article 79 provides for release from an obligation made impossible by a 
supervening impediment not attributable to a party according to a rule roughly similar to 
article 1463 et seq. of the Italian Civil Code, but it does not consider the remedy of 
avoidance for supervening excessive onerousness (or hardship), which might be the case 
under Italy's domestic law.973 Thus, a domestic court cannot integrate into the CISG 
972 Nuova Fucinati v. Fondmetall Jnternational, ibid. The provision dealing with "hardship" or excessive 
onerousness can be found in articles 1463 and 1467 of the Civil Code. 
973 In particular, Article 1467 of the Civil Code. 
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provisions of domestic law that recognize the right of avoidance of a contract in cases of 
excessive onerousness (or hardship). But considering that the CISG did not apply, the 
court noted that a defense of supervening excessive onerousness was available to the 
seller. Nevertheless, it denied the claim under the Civil Code. 
Supervening excessive onerousness or hardship may exempt a party from liability 
under the Italian Civil Code, but these principles have no place in Article 79.974 The 
threshold for such an exemption in the CISG is much higher. Indeed, the legislative 
history of demonstrates that Article 79 was crafted in a manner that deliberately avoided 
the use of the terms "economic hardship .. . imprevision, frustration of purpose, and the 
like".975 The UNCITRAL Working Group drafted Article 79 in a stricter manner than its 
predecessor conventions.976 In Vienna the new article was designed to deny relief to a 
party that had failed to perform simply because the performance had become 
unforeseeably more burdensome or unprofitable. At the conference the drafters rejected 
the Norwegian delegation proposal of supplementing paragraph (3) of Article 79 on the 
ground that it would allow commercial or economic hardship as a basis of claiming 
excuse for non-performance under the CISG.977 The drafters chose the word 
"impediment" after subjecting the Article to three stages of debates in order to define the 
extent of a party's liability for non-performance. In the end it was decided that the CISG 
974 Contra, CISG-AC Opinion No. 7, supra note 599 at s. 3.1 and para. 26.ff. Adopted by the CISG-
Advisory Council, 12 October 2007. This author takes the opposite view, and believes there is strong 
evidence in the records of the Diplomatic Conference (and elsewhere) to support the argument that 
"hardship" and changed circumstances were specifically excluded from CISG Article 79. 
975 Ibid. at para. 30. 
976 The Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF), supra note 800. 
977 CISG-AC Opinion No. 7, supra note 599 at para. 30. 
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would only exempt a party from liability for physical or legal impossibility rather than on 
the basis of legal principles of imprevision, hardship, or changed circumstances. 
Thus, the hardship of an increase in the price of goods is deemed·to~be an 
assumed business risk, and not an impediment outside a party's control, as are other 
business difficulties. In Bielloni Castello v. EGO, for example, construction delays that 
made it difficult for the buyer to take delivery of the goods was also beyond the scope of 
a successful Article 79 defense. In that case, a French buyer sought an exemption "due to 
circumstances beyond its control" because the printing equipment it purchased was to be 
placed in premises still to be built. The buyer alleged that the construction of the building 
had been substantially delayed, and this rendered it impossible to accept delivery of the 
goods. The trial level court erroneously applied Italian domestic law to the dispute and 
ruled in favour of the buyer. The Appellate Court found the CISG to be applicable rather 
than the Civil Code. In a passage that reflects an enlightened understanding of the CISG, 
the Court stated that it was "appropriate to stress that all references to the Italian internal 
law [ ... ] referring to this issue [ ... ] made by the [seller] do not appear appropriate. The 
provisions of the Convention should be deemed [ ... ] self-sufficient and in general cannot 
be integrated with other internal provisions, which would contradict the Convention's 
intended [objectives ofuniformity]".978 It reversed the decision of the trial court, and 
awarded damages to the seller pursuant to Article 74. 
The remaining two Italian cases that refer to Article 79 are primarily concerned 
with damages and the burden of proof. Article 79 issues are not central in these cases, 
978 Bielloni Castello v. EGO, supra note 971. 
282 
but the dicta is noteworthy. In Tessile v. Ixela, an Italian seller sued the Greek buyer for 
payment, as well as of interests and damages.979 In awarding payment to the seller, the 
Court noted that the CISG'was the·applicable law, but the rate of interest was not settled 
by the Convention. The Court also emphasized that, under Article 78, the entitlement to 
interest did not prejudice the right to claim damages, but it was the party claiming 
damages that had to prove them, according to the principle underlying Article 79. In this 
manner, Article 79 was used to inform the Court of other principles underlying the CISG, 
specifically those concerning the burden of proof. The Court was also informed by 
foreign case law on the CISG. It recognized the non-binding nature of these foreign 
decisions, but noted that they should be taken into account by courts when interpreting 
and applying the CISG. The Court made specific reference to Article 7(1), which 
expressly provides that "regard is to be had" to the "international character" of the 
Convention and "the need to promote uniformity in its application".980 Thus, although a 
case that is of minor significance for Article 79, the Court displayed a sophisticated and 
nuanced understanding of the CISG. 
Rhein/and Versicherungen v. Atlarex is a case that also concerned issues 
of damages and the burden of proof, and made reference to Article 79. 981 It is also a case 
that is remarkable in that it demonstrates the Court's, sophisticated international 
perspective, and its desire to promote uniformity in the application of the CISG. The 
opinion of the sole judge, Alessandro Rizzieri, was exemplary in its faithful attempt to 
979 Tessile v. Ixela, supra note 971. 
98° CISG Article 7(1). 
981 Rhein/and Versicherungen v. Atlarex, supra note 971. 
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apply the CISG in a manner befitting the spirit of an internationally uniform law. It also 
utilized the approach that has been exhorted by so many scholars and jurists. 982 In the 
process of making his -ruling, Rizzieri J. cited American, Austrian, Dutch~ ·French, 
German, Italian, and Swiss court cases contained in national reporters, ICC arbitral 
awards, as well as two CISG websites and UNILEX. 
The case involved an Italian seller that had delivered vulcanized rubber to a 
German buyer for the production of shoe soles. The soles produced by the buyer were 
sold to an Austrian manufacturer who produced a number of shoes, and exported them to 
Russia. After receiving complaints from its customer, the Austrian manufacturer 
complained to the German buyer, who then sued the seller alleging non-conforming 
goods. 
The court dealt with various highly debated issues, but the conformity of the 
goods under CISG Article 35 was of primary importance in this case. Rizzieri J. also 
referred to damages under Article 74, and noted that the party that alleged damages had 
to prove the damages it had suffered. This evidentiary issue also played a key role in this 
case. On that point, Rizzieri J. avoided any reference to domestic law and Italian jurists. 
He noted that "[a]ccording to better-reasoned and more numerous authorities [the CISG] 
governs the burden of proof issue although it does not directly deal with it".983 To 
support his view that the burden of proof issue was not excluded from the CISG, Rizzieri 
J. referred "to Article 79(1) of the Convention, which expressly refers to the burden of 
982 The approach referred to is one of "relative uniformity" in the application of the CISG across national 
borders. See s. Aii. The Importance of Uniformity, supra. 
983 Rhein/and Versicherungen v. Atlarex, supra note 971 at para. 23. 
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proof concerning exemption from damages for breach". 984 In this manner, Rizzieri J. 
utilized Article 79 to inform him of the principle that the "issue of the burden of proof 
cannot be deemed beyond the ambit of the Convention". 985 
This was the court's attempt to utilize the principles upon which the CISG is 
based, as mandated by Article 7(2). But Rizzieri J. went further. He recognized the 
international character of the CISG, and stated with respect to foreign case law that, even 
if it was not binding, he would hold that foreign case law should be taken into 
consideration in order to promote the uniform application of the CISG and the observance 
of good faith in international trade, as mandated by Article 7(1).986 This willingness to 
take foreign case law into consideration illustrated a deep and sophisticated 
understanding of international jurisprudence, which has been uncommon among the 
courts of many CISG signatory states. In this manner, the Italian courts have assisted in 
the promotion of the uniform application of the CISG by putting forth solutions that "are 
tenable on an international level". 987 
K. The Netherlands: A Favourable Reception of the CISG 
The CISG has been in force in The Netherlands since 1992. Since that time, the 
courts, legal community, and businesspersons of that country have favourably received 
984 Ibid. 
985 Ibid. 
986 Ibid. at para. 5. 
987 Francesco G. Mazzotta, "The International Character of the UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods: An Italian Case Example" June 2003, online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/mazzotta.html>. 
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the CISG.988 There are a number of reasons for this positive treatment of the CISG in 
The Netherlands. Historically, The Netherlands is a nation that has been involved in 
trade with other nations:- It-has, thus, become heavily dependent on the import and export 
of goods. With the rise of international trade comes the concomitant increase in legal 
disputes. In addition to this history of international trade, the Dutch have also become 
familiar with international sale of goods law. The Netherlands was a contracting state to 
the forerunners to the CISG, the ULF and the ULIS.989 These conventions were very 
similar in content to the CISG. This experience meant that with the introduction of the 
CISG, little adaption was needed with the new law on the international sale of goods. 
Finally, the content between the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), the ULF, the 
ULIS, and the CISG, is very similar. Indeed, these international sale of goods 
conventions have had a significant influence on the internal sales law of The 
Netherlands.990 In particular, they were highly influential during the creation of The 
Netherlands' new internal sale of goods law, which also came into force at the same time 
as the CISG.991 As Andre Janssen stated, the result is that "in contrast to many other 
jurisdictions in Contracting States which only apply the CISG with much hesitation, 
Dutch courts cannot be said to have a general 'fear' of the CISG". 992 
988 See e.g. Andre Janssen, "Application of the CISG in Dutch Courts" in Franco Ferrari, ed., Quo Vadis 
CJSG? (Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 2005) at 129-165. 
989 ULF and ULIS, supra note 800. 
990 Ibid. at 130. 
991 Ibid. 
992 Ibid. at 130-131. 
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Of the four reported Article 79 cases from The Netherlands,993 three of them 
concern agricultural products,994 and the fourth contains no useful information on that 
provision.9,95 -As Andre Janssen has noted, the Dutch courts have had little difficulty in 
applying the CISG in a manner that avoids the homeward trend. Although the number of 
cases is not large, the results are encouraging for the development of relative uniformity 
in the CISG across signatory states. While Article 79 has rarely been used by the Dutch, 
the treatment of that provision by the courts has been in relative harmony with letter and 
spirit of that provision. Perhaps this is partly due to the fact that CISG Article 79 and the 
domestic Dutch law of force majeure are very similar.996 
Article 79 was first discussed by the District Court (Rechtbank) in 's-
Hertogenbosch in Malaysia Dairy Industries Pte. Ltd. v. Dairex Holland B. V.997 The 
Dutch seller attempted to use an Article 79(1) defense by arguing that the strict 
Singaporean regulations on the radioactive content of powdered milk constituted an 
impediment beyond its control, and this exempted the seller from performance as it was 
not foreseeable. The District Court correctly rejected this defense. It held that the seller 
993 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: Agristo NV. v. Macces Agri B. V., 
Arrondissementsrechtbank [Rb] [District Court] Maastricht, 9 July 2008, online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080709nl.html>; 6. Vattenkvalite A.B. v. Sepeq B. V., 
Arrondissementsrechtbank [Rb] [District Court] Zwolle, 29 January 2003, online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030129nl.html>; Hispafruit B. V. v. Amuyen SA., 
Arrondissementsrechtbank [Rb] [District Court] Rotterdam, 12 July 2001, online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010712nl.html>; and Malaysia Dairy Industries v. Dairex 
Holland, Arrondissementsrechtbank [Rb] [District Court] 's-Hertogenbosch, 2 October 1998, online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981002nl .html>. 
994 Agristo N V. v. Macces Agri B. V., His pa fruit B. V. v. Amuyen SA., and Malaysia Dairy Industries v. 
Dairex Holland, ibid. 
995 6. Vattenkvalite A.B. v. Sepeq B. V., supra note 993. Due to this lack of information, the case is not 
considered in this discussion. 
996 Sonja A. Kruisinga, "The Impact of Uniform Law on National Law: Limits and Possibilities - CISG and 
Its Incidence in Dutch Law" EJCL 13 :2 (May 2009) 1 at 17, online: Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 
<http://www.ejcl.org>. 
997 Supra note 993. 
287 
was aware of the regulations before the conclusion of the contract and, therefore, it took 
the risk of not being able to supply conforming goods. As a general rule, the risk 
.. assumption may not include the risk of a subsequent change in a government regtilation, 
but in this case the regulation was in effect long before the conclusion of the contract. 
Thus, as the seller had knowingly accepted the procurement risk, it also had to accept the 
responsibility for supplying conforming goods. 
The case of Hispafruit B. V. v. Amunyen SA. was slightly more complex.998 In it 
the District Court of Rotterdam noted that "the trade relationship between the [buyer] and 
[seller needed to] be placed in an international context".999 The court decided to give the 
Argentinean seller of mandarins the opportunity to support its claim for an Article 79 
exemption. Normally sellers of agricultural products should be able to foresee that poor 
weather conditions might affect the production of crops. Contracts typically include 
allowances for such crop failure, but in this case, the seller was a dealer in citrus 
products, and not a grower, and there was no contractual limitation of the seller's 
procurement risk. As such, it was expected that the dealer should have been able to 
procure the goods from other sources, even though at a much higher cost. In order to be 
successful with an Article 79 defense, the court stated that the seller would have to prove 
that due to frost, at the time of delivery no mandarins of the quality agreed to with the 
Dutch buyer were available anywhere on the Argentinean market. The court remanded 
the case to give the seller an opportunity to produce evidence to this effect. While the 
final outcome of the case is unknown, the court appears to have taken the correct position 
998 Supra note 993. 
999 Ibid. at para. 4.3. 
by maintaining that the seller would need to prove that the frost was so unusual and 
devastating in its effect to have destroyed all available supplies of Argentinean 
· mandarins. It is doubtful that this was the case. · ···· · 
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A similar case was that of Agristo N V. v. Macces Agri B. V. 1000 A Dutch seller 
and a Belgian buyer entered into a contract for the sale and delivery of all the potatoes 
harvested by the seller in the year 2006. It was expected that the harvest would be 400 
tons of potatoes. Due to extreme weather conditions, the harvested potatoes were inferior 
both in quality and amount than expected. The seller was only able to make partial 
shipments. When the buyer requested delivery of the outstanding potatoes, the seller did 
not perform, and the buyer terminated the contract and sued the seller for damages. The 
seller responded by arguing that its failure to deliver part of the goods should be excused 
on force majeure grounds. 
As the court found the CISG to be applicable, it had to determine whether the 
seller's non-performance was excusable under Article 79. It held that the seller was 
obligated to deliver all the potatoes it had grown during the season, and this amount was 
to be the full 400 tons. It made the point that a diligent grower in similar circumstances 
was expected to consider all possibilities regarding weather conditions when entering into 
a forward contract for the sale of its entire harvest. But the court also noted that the seller 
was the grower of the potatoes, and not a trader in the market. In that respect, this case 
must be distinguished from Agristo N V. v. Macces Agri B. V., which involved an 
agricultural trader, rather than a grower of crops. Therefore, the court rejected the 
1000 Supra note 993. 
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buyer's argument that an impediment could not occur in this case, because potatoes were 
generic goods, and as such, the seller could have purchased them from elsewhere. In fact, 
the Court noted that the obligation to deliver was limited to the crop grown by·the seller. 
The court reasoned that the seller could be exempted under Article 79 only by 
demonstrating that its non-performance was due to such extreme weather conditions that 
made it impossible to grow at least 90 percent of its crops when compared to previous 
growing seasons. The court provided no information or analysis on how it arrived at the 
threshold test of "90 percent". However, this appears to be the correct outcome. As this 
was a contract for the sale of goods from a specific source, the parties contracted on the 
basis of the continued existence of the goods. The failure of the specified source to 
produce the quantity of goods was an impediment that excused the seller if the source 
failed without the fault of that party. In this respect, the case is not unlike the 1863 
English case of Taylor v. Caldwell were Blackbum J. enunciated the principle that if the 
parties contract on the basis of the continued existence of a "particular specified thing" or 
of a "particular [ ... ] chattel", the obligor is excused from performance by the "perishing 
of the thing". 1001 In a situation where the goods are specified from an exclusive source, 
performance is excused were the goods from that source have been destroyed. Even 
though the Court decided to ask for a detailed report from an independent appraiser on 
the extent of the extreme weather conditions and subsequent crop failure, its reasoning 
appears to be in harmony with most Article 79 case law from other jurisdictions. 
1001 Taylor, supra note 190. 
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L. Russian Arbitrations and CISG Article 79: The Cases Promoting Uniformity 
The USSR became a signatory state of the CISG in 1991, and since that year the 
Russian Federation has acquired all of the rights and obligations of the USSR's 
multilateral treaties. Russia is, therefore, a successor to the membership of the USSR in 
the CISG. In accordance with Article 15(4) of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, the CISG has become a constituent part of the legal system of Russia, and as 
an international convention, it enjoys priority over national (i.e. domestic) legislation. 1002 
This fact, however, does not mean that the CISG has been interpreted in Russia without 
inappropriate references to national laws and domestic legal concepts. While there is 
ample evidence to suggest that the homeward trend prevails in that jurisdiction, there are 
some cases that have contributed to relative uniformity in the interpretation of Article 79. 
Of the 25 Russian cases 1003 on Article 79 considered in this dissertation, two 
cases 1004 are lacking in detail so no conclusions can be drawn. In one other case, a one 
1002 Djakhongir Saidov, "Cases on CISG Decided in the Russian Federation" (2003) 7 Vindobona J. Int'l 
Com. L. & Arb. 1at1. 
1003 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: Tribunal oflnternational Commercial 
Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 13 May 2008, Award 13/2007, 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080513rl.html>; Tribunal of 
International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 15 
November 2006, Award 30/2006, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/061115r2.html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 21November2005, Award 42/2005 [Equipment 
case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051121rl.html>; 
Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
9 April 2004, Award 129/2003, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040409r I .html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 16 June 2003, Award 135/2002, online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030616rl.html>; Federal Arbitration Court for 
the Moscow Region [Appellate Court], 4 February 2002 (Rimpi Ltd v. Moscow Northern Customs 
Department), online: Pace Law School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020204rl.html>; 
Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
30 July 2001, Award 198/2000, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
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paragraph excerpt is all that is available, which makes an analysis of that case 
impossible. 1005 A relatively large number of CISG cases have been decided in Russia, 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/O 10730rl .html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 6 June 2000, Award 406/1998, online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3 .law.pace.edu/cases/000606rl .html>; Tribunal of International 
Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 24 November 1998, 
Award 96/1998, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<htto://cisgw3 .law.pace.edu/cases/981124rl .html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 6 October 1998, Award 269/1997, online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981006rl.html>; Tribunal of International 
Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 10 June 1998, Award 
83/1997, online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/98061 Or I .html>; 
High Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, 16 February 1998, [Information Letter No. 29] [Onions 
case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980216rl.html>; 
Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
12 January 1998, Award 152/1996, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980112rl.html>; High Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, 
1997, [Ruling No. 4, case 4], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970000r2.html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 11June1997, Award 255/1994, online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/97061 lrl.html>; Tribunal oflnternational 
Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 13 May 1997, Award 
3/1996, online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970513rl.html>; 
Tribunal oflnternational Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
11May1997, Award 2/1995, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970511 r I .html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 22 January 1997, Award 155/1996 [Butter case], 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970122rl.html>; Tribunal of 
International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 10 
February 1996, Award 328/1994, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/96021 Orl .html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 13 December 1995, Award 36411994, online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951213rl.html>; Tribunal of 
International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1 
December 1995, Award 369/1994, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/95120 lrl .html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 17 October 1995, Award 123/1992 [Automatic 
diffractameter equipment case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951017rl.html>; Tribunal oflnternational Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 15 May 1995, Award 321/1994, online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950515rl.html>; Tribunal of International 
Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 16 March 1995, Award 
155/1994 [Metallic sodium case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<htto://cisgw3 .law.pace.edu/cases/9 503 l 6r I .html>; and Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 17 November 1994, Award 493/1993, online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/941117rl .html>. 
1004 These two cases are: High Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, 1997, [Ruling No. 4, case 4]; 
and ICAC, 17 November 1994, Award 493/1993, ibid. 
1005 ICAC, 13 May 2008, Award 13/2007, supra note 1122. 
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and arbitral tribunals have heard the vast majority of those cases. Indeed, next to 
CIET AC, Russia has more Article 79 arbitrations than any other jurisdiction. This is for 
· three.reasons. First, access to state courts is usually unavailable to commercial parties 
and for this reason arbitration is the only method for resolving disputes in Russia, 
particularly where the dispute involves a foreign party. Secondly, international sales are 
the most common type of international economic transaction undertaken by Russian 
parties. 1006 Thirdly, the CISG is very popular in Russia, and it is rarely excluded by 
parties to an international sales transaction. 1007 
Most Russian cases on the CISG have been conducted under the auspices of the 
International Commercial Arbitration Court ("ICAC") at the Russian Federation Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry. The ICAC is one of the leading international arbitration 
institutions in Eastern Europe. 1008 It has been functioning since 1932. The legal 
background for ICAC is found mainly in the Russian Federation law "On International 
Commercial Arbitration" that was adopted in 1993 and is based on the UNCITRAL 
Model Law. 1009 Domestic arbitration is subject to special regulations that do not apply to 
international arbitration proceedings. 
L.i. Article 79(1): The High Standard for Impediments 
In many cases, the Russian arbitral tribunals have recognized that impediments 
within the meaning of Article 79 had not taken place. As with most decisions on the 
1006 Ibid. at 2. 
1001 Ibid. 
1008 See the ICAC website (available in English), online: <http://www.toprf-mkac.ru/en/>. 
1009 Ibid., online: <htto://www.toprf-mkac.ru/en/-whatis-/lawstatus>. 
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impediment requirement, this suggests that the standard for an exemption under Article 
79 is set relatively high. In this respect, some Russian jurisprudence on Article 79 is 
generally in harmony with the rulings in other jurisdictions. As we have seen, this· 
approach favours a strict construction analysis that holds parties liable for their 
obligations unless performance is prevented by unforeseen supervening events beyond 
their control. Incidents of a personal nature, such as procurement risk, foreign currency 
freezes, or import or export bans, do not fall within this scope. As such, few conditions 
will serve to excuse a party for non-performance. 
As with many decisions from other jurisdictions, the Russian cases do not 
elaborate on a definition of "impediment", but focus on the facts that do not constitute an 
impediment. In other words, the Russian tribunals were more likely to determine what 
was not an impediment under Article 79(1), rather than explaining what might constitute 
an impediment. Thus, in Award 155/1994, the seller claimed that it could not deliver the 
remaining goods due to impediments beyond his control, "i.e., his supplier's emergency 
stopping of metallic sodium production". 1010 In addition, the seller argued "that it was 
impossible to make delivery due to circumstances beyond his control, i.e., cancellation of 
his export license". 1011 Quoting Article 79 in its entirety, the tribunal found that these 
impediments were not sufficient to excuse the seller from its contractual obligations. 
Although it was not explicit on this point, the ruling correctly suggests that these are 
ordinary business risks that ought to have been taken into account when engaging in 
international commercial activity. 
1010 Metallic sodium case, supra note 1122. 
1011 Ibid. 
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In a number of cases, the parties referred to a failure of third parties to perform the 
obligations under the contract, as a ground for exemption. Typically, the production 
-- problems of a third ·party supplier will not release the seller from its responsibility to 
deliver the goods, unless that specific supplier is named as the exclusive source in the 
contract. Thus, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, no impediment will exist 
if the seller contracts a third party to perform its contractual duties. Thus, in Award 
129/2003, that the seller's non-delivery of goods was caused by production difficulties of 
the producer of the goods was not deemed to be an impediment beyond its control. 1012 
This was a fact that the seller ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract. Similarly, financial problems resulting from the inability of the buyer's 
customers to make payments due to a severe drought was not deemed to be an 
impediment excusing the buyer from responsibility. 1013 Nor was a rise in taxes (customs 
duties), resulting from the seller's failure to export goods at a price lower than sold in the 
domestic market, deemed to be aforce majeure impediment beyond that party's 
control. 1014 
In another case the tribunal was correct to point out to the respondent buyer that it 
could not invoke Article 79 when it did not submit any evidence to demonstrate that its 
1012 ICAC, 9 April 2004, Award 129/2003, supra note 1122. The tribunal held the CISG to be applicable, 
but did not refer to Article 79 (or domestic law) when making this determination. 
1013 ICAC, 15 November 2006, Award 30/2006, supra note 1122. As in Award 129/2003, ibid., the tribunal 
held the CISG to be applicable, but did not refer to Article 79 (or domestic law) in this ruling. 
1014 ICAC, 6 June 2000, Award 406/1998, supra note 1122. As in Award 30/2006, ibid., and Award 
129/2003, supra note 1012, the tribunal held the CISG to be applicable, but did not refer to Article 79 (or 
domestic law) in this ruling. The tribunal also stated that the seller failed to provide it with sufficient 
evidence to establishforce majeure. 
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delay in payment was due to "reasons beyond his responsibility". 1015 That the seller's 
extension of the products' expiry dates was prohibited by law, or that a great number of 
the products were defective and could not be resold, were·not impediments to·pay the 
seller. The tribunal correctly decided that this was an ordinary risk that ought to have 
been taken into account when conducting commercial activity. In a similar case, the 
party that invoked Article 79 in its defense provided no evidence to substantiate its 
argument. 1016 In Award 2/1995, the buyer had paid for the goods, but the seller had not 
shipped them because it claimed that the shipping arrangement was the responsibility of 
the buyer. 1017 It provided no other evidence for its failure to perform the contract. As 
such, the tribunal held that in the absence of such explanations or evidence, the seller 
failed to prove that its non-performance of the contract was due to circumstances beyond 
its control. The party invoking an Article 79 exemption always bears the burden of 
proving that all the requirements of the excuse have been met. ) 
L.ii. Particular Impediments: Non-conforming Goods 
Non-conforming goods has often been invoked with an Article 79 defense, but 
there are only two Russian cases that are relevant in this regard. In Award 155/1996 it 
was the claimant buyer that successfully used aforce majeure argument to recover its 
deposit. 1018 Article 79 was not mentioned, even though the tribunal found the CISG to 
applicable. The buyer argued that it did not become the owner of a shipment of table 
1015 ICAC, 1 December 1995, Award 369/1994, supra note 1122. 
1016 ICAC, 11 May 1997, Award 2/1995, supra note 1122. 
1017 Ibid. The seller also claimed that the certificate to transfer the goods was not signed for the same 
reason. 
1018 ICAC, 22 January 1997, Award 155/1996, supra note 1122. 
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butter because the customs department was prohibited from releasing the goods due to a 
high content of lead salts. This argument was substantiated by the contract that required 
·the seller to ship the butter, and be responsible for it, until it reached its final'destination · 
in St. Petersburg. 1019 The tribunal agreed with the buyer. It held that "due to 
circumstances beyond his control", the buyer was not able to take delivery of the goods 
because the Russian state Customs Department would not release the butter as it was 
unsafe for human consumption. 1020 
The contract between the parties specified a particular INCOTERM that identified 
the seller as the party with the duty to obtain the necessary authorization for import 
clearance. On this basis, the tribunal ruled in favour of the claimant buyer. The 
reasoning of the tribunal in this regard appears to be correct, but only because of a 
specific contractual term worked to the advantage of the buyer. Normally, an 
"impediment" does not include a lack of a customs authorization, or any governmental 
approval necessary for the performance of the contract in the country of the party seeking 
relief, unless it is otherwise noted in the contract. In this case, the reasoning of the 
tribunal suggested that the INCOTERM could be read to imply that the customs 
authorization was a contractual term. Failure to obtain this authorization would relieve 
the aggrieved party from its obligations. Because of the high lead content and other 
product defects, the buyer was not willing to accept the goods, and sought a return of its 
1019 INCOTERM CIP or "Carriage and Insurance Paid to" requires the seller to arrange for the goods to be 
delivered to the named port of destination, or a final destination point. The seller's risks do not end until 
the carrier reaches the agreed destination. 
1020 ICAC, 22 January 1997, Award 155/1996, supra note 1122. 
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deposit. That the seller was obliged to obtain import clearance under the CIP 1021 shipping 
term was also uncommon. Typically, courts and tribunals have held that in cases 
· involving the export/import of goods, it is the duty of the buyer to obtain any license or · 
import approval from the state authorities. 1022 Fortunately for the buyer in this case, that 
obligation fell on the seller. 
In the other case involving non-conforming goods, a Russian seller brought an 
action against a Swiss buyer for its failure to pay for the goods. 1023 The CISG was 
deemed applicable, but reference was made to force majeure rather than Article 79. The 
buyer refused to pay for the goods because of their deterioration and poor quality. The 
seller claimed that the defect in the goods was the result of wetness, but because the 
contract stipulated an INCOTERM "FOB Black Sea port", the wetness occurred after title 
to the goods had transferred to the buyer. 1024 The seller had delivered the goods to the 
port on time, but the buyer had difficulty in chartering a ship because of an accident in 
the Bosporus Strait. The temporary closing of the channel for navigation was the force 
majeure event that the buyer relied on in its attempt to excuse it from performance of the 
contract. Although this delay caused the goods at the port to be exposed to the elements, 
causing some of the goods to absorb unacceptable levels of moisture, the tribunal found 
that the buyer had failed to prove a causal connection between the accident in the 
Bosporus Strait and its failure to pay for the goods. In other words, the buyer failed to 
prove force majeure. The same result would likely have occurred under Article 79. As 
1021 See supra note 1019. 
1022 Brunner, supra note 47 at 128-129. 
1023 ICAC, 10 February 1996, Award 328/1994, supra note 1122. 
1024 Ibid. 
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the buyer had title to the goods under the FOB shipping term, there was nothing to 
prevent it from paying the seller. That there was a delay in chartering a vessel due to the 
accident in the channel was a risk to be borne by the buyer. 1025 
L.iii. Particular Impediments: Foreign Currency Controls 
Many of the Russian cases concern difficulties that parties had in securing the 
requisite foreign currency to pay for the goods. Much of this difficulty is related to the 
economic ills that have plagued Russia in the last two decades. Rigid foreign exchange 
controls and bank failures provide the background to a number of cases involving Article 
79 and the inability of buyers to make payment to the sellers. Five cases are factually 
similar in that they all involve non-payment due to some form of foreign currency 
control, frozen bank funds, or lack of a foreign currency license. 1026 All these cases have 
the same outcome: the buyer of goods must ensure that it has a sufficient amount of the 
foreign currency to pay for the goods. The seller is typically indifferent to the source of 
the payment; that source is normally only a concern of the buyer. Its failure to obtain the 
funds from that source means that the buyer will need to get the money from another 
source. The fact that a buyer does not have the hard currency, a foreign currency license, 
or "frozen" funds will not excuse it from liability for non-performance. The payment of 
money is never impossible. 1027 Readiness to pay is a business risk that the recipient of 
1025 The tribunal did find the seller partly liable for the deterioration of the goods. It found that under CISG 
Article 85, the seller should have taken additional steps to preserve the goods from getting wet. 
1026 These cases are: ICAC, 15 May 1995, Award 321/1994; ICAC, 17 October 1995, Award 123/199; 
ICAC, 13 December 1995, Award 364/1994; ICAC, 24 November 1998, Award 96/1998; and ICAC, 30 
July 2000, Award 198/2000, supra note 1122. 
1027 See Treitel, supra note 143 at 186, 196. 
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the goods assumes. Even where post-contract payment in a foreign currency becomes 
prohibited by a government act, the seller may ask for payment in the buyer's local 
currency. 1028 Thus, the necessity to pay is always foreseeable. 
The risk that a bank may go bankrupt, and that payment may not be able to be 
made, or received, is also thought to be a general business risk that is outside the scope of 
Article 79. As two ICAC cases demonstrate, this applies equally to buyers as it does to 
sellers. In Award 269/1997, the buyer argued that it should be excused from its liability 
to pay for the goods on the basis of Article 79 due to an obstacle beyond its control: its 
bank, where the buyer's money was deposited, had gone bankrupt. 1029 In harmony with 
other jurists on this point, the tribunal noted that under Article 79, a bank's bankruptcy is 
not grounds to release a party from its liability to pay. The same reasoning applies where 
the seller's bank goes bankrupt. Thus, in Award 152/1996, the buyer claimed against the 
seller as it failed to ship the goods under the contract. 1030 As instructed, the buyer had 
wired the money to the seller's bank, but when it received the funds the bank was 
adjudged bankrupt and the funds were frozen. Without referring to Article 79, the 
tribunal denied the seller's argument that the bank's bankruptcy amounted to force 
majeure. In its view, the seller was still obliged to perform the contract. Another 
Russian arbitration panel has similarly ruled that even where money has been stolen from 
a bank account, according to Article 79, the failure of the buyer to pay is not an 
impediment beyond its control. 1031 That is the correct outcome. 
1028 Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 170-171. 
1029 ICAC, 6 October 1998, Award 269/1997, supra note 1122. 
1030 ICAC, 12 January 1998, Award 152/1996, supra note 1122. 
1031 High Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, 16 February 1998, Onions case, supra note 1122. 
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These Russian cases support a relatively uniform interpretation of Article 79. 
Unfortunately, there are many other Russian cases that do the opposite, and support a 
·divergent interpretation of that provision. Those cases with a propensity towards·· the · 
homeward trend are discussed in the following chapter. 
M Slovak Republic: Right Outcome; Wrong Reference 
The two cases from the Slovak Republic that reference Article 79 are primarily 
concerned with the issue of non-conforming goods. 1032 Both of these cases, even though 
they are unrelated, are strikingly similar in terms of their facts and the legal analysis. 
This is likely due to the fact that the same court administered the cases 1033 and the same 
judge delivered the judgments. 1034 The issue in each case was whether the notice of non-
conformity had been given within a reasonable time as per CISG Article 39. 1035 In the 
Frozen peas case, the buyer refused to pay for part of the purchase price as it claimed that 
a portion of the goods were defective. The seller sued and argued that the buyer had 
failed to provide evidence of both the defects and a reasonable notice of the lack of 
1032 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: District Court in Komamo, 12 March 
2009, 5 Cb/254/2008 [Frozen peas case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090312kl .html>; and District Court in Komamo, 24 February 2009, 5 
Cb/114/2006 [Potatoes case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090224kl .html>. 
1033 The District Court ofKomamo. 
1034 Mgr. Peter Mezoszallasi. 
1035 CISG Article 39 states: 
( 1) The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does 
not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a 
reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to have discovered it. 
(2) In any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods 
if he does not give the seller notice thereof at the latest within a period of two years 
from the date on which the goods were actually handed over to the buyer, unless this 
time-limit is inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee. 
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conformity. 1036 The court ruled that the buyer had not provided evidence of having 
notified the seller of a lack of conformity as required by Article 39. In doing so, 
however; the court made· a minor erroneous reference to Article 79(4). 1037 Although it: 
was a small error, the court noted that "[i]f the notice is not received by the other party 
within a reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew or ought to have 
known of the impediment, he is liable for damages". 1038 The invocation of Article 79(4) 
was incorrect. There was no impediment that prevented performance, and as such, the 
court should not have referenced Article 79(4). 
Similarly, in the Potatoes case, the buyer noticed that some of the goods were 
defective. It stated that it had notified the seller of the lack of conformity immediately 
after delivery. According to the buyer, the seller had accepted this notice and had 
promised to make a delivery of equivalent conforming goods. That promise had never 
been performed. At trial, the seller claimed that the buyer had failed to provide evidence 
of both the defects and the notice of the lack of conformity. The court agreed. It ruled 
that the buyer had not given adequate evidence of the non- conformity as required by 
Article 39. However, as in the Frozen peas case, 1039 and using almost identical language 
as found in that case, the court again mistakenly referenced Article 79(4) and noted that 
"ifthere is an impediment to performance the party who fails to perform must give notice 
1036 Frozen peas case, supra note 1032. 
1037 Article 79(4) states: "The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the 
impediment and its effect on his ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the other party within a 
reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew or ought to have known of the impediment, he is 
liable for damages resulting from such nonreceipt". 
1038 Frozen peas case, supra note 1032. 
1039 Ibid. 
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to the other party of the impediment". 1040 This was a redundant reference to Article 
79(4). As in the Frozen peas case, there was no impediment to performance, so a notice 
- of an-impediment·was·superfluous. The notice required concerned non-conforming 
goods, not an "impediment". While these are minor errors, they are bound to cause some 
confusion in Article 79 jurisprudence. Although the CISG incorporates the principle that 
matters governed by the "Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled 
in conformity with the general principles on which it is based" jurists must recognize that 
certain articles within the CISG are separate and distinct entities. A notice requirement 
for an "impediment" under Article 79 is a very different matter than a notice of non-
conforming goods under Article 39. To comingle the notice requirements under these 
two separate Articles will only add to confusion and the divergence of relative uniformity 
of Article 79 case law. 
M Switzerland: Paying Heed to the International Character of the CISG 
As with its neighbor Germany, the theory of excuse for contractual non-
performance has a long history in Switzerland. And like many civil jurisdictions in 
continental Europe, there is the recognition of hardship and changed circumstances in its 
contract law. This reflects its civil law tradition. As noted above, under the influence of 
Roman law, many European states came to recognize the principle of initial 
impossibility, impossibilium non est obligato. 1041 In continental Europe, legal scholars 
further developed this principle, and contracts were to be considered concluded under the 
1040 Potatoes case, supra note 1032. 
1041 Cohn, supra note 765 at 15. 
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implied condition that there would be no fundamental change in the circumstances. 1042 
Thus, in the case of changed circumstances or hardship the consequences could lead to an 
·adaptation or modification of the contractual terms.· Known as the doctrine of an implied · 
clausula rebus sic stantibus, this principle was codified in certain jurisdictions, including 
Switzerland. 1043 It was embodied in Article 119(1) of the Swiss Federal Code of 
Obligations relating to contracts and tort, 1044 which was adopted in 1911, but its roots go 
back to 1883. 1045 Its creation preceded that of the German Civil Code, the BGB. 1046 
Fortunately, none of the Swiss cases on Article 79 make reference to its Code of 
Obligations or to hardship or changed circumstances. Indeed, most of the Swiss case law 
makes an effort to acknowledge that where the CISG applies, it supersedes domestic law 
that might otherwise apply clausula rebus sic stantibus. 
There are nine cases from Switzerland that have considered Article 79. 1047 Many 
of these cases present issues that typically arise under Article 79: claims of an 
1042 Ibid. at 19. 
1043 Ibid. at 19-20. 
1044 Alexander von Ziegler & Lars Gerspacher, "Switzerland" in Global Legal Group, ed., The International 
Comparative Legal Guide to: Commodities and Trade Law 2006 (London: Global Legal Group Ltd., 2006) 
at 177. 
1045 Eugene Bucher, "Law of Contracts" in F. Dessemontet & T. Ansay, eds., Introduction to Swiss Law, 3d 
ed. (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2004) at 103. 
1046 Ibid. 
1047 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme 
Court], 5 April 2005, 4C.474/2004 [Chemical products case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050405sl.html>; Amtsgericht [County Court] Willisau, 12 March 2004, 
10 01 5 [Wood case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040312sl.html>; Appelationshof [Appellate Court] Bern, 11 February 
2004, 304/II/2003/wuda/scch [Wire and cable case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/04021 lsl.html>; Tribunale d'appello [Appellate Court] Lugano, 
Cantone del Ticino, 29 October 2003, 12.2002.181 [Modular wall partitions case], online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031029sl .html>; Handelsgericht [HG] 
[Commercial Court] St. Gallen, 3 December 2002, HG.1999.82-HGK [Sizing machine case], online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021203sl.html>; Bundesgericht [BGer] 
[Federal Supreme Court], 15 September 2000, 4C.105/2000, (FCF SA. v. Adriafil Commerciale Sr.I.), 
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impediment in conjunction with non-conforming goods supplied by the seller1048 and a 
third-party, 1049 late delivery, 1050 non-payment, 1051 and bankruptcy. 1052 Two of these cases 
· · cite Article· 79, but-do not contain any facts or legal analysis that might be significant to 
that provision. 1053 Two additional cases are listed separately but are companion cases 
that were considered together by the Supreme Court of Switzerland (Bundesgericht). 1054 
These two cases involved a series of sales of Egyptian cotton by an Italian seller to a 
Swiss buyer. The seller experienced a delay in one of the shipments, and when asked by 
the buyer to perform, it failed to respond. The buyer then purchased substitute goods 
from other suppliers at a higher price, and sued the seller for the price difference. 
The trial court ruled in favour of the buyer and the seller appealed. The appellate 
court rejected the seller's argument for an exemption of liability for non-performance 
under Article 79, and the seller then appealed to the Supreme Court. It argued that the 
appeal court had denied it justice by remaining silent with regard to the seller's pleadings 
in connection with the existence of an impossibility to performance. The basis for 
arguing its case under Article 79 was "the existence of an impossibility of performance 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000915s2.html>; 
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court], 15 September 2000, 4P.75/2000 [Egyptian cotton case], 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000915sl.html>; 
Handelsgericht [HG] [Commercial Court] Zurich, 10 February 1999, HG 970238.1 [Art books case], 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990210sl.html>; and 
Handelsgericht [HG] [Commercial Court] Zurich, 26 April 1995, HG 920670 [Saltwater isolation tank 
case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950426sl.html>. 
1048 Wire and cable case, ibid. 
1049 Modular wall partitions case, supra note 1047. 
1050 Art books case, supra note 1047. 
1051 Wood case, supra note 1047. 
1052 Sizing machine case, supra note 1047. 
1053 The two cases are the Saltwater isolation tank case and the Chemical products case, supra note 1047. 
As they are of little relevance to Article 79 jurisprudence, they will not be discussed in this dissertation. 
1054 The two cases considered together by the Bundesgericht are the Egyptian cotton case and FCF S.A. v. 
Adriafil Commerciale S.r.l., supra note 1047. 
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beyond [the seller's] control". 1055 The details of exactly what constituted this 
impossibility appear to have been restrictions imposed by the Egyptian authorities on the 
·export of cotton. However, the seller supplied insufficient proof of the alleged ...... ·. 
impossibility. The Supreme Court, thus, ruled that even though the appeal court did not 
examine the seller's claim under Article 79, it did not violate the seller's legal rights. As 
with the appeal court, it excluded the application of Article 79 because there was no 
existence of an impediment beyond the seller's sphere of control that prevented it from 
performing the contract. Interestingly, the court noted that the burden of proof was not a 
matter expressly settled by the CISG, but it excluded recourse to domestic law and 
referred instead to the international principle of actori incumbit probatio.1056 In this 
manner, the Supreme Court appeared to pay heed to the international character of the 
CISG, even though its analysis on the burden of proof was slightly incorrect. 1057 
1055 Egyptian cotton case, supra note 1047 at para. C.5. 
1056 This principle literally means "acts of a court". With respect to the allocation of the burden of proof in 
international procedure, in that the party who asserts a fact, whether claimant or respondent, is responsible 
for providing proof thereof. 
1057 Other CISG scholars have differed on this point. Larry A. DiMatteo et al. took issue with the 
Bundesgericht in this case on the issue of contract avoidance under CISG Article 49(1). The relevant 
passage from DiMatteo et al. states: 
In this case, a Swiss court used language that to the common law lawyer appears to 
reflect a homeward trend in its mode of interpretation. The court was faced with 
contract for cotton to be delivered between certain dates, with payment to be made by 
letter of credit due 60 days after the date of customs clearance. The buyer and seller 
contracted for a series of cotton deliveries that, to condense the facts, did not 
materialize according to the times specified in the contract. The buyer sued for the 
costs of cover, and the seller complained that the buyer had unilaterally cancelled the 
contracts with no justification. One of the issues for the court was the significance of 
avoidance under Article 49(1). Citing commentary on the CISG, the court 
characterized avoidance under the CISG in this manner: 'It is not an avoidance in the 
juridical way of the words with effects ex tune, but a resiliation which releases both 
parties from their contractual obligations yet to be executed and which executes itself 
ex nunc '. The court in explaining its decision in a manner sensible to Swiss lawyers is 
doing so at the expense of hindering the development of uniform concepts. 
Larry A. DiMatteo et al., supra note 8 at 135, note 29. 
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To state it more accurately, the allocation of the burden of proof is, with the 
exception of Article 79, implicitly governed by the CISG. The wording of Article 79(1) 
makes it dear that the non-performing party claiming an impediment is under an 
obligation to prove that the requirements for the excuse are met. Furthermore, the burden 
of proof is also recognized under Article 79(2). There a party that utilizes a third-party in 
the performance of its obligation, but where an impediment has caused the third-party to 
not perform, the party seeking to be excused under the primary contract must prove 
cumulatively that it would be exempt because of the impediment and the third-party 
would also be exempt if it would have been a party to the contract. Article 79(4) adds to 
the burden of proof by establishing a notice duty for any type of impediment, hence, the 
party that seeks an exemption must also prove that it has satisfied this prerequisite by 
giving notice to the other party. 
While the Supreme Court in the Egyptian cotton case1058 took the position that the 
burden of proof was not a matter expressly settled by the CISG, in the Wire and cable 
case the legal analysis of the Appellate Court (Appellationshof) on this point was much 
more accurate. 1059 The Appellationshof was clear in its analysis of the burden of proof, in 
that it was a matter "governed by the CISG only impliedly-with Art. 79(1) as an 
exception". 1060 This case was primarily concerned with a shipment of allegedly non-
conforming goods, where the burden of proof regarding the examination and notice 
(under Articles 38 and 39) became a pivotal issue. The difficulty for the Appellationshof 
1058 Egyptian cotton case, supra note 1047. 
1059 Wire and cable case, supra note 1047. 
1060 Ibid. 
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was to ascertain which party bore the burden of proof, and therefore, who should bear the 
consequences for a possible lack of evidence. As such, Article 79 played only a minor, 
interpretive role. 
In undertaking its legal analysis, the Appellationshofwas careful not to resort to 
domestic law to uncover the procedural rules that might govern the issue had the case 
been between local parties. Instead, it respected the international character of the 
Convention by seeking to fill these legal gaps with general principles that were based on 
the CISG, as directed by Article 7(1) and (2). Referring to leading CISG commentators, 
such as Peter Schlechtriem and Franco Ferrari, as well as the dissertation of Michael 
Henninger, the Appellationshof ruled that a gap in terms of Article 7(1) CISG existed, 
"but it was to be resolved primarily in accordance with the general principles underlying 
the Convention, and only secondarily-in the absence of such principles-according to 
the domestic law which is applicable under the rules of private international law". 1061 By 
utilizing this sophisticated legal analysis, the Appellationshof was able to conclude that 
the CISG embraced the general rule (and Article 79 the explicit rule) that each party bore 
the burden to prove the factual aspects which were favorable to it, or which it attempted 
to claim as a prerequisite for a favorable legal provision. With this judgment, the 
Appellationshof also contributed to a growing body of relatively uniform case law on the 
CISG. 
1061 Ibid. 
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Two of the Swiss cases concern claimed impediments based on the non-
performance of third parties. 1062 This type of excuse appears in Article 79 case law with 
some frequency, but it is rarely used with success. As a general principle, the obligor 
must assume the risks related to the assignment to third parties of tasks associated with 
the performance of its obligations under the contract. As the obligor benefits from the 
advantages of using third parties, the obligor cannot be excused if that party fails to 
perform. Thus, in the Modular wall partitions case the court observed that the seller 
would be liable for non-performance if that were due to the failure of a third party who 
had been engaged to perform the whole or part of the contract, unless both the seller and 
the third party were exempted under Article 79(1 ). 1063 As the court correctly noted, 
"Article 79(2) has as its scope maintaining the responsibility of the seller if he relies on 
third parties for the total or partial execution of the contract". 1064 Fortunately for the 
seller in that case, the buyer failed to prove that the seller had actually contracted the third 
parties who had defectively installed the wall partitions. Since the burden of proof was 
placed on the buyer to prove that the installation had been the responsibility of the seller, 
and the buyer failed to bring sufficient evidence on that issue, the seller was not held 
liable for the non-conformity in the installation of the wall panels. 
The Art books case had similar issues regarding the burden of proof as well as the 
use of third parties in the performance of the seller's contractual obligations. 1065 A Swiss 
buyer commissioned an Italian seller to print, bind, and supply it with art books. When 
1062 Modular wall partitions case and the Art books case, supra note 1047. 
1063 Modular wall partitions case, ibid. 
1064 Ibid. at para. 2.1. 
1065 Art books case, supra note 104 7. 
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the buyer failed to pay the outstanding purchase price, claiming late delivery and non-
conformity of one shipment of the goods, the seller sued and the buyer counterclaimed. 
At the outset, the court held that based on the underlying principles· of the CISG, a par-ty 
asserting a claim was responsible for bearing the burden of proof. The issue under 
Article 79 was whether the seller was excused for late delivery because of the fault of the 
freight forwarding company that it had used to ship the books to the buyer. According to 
the seller, the freight forwarding company could be regarded as the seller's vicarious 
agent, which would make the seller liable for third parties engaged by it under Article 
79(2). The court did not need to answer this question directly under Article 79, as it held 
that under an Ex Works1066 contract the seller was only obliged to arrange for the 
transport of the books, and that it had performed its obligation when it handed over the 
goods to the carrier on time. The court correctly referred to Article 31 1067 when it, thus, 
ruled that the seller could not, under Article 79(2), be held liable for the conduct of the 
carrier, whom it had engaged to perform part of the contract. The court concluded that 
the seller performed its obligations in time by dispatching the goods in time. That the 
buyer received the books late was an issue between it and the carrier. 
1066 
"EXW" - Ex Works (named place of delivery). This INCOTERM requires the seller to make the goods 
available at its premises. Ex Works places the maximum obligation on the buyer and minimum obligations 
on the seller. The buyer pays all transportation costs and also bears the risks for bringing the goods to their 
final destination. 
1067 Article 31 states: "If the seller is not bound to deliver the goods at any other particular place, his 
obligation to deliver consists: 
(a) if the contract of sale involves carriage of the goods-in handing the goods over to the first carrier 
for transmission to the buyer." 
Arguably, CISG Article 30 also applies, as it states: "The seller must deliver the goods, hand over any 
documents relating to them and transfer the property in the goods, as required by the contract and this 
Convention". 
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In many cases courts that have failed to find an exemption under Article 79 have 
used language to suggest that there was not an impediment within the meaning of Article 
79(1). This was the situation in the Sizing machine case, which-involved a Swiss seller 
and an Israeli buyer. 1068 After concluding the contract for a machine and placing a 
deposit on the order, the buyer encountered financial difficulties and its creditors 
commenced bankruptcy proceedings over the buyer's assets. The buyer sought to recover 
its deposit and the seller counterclaimed for damages. The court correctly observed that 
the buyer could not rely on Article 79 to excuse it from its contractual obligations. In the 
words of the court, "mere lack of financial wherewithal and capital is generally irrelevant 
[under Article 79]". 1069 The court found this fact to be even more applicable where it was 
not an impediment beyond the buyer's control that prevented it from paying, but rather 
"the lack of financial ability[ ... ] based on mismanagement". 1070 Article 79 case law is 
relatively consistent on this point: financial matters are a normal business risk and as such 
are always deemed to be within a party's sphere of control. 
Of the nine Article 79 cases from Switzerland, only one utilized that provision 
successfully in its defense. The important issue relating to an Article 79 impediment for 
the court in the Wood case was to determine whether an impediment existed in light of an 
uncommon set of facts. 1071 In this respect, the case is quite novel. The plaintiff seller's 
assignee sought from the buyer the outstanding payment due, plus interest, from a 
previous shipment of wood. However, a legal representative from the original seller had 
1068 Sizing machine case, supra note 1047. 
1069 Ibid. at para. IV.2. 
1010 Ibid. 
1071 Wood case, supra note 1047. 
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notified the buyer that a German court had issued a temporary prohibition order that 
prohibited payment to the seller. Due to this unclear legal situation, the buyer refrained 
from making the payment.·,Shortly after, the seller's assignee sought to have the buyer· · 
pay the outstanding amount, with interest, but it provided no proof of the assignment. 
Due to these circumstances, the buyer was not sure which party it should pay without 
incurring the risk of double payment. 
In its defense the buyer invoked Article 79 and claimed that the delay in payment 
was an impediment beyond its control. The court acknowledged that under Article 79 a 
strict standard must be adopted. That an impediment might include the absence of 
information necessary to effect payment would be a novel use of that provision. Making 
payment is never impossible, and in this respect the court appears to have adopted not a 
strict standard, but rather one that was very elastic. It found that the buyer was initially 
not allowed to pay the seller due to the court-imposed freezing of payment. Thereafter, 
the dispute between the seller and the seller's assignee as to who was entitled to the 
payment confused the buyer, so it simply withheld payment. To make matters worse, the 
seller's assignee did nothing for almost a year to prove that it was entitled to the payment. 
It only asserted the assignment. On this basis the court concluded that the buyer was not 
liable for the non-performance of its obligation as it could rely on the impediment 
provision under Article 79(1 ). As such the seller's assignee claim for compensation, 
which consisted mostly of interest on the outstanding balance and legal costs, was 
rejected. 
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Perhaps the novelty of the facts in this case played a large part in its outcome. 
The plaintiff/seller's assignee did little to clarify its legal entitlement to the payment from 
the buyec It simply asserted its claim to the buyer in the context of an unclear legaJ: .· 
environment. In the face of this uncertainty, the buyer could have paid one of the parties, 
or paid both the seller and the seller's assignee and then seek reimbursement from the 
incorrectly paid party. That was not an impossibility. Rather than risk paying the 
incorrect party or risk a double payment, the buyer chose to wait for a clarification. In a 
strict reading of Article 79(1), there was no impediment beyond the control of the buyer. 
It could pay. The only "impediment" was the absence of information, and an uncertain 
legal environment. Indeed, even the legal barrier to payment-the court freezing of 
payments to the seller-had been lifted. From this perspective, the decision of the court 
appears to be a departure from the strict impediment standard imposed under Article 
79(1 ). Instead, it is a generous reading of that article in light of the unique circumstances 
of this case. 
N Conclusion 
The majority of the cases noted above, particularly from civil law jurisdictions, 
support the view that Article 79 of the CISG may be regarded as an expression of an 
autonomous international legal principle. This has resulted from a growing body of 
Article 79 case law that has interpreted that provision in a relatively uniform manner. 
These interpretations have led to considerable convergence regarding the breadth and 
scope of Article 79 internationally. Credit for this development must be given to civil 
law jurisdictions, as they have led in the development of converging Article 79 case law. 
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The case law further supports the notion that Article 79 is an autonomous international 
norm, and is capable of creating relative uniformity within the context of the CISG's goal 
for a··sales law that is transnational in design. While excuses ·for non-performance 1in 
Article 79 may have developed out of variants of similar national conceptions-and 
while some courts and tribunals may still erroneously refer to domestic legal 
terminology-it ultimately stands alone as an autonomous international doctrine under 
the CISG. 
While the CISG has sought to develop autonomous terminology and relatively 
uniform interpretation, absolute uniformity was neither a necessity nor a realizable goal. 
However, there is no room for flexibility in its adaptation and interpretation in the various 
domestic legal regimes of the signatory states. Where such flexibility exists (i.e. non-
uniformity) those cases are to be considered homeward trend aberrations leading to 
divergence in the interpretation of the CISG. The next chapter considers those cases. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GETTING IT WRONG: DIVERGENCE IN ARTICLE 79 CASE LAW IN DOMESTIC 
COURTS AND ARBITRATIONS 
·'-: ., 
A. Threats to Autonomous Interpretations 
The fact that the CISG is in force in 78 countries says little about the how it has 
been received in those countries and the level of awareness regarding the existence of the 
Convention. 1072 But as noted above, 1073 an analysis of a large body of case law on Article 
79 has demonstrated that there is a growing body of autonomous judicial decisions on 
that Article and, for the most part, these decisions have avoided references to domestic 
law. Since the CISG has come into effect, jurisprudence on Article 79 has produced a 
mix of properly-reasoned cases that have avoided the homeward trend. These decisions 
are consistent with the CISG's objective that it be applied in a uniform manner. They are 
also true to the original intent of the drafters of the CISG when they incorporated neutral 
terminology that eschewed words and concepts that were common to specific legal 
systems. This explains why the legal idioms of the CISG avoid references to divergent, 
national meanings and instead speak in terms of physical events that occur in the conduct 
of international trade. 
Unfortunately, there are some Article 79 cases from specific jurisdictions that 
have diverged from the CISG's mandate to create a relatively uniform international sales 
1072 For a list of contracting states, see supra note 4. 
1073 See Chapter Four, Getting it Right: Relative Uniformity in the Treatment of Article 79 in Domestic 
Courts and Arbitrations, supra. 
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law. In these cases, the homeward trend is clearly discernable. This is an undesirable 
development, as it promotes parochialism and defeats the very purpose behind the 
.. creation of the·CISG, which was to create legal certainty andrnduce the barriers to 
international trade. While courts and arbitral panels in many countries-such as for 
example, Austria, Germany, and Italy-have gone to great lengths to fend off the 
homeward trend, the record of other countries is mixed, if not poor. For example, in 
Belgium, France, Russia, and the United States, the evidence is strong that the homeward 
trend prevails over autonomous interpretation. But even in jurisdictions where Article 79 
has been interpreted with relative uniformity, there have been some problems. 
A.i. Blips on the Road to Autonomous Interpretations: Austria and CIETAC 
As noted above, 1074 in Austria, for example, in one case the Supreme Court made 
references to domestic law in a manner that was not consistent with the quest for 
uniformity in international sales law. 1075 In that case the Court noted "the defending 
parties could [ ... ] not successfully rely on a frustration of contract as a consequence of a 
changed market situation". 1076 The reference to "frustration" was unfortunate, as was the 
Court's statement that "the same results from the grounds of the doctrine of the 
frustration of contract according to purely national law". 1077 Also disappointing were the 
references to numerous domestic examples of changed market conditions were frustration 
1074 See Chapter Four, s. B. Austria: The Supreme Court Gets It Right-Almost. 
1075 Construction materials case, supra note 641. 
1076 Ibid. 
1011 Ibid. 
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of contract was denied, even though it noted that Article 79 was the controlling 
provision. 1078 
Similarly, it has ·been shown that disputants, arbitral tribunals, and courts·often 
refer to related domestic legal concepts rather than Article 79. This is common, even 
when the parties all agree that the CISG and Article 79 governs the contract (and 
provision) in question. For example, a common theme in CIET AC case law is that the 
disputants frequently invoked or resorted to domestic force majeure law and terminology 
in their pleadings. This appears to be the case even though the majority of CIET AC case 
law was sensitive to the autonomous nature of Article 79. As noted above, 1079 force 
majeure clauses are frequently included in CIETAC contracts, which typically involve 
Chinese parties. That may explain the use of domestic terminology. References to 
domestic law were often made even when the parties acknowledged that the CISG was 
the applicable law. Considering that none of the parties objected to the applicability of 
the CISG in the CIET AC cases, the references to domestic force majeure were likely 
made in ignorance of the fact that Article 79's rule of"impediment" would govern any 
claim for an excuse for non-performance due to a supervening event. While some 
CIET AC disputants may have inaccurately referred to domestic force majeure law and 
terminology instead of Article 79's "impediment", it was the duty of the relevant 
tribunals to correct the parties in this regard. 
1078 These included "[ f]rustrated expectation concerning the development of a shopping centre [ ... ] a 
change of commodity prices, [and] a decrease of purchasing power and down-sizing of companies". Ibid. 
1079 See CIETAC, supra note 686 and.ff. 
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Unfortunately, in some CIETAC cases the tribunals were just as careless as the 
disputants in their references and use of language. This was especially apparent in the 
·earlier cases; For example, in the 1997 Aluminum oxide case, it was the buyer that· 
referred to Article 79, and argued that its bank's refusal to issue a letter of credit was 
beyond its control. 1080 The tribunal made reference to both domestic law and the CISG 
with respect to other aspects of the case. It did not mention Article 79 or "impediment". 
It referred only to domestic law and "deem[ed] that force majeure, subject to the Law of 
the People's Republic of China on Economic Contracts Concerning Foreign Interests, 
refers to any event that is unforeseeable for the parties when the contract is signed and 
whose occurrence and consequences are inevitable and unconquerable". 1081 The tribunal 
noted that the bank's refusal to provide the letter of credit to the buyer was based on a 
history of poor business practices by the buyer. As a result, the bank's denial was 
foreseeable and did not constitute force majeure. While the same result would have 
likely occurred had the tribunal examined the issue under Article 79, it is unfortunate that 
the tribunal did not focus on the CISG with its legal analysis. 
A.ii. Blips on the Road to Autonomous Interpretations: ICC Case 8790 
While it was found in Case 8501 (above) 1082 that flooding in the country of 
exportation (and government action) were not sufficient for aforce majeure defense, the 
1080 Aluminium oxide case, supra note 726. 
1081 Ibid. 
1082 ICC, 1996, Case 8501, supra note 931. 
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opposite conclusion was reached four years later in Case 8790. 1083 Indeed, it is difficult 
to reconcile the reasoning in these two cases, and the lack of detail in the latter case 
·contributes to this problem. 10~4 The facts of Case 8790·are relatively complex, and may· -
help us understand why the sole arbitrator accepted the claimant's force majeure 
argument. The seller (claimant) concluded a contract where the buyer was to furnish the 
seller with a number of components for the production of a food product. The seller was 
then required to deliver to the buyer a large quantity of the processed product in periodic 
shipments. Following a number of deliveries, the seller informed the buyer that it had to 
suspend its deliveries of the finished product for approximately one month. It initially 
stated to the buyer that the reason for the suspension was due to a reduction in its supply 
of raw materials and a modification in the assortments of the products of its plants. It 
also informed the buyer that the price had also increased by ten percent. The buyer 
responded by withholding payment for the last shipment, and it also complained that 
some of the goods had been received in bad condition. When settlement negotiations 
failed, the seller commenced arbitration proceedings. 
The arbitrator found that the claimant was justified in its suspension of further 
deliveries due to force majeure. Thus, the impediment was to be a temporary. The seller 
produced a certificate issued by a local chamber of commerce, which stated that the 
climatic conditions during the period in question led to a reduction of raw material, and 
that these circumstances were beyond human control and prevented the claimant from 
fulfilling its contractual obligations towards defendant. The buyer noted that the contract, 
1083 ICC, 2000, Case 8790, supra note 931. 
1084 This is especially the case in Case 8501. See ICC, 1996, Case 8501, supra note 931. 
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which contained aforce majeure clause, did not specifically mention the term "drought". 
Instead, the contract clause referred to "natural catastrophes" and also to "other 
circumstances outside [the] contrnl" of the parties. Considering' this definition, the · ··'I~ - · 
arbitrator felt entitled to include "drought" in this definition. That is arguably incorrect. 
While natural catastrophes can include such things as drought, these are more often 
thought to be significant only when they are unpredictable, and of considerable 
duration-known as "historical droughts". 1085 A qrought causing a one-month delay in a 
shipment can hardly be considered a "natural catastrophe". Furthermore, the defendant 
introduced evidence that, notwithstanding the certification from a local chamber of 
commerce, brought the existence of the drought into doubt. During the period in 
question, it showed that it had been able to sign a contract with another company in the 
same country of the seller. The arbitrator rejected this argument by noting that the other 
supplier was located in a city 300 kilometers away from the claimant. In any event, this 
evidence suggests that the severity and duration of the drought were not sufficient 
impediments to warrant the successful invocation of force majeure. 
A.iii. Blips on the Road to Autonomous Interpretations: Slovak Frozen Peas Case 
In the Frozen peas case, the buyer refused to pay for part of the purchase price as 
it claimed that a portion of the goods were defective. The seller sued and argued that the 
buyer had failed to provide evidence of both the defects and a reasonable notice of the 
1085 See generally Luis F. Ballesteros, "What Determines a Disaster?" September 11, 2008, online: 54 
Pesos <http://54pesos.org/2008/09/l l/what-determines-a-disaster> and Neil Smith, "There's No Such 
Thing as a Natural Disaster" June 11, 2006, online: Social Science Research Council 
<http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Smith>. 
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lack of conformity. 1086 The court ruled that the buyer had not provided evidence of 
having notified the seller of a lack of conformity as required by Article 39. In doing so, 
however, the court made an erroneous reference to Article 79( 4). 1087. Although it was a ·· 
small error, the court noted that "[i]f there is an impediment to performance, under article 
79(4) of the Convention, the party who fails to perform must give notice to the other 
party of the impediment[ ... ] If the notice is not received by the other party within a 
reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew or ought to have known of the 
impediment, he is liable for damages". 1088 The invocation of Article 79(4) was incorrect. 
There was no impediment that prevented performance, and as such, the court should not 
have referenced Article 79(4). 
In a similar case involving potatoes, a different Slovakian court made the same 
error.
1089 It used almost identical language as found in in the Frozen peas case1090 and 
mistakenly referenced Article 79( 4). While these are minor errors, they are bound to 
cause some confusion in Article 79 jurisprudence. A notice requirement for an 
"impediment" under Article 79 is a very different matter than a notice of non-conforming 
goods under Article 39. To comingle the notice requirements under these two separate 
Articles will only add to confusion and the divergence of relative uniformity of Article 79 
case law. 
1086 Frozen peas case, supra note 1032. 
1087 Article 79(4) states: "The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the 
impediment and its effect on his ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the other party within a 
reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew or ought to have known of the impediment, he is 
liable for damages resulting from such nonreceipt". 
1088 Frozen peas case, supra note 1032. 
1089 Potatoes case, supra note 1032. 
1090 Ibid. 
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As difficult as it may be for domestic courts and arbitral panels to interpret the 
CISG autonomously, there has been a propensity in certain jurisdictions to construe the 
Convention in a nationalistic manner. This nationalistic approach, which includes 
"minor" terminological errors, not only leads to divergent interpretations of the CISG, but 
also promotes "forum shopping" which the CISG seeks to eliminate. 1091 
B. Belgium: Similar Issue; Mixed Results 
There are only three cases in Belgium that have invoked Article 79. Two of these 
cases concern an unanticipated change in the market prices of goods. 1092 The third case 
mentions Article 79 only in a peripheral manner. 1093 The two cases on changed market 
prices were separated by a span of almost ten years and offer interesting insights into this 
specific issue. Particularly noteworthy was the divergent result from the Belgian courts, 
from the first case in 1995 to a decision by the Supreme Court 2009. 
Case law from numerous jurisdictions has established the general principle that 
changes in the market prices of goods after the conclusion of a contract is not considered 
to be grounds to excuse a party from its obligations under Article 79. If that were the 
case, buyers would be able to argue successfully that taking delivery and paying the 
contact price when the market price of goods had fallen constituted an "impediment" 
1091 Honnold & Flechtner, ed., supra note 43 at 621. 
1092 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: Scaform International BV v. Lorraine 
Tubes S.A.S., Court of Cassation [Supreme Court] 19 June 2009, C.07.0289.N, online: Pace Law School 
CISG Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090619bl.html>; L. v. SAC., Rechtbank van 
Koophandel [District Court] leper 18 February 2002, A.R. 318/00, online: Pace Law School CISG 
Database <htto://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020218bl.html>; and Vital Berry Marketing v. Dira-Frost, 
Rechtbank van Koophandel [District Court] Hasselt 2 May 1995, A.R. 1849/94, 4205/94, online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <htto://cisgw3 .law.pace.edu/cases/9 50502b I .html>. 
1093 L. v. SA C., ibid. This was within the context of the possibility that meat was infected by dioxin during 
the dioxin crisis in Belgium. As the meat was tested after delivery and was found to be free of dioxin, the 
court did not undertake a discussion of Article 79. 
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within the meaning of Article 79. If that were possible, an enormous degree of business 
uncertainty would be introduced into contractual relationships, as prices in virtually all 
goods· tend to fluctuate. While the wording of Article 79 appears to encompass economic 
impediments, such as changes in market prices, in practice only those impediments that 
are comparable to non-economic (or "physical") impediments are likely to be exempted. 
Not surprisingly, in the 1995 case of Vital Berry Marketing v. Dira-Frost the court ruled 
that a significant drop in the price of frozen raspberries did not constitute a case of force 
majeure within the meaning of Article 79. 1094 Indeed, the vast majority of case law on 
this issue has indicated that a change in market prices will never amount to an 
impediment. 1095 Fluctuations in the prices of goods are a business risk, and as such are 
always foreseeable events in international trade. Rather than rendering performance 
impossible, price fluctuations only result in an economic gain for one party at the expense 
of the counterparty. They are in the normal risk of commercial activities. 
1094 Vital Berry Marketing v. Dira-Frost, supra note 1092. 
1095 See e.g. Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Hamburg, 28 February 1997, 1U167/95 
[Iron molybdenum case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970228gl.html> ("Despite of the triplication of market price that had to 
be paid for Chinese iron-molybdenum ... [t]he Seller is also not exempted by the fact that acquiring the 
goods elsewhere would have led to considerable financial loss because it would have had to pay a higher 
price"); Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, 11 June 1997, Award 255/1994, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/97061 lrl.html> ("no possible change of market conditions can release 
the buyer from this duty [to accept the goods] in accordance with ... the contracts and Article 79 CISG"); 
and Bulgaria Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award, 12 February 1998, Case 11/1996 [Steel ropes 
case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980212bu.html>. 
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B. i. Circumventing Article 79: The Supreme Court Upholds the "Hardship" Principle 
In a landmark 2009 decision the Belgian Supreme Court took a contrary view to 
existing jurisprudence on the issue of price fluctuations. I 096 In the. Scafom lnterniitional 
case, the parties had concluded an agreement for the sale of steel tubes. After the 
conclusion of the contract and before delivery, the price of steel unexpectedly rose by 
about 70 percent. Claiming "hardship", the seller tried to renegotiate a higher contract 
price, but the buyer refused and insisted on delivery of the goods at the original price. 
The trial court correctly held that the seller's invocation of "hardship" was beyond the 
scope of Article 79. It stated "that changes in prices are foreseeable and do not exempt 
the parties from performance of their obligations".1097 This has long been the 
conventional view with regard to Article 79 and similar force majeure provisions. With 
references to numerous authorities, it elaborated on the point that changes in prices are 
foreseeable and do not exempt the parties from performing their obligations. It has been 
well-established with jurists, as the court noted, that "a contract that is not lucrative or 
that is even a losing proposition, is part of the risks that belong to commercial 
acti vi ti es". 1098 
However, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the trial court. The 
Court of Appeal agreed that the issue regarding "hardship" was not dealt with by the 
CISG, it censured the trial court for its failure to not resort to domestic law to resolve the 
issue regarding "hardship". Such an approach would be antithetical to Article 79. Its 
1096 Scaform International BV v. Lorraine Tubes S.A.S., supra note 1092. 
1097 Ibid. 
io9s Ibid. 
. '\. 
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reasoning was based on the proposition that Article 79 does not explicitly exclude the 
possibility of an impediment due to price changes and unforeseen changed market 
· - conditions. It proceeded in finding that domestic law did not apply, but rather French 
law. Therefore, the appeal court allowed the seller's counterclaim for an amount based 
on a higher price. In this manner, it rejected the direct application of Article 79, and 
instead invoked French domestic law. It ruled that although French law did not recognize 
the theory of imprevision in this case, it did impose, in certain circumstances, a duty to 
renegotiate the contract based on the principle of good faith. In this manner, the appeal 
court was able to circumvent Article 79, and put in its place the principle of "hardship", a 
principle that was specifically excluded during the drafting history of the CISG. 1099 
The Supreme Court reversed the appeal decision in part by utilizing a different 
line of reasoning that rejected the application of French domestic law. It went much 
further than the appeal court decision and held that while there was a gap in the CISG, it 
was to be filled not by domestic law-French or Belgian-but rather by the general 
principles of international trade. This was in accordance with CISG Article 7. Without 
adding any further explanation, it affirmed that such principles were to be found in other 
sources, in particular, the UNIDROIT Principles. 1100 
However, the hardship provision in the UNIDROIT Principles is completely 
separate from its force majeure provision, which closely mirrors CISG Article 79. 1101 
1099 Harry M. Flechtner, "The Exemption Provisions of the Sales Convention, Including Comments on 
'Hardship' Doctrine and the 19 June 2009 Decision of the Belgian Cassation Court" (2011) 3 Belgrade L. 
Rev. 84 at 89. 
llOO UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 196. 
1101 Article 7.1.7 ("Force majeure") of the UNIDROIT Principles, ibid., states: 
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Hardship in the UNIDROIT Principles closely resembles the hardship doctrines in many 
civil law jurisdictions.1102 In many ways, the UNIDROIT Principles show a bias in 
favour of civil law principles. 1103 Some jurists even question whether they should be 
allowed to fill "gaps" in the CISG. 1104 As Anna Veneziano has noted, the UNIDROIT 
Principles "may be used to supplement CISG only as long as they help in clarifying or 
supporting already existing general principles underlying the Convention". 1105 The 
problem is that the hardship provision in the UNIDROIT Principles has significant 
features that distinguish it from traditional/orce majeure doctrine, including Article 79. 
In particular, the threshold for invoking a successful hardship defense is much lower: 
(1) Nonperformance by a party is excused if that party proves that the non-
performance was due to an impediment beyond its control and that it could not 
reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its 
consequences. 
(2) When the impediment is only temporary, the excuse shall have effect for such 
period as is reasonable having regard to the effect of the impediment on the 
performance of the contract. 
(3) The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the 
impediment and its effect on its ability to perform. If the notice is not received by 
the other party within a reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew 
or ought to have known of the impediment, it is liable for damages resulting from 
such nonreceipt. 
(4) Nothing in this article prevents a party from exercising a right to terminate the 
contract or to withhold performance or request interest on money due. 
1102 Article 6.2.3 ("Hardship") of the UNIDROIT Principles, ibid., states: 
( 1) In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request 
renegotiations. The request shall be made without undue delay and shall indicate 
the grounds on which it is based. 
(2) The request for renegotiation does not in itself entitle the disadvantaged party 
to withhold performance. 
(3) Upon failure to reach agreement within a reasonable time either party may 
resort to the court. 
(4) If the court finds hardship it may, if reasonable, 
(a) terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be fixed; or 
(b) adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium. 
1103 See Flechtner, supra note 1099 at 97. 
1104 See e.g. ibid. at 96-97. 
llos Anna Veneziano, "UNIDROIT Principles and CISG: Change of Circumstances and Duty to 
Renegotiate According to the Belgian Supreme Court" (2010) 1 Unif. L. Rev. 137 at 142. 
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hardship includes events that do not render a party's performance impossible, but only 
more onerous. Furthermore, the hardship doctrine provides for a remedy that is not 
., . 
· available under Article 79: a requirement that the parties renegotiate the contract and, 
most extraordinarily is the possibility that a court will impose changed contractual terms 
upon the parties in order to restore the contractual equilibrium. These are unique civil 
law principles that have no place in Article 79. Indeed, the traditional view of common 
law courts is that they are there to enforce contracts made by the parties, and not create 
these contracts. The fact that the CISG does not authorize a court to revise the 
contractual terms between the parties does not create a "gap" in the Convention. Rather, 
it reflects the rejection of the adaptation remedy in the CISG.1106 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court held that the market price increase in the cost 
of steel was a changed circumstance or "hardship" that demanded a revision of the 
contract. In this sense it was considered an impediment under Article 79, even though the 
court acknowledged that the CISG provided no indication as to how hardship issues were 
to be resolved, and therefore resorted to the UNIDROIT Principles. Its decision in 
Scaform International BV v. Lorraine Tubes S.A.S. was a marked departure from 
convention, and will likely create considerable divergence in the effort to create a 
uniform sales law, as well as introduce added uncertainty in international commercial 
transactions. 1107 It undermines the principle of pacta sunt servanda. As Harry Flechtner 
recently noted, the decision "is likely to seriously increase non-uniformity in the 
1106 A point made by Flechtner, supra note 1099 at 93-94. 
1107 Scaform International BV v. Lorraine Tubes S.A.S., supra note 1092. 
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application of the Convention". 1108 Should courts find that a "gap" exists in the CISG 
whenever familiar domestic legal principles fail to appear in the Convention, there exists 
the likelihood that the CISG will fail in the effort to create a relatively uniform J f ~ ' •H 
international sales law. 
C. France: Flawed Article 79 Jurisprudence 
As with Belgium, there are only three French Article 79 cases. 1109 One case 
involves the issue of an "impediment" due to the actions of a third party supplier, 1110 and 
two of the cases are related actions that concern the "impediment" of a change in market 
conditions. 1111 Unfortunately, the court decisions, particularly the lower level decisions, 
reveal a flawed understanding of the CISG and Article 79. They also suggest that courts 
in France, as with Belgium, tend to have a flexible attitude towards buyers. 1112 
Fortunately, in one case the appeal and supreme courts were able to correct an erroneous 
lower level decision, but even there they appeared to have a tainted view of Article 79. 
These decisions, although few in number, fail to add to the development of a relatively 
uniform international sales law. 
1108 See Flechtner, supra note 1099 at 97. 
1109 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: Cour d'appel [CA] Colmar, 12 June 2001, 
Societe Romay AG v. SARL Behr, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010612fl.html>; Tribunal de commercial [Trib. com.] Besan9on, 19 
January 1998, Flippe Christian v. Douet Sport Collections, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980119fl .html>; and Tribunal de grande instance [Trib. gr. inst.] 
Colmar, 18 December 1997, Romay v. Behr France, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/971218fl .html>. 
111° Flippe Christian v. Douet Sport Collections, ibid. 
1111 Romay v. Behr France and Societe Romay AG v. SARL Behr, supra note 1109. These two cases have 
been treated separately on the Pace Law School CISG Database. However, they are the same cases. The 
only difference is the treatment of the case name at the trial level and appeal and Supreme Court levels. 
1112 A point made by S.A. Kruisinga, particularly with respect to the reasonable time in which a buyer is to 
examine the goods. See Kruisinga, supra note 48 at 86-88. 
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The treatment of Article 79 in Flippe Christian v. Douet Sport Collections has 
been described as "anomalous" and "confused and at odds with the other [Article 79] 
cases".
11
·1,3 The case-involved the purchase by a Swiss buyer of sweatsuits from a French 
seller for resale to members of a judo club. After having received complaints due to 
excessive shrinking of the goods during washing, the buyer gave notice to the seller of 
the defect. Not having received any reply from the seller, the buyer commenced legal 
action. Ruling in favour of the buyer, the District Court of Besancon concluded that it 
was entitled to avoid the contract and be awarded damages. However, in determining the 
amount of damages (which amounted to a reduction of the purchase price by 35 percent), 
it allowed the seller a partial Article 79 defense. The court pointed out that the seller's 
failure to perform was due to an impediment beyond its control, since the goods had been 
manufactured by a third party. It also noted that because there was no evidence that the 
seller had acted in bad faith, Article 79 could be successfully invoked by the seller. 
The decision is an incorrect application of Article 79. Sellers should not be 
excused due to the non-conforming goods of a third party supplier. In such a situation, it 
would be inappropriate to grant a seller refuge under Article 79. The court also ignored 
the fact that in order for the seller to be exempt under Article 79(2), the third-party 
supplier must be exempt. As Carla Spivack has noted of the case, "[t]his reasoning not 
only misses the point of Article 79, it also flies in the face of all of the other cases 
interpreting it". 1114 This perspective is also shared by S.A. Kruisinga, when she stated 
1113 According to Carla Spivack, "Of Shrinking Sweatsuits and Poison Vine Wax: A Comparison of Basis 
for Excuse under U.C.C. § 2-615 and CISG Article 79" (2006) 27 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 757 at 797. 
1114 Ibid. at 798. 
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that "[t]he application of art. 79 CISG in that case was, in my view, incorrect, because 
even if the seller does not have any control over the production of the goods sold, he will 
-still have to bear the consequences of any incorrect delivery". 11 q -
A flawed understanding of the CISG was also evident in Romay v. Behr 
France. 1116 A Swiss seller and a French buyer entered into a long-term agreement where 
the buyer committed to purchasing a certain quantity of automotive parts according to the 
needs of its customer. After taking delivery of some of the goods over a two-year period, 
a dispute arose when the buyer refused to take delivery of the remainder. It claimed that 
there was a change in market conditions, and that its customer no longer had a need for 
the goods. The seller brought an action to recover damages based on CISG Article 74. 
At the court of first instance the buyer invoked the theory of unforeseeability 
under Swiss law, as well as Article 79, to support its defense that the interruption in the 
purchase of the goods was due to the needs of its customer, and this constituted an 
economic impediment outside the buyer's control. Rather than refer to the precise 
language of the official text version of the CISG, the court utilized its own terminology 
when it summarized the various articles in the Convention. 1117 Ultimately, the court 
rejected the application of the CISG on the grounds that the agreement was a 
"framework" agreement only, and did not constitute a contract of sale. According to the 
court, the CISG would have been applicable if the contract of sale had bound the seller to 
deliver a specific quantity of goods. This relieved the court of the need to consider an 
1115 Kruisinga, supra note 48 at 143. 
1116 Romay v. Behr France, and the related case of Societe Romay AG v. SARL Behr, supra note 1109. 
1117 A point noted by the translator of the court decision, Charles Sant 'Elia. See Romay v. Behr France, 
ibid. 
330 
analysis under the CISG. Instead, it held that Swiss law was applicable, and on that basis 
the buyer was not liable for terminating a framework supply agreement. 
··The Court-of Appeal 'reversed the decision and found the CISGto be-applicable to 
the "collaboration agreement". 1118 Despite the title of the agreement, it held that it was a 
sales contract under the CISG. It also considered the buyer's defense under Article 79. 
Even though the appeal court refused to excuse the buyer's performance under Article 79, 
it should have declined to entertain this argument. The contract was a long-term 
international agreement over the span of eight years. The buyer also had extensive 
experience in international markets. The matter of a change in market conditions within 
this context should have been addressed by the parties in their contract, and not brought 
to a court for adjudication. 1119 Also interesting is the suggestion in the appeal court's 
reasoning that an unforeseeable drop in prices might bring the contract within the scope 
of Article 79(1 ). It focused on the issue of foreseeability, rather than on the difficulties 
raised by the term "impediment", or the official French term "empechement". 1120 
Although the appeal court rejected the buyer's Article 79 defense, it should have read the 
word "impediment" or "empechement" so as to preclude a market change defense. Thus, 
the case represents an example of an Article 79 defense that the drafters of the CISG did 
not intend to allow under that Article. This case was a clear instance of the use of an 
Article 79 defense that fell short of the physical impediments that the drafters had in mind 
1118 Societe Romay AG v. SARL Behr, supra note 1109. 
1119 Spivack, supra note 1113 at 790. 
1120 
"Empechement" can be translated to mean "impediment", "unforeseen difficulty", or "obstacle". 
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during the Diplomatic Conference in Vienna. 1121 On appeal, the Supreme Court, in a 
terse judgment, upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal. 
D. Russian Arbitrations and CISG Article 79: The Problematic Cases 
While it is a relatively prominent arbitral institution, there are concerns with a 
number of the decisions that have emanated from the International Commercial 
Arbitration Court ("ICAC") at the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. Many of the decisions, while factually interesting and addressing important 
legal issues, are lacking in sufficient detail and clarity. This makes any analysis of the 
interpretation of the CISG more difficult. Thus, of the 25 Russian cases 1122 on Article 79 
1121 Kruisinga, supra note 48 at 127-128. 
1122 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: Tribunal of International Commercial 
Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 13 May 2008, Award 13/2007, 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080513rl.html>; Tribunal of 
International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 15 
November 2006, Award 30/2006, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/061115r2.html>; Tribunal oflnternational Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 21November2005, Award 42/2005 [Equipment 
case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051121rl.html>; 
Tribunal oflnternational Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
9 April 2004, Award 129/2003, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040409rl .html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 16 June 2003, Award 135/2002, online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030616rl.html>; Federal Arbitration Court for 
the Moscow Region [Appellate Court], 4 February 2002 (Rimpi Ltd v. Moscow Northern Customs 
Department), online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020204rl.html>; 
Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
30 July 2001, Award 198/2000, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/O 10730r I .html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 6 June 2000, Award 406/1998, online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000606rl.html>; Tribunal of International 
Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 24 November 1998, 
Award 96/1998, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981124rl .html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 6 October 1998, Award 269/1997, online: Pace 
Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981006rl.html>; Tribunal oflnternational 
Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 10 June 1998, Award 
83/1997, online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980610rl.html>; 
High Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, 16 February 1998, [Information Letter No. 29] [Onions 
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considered here, two cases 1123 are so devoid of information that no conclusions can be 
drawn. In one other case, a one paragraph excerpt is all that is available. 1124 All that can 
· · be gleaned from that case is the buyer's view that Article 79 can be invoked where it is 
unable to refund a payment and pay a penalty. The tribunal agreed with respect to the 
payment of the penalty, but not regarding the refund. It then, strangely, referred to the 
force majeure provision in the UNIDROIT Principles1125 when it decided that interest 
case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980216rl.html>; 
Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
12 January 1998, Award 152/1996, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980112rl.html>; High Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, 
1997, [Ruling No. 4, case 4], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970000r2.html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 11 June 1997, Award 255/1994, online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/97061 lrl.html>; Tribunal oflnternational 
Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 13 May 1997, Award 
3/1996, online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970513rl.html>; 
Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
11May1997, Award 2/1995, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/97051 lrl.html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 22 January 1997, Award 155/1996 [Butter case], 
online: Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970122rl.html>; Tribunal of 
International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 10 
February 1996, Award 328/1994, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/96021 Ori .html>; Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 13 December 1995, Award 364/1994, online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951213rl.html>; Tribunal of 
International Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1 
December 1995, Award 369/1994, online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951201rl.html>; Tribunal oflnternational Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 17 October 1995, Award 123/1992 [Automatic 
diffractameter equipment case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951017rl .html>; Tribunal oflnternational Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 15 May 1995, Award 321/1994, online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/9 50515r I .html>; Tribunal of International 
Commercial Arbitration, Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 16 March 1995, Award 
15511994 [Metallic sodium case], online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950316rl .html>; and Tribunal of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 17 November 1994, Award 493/1993, online: 
Pace Law School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/941117rl .html>. 
1123 These two cases are: High Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation, 1997, [Ruling No. 4, case 4]; 
and ICAC, 17 November 1994, Award 493/1993, ibid. 
1124 ICAC, 13 May 2008, Award 13/2007, supra note 1122. 
1125 UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 196, at Article 7.4.9. 
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was due even ifthe delay in payment caused by aforce majeure event. The same 
determination could have been made under Article 79, so there was no need to gap-fill 
and reference the UNIDROIT Principles. ··,· ... 
The remaining ICAC decisions are often deficient in detail, so only general 
conclusions can be drawn. For example, little information is given in Award 3/1996, 
particularly with respect to Article 79. 1126 In that case, a Russian buyer made an advance 
payment to a Canadian seller, which after a significant delay delivered only part of the 
goods. The seller used an Article 79 defense, but the ICAC decision is terse and vague in 
this regard, referring only to "certain circumstances" and "some difficulties" the seller 
encountered in performance of its obligations under the contact. 1127 No detail is provided 
as to exactly what these "circumstances" or "difficulties" were. 
In addition to these problems, one commentator has noted that many of the ICAC 
decisions have reflected the homeward trend, and have not respected the international 
character of the CISG. 1128 This is reflected in another case involving a buyer's claim for 
its advance payment for undelivered goods. 1129 Even though the tribunal acknowledged 
that the CISG was the applicable law, it decided the seller's force majeure argument on 
the basis of Article 405 of the Russian Federation Civil Code. 1130 It stated that "a debtor, 
who delays his performance, shall not be released from his liability to the creditor for any 
consequences of the impossibility of performance that accidentally occurred during [the] 
1126 ICAC, 13 May 1997, Award 3/1996, supra note 1122. 
1121 Ibid. 
1128 Saidov, supra note 1002 at 2. 
1129 ICAC, 16 June 2003, Award 135/2002, supra note 1122. 
1130 Ibid. 
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delay" .1131 Why the tribunal felt a need to refer to domestic law instead of relying on 
Article 79 to rule in a similar manner is unknown. 
· The-same error occurred in Award 364/1994. 1132 The tribunal'concluded that the 
CISG was applicable, and noted the buyer's defense under Article 79. The buyer argued 
that its payment of funds to the seller where frozen by its bank due to a new foreign 
currency regulation. However, the tribunal referred to Article 223 of the Russian Civil 
Code, 1994, instead of Article 79 to dismiss the buyer's argument. Referencing the 
Russian law, it ruled that "when the debtor imposes upon a third party the obligation to 
perform its contractual obligation, the debtor is liable for non-performance [ ... ] of its 
obligations by the third party". 1133 The same ruling could have been made under Article 
79(2). While the end result would likely have been the same, these cases illustrate 
instances where the "international character"1134 of the CISG has not been respected. 
Thus, even if in substance a tribunal has given a correct ruling, if the CISG is applicable, 
tribunals should not utilize domestic law or local terminology when interpreting the 
Convention. This would be inconsistent with the CISG's interpretive mandate to 
"promote uniformity in its application". 1135 
The opposite problem occurred in another (but non-ICAC) case involving an 
appeal to the Cassation Board from the Appellate Division of the Arbitration Court for 
the City of Moscow. 1136 In Rimpi Ltd. v. Moscow Northern Customs Department the 
1131 Ibid. 
1132 ICAC, 13 December 1995, Award 364/1994, supra note 1122. 
1133 Ibid. 
1134 CISG Article 7(1). 
i13s Ibid. 
1136 Rimpi Ltd. v. Moscow Northern Customs Department, 4 February 2002, supra note 1122. 
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claimant invoked CISG Article 79 to provide it with the basis for relief for a customs 
penalty imposed on it for late payment. 1137 In this case, the disputants were both Russian 
parties· arguing over an internal customs penalty. In addition, there was no transaction-in 
goods between these two parties. This dispute was the result of a sales transaction 
between the claimant and a Ukrainian buyer that was unable to make timely payments 
due to delays by the Ukrainian government. In such a case, the claimant should have 
relied on domestic force majeure law for grounds for relief. The invocation of Article 79 
was an obvious error. The CISG applies "to contracts of sale of goods between parties 
whose places of business are in different [contracting] States". 1138 It is unknown what 
analysis of the applicable law the arbitration courts undertook in this case. The lower and 
an appellate court heard the case before it reached the Cassation Board, and all three 
levels agreed on the outcome. However, it is inconceivable that the CISG should have 
been the applicable law in a matter concerning a tax penalty in a domestic arbitration 
between parties from the same state. 
Russian law on excuses for non-performance differs considerably from CISG 
Article 79. Thus, reliance on domestic law instead of Article 79 could lead to very 
different outcomes. For example, as in many civil law jurisdictions, under Article 451 of 
the Russian Civil Code it recognizes the principle of changed circumstances. 1139 This is a 
relatively broad and liberal principle, which can lead to a change or alteration of a 
contract by a court, or its termination. "Changed circumstances" and court-altered 
1137 Ibid. 
1138 CISG Article 1 (1 ). 
1139 Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 402-403, 490. The law bears the heading "Change and Dissolution of 
Contract In Connection with Material Change of Circumstances". 
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contracts are anathemas in the common law. Recall that in the common law, under the 
more ridged principle of pacta sunt servanda, that where there is a case of impossibility 
the termination of the contract is the primary remedy. .. . 
D. i. A High Standard to "Impediments" but Imperfect Decisions 
Article 79 has been at issue in a variety of other ICAC cases. With relative 
consistency, the tribunals did not recognize that impediments within the meaning of 
Article 79 had occurred. Non-payment has been a recurrent theme in many of these 
cases. Thus, where a buyer failed to obtain the permission from a government agency to 
pay for the goods did not release it from its liability to make payment. 1140 Regrettably, 
the tribunal referred neither to Article 79 nor to domestic law or force majeure to ground 
its ruling with respect to the buyer's excuse for non-performance. However, the same 
logic applied to a seller who had been adjudged to return an advanced payment to the 
buyer. In such a situation, the seller was not able to successfully invoke Article 79 to 
excuse it from returning the deposit. 1141 It claimed that it lacked the funds because it had 
used the money to purchase the goods from another party, and that third party had the 
goods seized by the authorities. 1142 Unfortunately, the tribunal referred to both Article 79 
and the domestic civil code1143 to hold the seller liable for the repayment. 
A change in market conditions cannot be used as an excuse for a buyer to avoid 
payment under Article 79. In Award 255/1994, the buyer argued that "supply had 
1140 ICAC, 10 June 1998, Award 83/1997, supra note 1122. 
1141 ICAC, 21November2005, Award 42/2005, supra note 1122. 
1142 Ibid. 
1143 Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Art. 401(3). 
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exceeded demand for this type of good on the Western European market", and requested 
that it stop receiving shipment of the goods. 1144 In the opinion of the tribunal, under 
·Article 19, a change in market conditions cannot release a party from its obligations to · 
accept and pay for the goods for which it has contracted. 1145 
While it is difficult to make sweeping generalizations on the ICAC decisions 
regarding Article 79, two important points must be noted. Firstly, many of the decisions 
have been lacking in crucial detail. This makes an analysis of the cases more difficult. 
Instead, only broad conclusions and general outcomes may be drawn. Secondly, and 
related to this difficulty, is the apparent tendency to use the terminology and provisions 
from domestic sales law, sometimes concurrently with Article 79. While this is 
unnecessary and inappropriate, one must wonder whether the lack of detail in the 
decisions contributes to this problem. For example, many of the cases did not refer to 
Article 79, even though the CISG was deemed the applicable law, and the fact that an 
impediment or force majeure was argued by one of the parties. One must wonder if 
references to Article 79 were simply not recorded in the decisions of many of the cases. 
If the CISG was the governing law, and Article 79 was applicable, reference to 
similar domestic laws was not necessary, even if it led to the same outcome. Should this 
trend continue, it is possible that future decisions from Russian arbitrations, with their 
apparent predisposition towards domestic law and the homeward trend, could lead to 
different results for the parties concerned. This would have a negative impact on the 
development of the CISG as a relatively uniform international sales law. The Russian 
1144 ICAC, 11 June 1997, Award 255/1994, supra note 1122. 
1145 Ibid. 
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arbitration cases interpreting Article 79, while sometimes imperfect, have, overall, 
suggested that decisions were made with reference to the domestic law onforce majeure 
-rather than on the basis of;·or concurrently with CISG Article 79: Thus, many of these· 
cases illustrate how the CISG should not be applied. 
E. United States of America: The Homeward Trend Revisited 
Generally, the CISG has not been well-received by the courts in the United States. 
Courts there were very slow to consider the CISG. The federal courts did not fully 
consider the CISG until ten years after its ratification. 1146 A few scholarly comments 
summarize the American situation with respect to U.S. jurists. In 2004, Harry Flechtner 
completed an analysis of U.S. court decisions on the CISG. 1147 In that analysis Flechtner 
stated that "the picture of U.S. decisions is by no means a completely flattering one,"1148 
and thus, "examples oflaudable interpretive methodology in U.S. case law on the CISG 
are the exceptions rather than the rule". 1149 It appears that American courts have tended 
to suffer from the homeward trend. Flechtner noted that "[a] disturbing number of U.S. 
decisions [ ... ] are guilty of an even more grievous 'sin of commission '-the use of cases 
that apply U.S. domestic sales and contract law in interpreting the Convention ... Worse 
yet, the courts asserting that UCC case law can guide them in interpreting the CISG 
1146 Levasseur, "United States of America" in Ferrari, ed., The CISG and its Impact on National Legal 
Systems, supra, note 218 at 313. The CISG did not enter into force in the United States until January 1, 
1988. 
1147 Harry M. Flechtner, "The CISG in US Courts: The Evolution (and Devolution) of the Methodology of 
Interpretation" in Ferrari, ed., Quo Vadis CISG?, supra note 785 at 91. 
1148 Ibid. at 92. 
1149 Ibid. at 98. 
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actually put the idea in practice". 1150 He concluded by remarking: "U.S. decisions 
include flagrant and disturbing examples of the homeward trend in operation". 1151 This 
· · unfortunate' state of affairs for the CISG in the U.S. -does not' appearto be' shared in many 
other signatory states. 
Regrettably, the four American cases on Article 79 demonstrate ample evidence 
of the homeward trend. 1152 The first was the landmark case of Raw Materials Inc. v. 
Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co., KG. 1153 It was such a poor example of CISG 
jurisprudence that it was singled-out for the "Worst [CISG] Case" award in an article 
with the unflattering title of "Nominating Manfred Forberich: The Worst CISG Decision 
in 25 Years?" 1154 The authors identified this case from a pool of more than 1500 as 
representative of "the worst example of the 'homeward trend"'.1 155 While the result in 
the decision by the U.S. federal court may have been the correct one, it was the flawed 
methodology the court used to decide the case that has been the subject of much 
criticism. 1156 
1150 Ibid. at 103. 
1151 Ibid. at 111. 
1152 In chronological order, from the most recent case, these are: Macromex Sri. v. Globex International, 
Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31442 (S.D.N.Y. 16 April 2008), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080416ul .html>; Hilaturas Miel, S.L. v. Republic of Iraq, 573 F. Supp. 
2d 781 (S.D.N.Y. 20 August 2008), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080820ul.html>; Valero Marketing v. Greeni Oy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 475 
(D.N.J. 4 April 2006), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060404ul .html>; and Raw Materials Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH 
& Co., KG, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12510 (N.D. Ill. 6 July 2004), online: Pace Law School CISG Database 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040706ul .html>. 
1153 Ibid. 
1154 Joseph Lookofsky & Harry Flechtner, "Nominating Manfred Forberich: The Worst CISG Decision in 
25 Years?" (2005) 9 Vindobona J. Int'l Com. L. & Arb. 199. 
1155 Ibid. at 201. 
1156 See also Alain A. Levasseur "United States of America" supra, note 218 at 313-314, and Albert 
Kritzer, "Comments on Raw Materials Inc. v. Manfred Forberich" (February 2005), online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040706ul .html>. 
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In this case, the Illinois U.S. District Court had to decide whether the German 
seller of used railroad rails could claim an exemption under Article 79 because it failed to 
deliver the goods due to the freezing of the port of St. Petersburg at an unusually early . r. 
date. The court applied the CISG to the contract, but when it considered Article 79 it 
quoted the plaintiffs brief and lamented that "while no American court has specifically 
interpreted or applied Article 79 of the CISG, caselaw interpreting the Uniform 
Commercial Code's ('U.C.C.') provision on excuse provides guidance for interpreting the 
CISG's excuse provision since it contains similar requirements as those set forth in 
Article 79". 1157 In making this statement, the court ignored its obligations under CISG 
Article 7(1). Had the court consulted foreign case law on Article 79 it would have found 
important guidance on the issue. A number of foreign decisions on Article 79 deal 
directly with the topic of a seller's claim for exemption on the basis of adverse weather 
d. . 1158 con 1ttons. 
Instead, the court was guided by case law from s. 2-615 of the U.C.C., which 
deals with "impracticability". 1159 This is a different standard from the Article 79 standard 
of physical (or absolute) impossibility of performance, as the American version includes 
1157 Raw Materials Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co., KG, supra note 1152. 
1158 See e.g., Tomato concentrate case, supra note 878; Hispafru,it B. V. v. Amuyen S.A., supra note 993; 
Agristo NV. v. Macces Agri B. V., supra note 993; and Canned oranges case, infra note 727. 
1159 U.C.C. section 2-615 is entitled "Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions" and states, in part: 
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to 
the preceding section on substituted performance: 
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who 
complies with paragraphs (b) and ( c) is not a breach of his duty under a 
contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the 
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic 
assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in good faith 
with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order 
whether or not it later proves to be invalid. 
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the concepts of "economic impossibility" and "commercial impracticability". 1160 The 
latter two terms incorporate the concept of economic hardship that simply makes 
·performance excessively onerous. As such, the foreseeability-threshold is lowered·;· the'~ 
approach in the CISG is more stringent for the non-performing party. 1161 Rather than 
conduct its analysis under the CISG, the court referred to domestic case law and noted 
"that the freezing over of the upper Mississippi River has been the basis of a successful 
force majeure defense", hence, it ruled in favor of the defendant. 
Had the court considered the case under the stricter excuse requirements under 
Article 79, it is possible that it may have concluded that it was likely that the Russian port 
of St. Petersburg might become frozen in the winter months, and that occurrence should 
have been foreseeable by the defendant. As the plaintiff noted in its brief, the fact that 
the St. Petersburg port might become frozen in the winter would not be "a surprise to any 
experienced shipping merchant (or any grammar school geography student)". 1162 Thus, 
under Article 79's stricter foreseeability regime and excuse requirements, the result for 
the parties could have been the opposite. The court's flagrant disregard of Article 79 
(and the CISG generally) is an obstacle in the efforts to create a relatively uniform 
international sales law. 
The question of whether a storm and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on 
the World Trade Center in New York constituted a successful defense under Article 79 
·d d · · r,r / Lr k . G . 0 1163 were const ere m a cursory manner m ya ero 1v1ar etmg v. reem y. 
1160 Brunner, supra note 4 7 at 78-79. 
1161 Ibid. at 354. 
1162 Raw Materials Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co., KG, supra note 1152 at s. C. "Foreseeability". 
1163 Valero Marketing v. Greeni Oy, supra note 1152. 
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Unfortunately, the two courts that considered the defendant's Article 79 defense relegated 
the argument to a reply in the footnotes of their judgments.1164 Although the primary 
.. ·issue-in the case concerned late delivery and fundamental breach, ·the lack ·of discussion · 
on Article 79 was disappointing. The delays in delivery, caused in part by Hurricane 
Gabrielle in the North Atlantic, and the difficulty in unloading the cargo in port of New 
York shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, were issues that 
deserved greater legal analysis by the courts in this case. Instead, in its discussion of the 
late delivery the Federal District Court confined its comments on Article 79 to a footnote, 
and rejected the defendant's "force majeure" defense. 1165 It stated: "With the possible 
exception of the storm, the circumstances upon which [the defendant] relies were not 
impediments beyond [the defendant's] control and which it could not reasonably have 
been expected to take into account within the meaning of Article 79( 1) of the CISG". 1166 
On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeals was even more terse. This failure to properly 
consider the defendant's Article 79 defense reflects poorly on American CISG 
jurisprudence. 
The issue of an outbreak of war, which made performance impossible, was 
considered in Hilaturas Mi el S.L. v. Republic of Iraq .1167 Before the Iraqi War, a Spanish 
company, Hilaturas, agreed to sell yam to the Republic oflraq under the U.N. Oil For 
Food Program. This program provided letters of credit to the seller, but required 
independent inspection of goods when they were received in Iraq. When war erupted, the 
1164 The two courts were the Federal District Court (New Jersey) and the Federal Court of Appeals (3d 
Circuit), supra note 1152. 
1165 Federal District Court (New Jersey), ibid. 
1166 Ibid at fu. 5. 
1167 Hilaturas Miel S.L. v. Republic of Iraq, supra note 1152. 
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United Nations inspectors left the country, leaving no one to inspect the Hilaturas yarn. 
Shortly thereafter, the government of Iraq ceased to function. Still later, the letter of 
credit for the Hilaturas yarn·expired. Hilaturas was forced to ·sell the yam at a-loss arid· 
sued Iraq for damages. 
Applying Article 79, the New York Federal District Court concluded that since 
the contract required product inspections, the withdrawal of the inspectors created an 
impossibility of performance. That is, payment for the yarn under the letter of credit 
could only be made after presentation of the required documents, including the 
inspector's report. In this respect, the court's reasoning was correct. Unfortunately, the 
court elaborated by remarking that American courts often looked to similar provisions in 
the U.C.C. to resolve issues arising under the CISG. This was a clear invocation of the 
homeward trend. 
Hilaturas argued that Iraq should have provided an alternative means of 
performance. A reasonable alternative would have been a revised inspection procedure 
or the waiving of that provision of the letter of credit. Because the CISG did not directly 
deal with substitute performance, the court concluded that U.C.C. s. 2-614, which 
concerns substituted performance due to impracticability of delivery or payment, was an 
appropriate provision to apply. Quoting the case of De/chi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 
the court noted that "Caselaw interpreting analogous provisions of Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code [ ... ] may also inform a court where the language of the 
relevant CISG provisions tracks that of the UCC" .1168 Also important to the court was 
1168 De/chi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024 [De/chi]. 
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the official commentary of the U.C.C. The commentary explained that "a reasonable 
substituted performance tendered by either party should excuse that party from strict 
-compliance with the contract terms which do not go to the ·essence of.the agreement". 1.1 69 
The court felt obliged to invoke these domestic sources because the CISG did not 
directly deal with these issues. In doing so, the court failed to pay heed to CISG Article 
7(2), which instructs courts that questions concerning matters to which the CISG is silent 
"are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based" .1170 By 
focusing on a marginally relevant domestic legal provision, the court was thus able to 
avoid the lurking issue in Article 79 regarding whether the inspection impediment was 
beyond the control of Iraq and whether it could have "avoided or overcome it or its 
consequences". 1171 The issue was a difficult one for the court to decide since the former 
government of Iraq no longer existed in a way that would have made it accountable for 
the breach of contract or for the creation of the impediment. As the seller noted, the court 
should have explored the plaintiffs argument that it should have been Iraq that should 
have found a substituted performance. Regrettably, these important issues were not 
explored by the court under Article 79. 
The issue of substitute performance was of primary importance in the fourth 
American case involving Article 79, Macromex Sri. v. Globex International, Inc. 1172 The 
case was particularly noteworthy as it delved into certain issues that the court in De/chi 
1169 Hilaturas Miel SL. v. Republic of Iraq, supra note 1152. 
1170 In its entirety, CISG Article 7(2) states: "Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention 
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is 
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of 
private international law." 
1171 CISG Article 79. 
1172 Macromex Sri. v. Globex International, Inc., supra note 1152 [Macromex]. 
failed to address. In this respect, the Macromex case revisits the question of an 
impediment and substituted performance under the CISG. 
·The case involved an American seller of chicken parts ·and a Romanian buyer: 
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The seller failed to deliver a portion of the goods within the contract delivery date. 
Shortly thereafter, the Romanian government issued a new regulation that required that 
all imported chicken products be certified. Citing this new regulation, the seller failed to 
ship the remainder of the goods, even though it could have done so before the regulation 
came into effect. To avoid the regulation, the buyer offered to have the goods delivered 
to Georgia, which it would have accepted as substituted performance. However, the 
seller refused to ship to the alternative destination. It appears that it was influenced by 
the rising prices for chicken products. Thus, the buyer commenced arbitration 
proceedings against the seller alleging breach of contract, plus damages. 
The seller contended that its failure to perform should be excused under Article 79 
due to the ban on importing chicken without certification. The arbitrator held that the 
seller's defense did not meet the requirements specified in Article 79. In its view, the 
seller could have reasonably overcome the governmental regulations by delivering the 
goods to Georgia. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the buyer, basing its decision on the 
principles of CISG supplemented by the U.C.C. The use of domestic law to inform the 
CISG was another example of the homeward trend. 
On appeal from the arbitral award, the defendant argued that the arbitrator's 
application of the U.C.C. 's substituted performance provision "constituted a manifest 
'I 
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disregard for the law". 1173 The seller did not contest the arbitrator's decision to use the 
U.C.C. to help clarify the CISG, but rather it argued that the arbitrator misapplied the 
U.C:C: In particular, it contended that U.C.C. s. 2-614 was not intended to be·applied to 
force majeure situations, because those were covered instead bys. 2-615. 1174 An analysis 
under Article 79 and related provisions of the CISG were not considered by the parties or 
the court. Rather, the U.S. Court of Appeal cited De/chi and noted that "there is virtually 
no caselaw under the Convention", hence, it made reference to two domestic cases that 
applied U.C.C. s. 2-614. 1175 It justified this domestically-focused approach by remarking 
that "[t]he arbitrator found that the materials within the CISG were oflimited use", and 
"[b]y contrast, the arbitrator found thats. 2-614 of the U.C.C. was dispositive of the 
issue". 1176 
The need to refer exclusively to domestic law sources to determine whether the 
request for substituted performance was commercially reasonable, in light of an 
impediment, was unnecessary. The court could have looked at the "general principles" 
upon which the CISG is based, such as Article 46 that discusses substitute goods. In 
accordance with Article 7(2), such an approach could have informed the court on a rule 
for substitute performance under the CISG. In addition, "reasonableness" is mentioned 
3 7 times in the CISG, and an analysis of the principle of commercial "reasonableness" 
within the four comers of the Convention would have been a more appropriate 
1173 Ibid. 
1174 U.C.C. s. 2-615, supra note 1159. 
1175 Macromex Sri. v. Globex International, Inc., supra note 1152. The two cases were International Paper 
v. Rockefeller, 146 N.Y.S. 371 (3d Dep't 1914), and Meyer v. Sullivan, 181 P. 847 (Cal. App. 1919). 
1176 Macromex Sri. v. Globex International, Inc., supra note 1152. 
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adjudication of a case with international dimensions. 1177 The need to resort to domestic 
law and case law to determine the scope of commercially reasonable substitute 
performance-in the face of an impediment was a disservice to the attempts to create a:--·.,. 
relatively uniform international sales law. 
F. Conclusion 
Although the majority of reported Article 79 cases interpret that provision with a 
strict interpretation of "impediment", the above cases demonstrate that there exists a 
certain tendency for homeward trend interpretations. The homeward trend is evident in 
those cases where Article 79 is interpreted with reference to similar domestic legal 
provisions or where the interpreter(s) is generally influenced by the legal system in which 
he/she operates. As Honnold put it: "[ o ]ne threat to international uniformity in 
interpretation is a natural tendency to read the international text through the lens of 
domestic law". 1178 Thus, there are cases that equate the "impediment" requirement in 
Article 79 to domestic legal concepts, such as force majeure and "impracticability". As 
Andersen has stated, "Article 79 exists outside of such labeling, in its own autonomous 
sphere". 1179 While it could be argued that the use of domestic legal terminology made 
little difference in the outcome of these cases, the use of such terminology and references 
1177 Bojidara Borisova, "Remarks on the manner in which the Principles of European Contract 
Law may be used to interpret or supplement Article 75 of the CISG" October, 2003, online: Pace Law 
School CISG Database <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/peclcomp7 5 .html#edv>. 
1178 John 0. Honnold, "The Sales Convention in Action-Uniform International Words: Uniform 
Application?" (1988) 8 J.L. & Comm. 207 at 208. 
1179 Camilla Baasch Andersen, Uniform Application of the International Sales Law. Understanding 
Uniformity, the Global Jurisconsultorium and Examination and Notification Provisions (The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International, 2007) at 98. 
to local laws causes affiliations with incorrect legal concepts. In addition, the use of 
these misplaced terms may lead to the wrong outcome in future cases. 
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·Fortunately; many-jurists are aware of the· homeward trend. It can only be hoped 
that as the CISG grows in popularity, jurists will become more attuned to the issues of 
interpretation, and will treat the CISG in a relatively uniform manner. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
A. Article 79: Heeding to the Interpretive Provision of Article 7 
Most-but not all-cases on CISG Article 79 have shared remarkable similarities 
in that they form a substantial body of relatively uniform jurisprudence. With the 
exception of a small number of cases, 1180 there have been laudable efforts to interpret 
Article 79 in a strict manner-in a fashion that is more in harmony with the legal 
principle of pacta sunt servanda. That helps to explain why an Article 79 defense has 
rarely been successful. 
As the cases analyzed in this dissertation illustrate, most courts have not treated 
Article 79 in a cursory manner; they have rarely made decisions reflexively, that is, based 
on domestic law. Generally, they have heeded to the mandate of Article 7, 1181 and treated 
Article 79 as an autonomous provision, that is, without reference to national legal 
concepts. In other words, for the most part, Article 79 jurisprudence is not permeated 
with domestic gloss. Internationally, this suggests that CISG jurists have a certain 
analytical sophistication with international law, and do not suffer from legal 
parochialism. 
Unfortunately, not all jurists share this same fate. Interpretive flaws do exist. The 
evidence shows that the courts and tribunals of some signatory states are much more 
1180 See the cases discussed in Chapter Five, supra. 
1181 Article 7 requires, in part, that "[i]n the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its 
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good 
faith in international trade". 
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enlightened than are others. A typical example of legal parochialism is that of the United 
States, and one must wonder if there is something inherent in common law jurisdictions 
which,makesthem eschew recognizing the international character of the CISG. The · ·. 
problem may also have to do with the use of stare decisis or precedent. Rather than look 
at non-binding case law from foreign jurisdictions for guidance, common law 
jurisdictions reflexively look to binding and persuasive domestic cases and laws. Such an 
approach does little to promote relative uniformity in the jurisprudence of the CISG 
across the signatory states. 
Thus, while there appears to be a growing body of relatively uniform Article 79 
case law, the homeward trend remains a problem with some signatory states. 1182 Some of 
the problem appears due to the ambiguous and vague language incorporated in the CISG. 
Oftentimes, a high level of abstraction was necessary in order to accommodate the 
diverse political considerations during the drafting of the Convention. 1183 While this 
created a law that is formally and linguistically uniform in numerous jurisdictions, 
subsequent case law creates many opportunities for divergent interpretations of the 
Convention's provisions. 1184 Perhaps for this reason, DiMatteo et al. found that, "[a]t one 
extreme, some courts have largely ignored the CISG's mandate that interpretations are to 
be formulated with an eye toward the international character of the transaction and the 
1182 DiMatteo et al., supra note 8 at 437. 
1183 Clayton Gillette and Robert Scott, "The Political Economy oflntemational Sales Law" (April 23, 2005) 
New York University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 05-02, at 4. 
Available online: Social Science Research Network <http://ssm.com/abstract=709242>. 
1184 Ibid. Gillette and Scott proceed to predict the demise of the CISG because of its failure to supply a truly 
uniform interpretive language to resolve all contractual problems. 
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need for uniformity of application." 1185 This appears to be the category in which some 
Article 79 case law belongs. At the other extreme are many more courts and tribunals 
that have· made a concerted,effort to apply the mandate of the·CISG seriously, and reject 
the temptation of the homeward trend. 
However, as DiMatteo notes, and as this analysis of Article 79 case law has 
demonstrated, the vast majority of CISG cases fall somewhere in the middle, between the 
two extremes ofrecognition and insensitivity to the interpretive requirements of the 
Convention. 1186 They conclude on a positive note by acknowledging that there are signs 
that courts are becoming more serious in applying the CISG's interpretive 
methodology. 1187 This conclusion is shared in this dissertation. At the very least, this 
development illustrates the fundamental difficulties that nations face when trying to 
implement uniform international law. Indeed, as Denis Tallon states, "diverging 
interpretations by national courts is a problem of all international uniform laws". 1188 
Perhaps this is simply evidence that the CISG, like other uniform laws, is an evolving, 
living code. As it develops, it is hoped that courts everywhere will apply the interpretive 
methodology of the Convention more rigorously. Doing so will produce a greater 
coalescing of national CISG jurisprudence, and will create a relatively uniform law for 
the international merchants of the future. 
1185 DiMatteo et al., supra note 8 at 440. 
1186 Ibid. 
1187 Ibid. 
1188 Quote by Denis Tallon, in Leonardo Graffi, "Case Law on the Concept of 'Fundamental Breach' in the 
Vienna Sales Convention" (2003) 3 l.B.L.J. 338 and online: Pace Law School CISG Database at 
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ graffi.html>. 
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B. Article 79: The Appropriate Standard in International Commerce 
It has been noted above 1189 that Article 79 is a compromise provision between the 
civil law and common law. Artie1e 79 bridges the civil-common law divide by 'providing 
a principle of non-performance that fuses together the civil and common laws' distinctive 
approaches to this legal rule. It relies neither on the civil law's concept of presumed 
fault, nor on the common law's concept of strict liability. 1190 But is this the right standard 
to apply in international commerce? After all, it is a compromise provision. 
Article 79 seeks to strike a balance between the traditionally ridged approach 
found in the common law under the pacta principle and the more liberal rebus sic 
stantibus principle that is recognized in civil law jurisdictions. As a compromise, Article 
79 is the appropriate standard in international commercial transactions. It provides the 
flexibility to solve problems that arise for international commercial traders. It does so by 
rejecting the ridged approach to excuses for non-performance as found in English law and 
related common law jurisdictions. It does so by relieving a party of liability for "a failure 
to perform any of his obligations". 1191 At the same time, it recognizes the rebus sic 
stantibus principle by acknowledging the factual circumstances surrounding "an 
impediment beyond his control". 1192 The issue of an "impediment" becomes a matter to 
be determined by the facts surround the case. In theory, the impediment may also include 
changed circumstances or economic hardship, but they must meet the strict standard of 
being beyond the control of the party seeking the exemption. In this manner Article 79 
1189 See Chapter Three, Section K. 
1190 Brunner, supra note 47 at 69. 
1191 CISG Art. 79(1). Emphasis added. 
1192 Ibid. 
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connects the pacta principle with rebus sic stantibus. In doing so Article 79 bridges the 
common law-civil law divide and offers international parties a commercially reasonable 
standard for selling goods across borders. 
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APPENDIX 'A' CISG ARTICLE 79 
Section IV. Exemption 
Article 79 
(1) A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations ifhe proves that the failure was due 
to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the 
impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or 
its consequences. 
(2) If the party's failure is due to the failure by a third person whom he has engaged to perform the whole 
or a part of the contract, that party is exempt from liability only if: 
(a) he is exempt under the preceding paragraph; and 
(b) the person whom he has so engaged would be so exempt if the provisions of that paragraph were 
applied to him. 
(3) The exemption provided by this article has effect for the period during which the impediment exists. 
( 4) The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the impediment and its effect on 
his ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the other party within a reasonable time after the 
party who fails to perform knew or ought to have known of the impediment, he is liable for damages 
resulting from such nonreceipt. 
(5) Nothing in this article prevents either party from exercising any right other than to claim damages under 
this Convention. 
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